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Abstract 
The aim of the research is to rethink how students of mathematics 
learn, by employing the ‘late’ Husserl’s theory of knowledge. To do this 
the mathematical investigations of three prospective teachers of 
mathematics are explored, focusing on ‘object if icat ion’ and ‘intuit ion’, 
thinking about how students acquire new knowledge in order to resolve 
mathematical tasks; in particular how students come to grasp 
mathematical objects in order to conceptualise the tasks. For this 
purpose I employed Husserl’s phenomenological att itude and his 
methods of reduction and bracketing, informed by Merleau -Ponty’s 
extension of the Husserlian frame. The course from where the data 
were collected included thirteen students, and the teacher facil itated 
my phenomenological perspect ive, by deliberately suspending 
guidance and any other intervention apart from introducing the 
operational aspect of the tasks.  
By using the Husserl ian theory and methodology and by following the 
teacher’s non-intervention strategy I managed to track the ‘moments’ 
of objectif ication and the crit ical role of intuit ions — in the Husserl ian 
sense— in the process of objectif ication. The embodied, founding 
powers of the l iving body (the body-subject) and the pre-ref lective and 
ref lective intentional forces manifes ted their signif icance for the 
students’ object if ication processes. Most importantly, intuit ions 
appeared as the crit ical acts that enabled each objectif ication to take 
place.  
In summary, the main f indings of the research and the related 
contributions of the study to knowledge are the following:  
Intuit ions are crit ical object ifying acts, preparing as well as constituting 
mathematical objects.  
Three genetic features of intuit ions are identif ied, thus allowing their 
tracing as such.  
Empirical and abstract intuit ions were shown as essential ly 
interrelated, and the descript ion of the transition from empirical to 
abstract knowledge through according objects was exemplif ied in a 
number of cases. 
The general structure of the (Husserl ian) abstract intuit ions was 
clarif ied, leading to suggestions for teachers to introduce abstract  
objects in accordance to the aforementioned structure.  
A novel phenomenological gaze on the mathematical learning 
experience is introduced, one that transforms ready-made 
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mathematical objects to object if ied l ived experience. The contribution 
to knowledge suggested by this gaze is that it  takes into account the 
complexity and richness of the learners’ l ived worlds, that it has the 
potential to reorient teaching pract ice into  a student-oriented inclusive 
praxis, and f inally, to enable the researcher to cash in Husserl ’s 
theoretical and methodological ref lect ions as a “working philosophy”.  
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In order to arrive at what you do not know 
     You must go by a way which is the way of ignorance. 
 In order to possess what you do not possess 
     You must go by the way of dispossession. 
 In order to arrive at where you are not 
      You must go through the way in which you are not. 
  And what you do not know is the only thing you know 
  And what you own is what you do not own 
  And where you are is where you are not. 
                                               T. S. Eliot – “East Coker” 
Preface 
This research is the result of an exploration, of a parallel study of theoretical—
phenomenological—concepts that Husserl’s theory provides, in relation to what 
Husserl calls the empirical ‘self-evidence’; namely focusing upon observations and 
the accounts of the thinking strategies that the work of three prospective teachers 
of mathematics have provided, thus bringing evidence that the theory availed. 
The evidence brought about and analysed here is made possible due to the 
illuminations afforded by the chosen theoretical and methodological filters, which 
were realised due to the phenomenological attitude that I employ. The Husserlian 
theory and methodology that I principally draw on is largely unknown to our field 
of mathematics education research, and thus my endeavour here is also linked to 
an introduction to theoretical and methodological ideas that could be useful for 
further study and analytical praxis. In other words, through the text that follows I 
aim at explicating a novel phenomenological gaze on the mathematical learning 
experience, as a first novelty of this study, prior to the findings that the three case 
studies will accordingly present and explicate.  
The second novelty is brought by the main theme of my study, namely the 
exploration of the essential part that intuition plays in the objectification process—
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the commencing of objectification in particular—which originates from the students’ 
lived learning experiences. The novelty is the identification of intuition as a critical 
objectifying act, due to the Husserlian theoretical and methodological framework 
that I adopt. The three students’ lived learning experiences are brought to the 
surface as “quivering fish” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. 14)—i.e. alive—by means of 
the aforementioned theoretical perspective and methodology; for this reason the 
detailed analysis of the learning episodes is framed by a necessarily extended 
theoretical presentation, in order to introduce the necessary concepts for the better 
grasping of the analysis.  
Finally, since Husserl’s books are notoriously lacking in examples (Moran, 
2010, p. 63), my study aspires to serve also as an exemplification of subtle, 
constitutional notions of mature Husserl’s theory of perception, in particular as it 
was radically extended through Merleau-Ponty and his primacy of perception. 
Introduction 
This introduction is about a research study that is focused on how the learner learns, 
attempting to delve as deeply as possible into this phenomenon as does the 
infamous Meno’s paradox, 1  which concerns the possibility of knowledge. The 
theoretical ground of my research is a tribute to Husserl's strenuous, unresting 
reflections, to the philosophically undertaken unresolved tasks that he embarked on 
and the paths that he inaugurated. The empirical aspect of the research is shaped 
as the study of three cases, three prospective teachers of mathematics, analysed 
using the same theoretical lens and the according methodology.  
Three learning episodes are at the focal point of the analysis, emerging as 
distinct and complementary cases of how learning takes place. The focus will be on 
the devising of objects (objectifications) on behalf of the learners (prospective 
teachers of mathematics)—in order to tackle their tasks—and the corresponding 
                                                          
1 Meno’s paradox concerns the possibility for the acquisition of new knowledge. See sections 1.2.2 (for the 
introduction and the theoretical consideration of the paradox), 3.1.1, 3.2, 4.3.2 for the discussion of the 
solution that Husserl gives to Meno’s paradox, and the evidence that the three cases give in support of 
Husserl's theory of perception. 
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intuitions that brought them to surface, from my Husserlian perspective, and after 
the appropriate reduction and bracketing, as they will be clarified in the following 
chapters. But a few words before I’ll technically unfold these three cases are 
needed, concerning the general aims that support the rationale of this study. 
Anyone engaged more or less in mathematical enquiry knows that the results 
of this endeavour are usually presented as stress free, as an almost ‘natural’ 
process. In the textbooks, mathematics is ordered in a linear way and presented as 
a unity in the sense of a ready-made product (Steinbring, 1991). Teachers present 
theorems to the students unaware of the etymology of the word, which is associated 
with the final view (thea) at the top of a hill or a mountain, after the laborious 
climbing has taken place. A similar phenomenon takes place when teachers 
encounter their students’ thoughts and suggestions, since the teachers gauge them 
according to their perception of mathematics and mathematical knowledge, 
neglecting the particular paths that their students take and their key ideas. The 
qualification of these key ideas in order to become visible is the target core of my 
present research. In the analysis of the data we will shed light on the figuration 
process of the learner’s world-as-lived in relation to mathematical knowledge; and 
trace the origins of learning in the reactivation of cultural objects (see the parabola 
in Part 3, Ch. 4), first signal the immediate access of the individual to her lived 
world, from which the learner acquires the texture and the material of her thoughts. 
Using a corresponding phenomenological data analysis my current research has a 
four-fold aim: 
 To accentuate the given aspect of learning mathematics as a non-
prepackaged experience of the learner’s world-as-lived. 
 To manifest how intuition may be realised as a critical objectifying act, 
operating as the link between formal mathematical knowledge and the 
learner’s lived-experience. 
 To explore and to exemplify the role of different kinds of intuitive acts 
in the first stages of objectification. To attempt an inquiry into the 
‘things themselves’, the learner’s lived-experience that becomes the 
material for empirical and abstract (mathematical) objects, and to 
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explore essential actual and structural relations between these 
objects. 
 To suggest possible implications of a Husserlian phenomenological 
perspective for teaching practice. 
From the aforementioned set of interrelated aims the three cases of the prospective 
teachers of mathematics that will be analysed can be technically (operatively) 
summarised as follows, as bringing different and similar evidence on the 
objectification – intuition link that is the theme of the study:  
 An apodictic2 essential intuition and a corresponding objectification from a 
gifted student, who fully enjoyed the sessions. The intuition unlocked the 
task for the student and was responsible for the plethora of mathematical 
objects that followed. 
 An empirical intuition, followed by an abstract one that retained the initial 
theme, while producing more advanced mathematical objects. The intuitions 
and the legitimised results were able to shake the student’s perception of 
learning and teaching, as well as transform the student’s frustration to a full 
appreciation of the course.3 
 And a ‘stream’ of intuitions (and according objectifications), supported and 
primarily grasped through embodied re-presentations of the student’s lived 
world, through a diagram that was realised due to a pivotal sensuous 
intuition. 
Research questions – preliminary delineation of mathematical 
objects 
My investigation started from the desire to investigate the acts and thoughts of 
learners of mathematics in order to tackle mathematical tasks, in terms of the 
students’ own decisions how to develop their own understandings. The different 
                                                          
2 Pertaining to proof; clearly established or of clear demonstration. 
3  The teacher’s role was critical here, since probably nothing would have been achieved without his 
legitimisation of her results. 
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linguistic and cultural environment and my participant-observer role gave me a good 
chance to put out of play my teaching perceptions, and focus on (learning) features 
that would pass unnoticed in my familiar Greek environment of teaching-
mathematics. I and the teacher already believed in the diversity of understandings 
(and of the expressions of understandings) of the learners of mathematics, and we 
were wishing to trigger them due to our (the teacher’s and mine) non-guiding 
teaching and participation strategies respectively. 
Since the focus of the study will be on the devising of objects 
(objectifications) on behalf of the learners a preliminary description of the 
perception of mathematical objects in this study is necessary. So from the 
perspective of my study mathematical objects are anything intended for and 
resonant with formal mathematical reasoning that stands out for the embodied mind 
‘for a reason’, namely due to intentions that are (thus) fulfilled. The mathematical 
objects are prepared in pre-reflective consciousness before they appear as posited 
objects; and they are either reactivating previously established concepts in the 
mathematical canon, or instigating new paths, towards new scientific constitutions 
(and eventually becoming part of the body of tradition). Mathematical objects that 
already belong to the body of mathematical tradition transcend the learner’s 
understanding, yet they are constantly in motion, precisely due to learning and 
innovative experiences that I just indicated. Therefore, there is no sense in 
analysing them from a straightforward, natural attitude, and I would overlook critical 
features of their emergence if I would employ positivistic research methods, since 
these methods would detach them from the life-world that brought them to life in 
the first place. Nor could I rely on sociocultural approaches that neglect the role of 
subjectivity, because they perceive the latter as an a priori idealistic philosophical 
gesture.4 
                                                          
4 Yet there is a dialectic relation between the phenomenological approach suggested here and the sociocultural 
approach and in particular activity theory (Shvarts & Zagorianakos, 2015, Crossroads of Phenomenology and 
Activity Theory in the study of the number line perception, CERME9 presentation) that is not opened in this 
study, due to space limitation and the need of further research results (it is research study in progress). 
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Another aspect that determined some of my research questions was the need 
for an appropriate theory and an accordingly adequate methodology that could 
address their complexity from the perspective of the learner. So my research 
questions—which arose as soon as I started my research—concerned how students 
learn from the viewpoint of the mathematical objects that they devise in order to 
tackle mathematical tasks. My research questions are as follows:  
 How do the students devise mathematical objects in order to tackle 
mathematical tasks? 
 What were the students’ practices as expressions of their lived experience 
throughout the learning situations, and in particular during the moments of 
tension, when new mathematical objects emerged for the students? This 
exploration involved parenthesising/minimising the teacher’s intervention 
and my participation, in order to lay bare the students’ own practices. For 
the same reason the first-person perspective was chosen. 
The aforementioned student oriented research questions employed implicit 
philosophical and methodological questions, in asking questions about student 
learning, which were the following: 
 How is new knowledge possible for the students,5 given that they do not 
know what they are looking for? In other words I explore how the students 
come to new knowledge (for them) and how they know that what they found 
is what they were looking for. 
 Are there ways of analysing mathematical objects as phenomena of lived 
reality, and not as ready-made objects of our world, ‘already existing’ and 
‘ready to be transferred’? In philosophical terms, is there something in the 
framework that I will use that allows me, as a mathematics education 
researcher, to think differently about the issues of learning mathematics, in 
particular of acquiring abstract knowledge through tasks? 
                                                          
5 This research question is related to Meno’s paradox, which was introduced in a previous section and which 
will be unfolded in the following sections. 
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 Can theoretical and methodological frames that claim to give thorough 
understanding of the learning experience, be put to the test of actual learning 
praxis and give results? That is results that concern the texture and the 
structure of this elemental cognitive ‘moment’ of objectification. Such results 
might exemplify an adequate theoretical/methodological paradigm that could 
be used effectively for the open exploration of the students’ learning 
situations, with respect to their personal development as part of the 
development of mathematics. 
 What are the implications for bodies of knowledge, pedagogic practice, 
curriculum development, and the approach of the ‘classroom’ as a complex 
intentional work unit, i.e., questioning what constitutes a learning space. 
While I was focused on moments when objects were devised by the learners and 
allowed or even pushed their mathematical explorations further, I was led to explore 
the students’ key ideas and their origination. And intuitions were found to be 
constant companions to the origination of these key ideas and the mathematical 
objects that followed them; hence, I was driven to the investigation of intuitions, in 
relation to objectification. Thus another research question completed the previously 
mentioned ones, as intuition became prominent in my research:  
 What is the part that intuitions play in the students’ objectification process, 
and in its inaugural steps in particular? 
The research questions—either focusing on the students or those involving 
related philosophical issues—concern the how of the emergence of mathematical 
objects; and it will be studied by putting out of play the direct (traditional) approach 
to teaching, and by adopting the first-person perspective. This parenthesising of 
teaching guidance was a well-known practice for the teacher and it facilitated 
tremendously the theoretical (phenomenological) frame of my research. From my 
research point of view, this suspension of traditional teaching practices is also 
performed in order to serve the teachers’ own practices, by suggesting a new 
perception of their learners’ practices, after the investigated phenomenon (intuitions 
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as objectifying acts) will be fully unfolded. The next section will introduce important 
terminology appearing in the research… 
Methodological considerations – Introduction of intuition in the 
Husserlian sense 
The italicised words in this section concern terms that will be defined in the coming 
sections. Continuing on the technical (operative) level, before entering the world of 
intuition, objectification and their close links, I will now give a preliminary description 
of my methodological approach and the inevitability of becoming involved again and 
again in paradoxes, such as Meno’s paradox, which will be unfolded in the following 
sections and concerns the possibility of knowledge. I will use Husserl's words, since 
my research is on the path of the phenomenological-transcendental radicalism that 
Husserl talks about in the following extract. The paradox that Husserl exposes is 
how a philosophy that denies the possibility of any ground of things that can be 
taken for granted, does in fact acquire ground for itself: 
[W]hat is peculiarly proper to the essence of the incipient philosophy of this 
phenomenological-transcendental radicalism is that, as we have said before, 
rather than having a ground of things taken for granted and ready in 
advance, as does objective philosophy, it excludes in principle a ground of 
this or any other sort. Thus it must begin without any underlying ground. But 
immediately it achieves the possibility of creating a ground for itself through 
its own powers, namely, in mastering, through original self-reflection, the 
naive world as transformed into a phenomenon or rather a universe of 
phenomena. Its beginning course, like that carried out above in rough 
outlines, is necessarily one of experiencing and thinking in naive self-
evidence. It possesses no formed logic and methodology in advance and can 
achieve its method and even the genuine sense of its accomplishments only 
through ever renewed self-reflections. Its fate (understood subsequently, to 
be sure, as an essentially necessary one) is to become involved again and 
again in paradoxes, which, arising out of uninvestigated and even unnoticed 
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horizons, remain functional and announce themselves as 
incomprehensibilities. (Husserl, 1970a, p. 181) 
The paradox that Husserl introduces is resolved by the transformation of the naïve 
world into a phenomenon “or rather a universe of phenomena”. My difficulty in 
approaching the phenomena of the students’ actions was resolved by employing 
phenomenology as a methodology (cf. Carr, 1999, p. 97, Zahavi, , pp. 667-68),6 by 
suspending our beliefs in the objects of knowledge as existing (“as taken for granted 
unquestioningly”), 7  as ready-made artefacts ready to be transferred; and by 
focusing on their appearance, while studying the objects’ emergence in the 
subjective intentional realm that constitutes them as such, ready to be 
communicated with other objects, by “ascrib[ing] to them, as to other objects, 
actual (veritable) being” (Husserl, 1983a, p. 41). 
A realm that is not a closed box, but transcendent “through and through”, as 
Merleau-Ponty contends, radically extending Husserlian concepts, such as the 
intentional force that operates pre-reflectively (operative intentionality). This 
intentional force  synthesises what will be(come) objectified, like the symmetry of a 
drawing, felt by the body as such and turning its attention towards the drawing 
where the symmetry is detected (and thus thematising it, as Husserl would call it). 
Merleau-Ponty also accentuates the embodied understanding that precedes 
objectification (i.e. pre-objective) and the logical categories (pre-logical), and it 
renews cultural significations. Cognition for Merleau-Ponty and Husserl is seen as 
grounded on the embodied contact with one’s lived-world through the body-subject 
(the living body or lived body), which organises my awareness, in particular the 
passive one, like my awareness that not only am I writing these lines in a room, but 
that this room is on a floor of a building. Even before my attention is directed to the 
latter, it is given to me, for a choice (judgment) that I may have to consider; in 
                                                          
6  Concrete arguments for Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s common perception on the 
phenomenological methodological instruments of reduction and bracketing can be found in Zahavi, 2008. 
7 Husserl, 1970a, p. 74. 
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contrast with the body-object (Körper), which is a theme of the so called natural 
sciences. 
The Husserlian/Merleau-Pontyian approach to conscious cognitive acts that 
was just delineated takes into account that postulate one for the phenomenological 
perspective is that consciousness is intentional, it is always consciousness of, aiming 
at objects. The objects that consciousness aims at, fulfil a complex web of 
intentions, which bring them to surface, but “it is the non-reflective consciousness 
which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the 
condition of the Cartesian cogito” (Sartre, 2010, p. 9). It is in this sense that 
objectification is a breathing process for consciousness, which constitutes endlessly 
new artefacts, according to new tasks and tailored to the learner’s manners, her 
objectification history in a particular domain like the mathematics.  
From this perspective the intuitions’ critical part in the commencing of 
objectification makes a strong link towards many directions, like the students’ lived 
worlds, previous conceptions and misconceptions, re-cognition, renewal of concept 
understanding (reactivation) etc.. My research aims at disclosing the richness of the 
emergence of objectification through the revealing of the essential part that intuition 
in the Husserlian sense plays in it. Examples will be given and different sorts of 
intuitions will be analysed more than once, in the same or different cases; particular 
intuitions/objectifications will be in focus, namely the ones leading to abstract, 
mathematical objects. And such objects are traced in the learners’ lived experiences, 
emerging from empirical, idiosyncratically employed and taken into action materials, 
from profiles of the real, as-lived by the learners themselves, from the first-person 
perspective. 
In the following chapters I engage in “experiencing and thinking in naive self-
evidence” (op. cit.), moving through a process that could be read as renewed 
reflections on the learning episodes, while operating with a method that 
progressively puts out of play everything but the object and the objectifying act. 
The relation between the intending act and the intended object, as I approach it in 
my study, drawing mainly on Husserl, could be prefigured as follows: 
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Conscious acts are characterised by their directedness to objects, a phenomenon 
called intentionality [of consciousness]. When the learner constitutes an object, as 
she realises through conscious acts that it fulfils the intentionality that was directed 
to it,8 and when she brings it to existence with immediacy, i.e. with a certain sense 
of instantaneity (or directness) and non-mediation,9 we have the case of intuition in 
the Husserlian sense of the term, which I adopt here and will be explored 
throughout this study. What is constituted in the aforementioned process appears 
as objective and it is ready to be circulated in the learner’s community, starting from 
her peers and her teacher, who is also responsible for the legitimisation of the 
constituted objectivity that comes with the learner’s object. This fundamental 
interplay, which starts in a mathematics classroom, at home or anywhere else, and 
which generates mathematical objects in the learner’s attempt to conceptualise 
mathematical phenomena, is at the centre of my study—i.e. the phenomenon of 
object constitution in the Husserlian sense—in my attempt to cast light on the 
decisive role that intuitions play for the objectification process.10 
Since the aim is to take nothing for granted in my research, the teacher’s 
masterfully performed withdrawal from instruction, and the open-endedness of his 
mathematical tasks helped me immensely to bracket the teacher’s part in order to 
focus on the students’ own ideas, strategies and judgments. But I am also especially 
indebted to the teacher, for 
 giving me full license to participate and record the sessions; 
 giving me full access to the students’ coursework; 
                                                          
8 The object in this Husserlian view becomes an object when the subject realises that it fulfils the 
intentionality that was striving for fulfilment. 
9 I am using immediacy in the double sense of the word, i.e. with instantaneity and without intervention. 
10 The italicised words mentioned in the paragraphs after Husserl's long quotation are also key terms for the 
theory and the analysis of the learning episodes; but they should be understood quite literally now, without 
feeling that any ‘essential meaning’ is missed. Husserl himself used horizons, intentions and intentionality 
(roughly as a web of intentions) in much an every-day sense. And the reader is expected to gradually acquire 
the specificities of the meanings involved in the terms mentioned here according to the context that they will 
appear throughout the text, in theoretical, methodological and analytical adumbrations that will be presented 
in the following parts of the study. 
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 introducing me nicely to the students, as a Greek teacher of mathematics 
who does postgraduate research, trying to understand the students’ way of 
thinking. 
My research is the result of several reflections, after revisiting the theory, the 
data sources, the data and the findings, the theory and the findings etc. (cf. Graph 
4 in Part 2, §2.2). The aforementioned movement was shaped by my methodological 
choices and the methods employed; but the methodology was not an imposed, one-
dimensional instrument that was preconceived as appropriate; rather, the research 
achieved “its method and even the genuine sense of its accomplishments only 
through ever renewed self-reflections” (op. cit.). In other words, the reflections on 
previously analysed material brought new findings on the surface, and enriched 
both the data as a whole and the range of the methods that were implicated; hence 
the methodology and the data analysis were critically interrelated, as the latter was 
forwarded by the former. And it is not excessive to say that the self-reflections 
concerning the findings have been continuous, up to the submission of the 
dissertation; in other words, I see the thesis itself as a ‘moment’ within broader 
research, while already sufficiently matured in order to present original and 
interesting results for mathematics education research. 
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PART 1 – Theoretical framework 
A short introduction and summary of the five chapters of the study 
The division of the theory section of the study into five parts is deemed useful for 
the following reasons: 
 The extensive (given the space limitations) introduction of Husserl's theory 
of perception, which is necessary in order to grasp the particularities of the 
data analysis. 
 The Husserlian approach to objectification and intuitions ‘separately’, 
although separabillity is not firmly achievable, since it is intuitions as 
objectifying acts that is the theme of exploration here. 
 The Husserlian approach as a critical alternative to functionalistic 
approaches towards cognition that abundant in mathematics education, 
residing in behaviouristic approaches in their blindness to the 
phenomenological apparatus of intentionality.11 
The first chapter will introduce necessary concepts and terminology that will be 
unfolded in the following sections, it will indicate the Husserlian concepts that were 
of particular interest for Merleau-Ponty (and which are relevant to this study), and 
it will delineate—using the aforementioned concepts and terms—a Husserlian and 
Merleau-Pontyian response to the Cartesian doubt, as an outline of the theoretical 
and exemplary explication of the distinction that will follow. In other words it is, 
from the genetic point of view, the starting point of the aporia that drives this study. 
The aporia that led me to the exploration of the ground of learning. The question 
was “how do we manipulate our lived experience, how do we arrive at new 
knowledge (for us)?” “How does abstract knowledge come about? “How is the 
learner’s lived experience involved in what we see as final ready-made result?” “How 
                                                          
11 For further explication of my phenomenological approach see the three reasons that legitimise a theory 
of transcendental descriptions (one exculpatory, one contemplative and one polemical) in Sokolowski 
(1983, pp. 221-222). 
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does speaking speech emerge and what resources does it use, and finally, how 
Husserl's theory may give access to critical areas of cognition that are ignored or 
misunderstood by Kantian and Cartesian approaches, still spread in mathematics 
education research; having in mind a constructive dialogue, rather than a 
confrontation. 
The second chapter will clarify the distinction between Husserlian and 
Kantian/constructivist frames of experience, and elaborate the Husserlian 
perception of experience–as–lived, radically interpreted by Merleau-Ponty and his 
focusing on the operative powers of the lived body. The Husserlian approach with 
the Merleau-Pontyian primacy of perception, which is adopted in my study, is 
contrasted with the already categorically afforded Kantian perception of experience, 
which demonstrates and materialises the presents of lived-reality separately from 
sensibility, in an allegedly complete complementarity. Some clarifications towards 
contemporary materialist and empiricist studies that use phenomenological frames 
will be given, and finally, the Husserlian principle of all principles will be introduced.  
The third chapter introduces objectification and Meno’s paradox. A literature 
example is used in order to introduce Husserl's intentionality, the process of 
objectification as based on founded and founding acts, and the exemplary 
application of the phenomenological reduction, which will be employed in the 
analysis of the data.  
The forth chapter also introduces the milieu of objectification and intuition 
on the ground of the life-world of the learner. It manifests the critical part of the 
just-have-been (retention) and (particularly) the just-about-to-arrive (protention) 
moments of the present ‘moment’, in the confirmation or rejection, and the 
anticipation respectively, of what continually enters the field of perception. It is 
shown how the theory acknowledges and allows the potential for new 
thematisations that retention and protention hold for the conscious present—not in 
a fully-fledged manner, yet in direct contact with the lived world of the learner and 
announcing the . 
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The concluding fifth chapter starts by summarising objectification and key 
concepts for this study, like the living body. It further demonstrates the distinction 
between the Husserlian and the Kantian approaches, using terminology that has 
now been explicated. Finally, the Husserlian approach to intuitions that is adopted 
in this study is presented, the three genetic features/properties of intuitions that 
allow them to be detected as such, and the different kinds of the Husserlian 
intuitions that will be studied. The chapter concludes with a summarising Table 1 
and a Graph 3, which will be poles of reference throughout the study. 
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CHAPTER 1. Introduction to the theory, the aims and the 
terminology of the study 
1.1 Further clarifications necessary for the better grasping of the 
concepts and the terminology that will be used throughout the thesis 
Before starting introducing the theory and the aims of the study, further clarification 
of terms that will be used is necessary, due to the strong theoretical aspect of this 
research. The unfolding of the terms will take place in the context of the introduction 
to the theory, which is related to my research on Husserlian intuitions and their 
critical role in the objectification process. The terms will be italicised and particularly 
indicated (i.e. put in brackets, after a short description of their meaning), but not 
expected to be understood in their full sense, which will be later unfolded. As Husserl 
(1983a, p. 201) put it, 
[I]n phenomenology, at the beginning, all concepts or terms must remain in 
flux in a certain way, always at the point of being differentiated in accord 
with the progress of the analysis of consciousness and the cognition of new 
phenomenological strata within what is at first seen in undifferentiated unity. 
Therefore, our common sense understanding of the terms will suffice for the 
moment, and it will be polished as we will further expand our reading, and after the 
decisive analytical employment of the terms, which will clarify the theory that would 
otherwise be fruitless and empty according to Kant’s ever useful claim.12 The three 
learning episodes where the terminology will be brought to life (Part 3) aim at 
becoming the culmination of the theory, and their analysis and discussion (Parts 3 
and 4 respectively) an exemplary path for research and teaching practice. As it was 
in the Platonic dialogues, where a principle message is carried out in the 
dialogical/dialectic form of inquiry, deeply rooted in the texts themselves, our 
expected gain as readers starts from the saturation of the theory and the methods 
                                                          
12 “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (Kant, 1998, B75, pp. 193-
194). 
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used. The findings of the data, approached as they were by the particular theory 
and methodology bring about, in my view, the two-folded novelty of the findings 
themselves and of the theory/method that enables their approach. The research 
questions started in a naïve way.  
Having said at the start of this section that the focus of the study is the 
objectification process and the intuitions that are involved in it, and having 
acknowledged my theoretical debt to the Husserlian reflections and acquisitions in 
perception and the possibility of abstract knowledge, I need to clarify, already from 
the beginning that my theoretical ‘devotion’ is not an unreflective or uncritical one. 
Husserl's approach to perception was, at least seemingly, too tight on the ego pole 
(the constituting subject) and the object poles (the constituted objects), an 
approach considered by many as a dualistic one (e.g. Seamon, 2010, p. 2,).  
But Husserl thematised and Merleau-Ponty explored the synthesising 13 
potential of the tension between the subject and the object poles (Husserl, 1970a, 
1973, 2001; Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, b, 1964a). Husserl related these two poles by 
the subjective (noetic) experience (1970a, p. 171), in which relation no one aspect 
is prior to or apart from the other – hence not so much a mediation as between two 
external things, as a co-existence where each arises one with the other in the act 
of being directed towards. This is the relation between the thinking act and the 
thought object, between the intention and the intended, already starting before any 
thought emerges, as the embodied consciousness operates (before the 
subject/object rift).14 I think of the little red ball that I suspect lying under the 
wooden table and my body coordinates to give me the appropriate view; I bend, I 
turn my head, I move my eyes towards certain ‘corners’, informed by recollection—
or intuitive recollection, as Husserl (2001) calls it, since it is fulfilled by previous 
                                                          
13 This tension also demarcates the field for an inherent (immanent in Husserl’s terms) dialectics of lived-
experience, in the context of the lived-world. It is where the ground starts becoming groundless, as it yields 
authorship and authorisation to the allure of the objects (Husserl, 2001, p. 196). It is what Husserl calls 
affection (ibid.), which progresses to a “striving toward self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of the 
self of the object, thus, striving toward an acquisition of knowledge, toward a more precise view of the 
object” (ibid.). 
14 Cf. Zahavi, 2008, p. 670. 
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direct contact with this small red ball, under this very table, which is intentionally 
recalled for this purpose.  
In all this my living body operates as an organ of perception, unseparated by 
what will eventually emerge as thought (“it could be behind this bamboo basket, as 
it was the other time”). And by putting aside this orchestrated operation—cf. the 
students’ diagrams in DeFreitas and Sinclair, 2012 for another example of this 
exploration on lived space15 that my study also argues for—which is at the same 
moment the condition for any sort of epistemic knowledge to be constituted, anyone 
whatsoever, mathematics and even pure, formal logic included, according to Husserl 
(1970a, p. 141 –full citation follows in Part 1, §1.2.2),16 we do not pose our cognitive 
enquiries in a full sense, far from it. By ignoring the origins of our understandings 
from the view of the ‘I’ pole (the subject of learning), due to an equivocal suspicion 
towards subjectivism, we do not get wiser about how the learner learns. If we allow 
only the products of reflection to enter our cognitive, mathematical scope we miss 
a critical foundational aspect of how subjectivity perceives the world, while in and 
for the world, how each one of us enters the adventure of new knowledge, first of 
all new-for-us, as we are in and for the world. This transition from the pre-reflective 
to the reflective ‘materials’ of the learners’ cognitive efforts are in focus when I 
analyse how the three students deployed their strategies, and it will be the main 
background of this analytical exemplification of intuition in the Husserlian sense, as 
it operates and acts in processes of objectification, in its inaugural stages. And the 
opening moment of this experience is the immediate perception of a profile of the 
real, the intuitive primal impression.  
Husserl makes clear that what we call present is not only the aforementioned 
immediate perception of the real, that the lived experience of the present is not 
structured simply as a succession of these immediate perceptions (termed as primal 
                                                          
15 It would probably be interesting to compare and contrast these diagrams with Mary’s diagram in Part 3, 
Ch.4. 
16 Also, see Part 1, §1.3.2 for an extensive analytical exemplification, drawn from the literature and setting 
the theoretical/methodological ground for the data analysis. 
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impressions by Husserl). The present is already a multiplicity that co-exists,17 co-
presented in the case of the primal impression and co-presentified (in Husserlian 
terminology) in the other two cases: since for each primal impression there is 
simultaneously a just-having-been of a primal impression—which is a 
presentification18 that is temporalised accordingly and instigating a trail of the so-
called retentions, according to their temporal distance from their Now-moment, 
when they were primal impressions. And there is also a just-about-to-arrive 
presentification, which is an anticipation that is meant to be confirmed or rejected 
by subsequent experience, instigating yet another trail, of the so-called protentions. 
The conscious—in the broader sense that Husserl gives to the term—(cognitive) 
present is the synthesis of these three states of consciousness,19 in what he calls 
the flow of appearances (e.g. Husserl, 1991, p. 126; 2001, p. 51). When I look at 
the wooden table as I approach it, every Now is simultaneously a primal perception 
of what I actually see this very moment, a fulfilled anticipation of what I was 
expecting to see and an arising of new expectations of what I am about to see. How 
does the perceived object appear in the flow of appearances as a whole, according 
to Husserl? 
The object appearing constantly new, constantly different, is constituted as 
the same in these exceedingly intricate and wondrous systems of intention 
and fulfillment that make up the appearances. But the object is never 
finished, never fixed completely. (Husserl, 2001, p. 50) 
                                                          
17 And it is not necessarily moments but rather like “stripes that have certain ‘thickness’” (Husserl, 1991, p. 
217). 
18 Presentification is a term used by Husserl in order to distinguish objects of regular perception, which are 
given directly and with ‘in the flesh’ here-and-now presence (presentation), from objects that do not have this 
in-the-flesh givenness (re-presentation) (Moran & Cohen, 2012, pp. 260-261). Re-presentation and 
presentification need to be distinguished from representation, since not only do they additionally bear temporal 
features that are pre-constituted and their history is registered (e.g. in recollection, the awareness of their past 
feature), but they also retrieve their intentional history (e.g. in perceptual acts that are recollected and even in 
futural presentifications that “can in principle be present”), in gradations of clarity and fusion (cf. 
presentification in Glossary). 
19 Cf. the Table 1 and the Graph 3 in Part1, §1.5.7, and Husserl's drawing in Husserl 1991, p. 243, which he 
describes in pp. 242-244; this material originates from Husserl's manuscripts that Edith Stein omitted in her 
editing of the book on inner-time consciousness (cf. Husserl, 1991, fn. 64 (p. 242), fn. 31, 32 (pp. 223-224)). 
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The flow of appearances of the table, as I approach it, make up “exceedingly 
intricate and wondrous systems of intention and fulfillment”, and the object is 
“constituted as the same” although I am aware that in each of these appearances 
there are always sides of the table hidden from me. Moreover, “the object is never 
finished, never fixed completely”, since there can always be found ‘details’ that will 
lead to a closer determination (e.g. features that will enrich my perception of the 
table, related to its interior, its resistance to certain actions, its functioning etc.). 
Husserl was the first to thematise the activity that takes place prior to 
reflection, which he called passive stage, in terms of possibility and necessity 
(Husserl, 2001), rather than by employing psychologistic arguments—i.e. 
arguments that would allow logical processes to be considered as parts of 
psychological processes.20 Having being a mathematician under Weierstrass he 
strove to ground mathematical objectivities in historical, spatiotemporal lived 
experiences. The first step that Husserl’s phenomenology—the so called static 
phenomenology—makes, is the constituted identity of the object that appears 
“constantly new, constantly different”, in replenished “intricate and wondrous 
systems of intention and fulfillment”. And at the same moment the Husserlian 
phenomenology opens up the object’s indeterminacy (“never finished, never fixed 
completely”), occurring from the object’s inexhaustibility and the learner’s 
transcendence of meaning, an ever renewed meaning; which is what Husserl calls 
determinable indeterminacy (Husserl, 2001, pp. 42, 43, 45)—which is “an emptiness 
to be filled-out” (p. 42) when it comes to the “transition of appearances” (p. 48)—
and Husserl distinguishes it as a primordial21 feature of perception.  
Consequently, there is a tension that is indigenous (immanent) in 
consciousness’ determinable indeterminacy, which is the core of cognition according 
to Husserl. Moreover, “the formation of unity through coinciding as it pertains to 
sense” (Husserl, 2001, p. 48, emphasis added) “also brings, together with the 
fulfillment, a closer determination” (ibid. emphasis added); and it is precisely this 
                                                          
20 Cf. Index/Glossary for psychologism. 
21 And in this sense universal. 
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closer determination that knowledge actually is equivalent to, such as the 
aforementioned table that became ‘a wooden table’ and then ‘a (wooden) table with 
a red ball under it’. Whilst closer determination takes place in the context of 
determinable indeterminacy, such as the sides of the table that I suppose how they 
look like although I have not (yet) seen them. Therefore, Husserl's approach to 
objectification (or objectivation insofar as the inaugural stages of objectification are 
in focus) is characterised by determinable indeterminacy, which is ‘resolved’ by 
closer determination, although through never fully resolved determinations, due to 
limitations of the inner and outer horizons of every perception (horizon as limit-
horio-όριο). 
a. Introduction of the living body and the operative intentionality, from 
Husserl to Merleau-Ponty 
What made Husserl's theory particularly interesting for Merleau-Ponty, who was 
studying Husserl’s work when he died in 1938, without having full access to the vast 
unpublished work that Husserl left behind and Herman Leo van Breda rescued from 
Nazi Germany,22 was not the identity that the object acquires, as the condition for 
the possibility of its existence as such. Rather, it was that the aforementioned 
process, with its determinable indeterminacy, is not an isolated mind process. 
Embodied consciousness is what Husserl called the living body (Leib) or lived-body, 
which became a main theme for Merleau-Ponty, who crucially associated some of 
his key concepts with it (such as the motor intentionality and the body schema),23 
and it is a key concept for my study. Here is an introduction to it, using Husserl's 
own words: 
                                                          
22 Herman Leo van Breda traveled to Freiburg, Germany in 1938 for the preparation of his PhD thesis, where 
he found, in the legacy of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), more than 45000 pages of hand-written 
manuscripts, composed in an obsolete form of German shorthand, the Gabelsberger system (further modified 
by Husserl himself to include philosophical terms), and his complete research library, which he moved to 
Leuven, Belgium. He also convinced Husserl's former assistants, Eugen Fink and Ludvig Landgrebe, to 
collaborate on the editing of these documents in the university library in Leuven. The university library was 
burned to ashes on 17 May 1940 but fortunately, one week before the fire Van Breda decided to bring the 
documents to the Higher Institute of Philosophy (cf. Moran, 2000, pp. 63-64). 
23 Cf. Morris, 2012, pp. 59-63, 54-56 for Merleau-Ponty’s motor intentionality and the body schema 
respectively. 
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We mentioned in passing time and again that the courses of appearance24 
go hand in hand with the orchestrating movements of the lived-body. But 
that must not remain something that we only mention haphazardly in 
passing. The lived-body is constantly there, functioning as an organ of 
perception; and here it is also, in itself, an entire system of compatibly 
harmonizing organs of perception. The lived-body is in itself characterized as 
the perceiving-lived-body. We recognize it then purely as a lived-body, 
subjectively movable and in perceiving activity, as subjectively self-moving. 
In this regard it does not come into consideration as a perceived spatial thing, 
but rather with respect to the system of so-called ‘movement-sensations’ that 
run their course during perception, in eye movements, head movements, etc. 
And they do not simply run parallel to the flow of appearances there; rather 
the kinaesthetic series under consideration and the perceptual appearances 
are related to one another through consciousness. (ibid.) 
For Husserl, “[t]he lived-body is constantly there, functioning as an organ of 
perception” (Husserl, 2001, p. 50). It is “in itself, an entire system of compatibly 
harmonizing organs of perception”. “[I]t does not come into consideration as a 
perceived spatial thing, but rather with respect to the system of so-called 
‘movement-sensations’ that run their course during perception, in eye movements, 
head movements, etc.”, and it is not a “perceived spatial thing” (ibid.). The 
“perceiving-lived-body” is not detachable from the ‘mind’, and Husserl's radical 
divorce with Cartesian and Kantian perceptions of cognition starts right here, where 
Husserl conceives consciousness as profoundly embodied. Its embodied character 
shapes it as intersubjective, dialectic, temporalising and spatialising right from the 
start.  As I try to push the table for the first time I’m surprised by how much lighter 
it actually is than I expected it to be; I realise—in reflection—that my body had 
already anticipated a certain resistance, without any prior reflection. What appears 
before any thought arises is an expectation (protention in Husserl's terms), as it is 
the case for the anticipated table’s resistance in the table example. What appears 
                                                          
24 I.e. the flow of appearances. 
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before any thought arises is an embodied sense that I consciously communicate 
with from within, without any mind/body dualism, without the “play of the ego”, yet 
with a certain mineness, an awareness that it is my experience. 
The how of the richness that the lived-body avails for cognition is visible as 
soon as one removes the ‘certainty of the world’ and focuses on the ‘ambiguity of 
the world’, when one starts to perceive the learning praxis as an achievement and 
as reactivation (de-sedimentation), under new spatial-temporal and intentional, 
horizonal thematisations; and the factualities approached as appearances and as 
material for constitution. For “[a]ppearance is, within me, reality, and the being of 
consciousness consists in appearing to itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. 439). 
Merleau-Ponty, carefully read, also summarises in this phrase how the appearance 
of an objective world is transformed to a world of objects, under the 
phenomenological view. Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the ‘I’ of the cognising subject 
meets both the Husserlian ‘unthought’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002b, p. 14) and my study’s 
deeper layers of how subjectivity can be approached in a more inclusive and real 
sense: 
The acts of the I are of such a nature that they outstrip themselves leaving 
no interiority of consciousness. Consciousness is transcendence through and 
through, not transcendence undergone—we have already said that such a 
transcendence would bring consciousness to a stop—but active 
transcendence. (2002a, pp. 335-336). 
What is most important for us here is that all these acts and actions are based on 
particular profiles of the learner’s lived experiences, perceived and anticipated 
(protented and apperceived in Husserl's terms) through the perceptively 
orchestrated actualisations of the lived body, which is Husserl's (and Merleau-
Ponty’s)25 embodied consciousness. Moreover, Husserl (2001, pp. 228-229) tells us 
how objects are constituted insofar as they “exercise[s] an affection”, and thus they 
                                                          
25 E.g. Tito, 1990, p. 185. 
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are “grasped explicitly” through awakening. It is related to the “allure of the 
objects”, which will be detected in the analyses of each of the three case studies: 
Awakening is possible because the constituted sense is actually implied in 
background-consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here 
unconsciousness. Here awakening is also the production of an affective 
communication and therefore the production of a relevant synthesis, of an 
objectlike connection which, as connection, is actually produced like a simple 
object, affective for itself. Once something is constituted in the manner of an 
object, it can connect with anything else that is already constituted as an 
object; in this instance, precisely two kinds of conditions are to be fulfilled, 
on the one hand, the conditions of content, of both senses of the objects, on 
the other hand, the conditions belonging to the consciousness of them. Only 
something that is grasped explicitly, that is, something that exercises an 
affection, can become connected in consciousness. 
Thus, awakening is the other side of sedimentation, which is the outcome of 
retention, since “every accomplishment of the living present, that is, every 
accomplishment of sense or of the object becomes sedimented in the realm of the 
dead, or rather, dormant horizonal sphere, precisely in the manner of a fixed order 
of sedimentation” (ibid.).26 Implicitly existing in background-consciousness sense is 
brought to life, “constituted in the manner of an object”. The object is the 
“production of an affective communication”, which leads to a synthesis that is 
operated by the lived-body.  
And intersubjectivity is a component the subjective act (an intentional horizon), not 
by psychologistic preconceptions of “how people think”, but by necessity, since it is 
the channel through which sense becomes communicable: “[o]nce something is 
constituted in the manner of an object, it can connect with anything else that is 
already constituted as an object”. 
                                                          
26 See Part 1, §1.4.7 for a more detailed approach of retention. 
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b. Husserl's response to the question of certainty 
The visibility of the learning praxis in the Husserlian context—with the Merleau-
Pontyian primacy of perception on the foreground—consists precisely in adopting 
the methodology of the phenomenological attitude, whose effects and targets 
related to my study I just outlined; it is where learning episodes become phenomena 
in the Husserlian phenomenological sense, where perception and certainty acquire 
a new perspective: 
[T]he world to which perception 'throws me open' is a world, and there is 
‘absolute certainty of the world in general, but not of any one thing in 
particular’ (PP 297/347),27 because those things 'outrun' both my perception 
and myself: it is 'absolutely necessarily the case that the thing, if it is to be a 
thing, should have sides of itself hidden from me', as well as its horizons of 
past and future; the world 'transcends' my perception, so that perception 
‘cannot present me with a ‘reality’ other than by running the risk of error' (PP 
377/439; cf. PP 296/345-6). Truth and the possibility of error go hand in 
hand. (Morris, 2012, pp. 105-106) 
The question of certainty “of any one thing in particular” and of the question of 
knowledge—the theme of Meno’s paradox—in general was raised by Descartes for 
the first time in the modern era. He inquired back into the ultimate source of all 
knowledge, doubting the truth of all his beliefs in order to determine which beliefs 
he could be certain were true. This fundamental doubt (the Cartesian doubt) led 
him to his own thought as the ultimate proof of existence and truth; for even if I 
doubt for the truth of my senses, I do not doubt of my thought of them, regardless 
if is illusory; in fact the fallibility of sense data in particular is a main theme of the 
Cartesian doubt.  
                                                          
27 “PP” stands for Phenomenology of perception in C. Morris’ book; the first number concerns the pagination 
of the French edition while the second number concerns the pagination of the English edition, which is the 
same as the one that I include in the references (that is Merleau-Ponty, 2002a). 
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But if the ground of knowledge is the infallibility of my thought, against my sensuous 
raw data, the mind/body dualism is already set, accompanied by the hierarchy that 
the prevalence of the so called mind implies; and the concomitant methodology of 
investigation is not different than the natural sciences, while the validity of the 
thinking act is founded purely on the alleged timelessness of mathematics, the 
mathematical sciences and logic, as the ultimate foundation of infallibility, and the 
guarantee of legitimisation (Husserl, 1970a, §§ 16, 19, 20, 21).  
“[W]hat Descartes only wished to establish, and found so hard to establish, by 
inquiring back into the ultimate source of all knowledge: namely, the absolute 
metaphysical validity of the objective sciences” (1970a, p. 91). Descartes’ starting 
point therefore is the cogito, the ‘I think’, which is also the instrument of judgment 
over the cogitationes, namely the objects of thought. 
Following Husserlian paths Merleau-Ponty announces that “I am not a 
constituting thought and my 'I think' is not an 'I am'” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. 
437). At the same moment Merleau-Ponty criticises Husserl (cf. fn. 16 in p. 437) 
and it is already indicative that Merleau-Ponty’s radicalization allowed a new life for 
these ideas, which is also true for many other major thinkers, starting with 
Heidegger, Derrida, Sartre, Levinas, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and others (Moran, 2000). 
Consciousness’ embodied character and the operative intentionality were main 
attractions of Husserl for Merleau-Ponty, who clarified Husserl’s negation of the 
Cartesian tenet cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I am). Merleau-Ponty's 
investigations attempted to unearth Husserl's unthought (2002b, pp. 14, 15), as 
was the case for Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between speaking speech or “language 
in the making” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002b, p. xxviii), and spoken speech or “‘ready-
made’ language” (ibid.). This distinction is particularly relevant to my study, since 
one of its themes is mathematics-in-the-making, and the particular—
phenomenological—ways that it can be realised. 
As I was writing the final parts of this research I read the following extract 
in an introduction to Husserlian phenomenology, written by some of the most 
renowned scholars in the area: 
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The basic insight that characterizes the idea of authentically genetic 
phenomenology is then brought forward. This insight is that Husserl no 
longer speaks of the “I” as empty pole of identity—a position he still held in 
Ideas (1913)—but rather elaborates a concept of “I” which possesses 
capabilities, takes positions, has convictions, etc., and to which the world is 
pregiven as the horizon of an “I can” do this and that. The task of genetic 
phenomenology will be one of investigating into the history' of the “I,” one 
of inquiring into the very origin of constitutional systems and the objects 
constituted within these systems. (Bernet, Kern & Marbach. 1999, p.8, 
emphasis added) 
As the extract clearly states, the essential (“basic”) Husserlian insight for [the need 
for] an authentically genetic enquiry—which takes place besides his static enquiry 
(Moran, 2012, p. 50)—has the task of “investigating into the history of the “I,” one 
of inquiring into the very origin of constitutional systems and the objects constituted 
within these systems” (op. cit.). And this authentically Husserlian genetic 
investigation—according to his genetic phenomenology—can start by expanding on 
the learner’s life world, where s/he perceives the world, pregiven as it appears, and 
most importantly, as the horizon of an “I can” (rather than ‘I think’). The operations 
that took place for the mathematical objects to be realised as such, in the learning 
episodes that will be analysed, will be elaborated, as thoroughly as the theory allows 
(and as the students kindly made available). 
In this section I gave indications and I implicated necessary terminology that 
will be unfolded in the following sections, concerning the experimental research that 
I started and that will be presented here. Concerning the terminology I will once 
more invoke Husserl’s own words (1983a, p. 201, cited in Part 1 §1.1). In other 
words, the terms introduced in this section will “remain in flux” while acquiring sense 
through theoretical, methodological and analytical explications, also bearing in mind 
that “a demand for mathematical exactness of definitions is totally inappropriate in 
phenomenology” (Husserl, 1970a, p. xxii). 
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c. Resumè 
My research, after my long experience as a teacher of mathematics is a close 
investigation of the origins of abstract (mathematical) objects, where I explore paths 
that my instinct (intuition) told me they may release a novel perspective (horizons) 
of the ‘I learn’, once a particular lens towards the learning phenomenon is adopted—
that is a theoretical lens, which indicates (summons) a fitting methodology. My 
teaching experience was suspended— although using it in order to understand what 
the students were doing—attempting to take a close look at the data from their 
perspective, beyond pre-conceptions of correctness. My natural teaching attitude 
was put out of play as the learners themselves were setting up their objects, hence 
unlocking the tasks that they were engaged in. My participation is consciously 
(phenomenologically) reduced; even in the case of Mary my active participation is 
an echo of a claim that the learner possibly found ready for use. 28  But the 
acknowledged possible influence is too distant from the theme of my analysis to be 
taken into account, since my analysis is concerned with the student’s subjective 
(first-person) and embodied intuitive take up of the task at hand, that is the manner 
in which the student (possibly) addressed at home my suggestion in the classroom, 
even if it was my suggestion that she followed. In summary, the learning 
phenomenon is analysed in this study for three distinct cases of three prospective 
teachers of mathematics, aiming at becoming a paradigmatic theoretical, 
methodological and analytical approach in our field, by indicating forms of action 
and interpretation of action, of the protagonists of the mathematics classes, namely 
the learners. And these possibilities for action and interpretation of action are 
expected to emerge from a deep understanding of learning as a phenomenon, 
employing Husserlian theoretical and methodological instruments with a new 
analytical sense. 
It is a rare feeling of accomplishment to see at the temporary pause of these 
paths—that the delivery of this dissertation actually is—that people who have deeply 
                                                          
28 My suggestion during the classroom investigation was to find more points belonging to the sought curve – 
see Part 3, § 3.4.2.1. 
~ 37 ~ 
 
studied the Husserlian texts ‘define’ genetic phenomenology as an enquiry with the 
same motivation (intentionality) as my research has adopted and practiced (Bernet, 
Kern & Marbach, 1999, op. cit.). Thus inscribing my dissertation to the long and 
wide stream of phenomenological research that Husserl initiated and envisaged.  
My conviction is that introducing an age old yet only recently fully exposed 
theoretical work of this calibre to our field, from the viewpoint that my research 
advocates for, may become an instance of closer theoretical/philosophical study in 
the field of mathematics education, and of more theoretically justified implications 
in everyday classroom/learning in any environment episodes, as well as an instance 
and a pole for deeper engagement with Husserlian theoretical ideas. Considering 
that these ideas may find a path for action and positive apprehension of the learner’s 
needs, towards their approach to mathematics and mathematical objects in 
particular, advocating for an immanent (inherent) inclusive character of the teaching 
praxis. The detailed elucidation of Husserl’s theory of perception that follows in 
Chapters 2 and 3 (as the space and scope of this research study allow), informed 
by Merleau-Ponty’s primacy of perception, will enable the linkages with the 
methodological and analytical approaches to the data sources to be appreciated, as 
the most appropriate for the chosen theory; and the concomitant findings to appear 
as the elucidation and the exemplification of the theory that supports them. Finally, 
the explication of the theoretical ground of my research will allow a subtle distinction 
to be made between the empirical and the transcendental aspects of my study, 
since my research seeks for empirical evidence whilst being a transcendental study, 
due to its particular intentional approach to cognition that will be unfolded in the 
following sections. 
d. The aim of the theoretical exploration of the research 
Since the aim of the theory section is to explore the theoretical notions that are 
necessary for the understanding of this research, as a whole and as its parts 
(chapters, as well as analytical methods), the starting point needs to be clarified. 
The starting point is also the aim of the study as a whole, i.e. the driving force of 
the theoretical analysis that follows, of the methodology and the concomitant 
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methods that rendered the data accessible as findings. 
The aim is to explore the emergence of abstract and empirical intuitions and 
their links to the objectification process, in common and uncommon settings; and it 
is complemented by my motivation: 
 to afford mathematics education research with a better understanding of the 
learning praxis, due to the phenomenological instruments that the theory 
provides.  
 to enrich the teaching practice with a particular attitude and analytical tools, 
in order to allow teachers to access their students’ ideas for what they could 
be, as soon as they would be legitimised.  
 By designing accordingly their engagement with mathematics in the 
classroom, by nurturing intuitions and their corresponding 
objectivations (objectifications).  
 By developing compasses for teaching practice, due to their 
phenomenological understandings of the structuring of empirical and 
abstract (categorial) intuitions, and their links to the students’ lived 
worlds.  
In summary, the motivation is to afford a better understanding of the learning 
praxis, due to the phenomenological instruments that the theory provides, and to 
look at it under the prism of the complexity of the mathematics classroom (Davis, 
2011, 2012; Davis & Simmt, 2003, 2006). It is for this purpose that the critical links 
between intuition and objectification (objectivation) are investigated, and that their 
trails are tracked down to the learners’ lived experiences.  
Given Husserl’s focus on lived experience, this effectively reversed the 
Cartesian method (1970a, p. 171-172) by moving bottom-up, from the learner’s 
lived-world and her lived experience, to the abstract mathematical entities; focusing 
on their emergence from the Life-world, and following their intentional life. This is 
the reason why the first person perspective was chosen, since it allowed to get a 
glimpse into the silenced world of perception, which resides in what Husserl calls 
the passive stage of lived experience, which will be explored theoretically and 
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analytically. This rich world of the passive stage of lived experience resists discursive 
communication, while it enriches and furnishes the text that we actually speak, our 
speaking speech (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. xx ; 2002b, p. xxviii). The theoretical 
exploration of the following chapter will be engaged in the distinction of the 
Husserlian and the Kantian theoretical frames, the explication of objects and 
objectivation (i.e. focusing on objectification’s early stages, in the Husserlian sense), 
as well as intentionality and its different and crucial functions for objectification and 
intuition. And all of it orchestrated by the living body, the embodied consciousness, 
the body-subject, the empirical ego, which, in its different names and functions 
feeds the transcendental ego with syntheses of ready-to-be objects. Linking the 
learning subject with her lived reality, her spatiotemporality that makes objects 
intelligible in their endurance (Gegenstand),29 and renders them communicable in 
their oral, written or other expressions (e.g. gestures). 
  
                                                          
29 Gegenstand is one of the two German words that Husserl used for objects, and it etymologically derives 
from standing-against, interpreted as standing-against the flow of conscious passive perception. Gegenstand 
has similar etymology to the English and the Greek term, already indicating a cultural ground, since the 
English term derives from Latin, and the Greek is a rendering of the German term.  The other word used by 
Husserl is Objekt, which is reserved for a more advanced stage of objectification than the one mentioned 
here. We will see it in the three learning episodes, when each learner’s Gegenstand becomes an Objekt of 
her/his investigation, as its thematisation becomes central for the treatment of the task, thus setting up new 
and specific intentional horizons on behalf of the student. 
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CHAPTER 2. Kantian and Husserlian approaches to the 
cognitive experience – Some clarifications towards 
contemporary studies that use constructivist or materialist 
theoretical frames 
1.2.1 Kantian and Husserlian approaches to objectification and intuition 
– Clarifications towards contemporary materialist and empiricist studies 
that use phenomenological theory 
Most definitions and classifications of intuition are endowed with a constructivist 
lens originating in Kant, Descartes or Plato, especially when it comes to abstract 
intuitions. Processes that inhabit the cogito, the discursive human mind, take over, 
and the abstract intuitive processes are ultimately settled in internal, relational 
cognitive models. The mature Husserlian approach on experience (after his Time 
Lectures and Ideas II)30 that my research adopts, cannot be properly understood 
as linked to a meta-Kantian philosophy without a space permitting clarification of 
its crucial yet highly neglected divergence from Kant’s notion of experience and 
knowledge.  
1.2.2 A critical difference between Kantian and Husserlian approaches 
"Experience is an empirical knowledge," writes Kant (cited in Tito, 1990, p. 78). By 
experience Kant means objective thinking, knowledge. In other words, there is a 
predisposed categorial network that the subject is stored with, which makes 
perception possible. A general remark of the issue that concerns us here, as we 
trace the origins of what makes cognition possible, is that the difference between 
Husserl and Kant is very subtle yet crucial, since Kant recognises experience as 
already endowed with objectivity, while Husserl re-cognises experience, by 
considering objectivity itself as being constituted by the subject(s) (as a major pole 
of constitution), the communities and the social-cultural-historical entities, while the 
                                                          
30 Husserl, 1991 and 1989 respectively, in the references. 
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scientific communities are also at the centre of his interest (1970a). 
Husserl introduces “a new phenomenological attitude which focuses on the 
correlation of experienced and experiencing within lived experience itself as a 
foundation of the sciences” (Husserl, 1983b, p. ix). In a necessarily crude sense we 
could say that for Kant, the objects that are constructed by the subject are 
‘separations’ of experience by thinking, which is already categorial; while for Husserl 
“[t]he object is the idea of the fulfilled sense (as fulfilled completely)” (Husserl, 
2001, p. 449). Which leads him to the essential “how the ‘objective’ a priori is 
grounded in the ‘subjective-relative’ a priori of the life-world or how, for example, 
mathematical self-evidence has its source of meaning and source of legitimacy in 
the self-evidence of the life-world” (1970a, p. 140). Kant’s persistent categorial 
membrane separates the subject from the world by making impossible her 
immediate contact with it, while Husserl introduces the immediacy of perception 
and objects as “self-given in a simple intuition” (Husserl, 1973, p. 150, §12). 
Kant distinguishes sharply between sensibility and understanding, which is 
already structured categorically. For Husserl there is continuation, similarities and 
structural as well as genetic continuities between the two, explicating ‘I think’ from 
‘I can’, ‘I could’, from the potential and the abilities of intentional consciousness—
potentiabilities is the term that Husserl uses—operating within and reflecting on the 
life-world. A life-world that remained unexplored before Husserl’s mature work, who 
constituted it as a term, a world lived through by the individual, from the proto-
geometer (Husserl, 1936/1989, p. 87) to the proto-learner.  
Kant’s principle idea that the transcendental ego is already installed with 
some qualities beforehand (a priori) remains as a genetic seal, inherited as we shall 
see by the constructivist followers of Kantian ideas in mathematics education and 
in particular intuition. Moreover, Kant’s concept of intuitions does not anticipate any 
abstract intuitions, apart from the a priori intuitions of time and space. And these 
intuitions yield knowledge due to their ideality and not due to their immediacy 
(Hintikka, 1972, p. 344). Husserl’s approach is in sharp contrast to Kant’s approach, 
since he argues for the constitution of all categories through his concept of 
categorial intuitions (cf. Part 1, §1.5.5); therefore Husserl’s innovation is the 
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abstract intuitions and their structural and factual links to the empirical ones, due 
to the thread of the empirical ego, which he called living body, (e.g. Husserl, 1970a), 
and Merleau-Ponty (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, 2002a), after Husserl, called lived body.  
But before delineating these concepts it is necessary to present Husserl’s 
account of knowledge itself and in particular how new knowledge is possible. This 
has obviously consequences to the question concerning the possibility of new 
knowledge that is alien to previously objectified knowledge (which is the core of 
Meno’s paradox). Husserl's answer to this question is related to new cultural 
horizons that are grasped originally (originarily) by the cognising subject, which is 
intentionally driven towards objects and intuited states of affairs due to what is at 
task, for the task at hand. The learner gets to new territories of so far alien objects 
and object-like formations—which could be read as an evolution of the Aristotelian 
morphè(see Held, 2010; Luft, 2007; Niel, 2010; Zahavi 2010).  
It unfortunately requires the space of a proper publication, without the 
current word limitations in order to provide an account of the innovativeness that 
Husserl has inspired to contemporary mathematics education research approaches, 
most often without addressing Husserl's contribution directly (De Freitas & Sinclair 
2012, Radford, Roth). Empiricist and materialist approaches to learning that make 
use of phenomenological perspectives (e.g. De Freitas & Sinclair, 2012, 2013; Roth, 
2009, 2010, 2012) offer a rich source of ideas, although avoiding or reducing the 
transcendental aspect of knowledge. Both my research and the aforementioned 
ones explore the cognitive praxis as essentially embodied, and explore it beyond 
the ‘I think’, towards the ‘I can’ and ‘I could’. But the main difference occurs from 
my focus on the cognitive praxis as intentional, in the Husserlian theoretical context 
that will be unfolded in the following sections. By distinguishing theoretically and 
analytically intentionality into operative intentionality and intentionality of act, and 
by employing the Merleau-Pontyian reading of Husserl on lived experience, through 
the lived-body, I will manifest Husserlian concepts as operational for learning 
situations of everyday classroom or other cognitive experience. And these concepts 
will be put to practice in the analyses of the three learning episodes (Part 3). 
Although my principal aim in this study is to clarify important theoretical distinctions 
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between the Husserlian and the Kantian/constructivist perspectives to 
understanding mathematics, I could summarise the main 
theoretical/methodological distinctions between my study and the materialist 
phenomenological ones that I mentioned occur from two main sources, concerning 
my methodological approach: 
 My Husserlian approach on subjectivity, “purely as intentional, that is, as 
transcendental” (Carr, 1999, p. 97). And the uncovering of the layers of 
intentionally lived cognitive life, corresponding to less or more epistemic—in 
our case mathematical—objects and layers of constituted objectivity. The 
critical difference with materialistic phenomenology is the immanent 
transcendence of the constituting subject that Husserl’s transcendental 
theory allows, when properly understood. Husserl’s theory puts the 
achievements of immanent transcendence at the centre of his investigations, 
which is also an implicit layer of my analyses of the learning episodes (Part 
3). Husserl’s radical response to Kant’s approach to the cognitive experience 
is based on intuition, as the original source of evidence in the life-world and 
as the ultimate ground of objective truth: 
The supposedly completely self-sufficient logic which modern 
mathematical logicians [Logistiker] think they are able to develop, 
even calling it a truly scientific philosophy, namely, as the universal, a 
priori, fundamental science for all objective sciences, is nothing but 
naivetè. Its self-evidence lacks scientific grounding in the universal 
life-world a priori, which it always presupposes in the form of things 
taken for granted, which are never scientifically, universally 
formulated, never put in the general form proper to a science of 
essence. (1970a, p. 141)                                                                  
 The actual implication of phenomenology purely as method (cf. Carr, 1999, 
pp. 96-97; fn. 182 in Husserl 1936/1989), focusing on the intentional forces 
that operate in pre-reflective and pre-objective consciousness, while using 
successive reductions and bracketing as a mechanism in the zig-zag 
movement (Moran, 2000, p. 93) between the theory and the data/data 
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sources. In other words, the process where the flow of data are transformed 
to findings due to the phenomenological methodology, and the application 
of the latter to the findings—i.e. to the products of the analysis—entails 
further reflections and analyses, which yield further findings (see Graph 4, 
in Part 2, § 2.2).  
1.2.3 Clarifications towards contemporary materialist and empiricist 
studies that use phenomenological theory frames – A further 
requirement for Meno’s paradox and the introduction of the Husserlian 
principle of all principles 
Let's take an example, concerning the way that Roth (2010, pp. 8-9) depicts the 
problem of Kantian-based constructivism and its radical ramifications, in relation to 
Meno's paradox. Roth refers to a case where second-grade students were called to 
identify shapes of objects due to solely tactile maneuvers, amongst them a cube. It 
is a tactile-oriented and similarly analysed cognitive ‘moment’, while aiming at 
projecting the prevalence of the tactile sense over all others: 
How can the mind intend constructing a cube when it does not know what a 
cube is and therefore cannot intentionally aim at and construct it? This is the 
dilemma that Kant, the ‘logodedalus’ (Nancy, 2008), the master artisan of 
the mind, has never solved. But then how did we come to understand that 
by looking at or touching some solid square faces we were seeing / touching 
a cube? 
The problem for the intellectualist mind is known in the cognitive sciences as 
the ‘symbol grounding problem,’ that is, the problem how mental 
representations are related to anything other than mental representations 
(Harnad, 1990). How does mind know that what it has constructed relates 
to anything in the world? Because social constructivists (e.g., Cobb, 1999) 
cannot answer this question, they have to assume everything to be ‘taken-
as-shared.’ 
Concerning “[h]ow can the mind intend constructing a cube when it does not know 
what a cube is” one could for instance track the second-grade students’ saccades 
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and fixations (using an eye-tracker), thus tracing visual and kinesthetic activities 
running parallel to their tactile ones. Perhaps one could support the claim that the 
tactile prevalence is a convenient metaphor, while kinethesis is at the base of all 
senses, amounting to Merleau-Ponty’s sensorimotor intentionality. But reading 
according to our paradox orientation, we notice in the ‘symbol grounding problem’ 
terminology that Roth uses another paradox and its relation to Kantian 
presuppositions, concerning the very contact of our “mental representations” with 
“anything in the world”.  
Expressed in a Husserlian/Derridian gloss, the Kantian questioning that remains 
hanging in mid-air concerns how does our mental presence (our understanding in 
Kantian terms) is related to the transcendence of sensible objects (their 
inexhaustible appearances), and to the constituted idealities such as the 
mathematical ones, deriving from geometry, analysis etc. and abstracted by the 
categorial mind, before any interference of experiments that put to the test our 
cognitive certainty. That is, how certainty does emerge immanently, fed by the 
transcendence of the subject’s lived-world and cashed in by transcendental 
subjectivity, before and as it becomes a conviction. So the question that Roth asks 
is at the heart of the Kantian problematique, and from my cognitive point of view it 
unravels the constructivist programme and its origins. Roth, expresses the same 
idea as he describes the dead-end of the Kantian-based constructivist programme, 
as he continuing the previous extract: 
In Kant’s constructivist approach, the knowing subject and the object known 
are but two abstractions and a real, positive connection between the two 
does not exist (Maine de Biran, 1859a, b). The separation between inside 
and outside, the mind and body, is inherent in the intellectualist approach 
whatever the particular brand. This is why Ernst von Glasersfeld’s (e.g., 
1989) radical constructivist mind knows nothing about the world and remains 
stuck in its own representations that are tested for fit. (ibid.) 
The question that Roth refers to in the aforementioned extract, put in Kantian 
terminology, is how the transition is possible, from experience to the abstraction of 
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experience, when sensibility is divorced from understanding as two different 
faculties of cognition, in their distinguished complementarity and equal necessity 
(Kant, 1998, A51, B75), thus linked externally to the latter? Doesn’t then testing 
become the sole guarantee of our mental constructions, such as those anticipated 
by constructivist mental representation frames? And does not cognition start only 
after the reflective mental activity, making use of intuitions in an evolutionary, 
biologistic sense (Fischbein, 1994, 2002; Beth & Piaget, 1996). This constructivist 
approach is an external (non-cognitive) solution to the aporia of Meno’s paradox, 
since the subject is moving towards new knowledge being afforded with a categorial 
mind beforehand, and ‘forced’ to construct new knowledge due to her evolutionary 
biological nature. The newly appearing schemata, drawing their motivations from 
the learner’s involvement in the world of experience involve categorical 
configurations tested in action before they are acknowledged as new. In other 
words they have a missing link in the chain to the real, to the raw lived-experience 
of the world-as-lived, since the process that leads to this ‘acknowledgement’ is taken 
for granted. 
In the same manner, Kant and Kantian-based theoretical frames have an indirect 
link to the raw lived-experience of the world-as-lived for the following three reasons 
that are related to this study: 
 Kant and Kantian-based theoretical frames perceive sensibility as separate 
from understanding, and they are working on sensibility as ready-made for 
understanding. In other words, although for Kant and Kantian-based 
constructivism “even in the case of mathematical objects, we need the 
support of intuitions, that is, of particular representations of the objects” 
(Radford, 2002, p. 223), the reduction of intuitions to “representations” is 
crucial, particularly since these ‘representations’ are not questioned or dealt 
as re-presentations31 and the absence of abstract intuitions apart from the 
a priori intuitions of (Euclidian) space and (Newtonian) time that are 
                                                          
31 For the use of re-presentation in Husserl (distinguished from that of representation) see fn 17 in Part 1, §1.1, 
and re-presentation and presentification in the Index-Glossary, at the end of the study. 
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somehow installed has led to the reduction of  understanding to a 
construction setting. 
 Continuing the previous distinction, comes the distinction between the 
appearance and the in-itself of an object. Luft’s (2007)32 words, give an 
adequate description of the inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself, the essence 
of an object, and the rejection of this conception by Husserl. 
Husserl rejected what was precisely the main tenet of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, i.e., the distinction between thing-in-itself 
and appearance, as ‘mythology’ …from the standpoint of 
phenomenology, a distinction between a thing-in-itself, to which we 
have no access and about which we can know nothing, and its 
appearance, of which we have experience and knowledge through 
our cognitive apparatus, makes no sense. With his distinction, Kant 
might have opened the door to a ‘science of appearances’, 
phenomenology, but the very distinction is a mythical construction. 
(Luft, 2007, p. 369) 
This mythical construction that Husserl attributes to Kant’s perception of 
experience sets the beginning of a ‘science of appearances’, 
phenomenology, and an alternative way to approach lived reality. This new 
way, is congruent with acknowledging the intentional character of conscious 
acts, in reflective and pre-reflective experience; it seeks to describe a 
‘pregnant’ striving for fulfilment of latent and prominent intentionalities. And 
it  
 Kant and Kantian-based theoretical frames are ‘blind’ to intentionality, and 
in particular its operative functioning, on which the positing, constituting 
intentionality of act is grounded, and due to which the latter is actually 
possible. This disregard is symptomatic of the different approaches to lived 
experience that Husserl, and Kant, including and his constructivist heir 
                                                          
32 Luft’s article is arguing towards bridging Husserl and Kant, therefore this quotation has an added 
significance. 
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The Kantian/constructivist approach reminds me of Alexander’s resolving of the 
Gordian knot, by loosening it and removing the sticks. The problem seizes to exist 
although remaining unsolved, from the cognitive point of view; rather, it is a 
‘solution’ that conceals the resources of the actual solution, a ‘solution’ that cancels 
any solution whatsoever. The question that Kantian-based constructivism fails to 
handle in depth concerns a deeper layer, concerning the tension between structure 
and genesis. But we will not focus in this study on the deeper theoretical issues 
related to contradictive statements, originating in unclear theoretical originations 
that constructivist Kantian-based or naively bracketed research in mathematics 
education is abundant of (e.g. Cobb, 2002). And it brings about the constitutive 
aspect of cognition and its possibility to meet the real world in the Kantian sense; if 
Meno's paradox, concerning the (possibility for the) acquisition of new knowledge 
has any chance to find an answer in the “intellectualist” paradigm, the 
aforementioned problem is critical since, if it would receive a negative answer then 
the subjective mental constructions would remain mythical figures, imposed by 
predisposed categories, and unable to relate “to anything other than mental 
representations”. In case the mind cannot “know that what it has constructed 
relates to anything in the world”, the question of the acquisition of new knowledge 
remains a separated issue from the real-lived world, while the cognising subject 
“remains stuck in its own representations that are tested for fit” (op. cit.). In other 
words, when the experience of the lived world concerning the subject’s sensibility 
is strictly separated from the process of understanding, as it is the case for Kant 
and constructivism (e.g. von Glasersfeld, 1980, 1984, 1989), when intuition can only 
give us particular singularities (e.g. Radford, The object of representations: Between 
wisdom and certainty; 2014), and present them to the categorial net of 
understanding, with the latter being responsible for the categorial determinations, 
externally related to the sensuous realm, then the possibility of meeting new 
knowledge concerns a mythical world. 
The same question is raised in Husserl’s work, as Derrida articulates it: “how 
can subjectivity go out of itself in order to encounter or constitute the object?” 
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(Derrida, in Husserl, 1989, p. 63). And for Roth, as well as for my study,33 this is 
the case where intellectualist views have failed to grasp the critical cognitive 
requirement, which inevitably led them to several instrumentalist views of the 
activist requirement of Piagetian-based theorising of cognitive experience. Neo-
constructivist views attempted to link/integrate von Glasersfeld’s instrumentalist 
approach to cognition with different theoretical approaches, such as social 
interactionism, situated learning and Vygotskian perspectives (e.g. Bauersfeld, 
1992; Cobb, 1994; Cobb & Bowers, 1999; Cobb, Boufi, McClain & Whitenack, 1997; 
Cobb & Yackel, 1996). The ontological commitments to the Piagetian cognitive 
pedagogy were only bracketed (Davis, Sumara & Kieren, 1996, p. 156, p. 168), in 
the researchers’ intension to release the possibilities for expansion of the Piagetian 
claim for cognition through action. 
According to Roth and to my theoretical viewpoint, as I roughly prefigured it in the 
previous paragraph, the questions that Roth posed remain a puzzle for Kant and his 
constructivist successors. My work will go a step further towards Husserlian 
phenomenology, which responds with Husserl’s abstract (categorial) intuitions, a 
particular kind of the latter, called intuition of essence, and their links with the 
empirical intuitions of something individual (1983a, §3, p. 10). As a preface   
[I]ntuition of essence has as its basis a principal part of intuition of something 
individual, namely an appearing, a sightedness of something individual … no 
intuition of essence is possible without the free possibility of turning one's 
regard to a ‘corresponding’ individual and forming a consciousness of an 
example—just as, conversely, no intuition of something individual is possible 
without the free possibility of bringing about an ideation and, in it, directing 
one's regard to the corresponding essence exemplified in what is individually 
                                                          
33 Although a reservation may be useful here, since Roth’s expression “the intellectualist approach whatever 
the particular brand” (emphasis added) seems to include Husserl, overlooking the Husserlian influence on 
Merleau-Ponty, even at his latest writings (e.g. Lawlor, in Toadvine & Embree, 2002, Ch. 10, p. 204), from 
where Roth is drawing upon. 
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sighted; but this in no respect alters the fact that the two sorts of intuition 
are essentially different. (italics in the original) 
Husserl describes an immanent transition, a lineage from the intuition of something 
individual to the intuition of essence (and vice versa), thus introducing a path 
towards abstract intuitions. Furthermore, he considers the links between empirical 
and abstract intuitions as indispensable, considering the intuition of something 
individual as in-itself giving space to the “free possibility of bringing about an 
ideation”. “[D]irecting one's regard to the corresponding essence exemplified in 
what is individually sighted” brings abstraction and sensuous embodied data closer 
than ever before, while dualities such as ‘empirical’ and ‘abstract’, or ‘embodied’ and 
‘mental’ work for the transition rather than the separations that these dichotomies 
indicate in Kantian-based frames. Since the empirical (individual) objects become 
material for the abstract ones Husserl provides a strong indication for the 
emergence of abstract objects as interrelated to individual objects, thus prefiguring 
the ground, the source from where subjectivity will go out of itself and meet 
“anything other than mental representations”.34 
Summing up, the critical difference between constructivism and Husserlian 
phenomenology amounts to the distinction between phenomenology and 
phenomenalism, as it is acutely picked up by Hintikka (1995, p. 83): 
What phenomenalism holds is that we have access only to phenomena, not 
to the real things… What a phenomenologist like Husserl maintains is that 
everything must be based on, and traced back to, what is given to me in my 
direct experience. (Hintikka, 1995, p. 83) 
In other words, contrasting to previously mentioned Kantian-based theoretical 
approaches, which have dominated the field of mathematics education in various 
versions, Husserl’s approach to perception in general and intuition in particular 
already prefigures a response to the question posed earlier by Derrida, i.e. “how 
can subjectivity go out of itself in order to encounter or constitute the object?” 
                                                          
34 Instances of intuition of essence are analysed in Part 3 (§§ 3.2.2, 3.2.3, 3.4.2.3.4). 
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‘Mental representations’ are only a ‘convenient expression’ that is actually very 
misleading, and “signifying nothing” (Hamlet); quite on the contrary, we need to 
look closely at the complexity of representations (as re-presentations) and the 
ground of the learning praxis. Although it transcends the scope of this study, I would 
be tempted to suggest—as the topic of future investigation—the common ground 
with the Hegelian dialectic, of the double move that Husserl introduces in the 
aforementioned extract (1983a, §3, p. 10), from abstract to concrete and from 
concrete to abstract. Both paths will be explored from a Husserlian/Merleau-
Pontyian perspective in the following sections, theoretically (Part 1 §§ 1.4, 1.5) and 
analytically (Part 3). But I’ll introduce Husserl’s principle of all principles here, as an 
epistemological principle for Husserl, indicating the grounding of science and 
mathematics on direct/immediate access that is achieved through intuition, in the 
embodied, conscious, lived-through actuality. According to this principle, 
every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that 
everything originarily (so to speak in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 
'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also 
only within the limits in which it is presented there'. (Husserl, 1983a, p. 44) 
The principle of all principles concerns the “grounding of all cognition of matters of 
fact by experience” (ibid.) for Husserl, that is lived-experience, which lends itself to 
the giveness of the real, thus shaping a preliminary answer to the riddle introduced 
by Roth (towards Kant) and by Derrida (towards Husserl), namely how can 
“subjectivity go out of itself in order to encounter or constitute the object”. Through 
embodied perception the contact with the raw lived material is made possible and 
it is precisely this contact that is the sole guarantee35 that what we constitute does 
in fact “relates to anything in the world” (op. cit.).  
As we will see in the following sections the same principle will become the starting 
point of unfolding the Husserlian answer to Meno’s paradox, which will be formally 
introduced in the following section. 
                                                          
35 It is the case when the contact, as a phenomenon, becomes part of our field of critical investigation. 
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CHAPTER 3. Objectification, the “red book” example, and the 
employment of the transcendental phenomenological 
reduction 
1.3.1 Husserl’s notion of objectification – Introduction of the Husserlian 
approach to Meno’s paradox 
A brief and focused unfolding of Husserl’s theory of objectification will follow, which 
is considered necessary for the grasping of the objectifications—i.e. object 
constitutions in a broader sense, including the shifts of the cognitive horizons that 
the objects entail—that are analysed in Part 3.  
The concepts and theory used in this research are drawing on Husserl's theory of 
objectification/objectivation, as it is explicated in his mature work and posthumously 
published manuscripts (Husserl, 1970a, 1973, 1983a, 1983b, 1991, 2001), as well 
as the use of Husserlian ideas (operative intentionality, living body) by Merleau-
Ponty (1964, 2002a, 2002b). 
Husserl delineates a complete course of the objectification process in five 
stages (Husserl, 1936, pp. 163-165), from the “intrapsychically constituted 
structure” (p. 163) of the proto-geometer, to the final, ideal stage of the object, 
through the social scale of “the community of scientists as a community of 
knowledge living in the unity of a common responsibility” (ibid. p. 169). The proto-
geometer is not Euclid, Pythagoras, Thales or any other particular historical figure 
per se; the concept of the proto-geometer transcends Euclidean geometry, 
signifying any person who managed to instantiate a property within mathematics 
and who communicated it to others, up to the point that the new object became 
independent of its origination and part of the body of mathematics, which is the 
final stage of the object, one that Husserl terms as ideal. The properties of particular 
kinds of triangles, circles, flat and three-dimensional shapes have formed an 
axiomatic structure and method of knowledge. This is the “ready-made geometry”, 
the tradition of geometry (Husserl, 1936, p. 158) that Husserl delves into its origins, 
using it as a paradigm for all science (e.g. Husserl, 1936, p. 159). In other words it 
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is an alternative historical task that Husserl undertakes, into the (intentional) origins 
of the object, as it is constituted by the subject, before its social circulation 
constitution  
During the first stage of objectification an object appears in front of 
consciousness, “in original ‘self-evidence’” (ibid., p. 163). In the second stage the 
same object appears and it is identified as the same. Then, in the third stage the 
subject has isolated an idea of object and applies it to different situations. In 
Husserl's 4th and 5th stage of the objectification the idea obtains the status of an 
“absolute ideal Objectivity” (Derrida, cited in Moutsios-Rentzos, Spyrou, & 
Peteinara, 2014, p. 30).36 The objects that have arrived at the 5th stage are allegedly 
untouched by empirical or abstract counterexamples. Although Gӧdel cautions us 
that this ‘joyful absolute’ is inconsistent, we keep on practicing mathematics without 
being able to notice any impact outpouring from this inconsistency. The issue is 
definitely far richer than this short reference allows to be exhibited, but it would be 
an unnecessary deviation to enter the field of mathematics revolutions, which are 
“at once the least destructive and still the most fundamental revolutions” (Grabiner, 
1986, p. 212). Since, mathematics-in-the-making, being the learning patent that 
this research argues for, is concerned primarily with constituting objectivities and 
the renewal of the pre-constituted objectivities by the acknowledged and legitimised 
lived experience of cognising subjects, who are themselves carriers of this renewal. 
It is not concerned with copying iconic, ready-made objectivities; it is the relation 
to the mathematical tradition that is critically approached in this study, explored 
from the perspective of the intentional horizons that new knowledge springs out. 
Moreover, from a practical viewpoint the reactivation of concepts/mathematical 
objects with an embodied startup, is also the theme of this investigation, as one of 
the studied cases (Mary) will manifest. 
Husserl’s unexplored work on objectification that concerns us here is related 
to the first stage of objectification, “the history of the object itself as the object of 
                                                          
36 A following section is dedicated to objectification/objectivation. All that is necessary at this point is a generic 
approach of the term, as constitution of objects, from the point of view of this study, by the cognising subject. 
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a possible knowledge” (Husserl, 2001, p. 634). Husserl introduced objectivation—
his special term for the early stages of objectification—of objects, from their 
objectlike to their object status (2001, part 3). The object appears for the first time 
in consciousness as a separation from its hyletic (raw) empirical material, by fulfilling 
the intentionality that was aiming at it. The fulfilment of intentionality leads to the 
constitution of the object, namely to a novel thematisation, a unity of previously 
latent features that perception brings together as a profile of the subject’s lived 
reality concerning the object, a new configuration from the 1st person perspective. 
The acts of constitution don’t just appear in a vacuum, since: 
 The individual involved in the primal constitution of a (mathematical) object 
for herself is already in a world, which houses and provides the material for 
the learner’s intuitions. 
 The subject herself has pre-reflective operative intentionality to render her 
proto-objects intelligible for others right from the start (Crisis, §54b) and then 
objects appear in front of her consciousness as existent for others. 
 There is a meaningful tension in the interplay between the subject that 
exercises the objectifying act, and the object that is intended (Kolen, 2005), 
a negotiation of meaning through the task/activity. 
In an educational context, the key ideas that were involved in the objects’ genesis 
are ‘awaiting’ their reactivation, for a meaningful sense of the teaching/learning 
praxis, and the students are guided through the unfolding of hundreds and 
thousands of years of evolution that each mathematical object conceals in its 
refined, ‘final’, ready-made mode in which it is presented. This aspect is stressed in 
the cultural-historical approach towards objectification, which is introduced as the 
process when “students gradually become acquainted with historically constituted 
cultural significations and forms of reasoning and action” (Roth & Radford, 2011, p 
48). In this approach a new object appears in subjective consciousness as a result 
of learning, by the “transformation of cultural objective knowledge into an object of 
consciousness” (Radford 2013, p. 25). 
The important problem here is that the cultural objects are originally 
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unknown for the learner: “How will you set about looking for that thing, the nature 
of which is totally unknown to you? Which, among the things you do not know, is 
the one which you propose to look for?” (Meno’s paradox as it is articulated by 
Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 431). From the phenomenological perspective “perceptual 
consciousness is not an empty box, into which a perceptual object shows up 
unannounced and ready-made” (Husserl, 2001, p. 606), but due to the “continual 
coinciding of sense” (ibid.) new objects appear. 37  And it is the history of 
objectivation (2001, p. 634) that reveals the origins of the reactivation of 
mathematical objects and objectivities in the acts of new constitutions, regardless 
if the latter have already entered the mathematical domain or are illuminations 
(Hadamard, 1954) that could achieve the final stages of the objectification that 
Husserl (1936) delineates. Perceptual consciousness is full of object-like formations 
and may perceive the previously unknown as whole and as true, as long as its 
appearances hold and can be visited “again and again”. But also it is not a box, 
since the lived-experience itself imposes the rules of confirmation, identification and 
cancellation-illusion, through consequent refutations and proofs, proofs and 
refutations (Lakatos, 1978). Perceptual consciousness is the dialectic ground where 
objects surface and previous objects are revisited anew, under different 
(intentional) horizons.  
At the moment of constitution the learner manifests herself as the Husserlian 
transcendental subject38 “that intentionally engages the world and discloses its 
significance” (Drummond, 2007, p. 204). The constitutive moment reveals both, the 
constitutive subject and the constituted object, through “the correlative 
intentionalities of which they are the poles, through whose function they have, and 
have attained, their ontic meaning” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 182). The intentional 
identification of the object by the objectifying act, performed with the immediacy 
                                                          
37 See also Part 3, Ch. 3, § 3.1.1 for the development of the argument that is presented here, just before the 
data analysis. 
38 A following section is dedicated to the explication of transcendence in Husserl, and to cognition as the 
tension between transcendence and immanence. The just mentioned tension, located at the core of cognition, 
is directly linked to Meno’s paradox and to the answer that my research adopts, following Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty. 
~ 56 ~ 
 
of self-giveness is intuition itself, which will be at the centre of the investigation in 
this research. And we will start with the primordial stage of intuition, by exploring 
its environment in passive synthesis, where an incessant course of acts is 
performed, and a continual synthesis of identification takes place, proliferating 
consciousness with object-like entities, preparing the ground for the emergence of 
objects, i.e. for objectivation, and making objectification possible, up to its final, 
‘ideal’ status (Husserl, 1936).39 
1.3.2 The Husserlian approach to objectification that is adopted by the 
research. The example of the “small red book” 
The intuitive recollection that will be analysed in the following section (Part 1, 
§1.3.3) concerns an example found in the literature that is relevant to my research 
(Radford, 2003), and it holds no immediate relevance to Meno’s paradox (Part 1, 
§ 1.3.1). But it gives an account of how, even when the intended object for the task 
at hand is a separation of suitable features from previous encounters with a familiar 
object of sensuous perception—like a book that was previously read extensively—
there are certain implicit acts involved, which go unnoticed without the particular 
Husserlian phenomenological filter that is applied in my study. 
The analysis will reveal how a sensuous object of our life-world and our 
straightforward involvement in it may yield appropriate thematisations of its 
features, due to the particular intentions that bring it to the surface of 
consciousness, as an intended object. The analysis will thus reveal the 
phenomenological character of the objects studied here, as they are intended, in 
contrast to the objects as they appear ready-made in the natural attitude (objects 
simpliciter in Husserlian terminology), which are bracketed here, in order to be 
better understood. Since the aim is to explore how abstract mathematical 
understanding emerges, through objects that the learner constitutes in her pathway 
through tasks that she encounters.  The phenomenological analytical novelty that 
                                                          
39 This ‘ideal’ status is spatiotemporally constituted and it is not a Platonic entity (cf. Husserl, 1983a, pp. 41-
42). The issue of Husserl’s alleged idealism and my perception of his transcendental idealism will be 
addressed throughout the study. 
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takes as its starting point the cognisant’s lived experience, and seeks to explore the 
intentional origins of the objects employed for the task at hand is matched with (the 
unfolding of) the methodological novelty that makes possible the operation of the 
aforementioned analytical approach.  
The theoretical analysis of the literature example will set the ground for 
discerning a gap between the Husserlian and the Kantian approaches to cognition 
that remains unnoticed in the mathematics education research field. This gap 
concerns the notion of experience, and in particular the objectifying/intuitive 
experience; and it has critical effects on the approach to objects, as constituted 
(Husserlian approach) or constructed (Kantian approach). The distinction is crucial 
in identifying the novel approach that my research adopts towards intuition, as an 
essential objectifying act. This approach, that will commence at the following 
sections, will become the main theme of my argument concerning the introduction 
of a Husserlian approach towards the commencing stages of objectification 
(objectivation), which already started with my reference to the reversal of the 
Cartesian method (Part 1, §1.1.b, §1.1.d)—i.e. the bottom-up process of the 
analysis, as soon as the intentional origins of the objects are unraveled. And the 
theoretical exploration will be complemented with the unfolding of the constitutive 
approach that my research adopts, towards the embodied conscious acts of ‘I can’, 
‘I could’—rather than ‘I think’.  
Such acts are distinguished theoretically and analytically from the 
constructivist Kantian heritage of knowledge, as separated from sensibility—a 
distinction prevalent for decades in mathematics education—which perceives 
experience in Kant’s mythical way (Husserl, 1970a, e.g. §30, p. 199). The necessary 
literature for the issue at task, namely intuitions and their objectifying potential and 
abilities (potentiabilities) is investigated, revealing the same preoccupations, strict 
separations and misconceptions. A radically different approach, based on Husserl is 
offered, one that takes into account the passive, silent and silenced stage of pre-
reflective, operative, cognitive process, the ground of all cognition for Husserl 
(Husserl, 1970a, p. 124), and the essential groundless ground (Gachè, 1997) of his 
Life-world, “for theoretical truths” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 124). But how does the 
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groundless ground yield objects, which populate our conscious life as something 
‘taken-for-granted’?  
The answer advocated for in this study  is related to ‘moments’ when the Life-world 
comes to life, in constitutive moments that new configurations and modalities enter, 
tied as they are to the real, being part and parcel of it, yet never allowing the full 
view. Yet the full view is always anticipated (protented), put to the test for becoming 
knowledge already existing, never accessed previously, or simply an illusion. In any 
case, a fundamental intentionality towards what is not seen, towards what is not 
perceived but co-presentified as being-there is immanent to the present perception 
or, more precisely, to the perception of the present, necessarily implicating its 
temporally modified retentions, the retentions of the ‘now’ moment(s).  So a few 
clarifications concerning the critical difference between Kantian and Husserlian 
approaches that concern my study are called for, before entering the analysis of the 
example itself, and the theoretical investigations that are expected to endow it with 
new horizons. And Meno’s paradox will be introduced, while an allusion towards its 
unriddling will be indicated. 
1.3.3 An introduction to the perspective that this study has to 
perception – The “image of a small red book” 
The intuitive recollection that will be analysed in this section holds no immediate 
relevance with the Meno’s paradox. But it gives an account of how, even when the 
intended object is a separation of suitable features from previous encounters with 
the object of perception, according to the task at hand, there are certain implicit 
acts involved, which go unnoticed if a Husserlian phenomenological filter is not 
applied. Louis Radford in his article Gestures, Speech, and the Sprouting of Signs: 
A Semiotic-Cultural Approach to Students’ Types of Generalization (2003) “offer[s] 
an exploratory investigation of presymbolic types of generalization” (p. 38) drawing 
from Vygotsky’s work and from phenomenology (p. 39). He gives an indicative 
example on the objectification process from everyday experience: 
Let us imagine that we are standing in front of a wall covered by shelves full 
of books without any particular intention to look at them. The books all look 
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quite similar. Let us also suppose that, although we were looking at the books 
in this disinterested way, we suddenly remembered that we needed to check 
something in Aristotle’s Poetics. The image of a small red book comes to 
mind. The non-reflective perception with which we began now gives rise to 
an intended perception. In scrutinizing the shelf, our attention will focus on 
some red books and, in practical terms, we will almost ignore the others. 
Suspecting that we will later need to find the same book, we decide to put a 
mark, or a sign of some sort, on the shelf so that the next time we enter the 
room the sign will mean something like, “Here’s the book!” This mark, or 
sign, is achieving a particular task: In an elementary way, it is accomplishing 
an objectification. (p. 39, italics in the original) 
For Radford the objectification process is linked to a sign (“a mark, or a sign of some 
sort, on the shelf”), which we use in order to facilitate our search the next time, a 
sign which “mean[s] something” in its objectification functioning.40 For my study, 
the “image of a small red book [that] comes to mind” is already an objectification, 
and a structurally significant one, since it may reveal the unseen mechanism of the 
objectification process. 41  I consider it an objectification not because of the 
attribution of redness as yet another sign to the task of finding the book, but merely 
because the image is a mental object, precisely at the moment that it emerges in 
consciousness, called by our intention to be attentive for something particular, that 
is the sought book’s material existence.42  
Intentionality for Husserl is “the being of the intention” (Origin, 1989, p. 139) 
and it is understood as the web of intentions that arise, merge, point to different 
directions as they exist in their similar yet distinct sets of horizons. When we focus 
on the material aspect of the object which, although absent we know that it exists 
there, on the “wall covered by shelves full of books”, we trigger the image of the 
red book to appear, as the fulfilment of our intention to substantiate what we are 
                                                          
40 The essential links between objectification and meaning are addressed in the following section. 
41 See the next section and the evidence acquired from empirical data, displayed in chapter 3. 
42 See also Radford’s description of objectification in Radford, 2003, p. 40. 
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looking for. In other words, the task “to check something in Aristotle’s Poetics” 
includes another task that concerns the concretisation of what we are searching for; 
and the latter task puts the mechanism of intentional consciousness in motion, 
bringing the image of the red book to the surface, in the still unfulfilled (“absent” in 
Husserl’s terms) intention of finding the actual book. Our attention is not enacted 
only when we “will focus on some red books” while “we will almost ignore the 
others” but, quite on the contrary, this attention is possible only due to a previous 
stage of attention, the one that was directed towards the image of the sought book’s 
material existence. 
Let’s try to explore further the moment of the “image of the red book” and 
the attention that brought it to the surface. Merleau-Ponty describes attention as 
“still empty but already determinate intention” (2002, p. 33); in its central role it is 
called forth (ibid, p. 32) or awakened (p. 31) and brings about “a passage from 
indistinctness to clarity” (p. 32). The clarity here is the identification that the book 
we’re looking for has such and such a colour, shape, size etc., as the image that 
surfaced in our consciousness. We need not be naïve about the form of the image 
that occurred, trapped by our natural attitude “of unquestioned belief in the world” 
(Husserl dictionary, p. 49): if we were looking for a digital form of the book, stored 
in our computer, without being able to recall the folder in which we had saved it, 
our attention would have been drawn towards other images, such as the title of the 
file, a distinctive phrase that only that book contained, or similar profiles (in 
Husserl’s terms) of the book’s digital form of existence, which would allow us to 
trace it, given the possibilities and limitations of the computer’s search software 
capabilities. In other words, even the first object, i.e. the mental object of the 
“image of the red book” is far from being straightforward, as it is implied by 
Radford’s example. 
The sought book had a material form, and its existence as a mental object 
(the “image of the red book”) started after our intention to look for it, as mentioned 
by Radford at the beginning of the citation: “we are standing in front of a wall 
covered by shelves full of books without any particular intention to look at them” 
(italics added). In order to understand the determinacy that our first attention 
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brought “[w]e must recognize the indeterminate as a positive phenomenon” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 7).  From the state of “without any particular intention to 
look at” the books, we shifted to the state of a particular need, related to one of 
them; our intention to find the book was the condition for the possibility of the 
appearance of the image of the book. The intention is linked to a need, namely “to 
check something in” it. But the inaugurating moment of the mechanism of 
objectification from the viewpoint of my research was set at the intentional moment, 
when consciousness started looking for a particular object in order to fulfill it, and 
finding the image of the book, i.e. an intended mental object (i.e. in its material 
form), before we found the book itself. 
A need emerges here, from the perspective of my Husserlian 
phenomenological investigation, namely to distinguish according to their 
directedness towards goals or ends,43 the sign on the shelf and the “image of the 
red book”.  The sign on the shelf concerns the objectification of the book’s location, 
and it is contrasted to the objectification of the object sought that is related to the 
“image of the red book”, which constituted an “intended perception” (ibid., p. 39). 
The latter, i.e. the intended perception of the book, worked through the “image of 
the red book”, which is a mental object that sprung from our “non-reflective 
perception” (ibid., p. 39). In scrutinizing the shelf the book was ultimately brought 
to originary sensuous perception—namely at our gaze and in our hands—and then 
to the new intention to facilitate our search the next time, expressed by the sign 
that we put on the shelf. The range of experience indicated by this contrast of goals 
that the two objectification moments bring to the surface, is quite symptomatic of 
the motivation(s) of my research: to lay bare the intentionalities of cognitive acts 
and to study “the act, the aim, the constituting mode of consciousness itself in the 
structuring of the horizon” (cf. next quotation) that mathematical objectivities and 
mathematical objects are rendered possible. This “double sense” of the “phenomena 
of knowledge” in the case of objectification is at the core of the Husserlian 
                                                          
43 Their teleology (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 314). 
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phenomenological study of the modes of knowledge, as Husserl expresses it in the 
abstract of the 1907 Gottingen Lectures entitled The Idea of Phenomenology: 
the phenomenological study of the modes of knowledge must always be 
understood as the study of the essence from which is brought forth their 
inherent intentionality, that is, the possibility and the condition of the object 
of knowledge as well as of the knowledge of the object. Furthermore, this 
definition means that the phenomenology of knowledge is the science of the 
phenomena of knowledge in this double sense: on the one hand, science of 
knowledge as explication of appearances, figurations, presentations given to 
consciousness in which such givens configures themselves and become—
either actively or passively—object of a consciousness and, on the other 
hand, analysis of this objectivity itself, that is of the act, the aim, the 
constituting mode of consciousness itself in the structuring of the horizon 
from which they are rendered possible. (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 253, italics 
in the original) 
Objects for Husserl appear in consciousness and their objectivity is constituted 
through their appearance. Husserlian phenomenology as I apply it in my study is 
concerned with both the object as it is intended and constituted by consciousness, 
and its objectivity, i.e. the conditions and the possibilities of the appearance of the 
object to the fore of consciousness as being objective, i.e. as existing or potentially 
existing in the “world for us all”. Objectivity is constituted through the object by the 
subject for Husserlian phenomenology, and in this sense objectivity is a becoming, 
involving two poles—the subject and the object—(Kolen, 2005), based on immediate 
experience. By drawing our attention to the “image of a small red book” and its 
appearance in our consciousness, before any sign was set, we are concerned not 
only with the object itself but also with “the possibility and the condition of the 
object of knowledge”; by trying to get closer to the object’s origins we are engaging 
in the phenomenological “science of knowledge as explication of appearances”; by 
analysing this primal objectification, we cast light on these “appearances, 
figurations, presentations given to consciousness … [that] become—either actively 
or passively—object of a consciousness”.  
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The focus of my analysis will be on objects that become mathematical objects as 
they are intended for this purpose, and as they are finally drawn out from the 
learner’s lived experience, through intuition, rather than as objects deriving from 
mere attention. Deriving from pregnant intentionalities, as Husserl would call them, 
echoing Socrates and his method. Radford’s “red book” example served the purpose 
of an introduction to the complexity and richness of the objectification process. The 
next section will use the same example in order to further adumbrate the 
objectification process and the longitude of the phenomenon from the “unreflected” 
to the different reflective layers of the final reflective experience of the “image of 
the small red book”. In other words, the inquiry here will be from an archeological 
perspective (horizons), first theoretically, and then methodologically and 
analytically, in the following chapters. 
1.3.4 Introduction to Husserl's intentionality, founded and founding 
acts, objective sense and determination of an object 
In the example mentioned by Radford the intentions seem to be clear and 
straightforward, related to a particular empirical object, namely the book of 
Aristotle’s Poetics, and the needs to find it and to mark its position on the shelf. Two 
different intentions arose due to two different tasks, and they gave rise to two 
different objects, i.e. the “image of a small red book” and the “mark or the sign” 
that concretised the objectification of the location of the book. The intention stated 
clearly by Radford is the one related to the “mark, or sign on the shelf”, which is 
straightforwardly motivated by the task of locating the book more easily the next 
time. Radford’s particular interest in the semiotic means of objectification (the 
phrase appears 33 times in his article) deliberately neglects to focus on the mental 
object that appeared due to the original need to find the book; the image that gave 
“rise to an intended perception” was put aside in favour of the objectification related 
to “the mark, the sign”, and it was classified as the outcome of a “non-reflective 
perception”. 
Radford mentions that it was “non-reflective perception” that gave rise to an 
“intended perception” through the “image of a small red book”, thus implying that 
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there was previous engagement with the actual book, and hence it was an act of 
recollection that allowed the image of the book to surface. Since my study is mainly 
concerned with pre-semiotic means of objectification, the following questions arise 
from my point of view: 
 What knowledge can we gain from the “image of a small red book”? In which 
way is it an outcome of a “non-reflective perception”? 
 How was the recollection (through which the “image of a small red book” 
surfaced) structured? How simple is the experience of the “image of a small 
red book”?  
 What can the experience of “non-reflective perception” tell us about 
objectification, from a first-person perspective (as it is perceived by the 
subject)? 
We know that the “image of a small red book” is not an original perception of the 
book, that it was not a direct outcome of pre-reflective activity, therefore it was 
already mediated. Moreover, the image was thematised as “red” and “small”, which 
is another evidence that the reflective process had taken place. Although there is 
no doubt that one or more pre-reflective perceptions of the book were originally 
involved as founding acts (cf. Drummond, 2003 in The New Husserl, §6) to the final 
appearance of the image in consciousness, my claim, which will be scrutinized 
below, is that the image has its origins in pre-reflective activity (in sensuous 
experiences with the book), but it had already undergone a reflective process, even 
before it appeared in consciousness for the specific task.  
In Husserl's words, the particular image is “experienceable only insofar as it 
is founded on what is simply and sensuously experienceable and only insofar as it 
is given in unity with what is simply ‘there’ according to perception” (Husserl, 1973, 
§12, p. 55). The image “is given in unity with what is simply ‘there’ according to 
perception”, and Husserl's phrase echoes the previous encounters that ‘we’ had with 
the actual book, since “we suddenly remembered that we needed to check 
something in Aristotle’s Poetics” (Radford, 2003, p. 39). But in order to understand 
the objectification of the “image of a small red book” due to the recollection that 
brought it to the surface of consciousness, we have to fully realise the difference 
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between the book itself  and the image of the book, the object and the intentionally 
perceived object, i.e. the intentional object: 
The tree pure and simple, the physical thing belonging to nature, is anything 
but [nichts weniger] this perceived tree as perceived which, as perceptual 
sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter can burn 
up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense—the sense of 
this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence—cannot burn 
up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real [realen] properties. 
(1983a, p. 216) 
In the same sense, the “image of a small red book” is not a fiction but it is not the 
actual book either; it is the intentional correlate of the perception of the book from 
previous encounters with the real object. And the book as it is perceived has a sense 
according to Husserl, “something belonging necessarily to its essence”. What does 
Husserl mean by “essence” of the image and which is the sense of the image that 
necessarily belongs to its essence? I will try to explain this with reference to the 
following diagram: 
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Graph 1. The objectification of Aristotle’s Poetics book through the image of the small 
red book 
Taking a closer look at the reflective process we notice that it is even more 
compound, as the example44 of finding the digital version of Aristotle’s Poetics 
indicates: would an “image of a small red book” appear if we were looking for the 
book in the files of our computer? Or, if it would appear, wouldn’t we reject or 
modify it in favour of the title of the file, the directory in which we have stored it, 
or a phrase from the book that would render it accessible due to the particular 
software capabilities that we had available? This view of the reflective process brings 
to the fore the particular materiality of the image and the implicit judgment that 
valued the image as applicable to the particular task. Due to this judgment, our 
attention was led to “focus on some red books and, in practical terms… almost 
ignore the others” “[i]n scrutinizing the shelf”, and in this sense, the judgment could 
provide the key for the “essence” and the “sense” of the “image of the small red 
book”’. For the Husserlian perspective adopted by my study, 
                                                          
44 See section 1.4.1. 
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[t]o judge is to grasp intentionally a state of affairs. … The object about 
which we judge is already given, for example, in a perception or 
remembrance, and in judging we distinguish features or parts or relations 
belonging to the object and make them the object of a special regard. … The 
act of judging, therefore, is directed toward the object so as to grasp it with 
respect to some categorial form or other. These categorial forms are, 
consequently, objective or ontological forms mirrored by the logical forms 
belonging to the senses in and through which we intend the categorically 
articulated objectivities. (Drummond in The New Husserl, 2003, pp. 83, 84)  
Husserl explicates the act of judging that took place as directedness toward the 
“image of the red, small book” (the intended object) and as an intentional grasping 
of the image’s “categorically articulated objectivities” of redness and smallness (the 
object as intended); with the latter being objective forms intended “in and through 
the senses”. In other words, the judgment is a judgment upon a mental object (the 
“image of a small red book”) but what is most important is that the act of judging 
distinguishes “features… belonging to the object and make[s] them the object of a 
special regard”. These features, namely the qualities of “red” and “small”, are the 
objective sense(s) corresponding to that object (cf. Graph 1). As Husserl explains, 
the objective sense(s) are “categorial forms” intended through the material texture 
of the image (the theme of the object), which is what he calls the determination of 
the object: 
The objective sense corresponding to such an object is, consequently, a 
sense of sense, a second-level sense. Therefore, from sense as objective 
sense we must distinguish sense as the determination of an object. Sense as 
objective determination belongs to the object itself as a theme. (Husserl, 
1973, p. 269, emphasis in the original) 
The materiality of the image (the expression of the book’s material existence) is 
already a sense of the image, being the theme of the object (or objective 
determination) as Husserl calls it. And the qualities of “red” and “small” are a sense 
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of sense, a second-level sense, which are intended through the object’s material 
sense in order to determine the action that the judgment entails.  
The understanding of the judgment of the “image of the red, small book” as a 
suitable recollection for the action demanded by the task, goes through the 
thorough understanding of the intentionality of the act, i.e. the “directed[ness] 
toward the object so as to grasp it with respect to some categorial form or other” 
(Drummond, op. cit.). The material features of redness and smallness (the objective 
sense(s)) were already intended as senses of the book’s material existence (the 
determination of an object) in previously re-presented 45  experiences, “in and 
through the senses” (objectively). More precisely, from the unthematising pre-
reflective perception that redness and smallness originally occurred, or even 
thematised for reasons alien to the current situation, they were reflectively 
thematised as significant features, according to intentionalities and horizons of 
previous appearances. And due to the task of finding the book our intentional 
consciousness, our embodied torchlight cast a new light on such embodied 
experiences, as it was intending for the book’s particular material senses (such as 
redness and smallness), through the material theme of the sought object. Thus, 
‘redness’ and ‘smallness’ emerged as the objective sense(s) of the mental object’s 
material existence, as the core or part of the core of the mental object’s material 
determination; henceforth they became the core of the judgment upon representing 
the object itself as appropriate, and they manifested their significance in the action 
that followed, the search for small, red books in the library. The description of the 
experience as a whole echoes Husserl's words concerning the embodiment of the 
essence (the material theme) of the mental object and the constitution of 
significance (through the judgment): “It belongs to the essence of objectivities of 
sense not to be otherwise than in real embodiments whose significance they 
constitute” (Husserl, 1973, p. 268). 
                                                          
45 For an explication of re-presenting (Vergegenwärtigung) or making–present in Husserl, see Drummond, p. 
78 (in The New Husserl, 2003). 
~ 69 ~ 
 
In summary, I refer back to the four questions that I enunciated earlier. 
Firstly, from the analysis of the objectification of the “image of a small red book” it 
became apparent that it is much more than the outcome of a “non-reflective 
perception”. Secondly, the experience that brought the image to the surface of 
consciousness was shown to be far from simple, and the value of the Husserlian 
phenomenological analysis was manifested in allowing us to take a deep gaze at the 
apparatus of the image’s appearance;; starting from founding pre-reflective 
appearance of the book images, to founded thematised objectivities of previous 
reflective encounters with the book, up to the particular intentionalities generated 
by the task of finding the book, and finally to the judgment that the image is 
appropriate and the particular actions that followed. Thirdly, since the image of the 
book was already mediated due to previous experiences with the book (through the 
recollection that brought it to the surface), I do not analyse here the structure and 
the possibilities of appearance of the pre-reflective experience(s), as well as what 
the latter can tell us about objectification. This third question is addressed later both 
empirically and theoretically. What is also stressed is the links between sensuous 
perceptions such as the “small, red book” example, and abstract mathematical 
objectivities. 
The image of the red book served as an example in order to explore the 
essential links between objectification and meaning or, more precisely, 
objectification and sense.46 In order to unfold the Husserlian approach of my study 
on this crucial topic I investigated the “concrete-object-in-the-How-of-its-
intentional-appearance” (Held, in Welton, 2003, p. 40). Analytical tools emerged 
around the concept of the object, such as intentionality, fulfillment (of the 
intentionality), judgment, founding and founded acts, essence (or theme or 
objective determination), objective sense (or sense of sense). The object appeared 
                                                          
46 The double connotation of the word sense is particularly expressed in its use as a verb, e.g. “I sense”, “I 
make sense”, (a) one of them being “to perceive (a sensation, object, etc.) by a sense or senses” and (b) the 
other one to “understand, comprehend, grasp, (meaning, import, etc.)” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, p. 
2754); and it is a ‘gap’ (tension) that is implicitly explored in this study. For the Husserlian distinction 
between sense and meaning cf. Index/Glossary for sense. 
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in consciousness as something “throw[n]… in front of somebody” (Radford, 2003, 
p. 40),47 in a process where the intentionality of consciousness was the driving force 
and the constituting agent. As we shall see in a following section, the constitution 
of an object (i.e. objectification) starts from such moments according to Husserl, 
although it is intuition rather than attention that is the decisive act that brings the 
object to the surface of the embodied consciousness, of the lived-body. 
 
Graph 2. Summary of the objectification of the "small red book". 
 
1.3.5 Perception and remembering – Clarifications concerning the 
transcendental reduction that was practiced in the previous section 
In the previous section I analysed the objectification of the “image of the red book”, 
which was a product of remembering; the analytical tools such as intentionality and 
its fulfillment, the determination of the object and the objective sense were 
introduced as key factors in understanding how an object appears in consciousness. 
But it is vital to clarify that I am following a phenomenological approach rather than 
                                                          
47 For the etymology of objectification cf. Radford, 2003, p. 40. 
~ 71 ~ 
 
a psychologistic48 one, since the misunderstanding concerning the latter would 
always entail the danger that my analysis can be interpreted to mean:   
 The study of how people actually think or ought to think, and  
 The collapsing of the logical nature of the judgment 49  into private 
psychological acts.50 
 The “highly plausible conception” of logical psychologism, that equates “the 
formations produced by judging and then, naturally, of all similar formations 
produced by rational acts of any other sort) with phenomena appearing in 
internal experience” (Husserl, 1969, p. 154); in this sense “concepts, 
judgments, arguments, proofs, theories, would be psychic occurrences; and 
logic would be, as John Stuart Mill said it is, a ‘part, or branch, of psychology’" 
(Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 154) 
The departure of my reflection was that “we have previously seen and held this 
book in our hands”, and in this sense my starting point was completely 
unphenomenological; but I carried out the transcendental reduction on it, by 
bracketing the spatio-temporal mundane actuality of book and author and referring 
to the previous reflective and pre-reflective (“unreflected” in Radford’s terms) 
experiences with the book “as present facts” and “according to their remembered 
intentional content” (Husserl, 2001, p. 453). Thus I gained, as Husserl puts it (ibid.), 
the transcendental phenomenon, namely, the past transcendental phenomenon of 
the ego's earlier perception of the book, whereby the real book itself was only the 
intentional object of the seeing and the touching acts.  The key for the reduction on 
the experience of “the small red book” was the inherent 51  directedness of 
consciousness (its intentionality), and my drive was towards unveiling the particular 
apparatus of its fulfillment, which is a purely phenomenological method. By 
                                                          
48 For a short historical account of psychologism, and the basic arguments concerning the controversy that it 
created see the Glossary – Index of terms (at the end of the Thesis). 
49 E.g. the judgment that the “image of the red book” was an appropriate mental object for the corresponding 
task of finding the actual book. 
50 Similar to the case between Husserl and Frege, after the former released his first book (cf. Moran & Cohen, 
2012, p. 273). 
51 ‘Immanent’ in Husserl's terms. 
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implementing such an approach I avoided examining the laws of thought that 
govern the phenomenon as being related to empirical psychological laws, as 
psychologism would have it. And in Husserl's own words, the transcendental 
phenomenological enquiry that was adopted here can be effective in studying the 
whole range of recollective experiences: 
In this way I can gain the entire realm of my memories as 
phenomenologically reduced, thus the realm of all memories of objectively 
mundane things and processes, and then of all memories in general, e.g., 
memories of mathematical proofs that I have carried out; and I gain them 
not only as present facts, but according to their remembered intentional 
content. And what finally results from this is my (i.e., the Ego's) past 
transcendental life with all of its past poles which, insofar as they are object 
poles, are bracketed, while the ego that is everywhere identical is the 
transcendental ego, and should not be bracketed, just as little as the past 
transcendental lived-experiences. (ibid., p. 453) 
By presenting the recollection of the red book as “present fact” and “according to 
[its] remembered intentional content” I brought the “image of the red book” under 
the Husserlian phenomenological lens. I bracketed “all of its past poles… insofar as 
they are object poles”, namely the previous reflective experiences with the actual 
book, by considering them as merely thematising the book’s “features or parts or 
relations belonging to the object” (Drummond, 2003, op. cit.), according to the 
previous intentionalities, to which I have had neither access nor particular interest 
for the purpose of the transcendental reduction. But, 
I only put out of play the positing, the memorial belief in the past objectivity, 
but not the belief implied in it, namely, the belief in my past ego and my past 
lived-experiencing, and my past perceiving in which my past life was given 
perceptually. (Husserl, 2001, §368, p. 454) 
And I maintained the transcendental feature of the ego as ever producing, as ever 
living through new thematisations of the book’s features, through new involvements 
with it, through new appearances in the embodied consciousness, such as the image 
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produced by the ‘current’ task of finding the Aristotle’s Poetics book. I went through 
such a process since the embodied consciousness and the body as subject—which 
is the same thing according to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty—are ‘equally’ 
transcendental to the transcendental objects that ‘they’ encounter, such as the 
concrete “small red book”. The embodied consciousness and the book are ‘equally’ 
transcendental in the sense that the lived body (i.e. the body as subject) actively 
and potentially enacts uncountable perspectives and intentionalities towards the 
book, as the different ‘profiles’ that the book may reveal to the subject. 52 
Thus I arrived at the qualities of the book (red, small), which were targeted and 
became evidence for and due to the phenomenological perspective of my study, as 
previously spotted (thematised) and ‘currently’ separated from the material theme 
of the image (its essence) by the involved subject.53 I followed “the evidence that 
itself lies, in part, in the phenomenological reflection on the present, in part, in the 
phenomenological reflection on the past (that is, in the reflection penetrating into 
the intentional content of memories)” (ibid., emphasis added),54 without asking 
“whether or not this evidence is apodictic, whether or not it is better than the 
evidence, e.g., of external perception” (ibid.). 
In summary, 
 The structure through which this evidence came to the fore included: 
ø The phenomenological analytical tools of 
 intentionality, (§§ 1.4.4, 1.4.5, 1.4.6, 1.5.1, 1.5.2) 
 fulfillment (of the intentionality), (§§ 1.3.1, 1.3.3, 1.4.4, 1.4.5, 
1.5.2) 
                                                          
52 C.f. “Husserl insists that there is no apodictic final evidence about empirical entities, due to their 
perspectival mode of givenness” (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 114); also cf.  Husserl, 1999a, §34, and Husserl’s 
concept of “the de facto transcendental ego” in p. 70, p. 71. 
53 Even if the ‘involved subject’ my approach involves a process that Husserl would call imaginative free 
variation (cf. Husserl's example in 1999a, § 34, p. 70) 
54 “Husserl often speaks indifferently of phenomenological and transcendental reductions or indeed of the 
'transcendental-phenomenological reduction' (CM § 8, p. 21; Hua I 61; Crisis VI 239)” (Moran & Cohen, 
2012, p. 274), and this is the way that I use it in this case. But I attempted to exemplify in this section the 
particular transcendental character of the reduction. 
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 the implicit judgment and the constitution of significance 
(through the judgment), 
 founding and founded acts, (§ 1.3.4) 
 essence (or objective determination or theme of the object),  
 objective sense (or sense of sense), (§§ 1.3.4, 1.4.2, 1.5.2) and  
ø The phenomenological perception of  
 The configurations involved in the ‘red and small book’ 
example, such as: 
 the act of recollection,  
 the non-thematising pre-reflective perception(s)  
 the transition through immediate experiences to the 
reflective perceptions in previous 
appearances/objectivations, and  
 the new thematisations 
 The contents found in the description of the example, which 
fulfilled the structures applied by the phenomenological 
perception, e.g.  
 the thematised qualities of red and small,  
 the transition from the lack of attention to the 
emergence of attention,  
 the particular implicit judgment and its filling by the 
qualities of ‘red’ and ‘small’.   
 My concern was to release a new layer of meaning through the 
phenomenological investigation of the ‘red book’ experience, which was  
ø limited by its fictional character and the consequent lack of any 
account of the immediate firsthand experience(s), 
ø achieving a generality through its common features with conscious 
acts that I, as every reader of this study may recognise, and 
ø offering a different perspective than Radford’s, namely a pre-semiotic 
approach to objectification, that sees “object and something real, 
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actuality and real actuality … sharply separated” 55  and objects 
“defined as anything at all, e.g., as subject[s] of a true (categorial, 
affirmative) statement”, “ascrib[ing] to them, as to other objects, 
actual (veritable) being” (1983a, p. 41; also cf. Tragesser, 1977, e.g. 
p. 35). 
Thus the analysis of the aforementioned episode became an example of Husserl's 
transcendental reduction in the case of rememberings, as I aimed at infiltrating into 
the intentive mental processes and their intentional contents (1983a, §36). 
  
                                                          
55 In a later section I will introduce the essential aspect of Husserl’s approach to mental objects, i.e. to 
“Husserl's distinctive view … that beings can actually be given to us, that ‘to be capable of being given 
belongs to the essence of being’" (Hintikka, 1995, p. 84). The basic idea is that “[w]hat is immediately given 
to me will then at the same time be part of the mind-independent reality and an element of my consciousness. 
There has to be an actual interface or overlap of my consciousness and reality. …reality in fact impinges 
directly on my consciousness” (ibid. pp. 82, 83). 
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CHAPTER 4. The living body, operative intentionality and 
intentionality of act – The milieu of objectification and 
intuitions 
1.4.1 Transcendence of objects and new knowledge 
When we see the side of a spatial object we do not take the side as the object. “It 
is clear that a non-intuitive pointing beyond or indicating is what characterizes the 
side actually seen as a mere side, and what provides for the fact that the side is not 
taken for the thing” (Husserl, 2001, p 41). This phenomenon, neglected in our 
natural attitude of the world as simply existing, becomes evident when the world is 
approached as a phenomenon, when we try to understand the how of the world’s 
appearance and constitution by the subject as always there (Husserl, 1969, p. 225; 
1970a, p. 123), as “the world for us all” (Husserl, 1969, p. 236) and as transcending 
our understandings of it. “Transcendent” for Husserl means “inexhaustible” 
(Follesdal, in Dreyfous & Wrathhal, 2006, p. 109) and as we shall argue, this is true 
not only for the inexhaustible sides of the object / profiles of the real that the 
cognising subject may come to contact with, but it is also true for the cognising 
subject that constitutes the object, and testifies her consciousness as an objectifying 
consciousness, while producing a first sense of objectivity. 
1.4.2 Empty indicating, referring to possible new perceptions, and what 
is originally exhibited. Synthesising identifications anew, through the 
synthesis of coincidence 
Husserl’s idea is simple, although groundbreaking in its relation to the acquisition of 
knowledge: for Husserl, “something transcending the side is intended in 
consciousness as perceived” (Husserl, 2001, p. 41, my emphasis). We see that 
Husserl is shifting from the object-in-itself (as Kant would have it) to the object as 
it appears to consciousness, “as perceived”; while the actual perception for Husserl 
is a mixture of “actual exhibiting”, which presents “in an intuitive manner what is 
originally exhibited”, and “of an empty indicating that refers to possible new 
perceptions” (ibid., p. 41).  
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Thus the knowledge production has for Husserl a double nature, expressed 
by the immediacy of intuition and the anticipatory “empty indicating that refers to 
possible new perceptions”. This “empty indicating” will be filled intuitively, one way 
or the other (Husserl, 2001, p. 378), resulting to a closer determination or to the 
collapse of the previous and the just-present objective sense of the object involved: 
The perception of something transcendent—the perception of the beer 
bottle— can ‘deceive.’ That its object exists, and exists in this way, can be ‘doubted.’ 
Perhaps the beer bottle is ‘other than it appears’; perhaps it does not exist ‘at all.’ 
What does this mean? It means that the perception includes intentions that are still 
unfulfilled and that it can either undergo fulfillment or ‘closer determination’, or 
‘contradiction’ and ‘disappointment.’ (Husserl, 1991, p. 246) 
The “empty indicating” allows itself the freedom to be wrong or just right for another 
activity, for another approach of the same, for a related or for a so-far-unrelated 
object, and for the different set of intuitive horizons that goes with it.  
This “empty indicating” is nevertheless the key to “possible new perceptions”, 
and this is a focal point of my research, since I perceive the renewal of knowledge 
as inevitably starting intrapsychically, from “new perceptions” and their immediate 
application and absorbedness in epistemic-social-cultural-historical spatiotemporal 
instantiations. The fact that new concepts end up as theorems in textbooks does 
not alter their origins in “possible new perceptions”, which were once brought to 
the fore of consciousness. The fact that some of these new concepts survive is a 
testification of the constitutive effect of the cognising subject (the ego pole) in the 
first place, which is a pole that comes to terms with the object pole, through the 
intentional subjective act of objectification (cf. Husserl, 1970a, pp. 171-172).  
The question posed for the first time precisely by Descartes, namely “how is it 
possible, for immanent knowledge, to grasp something that is not immanent” 
(Vanzago, 2005),56 is addressed by Husserl through his conception of immanent 
                                                          
56 See Part 1, Ch.2 for the theoretical discussion of the same question, in the context of the distinction 
between Husserl's and Kant’s approaches to experience. Immanent transcendence is also crucial for the 
Husserlian response to Meno’s paradox. 
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transcendence, which is achieved by the transcendental ego. 57  The “empty 
indicating” is meaningful due to the object’s transcendence and the awareness of 
this transcendence by the subject, and the latter is possible because of the ego’s 
immanent transcendence—i.e. the ego’s survival as an identical ego despite its 
diverse manifestations, and the potential and actual inexhaustible ways to perceive 
objects. This interplay of transcendence on behalf of the object and immanent 
transcendence on behalf of the subject is another Husserlian innovation, which is 
responsible for the constitution of sense: 
Transcendence in every form is an immanent existential characteristic, 
constituted within the ego. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, 
whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain 
of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and 
being. The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying 
outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible 
evidence, the two being related to one other merely externally by a rigid low, 
is nonsensical. (Husserl, 1999, p. 85) 
Objectification is for consciousness an existential act, since “consciousness is 
nothing without its object, for the intentional deﬁnition of consciousness is in terms 
of consciousness-of” (Vanzago, 2005, p. 360). And we could perhaps paraphrase 
Descartes in saying that for Husserl consciousness is best characterised by the 
phrase “I objectify therefore I am”. But Husserl’s answer does not consist, as in 
Descartes, in a deduction or a demonstration of the existence of transcendence, but 
in a pure clarification of the essential possibilities of consciousness, which brings the 
structures of ‘pure’ consciousness itself to light through a “complex concept” that 
Husserl discerned as one of its main features: 
Intentionality is a complex concept: it means that the world is to be seen as 
‘world-for-consciousness’, [as] the object of possible experience. But it also 
means that consciousness is nothing without its object, for the intentional 
                                                          
57 These terms are only introduced here and they will be explored in the following sections. 
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definition of consciousness is in terms of consciousness-of. The achievement 
of the reduction is then the awareness that consciousness and world are to 
be seen as poles of a relation which, as such, becomes the real theme of 
phenomenology. (p. 360) 
And in this sense “the real theme” of my study is the “awareness that consciousness 
and world are to be seen as poles of a relation” which yields objects on the ground 
of lived experience. The empty indicating may be filled or unfilled, and may conflict 
with the raw experience: 
[W]hen we perceive, some of the ‘anticipations’ in our noema are filled by 
hyle, others are not; they just point to further features of the object and may 
become filled when we go on exploring the object. These unfilled 
anticipations may conflict with the hyletic experiences we get when we 
explore the object, in that case, an “explosion” of the noema takes place, we 
have to revise our conception of what we perceive, we have to come up with 
another noema that fits in with our hyletic experiences. The hyle therefore 
constrain the noesis we can have in a given situation and thereby what 
noema we can have. (Follesdal in Dreyfus, 2006, p. 108) 
Although the constraints put by the reality, which appear in the form of raw 
empirical material, the hyle, are precisely/well described in the aforementioned 
extract, there is something missed by Follesdal, since his reduction brackets the 
perceived object as perceived, by isolating what is intended in the object, as 
intended, i.e. by isolating the noematic core58 from the object and the positing 
qualities. What is missed is the object as perceived, the awareness of the 
inexhaustibility of the object, as perceived by the subject, which does not stop us 
from perceiving the object always as a whole, 59 even when we don’t yet have a 
name for it. It is what Drummond calls the full noema, i.e. “the union of noematic 
                                                          
58 Which is the core of the noema, of the object as it is intended, also called the objective sense (Husserl, 
1973, p. 269 – cf. the “red book example” and Graph 1 in Part 1, §1.3.4) 
59 “But what has been constituted as present in the Now is an absolute self that does not have any unfamiliar 
sides” (Husserl, 2001, p. 59). 
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sense and thetic character” (Drummond in the New Husserl, 2003, p. 72).  We 
perceive the object always as a whole through our body-subject (Leib), with which 
“we can, whenever we like, orchestrate an intuitive presentational course, a 
reproductive course of aspects through which the non-visible side of the thing would 
be presented to us” (Husserl, 2001, pp. 40-41).  
The object is prepared in the pre-reflective passive stage of our lived-
experience, taking the form of object-like multiplicities of the hyle,60 from where it 
is drawn with its objective sense,61 although this sense may change, and/or it may 
change names in the course of the experience. The intentionality of protention, of 
anticipatory expectations that perceive the object-like entity as a whole, even before 
it becomes an object, goes side-by-side with the intuitive primal impression, i.e. the 
actual Now-moment of some thing that is originally exhibited.  
The subject is in-the-world, in Merleau-Ponty’s bridging of Heidegger and 
Husserl. The question is, as Husserl put it, the “distinction between determinations 
with respect to the content of the object [a] that are actually there, appearing in 
the flesh, and [b] those that are still ambiguously prefigured in full emptiness” (ibid, 
p. 43). Intuition is in the flesh of the lived-experience, as it makes possible the 
grounding of knowledge as a non-arbitrary process, based on actual/factual lived-
experience. Moreover, intuitions make possible the presentifications of protentive 
prefigurations of the same object. As Husserl put it, “what is perceived is given in 
adumbrations in such a way that the particular givenness refers to something else 
that is not-given, as what is not given belonging to the same object” (ibid. p. 41). 
This is true, one might object, only for the concrete empirical objects, which 
remain (relatively) unaltered through the course of our contact with them. What 
would guarantee the same or anywhere close to the transcendence of empirical 
                                                          
60 ‘Hyle’, ‘hyletic’ are Husserlian terms that will be explored throughout the study; see following section for 
a closer determination of hyle, which is not mere sense-data (also cf. the Glossary – Index of terms at the end 
of the Thesis). 
61‘Objective sense’ or ‘noematic sense’ is another Husserlian term that will be explored throughout the study. 
It is meant here quite literally, as the sense that we endow to an object, such as a table, a house, a bird 
singing, etc. 
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objects, of the transcendence of abstract objects,62  since the latter are constituted 
in immanent rather than transcendental manners of giveness? Husserl’s position 
concerned the meeting of the ideal and the concrete, since anything ideal has a 
time-specific genesis in space and time (Husserl, 1970a), in Husserl’s 
phenomenological attitude. In other words, Husserl’s task was to reverse the 
Cartesian analytical method by starting from the bottom, from the lived-experience 
and the a priori of the Life-world, up to the (constituted as) ideal forms. Moving 
from the intentions and how they are met (fulfilled), to the object pole, as it is 
constituted subjectively by the ego pole. Husserl introduces the fundamental 
demand of apodicticity, (e.g. Husserl, 1970a, pp. 339-340), which is safeguarded 
by intuition and it rules out psychologism (Held, in Welton, 2003). Husserl’s interplay 
between reality as self-given and subjectivity that is always intentional and always 
oriented towards the object-pole, this tension between the ideal forms (the 5th stage 
of objectification in the Origins) and their genesis in the Life-world, through the 
living body, just before they’ll enter the intersubjective circulation, is a tension that 
Husserlian phenomenology brought to the surface of investigation, and one that my 
research takes position in favour of the lived experience of mathematics-in-the-
making. Examples of such lived-experiences are analysed in all three cases of the 
prospective teachers of mathematics, attempting to exemplify that such moments 
are far from rare, that our “new-found Land” (John Donn) was always here, only 
that without the phenomenological analytical instruments such moments are 
inaccessible, invisible, silenced. The ‘glasses’ bring the object to a new existence, 
where interesting details of the cognitive structure are lit, due to the new 
perspective. 
The discovery of this tension is clearly stated in Husserl (1970a, p. 340), as 
“the discovery of the radical contrast between what is usually called apodictic 
knowledge and what, in the transcendental understanding, outlines the primal 
ground and the primal method of all philosophy”.  If the calling is for a 
                                                          
62 Mathematical is another name for what has been called abstract throughout this study, which is concerned 
with the transition from the pre-mathematical to the mathematical knowledge constitution. 
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phenomenological attitude, then, as Husserl put it, it concerns “[man's] existence 
(sic) in the spatiotemporally pregiven world as the self-objectification of 
transcendental subjectivity and its being, its constituting life” (ibid.). In a deeper 
layer this research aims at contributing to this objectification, through a close view 
of the learners’ constitutive activities. 
As Husserl put it in his Idea of Phenomenology (p. 62), “the intuitive, direct 
apprehension and possession of the cogitatio63 is itself a knowing, the cogitationes64 
are the first absolute items of givenness”. Taking into account Husserl’s attempt to 
ground his epistemology on the strictest possible account of true philosophy, we 
notice his recourse to his motor drive, intuition, “the intuitive, direct apprehension 
and possession of the cogitatio”. Only that Husserl troubles these acts of thought 
that aim at the cogitatio, attempting to delve deeper than Kant and Descartes in 
object constitution, towards the objects’ genetic, temporal, pre-structural life in 
passive synthesis, which inspired Merleau-Ponty’s primacy of perception (Reuter, 
1999).  
The link between the active object constitution and its passive grounding is 
for Husserl and for my study operative intentionality, and its crucial65 preparation of 
the object that will emerge from its object-like state. Operative intentionality is 
responsible for the embodied certainty of the learner’s profile of her/his world-as-
lived, which is at play every moment, temporalised every moment. Operative 
intentionality orchestrates the embodied experience as an expression of the lived-
body—which is what Husserl terms as the empirical ego—in the passive (pre-
reflective) stage of lived-experience. This phenomenological perspective of 
(cognitive lived experience was introduced by Husserl but focused on and radically 
advanced by Merleau-Ponty. 
                                                          
63 Acts of thought. 
64 The objects of thought in which the acts of thought are directed. 
65 Crucial for this research’s effort to explicate objectivation, that is objectification’s earliest stages (see 
below in §1.4.3). 
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1.4.3 Transcendence of objects, lived-experience and …‘turning coffee 
into theorems’ – An introduction to the three cases of the study 
In order to understand the constitution of abstract mathematical objects and their 
structural as well as factual affiliations with the empirical ones, the 
phenomenological attitude towards the transcendence of spatial objects is already 
informative of the acquisition of knowledge: I walk around the house and I realise 
that it is a scenery, moreover, a scenery without interior.  
The first realisation makes my previous perception of the house to collapse—to 
“explode”, in Husserl’s terms—while the second one is merely a specification of my 
new perception of the house, since I already anticipate that a scenery house might 
not have any interior. The sequence house – scenery – scenery-without-interior is 
not brought up here as an uncommon one, but rather as representing a thriving 
category: 
 I talk with my friend on Skype, there is light filling her room, I suddenly hear 
a bird singing and I conclude: “it must be a nice day there my dear, and the 
birds are singing”. She replies that “the day is rather nice though cloudy but 
this was my ‘12 o’ clock bird’, since my clock here produces different bird 
songs for different hours”. The bird singing that misled me, either a 
representation of a real bird or not, affected as it was by the quality of the 
Skype connection, is another collapse of the object of my consciousness (the 
noema), and it is responsible for a change of perception due to the conflict, 
in order to coincide with the hyletic material of the experience. Now that I 
know that it was not an actual bird singing that moment, in my friend’s 
garden, the apprehension of the bird that I previously heard singing becomes 
clearer than ever, finally settling as a “12 o’ clock bird, at my friend’s home, 
which I erroneously perceived as an actual bird singing”. The previous 
perception does not vanish but remains as a cancelled one. 
 A student of mathematics realises that an asymmetrical pattern gives better 
results and in a consistent way for the distribution in space, of “cops able to 
see two blocks away”; the asymmetrical distribution allows him to fully 
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mathematise his lived experience. A collapse of his previous conviction about 
symmetrical structures was necessary in order to unlock the task.66 
 A student of mathematics realises that the argumentation she employs for a 
task does not produce significant results in the case that she tries to apply 
it; but the ineffective argumentation may be transformed—due to its 
generalisation and its change of set of values (its actual re-presentation)—to 
an argumentation that produces significant results, for the same case, in a 
process where the previous argumentation, by using abstract, mathematical 
notification, may be retained as a cell, as a pre-structure, acquiring new 
context. What previously attained local, trivial results, now holds general 
depiction of a structure and, under the light of the new results, why is it that 
such a constitution is often dismissed as irrelevant to the tasks of the course, 
of any mathematics course?  
 A student of mathematics attempts to embody and then formalise her lived 
experience, of what kind of curve is one that is equidistant from a wall and 
a fixed point; after finding 5 points she intuits the curve as not crossing the 
x-axis. But after implementing a newly acquired tool her intuitive conception 
of the curve collapses, and it becomes an x2 curve, instead of a part of it.67 
There is a thriving list of cases where the ‘fractal balloon’ one,68 just mentioned, as 
well as the other two examples, are but mere examples of everyday practices that 
remain neglected, concealed or cancelled, as insignificant, or by aiming at the de-
subjectification of the pregnant lived-experience, which is already an aim of 
objectivism, often employing dialectics in a materialist sense. A student or a 
research mathematician may build up on her mathematical proof interface, and 
different mathematical categories may become variables in her proof zone. And it 
can’t be that rare, as far as examples like Paul Erdős are concerned, who coined the 
aphorism “A mathematician is a device turning coffee into theorems”, if not 
                                                          
66 Reference to Ivan’s case study (Part 3, Ch. 2). 
67 Reference to Mary’s case (Part 3, Ch. 4). 
68 See Diana’s case (Part 3, Ch. 3) and the evolvement of her empirical material to a generalised method, as 
an example related to the last bullet. 
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described himself as such by Renyi (Hoffman, P., 1998), and insofar as a quarter of 
a million new theorems are proved every year (ibid., p. 204).69  
1.4.4 Protentions and operative intentionality, immanent to the 
transcendental subject, and pointing towards a particular reduction, 
towards a phenomenological method. 
According to Husserl it is the empty indications that realise new perceptions, as soon 
as the latter will fulfill the former intuitively. I see a man sitting solemnly in the 
dusk; after a while I realise that it was an illusion, due to a costume that was 
hanging on the chair, a shadow that was mistaken for the head and the poor light. 
My conscious self strives for closer determination, as it starts with the image of a 
“solemn man, sitting in the dusk”. Any man or woman has a living body, as I have, 
something radically different compared to hats, chairs etc.. My perceptual “tendency 
toward originarity” and the intention to understand better what sort of living body 
is the one that seemingly appears in my sensuous field, leads to the collapse of the 
previous noema, i.e. the collapse of the alien subjectivity that was already 
understood as a whole, alien for my world, although different than any empirical 
object.70 My “purposeful striving” toward evidence through closer determination is 
the implicit intentionality that challenged my previous perception and led to its 
collapse. 
This is a view that I achieve when I apply the transcendental reduction, by excluding 
everything external to the object as it appears, thus arriving at the genetic settings 
of perception, and the structures that reign its inaugural moments, by necessity 
rather than reason. By exploring the potentiabilities (Held in Welton, 2003, pp. 14, 
19) of conscious life, I’m getting closer to understanding the Husserlian necessity 
and the origination of knowledge. 
In order to be able to be consciousness-of-something at all, consciousness 
must know of its own potential (Mӧglichkeit)—Husserl coins a striking 
                                                          
69 See Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theorem#cite_note-11. 
70 Such as the costume that misled me. 
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conceptual term here, ‘potentiability’ (Vermӧglichkeit)—to allow the related 
‘something’ to appear in intuition. Consciousness’s intending of an object is, 
therefore, not a static relation-to-something, but instead is animated with its 
tendency toward originarity; Husserl uses the words ‘intention’ and 
‘intending’ throughout his works in a way similar to our daily usage, indicating 
a purposeful striving. Intentional consciousness is, in all its forms, focused 
on finding satisfaction in the intuited self-having of lived experience. 
Consciousness wants to go toward evidence; that is what forms its goal, its 
telos. In this sense, all conscious life—as Husserl would say in his later work—
rests under the rule of a ‘teleology.’ (ibid., p. 14) 
My expectation shifted from the perception of “a man sitting solemnly in the dusk” 
to a conglomeration of objects, which made me think that someone was there. In 
both cases there is nothing ‘wrong’ from the phenomenological point of view, since 
these are two perceptual acts (noeses) with their corresponding objects (noemas, 
in Husserl’s terms). But since “I have the consciousness ‘I can…’”, since “it is within 
my full power, my ‘capability,’ to follow the referential interconnections in any 
direction I choose” (ibid., p. 19), and since my perceptual consciousness finds 
“satisfaction in the intuited self-having of lived experience”, only one of these two 
apparitions may survive, the one that corresponds better to the intuited self-having 
of my lived experience. Another perspective within the phenomenological one that 
is adopted here concerns the shifting from the intentional horizons that perceived a 
certain sight as a “solemn man, sitting in the dusk”, to different intentional horizons, 
always accompanied by empty indications (expectations), that strive for fulfilment.  
Such empty indications are a “halo of consciousness” for Husserl… 
It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but an emptiness to be filled-
out; it is a determinable inditerrminacy. … In spite of its emptiness, the sense 
of this halo of consciousness is a prefiguring that prescribes a rule for the 
transition to new actualizing appearances. (Husserl, 2001, p. 42, our 
emphasis).  
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What makes all this experience possible is the pole of the subject, of the 
transcendental subject, responsible for the unification of the raw material of the 
simple acts (Husserl, 1973, Introduction, §§ 11-14), in the pre-reflective and the 
reflective realm of her lived-experience. The transcendental subject whose 
consciousness is always intentional, is always consciousness of something. 
But already within passivity we find an intention, as belonging to the structure 
of intentional lived­experiences as such without the ego coming into play as 
a subject who is [actively] directed, as a cognitively striving subject 
potentially making a decision. It is what in truth transforms a concrete lived-
experience, perhaps like a remembering or an expectation already stirring in 
the background, into an intentional lived-experience. (Husserl, 2001, p. 449, 
my emphasis) 
1.4.5 Operative intentionality and the living body, operating in the 
passive stage 
It is crystal-clear in Husserl’s epistemology that the real has a share in the 
transcendental subject’s lived-experience, that there is determinable indeterminacy, 
and that “already within passivity we find an intention, as belonging to the structure 
of intentional lived experiences as such”, “without the ego coming into play as a 
subject who is [actively] directed, as a cognitively striving subject potentially making 
a decision”. The response of the (transcendental) ego to the real is objectification,71 
while the latter is grounded on the direct (intuitive) embodied contact with the real. 
The real is a primal agent in objectification, and intuition, in its primordial stage, 
grounds it as such. The adumbrations of the object, given in primal impressions, 
are combined with empty anticipations (protentive tendencies) that some of them 
will be fulfilled, when the determination of the object will be fuller, seen from 
different sides etc. 
                                                          
71 Rather, objectivation, which is the startup of objectification. See later section for the elaboration of 
objectivation. 
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The operative, pre-reflective intention is immanent to consciousness, as “belonging 
to the structure of intentional lived­experiences”, and it “transforms a concrete 
lived-experience, perhaps like a remembering or an expectation already stirring in 
the background, into an intentional lived-experience” (Husserl, 2001, p. 419). We 
are in the area of passivity (Husserl, 2001, p. 419)72 and the primordial part that 
intentionality and intuition play in it.  So let’s take a look. Since there is no ego-
cogito intervention the intention is of the type “I can” rather than “I think”. It is a 
pre-reflective intentionality and it is what Merleau-Ponty called operative 
intentionality, which is  
that which produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and 
of our life, being apparent in our desires, our evaluations and in the landscape 
we see, more clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text 
which our knowledge tries to translate into precise language. (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002a, p. xx) 
With the interplay of intuition and protentive tendencies, a unifying intention allows 
embodied intentional consciousness to distinguish objectlike entities from raw 
(hyletic) material and transform them into empirical objects. The objectilike entities 
reside consciousness until operative intentionality will call them forth to new 
thematisations, new unities that are constitutive for new objects.  
Embodied consciousness is what Husserl and Merleau-Ponty call the living body, 
“which is never absent from the perceptual field” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 106, also cf. 
Merleau- Ponty, 2002a, p. 87, and Tito, 1990, p. 185). The body73 plays an essential 
role in the fulfillment of operative intentionality, since it is “a sensory-motor 
behavior through which the world is constituted for man (sic) as the world of human 
consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. xvi). The operative intentionality is 
“already at work before any positing or any judgment” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. 
498) and it “produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our 
life” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. xx). It is pre-reflective but this does not mean that 
                                                          
72 Also called passive stage (cf. Index/Glossary). 
73 The body as (intentional) subject, not as an object (cf. Reuter, 1999, pp. 71-72). 
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it is unconscious (Reuter, 1999, p. 76); and it can be revealed: 
We do not see the operation, since it operates. We see what would be 
missing without it; we circumscribe it as what makes speech be a "speaking 
of" ... and not be the conscious having of the idealities implied in speech. 
(Merleau- Ponty, 2002b, p. 44)74 
When Mary, one of the three cases that are analysed in this study reported that 
she acquired a bird’s-eye-view on her “little diagram”, she quite literally expressed 
what ‘bird’s-eye-view’ actually means and how the body plays on this 
transformation kinaesthetically, in sensori-motor co-ordination. It is a subtle but 
most crucial difference between Husserlian and Kantian epistemologies, that in 
Husserl, due to the operative intentionality the cognising subject does not construct 
objects (by imposing categories on experience) but rather enacts and inhabits 
them, by separating them from the lived experience.  
Notwithstanding the immediate feeling of certainty that intuition brings, 
there is a tension, since the intuitive moment with all its fullness of certainty is also 
realised as a prehension, i.e. the “inadequate or imperfect grasp of something, 
where the content of the grasp adumbrates or points to something beyond what is 
given. … a form of incomplete cognitive apprehension” (Tragesser, 1977, pp. 18-
19). This tension is resolved, at least temporarily,75 with the application of the 
intuitive object into the task, asking legitimacy in “determinately ordered systems 
of possible appearances”. Mathematics, with its abstraction and formalisation,  
But no matter how indeterminate it may be, it is still a pointing ahead to a 
bodily shape, to a bodily coloring, etc. And only appearances that adumbrate 
things of that kind and that determine more closely what is indeterminate in 
the framework of this prefiguring can be integrated concordantly; only they 
                                                          
74 The extract is from Merleau-Ponty's notes on Husserl's Origin of Geometry. 
75 Although the issue is not my primary concern, it would be interesting to compare with Sophocles’ Oedipus 
trilogy for the Lacanian interpretation of Oedipus’s fate, as a reoccurring problem, first with Sphinx, then 
with the plague that forced him to take his sight away. Oedipus says in the last part of the trilogy that the 
problem is never solved in a final manner and that it signals an ongoing process. For an analogue in 
mathematics education research, see the latest work of Liz de Freitas with Nathalie Sinclair (2014, p. 560), 
where they argue for “bridging the concrete and the abstract”. 
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can stay the course of an identical x of determination as the same, being 
determined here newly and more closely. This holds time and again for every 
perceptual phase of the streaming process of perceiving, for every new 
appearance, only that the intentional horizon has altered and shifted. … To 
our mind, the aspects are nothing for themselves; they are appearances-of 
only through the intentional horizons that are inseparable from them. 
(Husserl, 2001, pp. 42-43) 
The “cognitively striving subject potentially making a decision” strives for fulfilment, 
since this tendency for fulfilment is indigenous, as “belonging to the structure of 
intentional lived­experiences as such without the ego coming into play”. “A 
remembering or an expectation already stirring in the background” are already 
endowed with affords and gains of the intentionally structured horizons, that bring 
them to the state of an intentional lived-experience, due to operative intentionality. 
By tracing the origins of intentionality (by exploring the “intentional 
horizons”) we apply a reduction that leads us down to the constitutive origins. Thus 
we have a unique chance to take a glimpse at the silent world of perception, the 
passive stage and its operative intentionality, which is revealed due to the 
concomitant manifestations of reflection. The reflection is rendered effective, due 
to the intentionality of act, which is the constant theme of mathematics education 
research, highly neglecting the part of operative intentionality. Husserl’s genius 
distinguished between these two intentionalities (e.g. 1999a, p. 98, also cf. 1969, 
1970a, 1973, 1989, 1991, 2001), and put effort in studying the structure, the 
genesis of both and their links, with his constitutive and his genetic 
phenomenologies. 
A final remark has to do with intuition’s first appearance, which is synonymous to 
original perception, renewed every moment “of the streaming process of perceiving, 
for every new appearance” (ibid., pp. 42-43). It is in the flow of appearances that 
the hyletic material appear, as they are intuitively grasped,  where inner and outer 
horizons interplay in ever new forms,76 with new intentions (“the intentional horizon 
                                                          
76 For the inner and outer horizons see the two following sections. 
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has altered and shifted” (Husserl, 2001, op. cit.)), which are supported (fulfilled) by 
new intuitions.  
Proper to every appearing thing of each perceptual phase is a new empty 
horizon, a new system of determinable indeterminacy, a new system of 
progressing tendencies with corresponding possibilities of entering into 
determinately ordered systems of possible appearances, of possible ways 
that the aspects can run their course, together with horizons that are 
inseparably affiliated with these aspects. In the concordant coinciding of 
sense, they would bring the same object as being ever newly determined to 
actual, fulfilling givenness. To our mind, the aspects are nothing for 
themselves; they are appearances-of only through the intentional horizons 
that are inseparable from them. (ibid. p. 43) 
The more or less unmediated originality/immediacy remains as a genetic seal in 
intuition’s more elaborated forms, of mathematically “determinately ordered 
systems of possible appearances”, in the learning activities that are analysed in this 
research. 
1.4.6 The objects’ self-giveness and allure – Intentionality of act, made 
possible due to the operative intentionality. 
What is crucial from our cognitive point of view is that the operative intentionality 
makes possible the intentionality of act (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. 486), “which is 
that of our judgements and of those occasions when we voluntarily take up a 
position” (p. xx). I have already mentioned that the intentionality of act, which will 
be the theme of other sections, is the prevalent theme of mathematics education, 
while systematically missing the embodied aspect of cognition or taking it as ready-
made, under an objectivist, instrumentalist approach of experience. What is 
important from our cognitive point of view at this point is that the intentionality of 
act is responsible for the “more complete apprehension of the object” (Tragesser, 
1977, p. 18), as it is achieved through its application to the task, shaped as a key 
idea, but this is not the whole story.  and actually being based on intuition. But the 
original prehension, comes with an intentionality other than the intentionality of act, 
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the first incomplete comprehension (ibid. p.18) comes with the intentionality that 
precedes the intentionality of act, already bringing with it the certainty that an 
objectivity is there, a certain candidate for protentive intentions to be fulfilled, 
before they’ll acquire names due to the intentionality that follows, the positing 
intentionality of act. By the interplay of the two intentionalities an object is born, as 
it appears to the lived body through the operative intentionality, and as it 
consequently acquires an object status, or an object label if you like. The embodied, 
original intentionality opens up a field of exploration for the self-given77 actualities 
and potentialities of the emerging object-like entity, which is transformed to an 
object according to what is at task. While the first intentionality is responsible for 
our immediate contact with the real, the second one is already an abstraction, as it 
meets its first idealisation by subscribing to the discursive realm (Husserl, 1936, 
1970a; Merleau-Ponty, 2002b).  
The two intentionalities are two poles that are interrelated and mutually fed, which 
is what supports—in the Husserlian theory—the interrelation and the mutual effect 
of empirical and abstract intuitive objects  
 e.g. symmetry intuition and what it triggers in Mary’s case (Part 3, §3.4.2.3.),  
 the double (in two stages) x2 categorial intuition and how it is triggered by 
the figure that empirically sprouts from the 5 points, or  
 the final quality of number 10, which started as the distance of the fixed point 
from the wall and it evolved to a variable, as it was fed by its continuous 
abstractions,78 while it was retaining an embodied kinesthetic aspect up to 
the final step.  
 which thus surfaces as a candidate for constitution, for becoming an object, posed 
as an object by the intentionality of act. 
I see the same road over and over again in my way to work at 7:35 am, and 
I realise an intentionality that makes all these cars move in accordance to the traffic 
                                                          
77 I.e. as it appears, as it is given in the lived experience, also cf. Index for self-giveness. 
78 Before it became a variable it was used in the construction of the first formula, and due to the process that 
was followed there number 10 was reflected on 6, for the construction of the second formula. 
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lights, and their motility to be more coordinated than usual. A reflection on the 
presence of these cars and the way that they move at this time of the day, combined 
with an imaginary variation on every previous working day, reveals a critical 
invariable (an essence in Husserl’s terms), which is the transportation of most of 
these people in order to go to their work space; it reveals it as a primary 
intentionality, which runs through their driving related actions. There is no doubt 
that most of these people intend, as I also do, to arrive at their work space as early 
as possible. Each and every driver that is involved in this process at 7:35am has her 
own personal traits in dealing with driving, with work related stress and all others 
issues in her life-world that are somehow involved (each time)  in her working 
mornings at 7:35am. Still, this intentionality finds expression in the motility and the 
regulation of the traffic, as I see it every working day; but it is not a reflective 
intentionality nor a discursive one, despite its exceptions, or rather its variations, as 
my case is. Despite behaviors that are based on reflection, this intentionality starts 
as an intersubjective, pre-reflective prefiguring of the way that each car moves, and 
each driver’s actions are broader manifestations of their traits and the special 
conditions they meet each time, resulting at the ‘more regulated’ traffic that I 
encounter every working day, and almost only at that time.  
This intentionality leads to acts, thus it becomes intentionality of act, shaped in 
many different subjective forms. It starts as operative intentionality, since it 
operates in the lived body, since it starts from driving a vehicle, a largely habitual 
activity that in many cases becomes an extension of one’s living body or, rather, a 
re-constituted living body, shaped as a car sort of speak. 
Instead of pursuing the collective intentionality, manifested in the previous example, 
I focused on individuals, in order to bracket anything but the following triangle, and 
explore its operations on the ground of the learners’ lived experiences:  
 ego pole –  
 subjective –  
 object pole  
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(mentioned as ego-cogitatio-cogitata in Husserl (1970a, p. 207 – see the same page 
for Husserl’s inversed Cartesianism).  
The links between the learner and her constitutive accomplishments (between the 
ego pole and the object pole) are shaped by the intentionalities of consciousness, 
namely the operative and the intentionality of act. They are intertwined and 
mutually affective, and, although the huge issue of affection, as a diluting and 
fertilising agent of acts and actions (e.g. Husserl, 2001, Ch. 2 ) is beyond the scope 
of this study, it may suffice to say that Husserlian bibliography offers a fair 
exploration of the topic. See for instance Husserl’s Selbstgebegenheit, rendered as 
“self-giveness”, meaning “both the giving of the self of the object on the part of the 
subject as a noetic process,79 and the self-giving of the self of the object from the 
object” (Husserl, 2001, p. lii). Husserl’s self-giveness concerns the object, which is 
not only a passive receptor of the ego’s attention: 
it exercises an affectively significant allure on the perceiver to be constituted 
as such, that is, for the ‘ego’ to tum toward it attentively and to constitute it 
as a theme of interest in an active manner. The fact that something is actually 
heard or seen or smelled, etc., is due to ‘affective rays’ radiating from the 
object, drawing in its wake the horizonal referential implications. (ibid. p. lii). 
Husserl is focusing on the “the ipseity of the object, the self-givenness of object it-
self in the intentional relation” (Husserl, 2001, p. lii), which is the relation that will 
explored in the study’s three cases.  
                                                          
79 That is a process directed by the ego pole towards the object pole, having the specific intentionality of 
objectivation, i.e. the intentionality to release objective sense out of transcendental and immanent objects that 
appear in the Life-world of the subject. 
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1.4.7 Retention and retentional modifications of the primordial 
impression – The continual synthesis of identification as a preparation 
for the constitution of the object – Inner and outer horizons of the 
object’s appearance 
We saw how the protentions (the empty intentions that concern what is to come)80 
play a part in pre-figuring the lived experience. But there is also the history of “the 
mode of original intuitability” (Husserl, 2001, p. 217), of the primal impressions 
which become past but they are not lost, although they do “not go undiminished” 
(Husserl, 2001, p. 217). As Husserl puts it, “[w]hat is given in the mode of original 
intuitability, of having a self in the flesh, givenness in the flesh, undergoes the modal 
transformation of the ‘more and more past.’” (Husserl, 2001, p. 217). 
It is a trait of intentional consciousness to retain the past impressions (Husserl, 
2001, p. 114), not as mental representations but as temporally determined 
modifications of their original moments (Husserl, 1991, pp. 243, 244). For the object 
of perception to appear—firstly as an object-like formation—a continual synthesis 
of identification is necessary, for which the retentional consciousness is decisive:  
The constitutive process of this being modified in consciousness is a continual 
synthesis of identification. What is given to consciousness is continuously the 
same, but it is pushed back further and further into the past. … the 
emergence of the new primordial impression is continuously linked up with 
the impression that has immediately passed and is modified into the form of 
the just-past. (Husserl, 2001, p. 217). 
In other words, “the retentional process is a process of identifying synthesis—the 
sameness of the objective sense runs clean through it” (ibid. p. 219). It is a first, 
pre-reflective unification of primordial lived-experiences, which are modified as 
‘moments’ of the identical object. What is seen as identical, already from the 
beginning has got other sides,81 hence inner horizons, as well as unexplored outer 
                                                          
80 Husserl (2001, p. 112) also calls protentions memories of the future. 
81 See section 3.3 for the protentive anticipations, i.e. the “empty indications that realise new perceptions”. 
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horizons,82 since it appears in a context that becomes gradually fulfilled, which 
remains to be revealed, and is under the state of determinable indeterminacy. The 
aforementioned state is also part and parcel of the retentional process, which 
“strives for clarity” (Husserl, 2001, p. 472) and depends on closer determination, 
due to the inner horizons of the object. 
From what we have said already, 
we see that every perception implicite invokes an entire perceptual system; 
every appearance that arises in it implies an entire system of appearance, 
specifically in the form of intentional inner and outer horizons. We cannot 
even imagine a mode of appearance in which the appearing object would be 
given completely. No final presentation in the flesh is ever reached in the 
mode of appearance as if it would present the complete, exhausted self of 
the object. Every appearance implies a plus ultra in the empty horizon. 
(Husserl, 2001, p. 48) 
Before the reflective, thinking process, there is a ‘preparation’ by temporal and 
qualitative configurations of the raw (hyletic) empirical material. It is truly essential 
here that Husserl ‘projects’ the real as not only the validation, the grounding and 
the source of the material that will be objectified, but also as the active partner to 
the ego’s constitutions. The object pole for Husserl is one of the three terms that 
constitute objectification and the subjective cognitive life in general (Husserl, 1970, 
p.217); the produced objects are not categorically pre-determined and even within 
the habitual modes of activity there is always a choice of novel determinations. The 
real transcends our understandings of it. And yet it proliferates our lives with objects 
that are or become active and ‘permanent’ for our lives, like tables or the 
Pythagorean Theorem. Because the real is involved, through which objects are 
separated as soon as they are thematised, and the real according to Husserl always 
appears in determinable indeterminacy, and through shifting intentional horizons. 
The subject is not isolated from the real, since she lives in and for the world. The 
                                                          
82 For Husserl's detailed account of inner and horizons, and their significance for the cognitive lived 
experience see chapter 12 in the Essential Husserl (1999) and in particular ∬2, 3. 
~ 97 ~ 
 
contact between the subject and the real is embodied, since consciousness is 
already embodied and since the lived body (the empirical ego) of the cognising 
subject is an active medium of the contact, as an organ of perception. In the 
subjective contact between the ego pole and the object pole the subject enriches—
as well as being enriched by—the subjective grasp that she has over the object, in 
a process that could be approached phenomenologically as reactivation.83 
CHAPTER 5. Objectification, intuitions and the living body – 
Empirical and abstract intuitions, and the genetic features that 
render intuitions detectable 
1.5.1 The transcendental ego, the living body and the “intentional 
background of constitutive accomplishments” 
There are different terms and expressions that describe the living body, each one 
of them adumbrating its particular character: it is the empirical ego for Husserl, the 
point of contact between the subject (the learner) and the world, the body-subject 
(Leib) in contradistinction to the body-object (Kőrper), it is the incarnate body for 
Merleau-Ponty and the embodied consciousness for both (Tito, 1990, p. 185). “As 
was the case previously with the psychic, everything that has newly flowed in is 
now concretely localized in the world through the living body, which is essentially 
always constituted along with it” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 210). 
The living body is the new movement that the “empirical human ego” “has 
become involved” (op. cit.), the zero point (Husserl, 1970a, p. 332), “[t]he zero-
region of the right-left, the zero-region of the above-below, the zero-region of front-
back” (Husserl, 2001, p. 584), the lived-body (Leib), guided by a consciousness 
(Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 31). Alfred Schutz gives a fair and concise description of 
it, as he introduces Husserl’s transcendental intersubjectivity. 
How, in the frame of the natural attitude, is mutual understanding 
(Einverstandnis) in principle possible? The answer given by Husserl in ldeen 
I (Par. 53), on the occasion of the preparatory analyses of pure 
                                                          
83 Mary’s case is an example of reactivation. 
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consciousness, refers to the experience of a linking of consciousness and 
body (Leib) to form a natural, empirical unity by means of which 
consciousness is located in the space and time of nature, and which, in acts 
of ‘empathy,’ makes possible reciprocal understanding between animate 
subjects belonging to one world. ‘The experiences of others manifest 
themselves to us,’ we apprehend them by virtue of the fact that they find 
bodily expression. (Collected Papers III, 1970, pp. 51-52) 
Husserl’s paradigmatic reflection on the “transcendental-phenomenological 
reorientation” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 210), in his last work that was published before 
his death in 1938,84 concludes with the transcendental dimension and the new 
transcendental discovery that is at hand for the phenomenologist and for one 
phenomenologically introduced and interested in its methodic exploration… 
As was the case previously with the psychic, everything that has newly flowed 
in is now concretely localized in the world through the living body, which is 
essentially always constituted along with it. I-the-man, together with the 
transcendental dimension now ascribed to me, am somewhere in space at 
some time in the world's time. Thus every new transcendental discovery, by 
going back into the natural attitude, enriches my psychic life and 
(apperceptively as a matter of course) that of every other. (Husserl, 1970a, 
p. 210) 
To summarise, “everything that has newly flowed in” from external perception is 
“concretely localized in the world through the living body”, and the latter is 
“essentially always constituted along with it” (op. cit.). The living body is the 
“intentional background of constitutive accomplishments”, it is the essential link that 
                                                          
84 Due to Husserl's illness it was Eugene Fink’s substantial help that the third part of the work was published 
in Belgrade after the previous two parts had been published there already, since, being a Jew he “was denied 
any public platform in Germany” (Husserl, 1970a, p. xvii). “We can see that the Crisis was to be an immense 
work, much longer than the present text. But no manuscript has been found for the conclusion of Part III or for 
the text of Parts IV and V” (ibid.). Yet Husserl left more than 50.000 stenographic pages when he died, a huge 
amount of his ever evolving reflections, rescued by Leo von Breda to Louven, Belgium and only recently fully 
accessed to the public. And it is of no less importance that Merleau-Ponty was one of the first to visit Husserl’s 
archives there.  
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is most often discarded, since it is silent and not immediately visible. When I am 
teaching in the class, explaining what I have written on the board and I hear 
students going “aha! So that’s it!”, I know that their living bodies are fully 
operational towards possible mathematical meaning that my performance evokes. 
Husserlian phenomenology reveals the structure of the original cognitive moment, 
by employing intentionality in a radically new sense (the dirtectedness of, which is 
an immanent feature of consciousness, taken by Brentano) and distinguishing 
between essentially different intentionalities. The living body (Leib), is where 
operative intentionality functions (e.g. Husserl, 2001, Merleau-Ponty 2002) and 
where the—more readily detectable—intentionality of act becomes possible (cf. 
Reuter, 1999; Morris, 2012), which is the same thing. 
What else do I make out of all of this? That the synthesis of identification that starts 
in the pre-reflective stage of the lived experience of the cognising subject (see 
Graph 3 in Part 1 §1.5.7), is possible since it is intentionally oriented by and towards 
a pole, which is no other than the ego pole, which transcends the objects that she 
constitutes and survives (transcends) her own past appearances, as an ‘identical’ 
ego; therefore it originally is a transcendental ego. “The transcendental ego is the 
intentional center of all conscious life and, hence, of all objectifying experiences, all 
affects, all valuations, and all volitions and actions” (Drummond, 2007, p. 205). 
Obviously Brown (2012), following Althusser’s terminology has hit the nail on the 
head with his approach of identifications instead of identities.85 As far as my scope 
of analysis is concerned, it is from the lived experience of identifications that 
constituted identities evolve, into what becomes the mathematical interface of the 
learner/teacher. Since these identities are under formation, and they may change 
dramatically,86 the results of my study appear concomitant with Brown’s approach, 
although deriving from a Husserlian rather than a Lacanian stream of thought.87 
                                                          
85 “Indeed, in Althusser’s terminology, there are no identities, just identifications with particular ideological 
ways of making sense of the world” (Brown, 2012, p. 72). 
86 See Diana’s case for an example of such a change in Part 3, Ch. 2. 
87 For a ‘balanced’ approach of Husserlian phenomenology from Lacanian and Freudian perspectives see 
Leder A. (2012). 
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Brown’s idea in a nutshell is that this survival for the ego is a failure for the 
concept, since the perception of the concept by the subject is never quite identical 
and it introduces edges that redefine the concept (Brown, 2012). Although I would 
sign all statements mentioned here as critical aspects of the phenomenological 
approach to cognition, I would have to add that what makes me feel uneasy is a 
rather functionalist epistemic approach of mathematics, as a result of privileging 
Kuhn’s evolutionary ideas. My study adopts the epistemological historical 
evolutionary theory of Lakatos instead, since mathematics may not be confused by 
natural science, (e.g. ‘counter’ theories may coexist, such as Euclidian geometry, 
which was considered as the only valid form of geometry for more than 2000 years, 
but after the discovery and the foundation of the non-Euclidian geometries it did 
not lose its validity and it became a branch of a broader field). As Grabiner (in New 
directions of the philosophy of mathematics, 1986, p. 212) puts it, mathematics 
“has at once the least destructive and still the most fundamental revolutions”; which 
is something that makes mathematics a science of a particular source, and certainly 
not a positivist science, despite its applications to positivist scientific fields. 
And what we are concerned here with is the grounding of mathematics in the 
learners’ lived experience and the object constituting activity that takes place in it: 
[C]onsciousness is to be understood throughout as a stream that constitutes 
objects and that is subject to pure essential laws; and we must understand 
that this still takes place on the founding level of passivity. For that is the soil 
upon which the free activity of the ego moves and without the knowledge of 
which the higher accomplishments of this activity must remain for us 
completely unintelligible. (ibid., p. 386) 
Hence, in order to understand “the higher accomplishments” of the “founding level 
of passivity”, that the object constitution actually is, the attention will be drawn to 
perception and in particular intuition, since they are “the first fundamental shapes 
of consciousness that are at issue for the structure of consciousness that is 
specifically logical; they are the first foundations in the logical structure that must 
be situated and understood” (Husserl 2001, p. 607).  
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1.5.2 Summary of objectification and of the distinction between 
Husserlian and constructivist approaches – Intuition as objectifying act  
Phenomenology, as the movement inaugurated by Edmund Husserl, has had a 
major influence on contemporary theory through Husserl's published work and its 
influence on Heidegger, Gadamer, Arendt, Levinas, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Derrida 
and numerous other philosophers and scholars (Moran, 2000). There has being a 
surprising convergence between many deconstructive, analytic, and critical theory 
readings of Husserl (Welton, 2000) that produced a standard picture during the 
1960s and the 1970s, which continues to be dominant today. “[S]everal 
postmodernist interpreters have added a second critical analysis that reduces 
Husserl to being a foil for developmental and genealogical accounts that attempt to 
overturn the very possibility of transcendental phenomenology” (Welton,  2003, p. 
xi). Husserl's name has resurfaced more frequently in recent decades “because the 
main concept of his unfinished later philosophy, the ‘life-world’, increasingly draws 
attention” (Held, in Welton, 2003, p. 4). In my research, phenomenology is seen as 
reviving our living contact with reality; and the Husserlian approach to intuition that 
will be exemplified here is seen as a critical way of approaching the learning praxis, 
distinct from misinterpretations based on Kantian and Cartesian perspectives. 
The concept of intuition is stressed as an important feature of mathematical 
learning activity in mathematics education, and the bibliography on this topic is 
particularly rich (Beth & Piaget, 1966; Hersh, 1997; Davis & Hersh, 1998; Fischbein 
1994, 2001; Poincare 2007). Most approaches of intuition are using a constructivist 
lens, originating in Kant, Descartes or Plato; the general idea is that processes that 
inhabit the cogito, the discursive human mind take over, and the abstract intuitive 
processes are ultimately settled in internal, relational cognitive models. Intuition 
borrows its materials from a world that is either internal (in the case of abstract 
objects) or external (in the case of empirical objects). Descartes' cogito insight has 
been confused with the Husserlian approach to intuition, as Hintikka (2003, pp. 178-
179) explains: 
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Among other alleged similarities, Descartes' cogito insight has been 
compared with Husserlian intuitions. … For Husserl, the certainty of an 
intuition is due to the fact that an object has been given to me, not to the 
fact that its object is in my consciousness. In contrast, according to one 
especially interesting interpretation of the Cartesian cogito, the certainty of 
my thinking is created by myself, viz. by performing an act of thinking. 
On the other hand, Kantian approaches to intuition see it as a mental act that 
presents empirical or mental objects to us, based on pictorial models, ideality, 
abstractness, absolute perfection and universality (Fischbein, 1994, 2001). What is 
common in most approaches to intuitive thinking is that they do not give a clear 
picture of what intuition actually is and how it emerges. Hersh (1997, p. 65) 
maintains that “[w]e have intuition because we have mental representations of 
mathematical objects. … We don’t know how these representations are held in the 
mind/brain. We don’t know how any thought or knowledge is held in the 
mind/brain”. Fischbein (1994, p. 88) explains that when a child “affirms that a line 
may be extended indefinitely, he expresses an intuition. This intuition is related to 
his experience”. Fischbein’s behavioural roots of intuitive representations (ibid, Ch. 
7) are concomitant with the approach of constructivism and its radical ramifications 
to perception in general (e.g. Richards & von Glasersfeld, 1980; Cobb, 1994; Cobb 
& Yackel, 1996; Steffe & Kieren, 1994), being faithful to the Kantian perception of 
experience as knowledge: 
When Kant maintains that the “I” makes experience possible, he is working 
with a very special concept of experience.  By experience Kant means 
objective thinking, knowledge. “Experience is an empirical knowledge,” 
writes Kant (CPR 208 [B 218]). Hence for Kant experience is knowledge and 
already involves objective categories. (Tito, 1990, p. 78) 
The radical constructivist turn attempted to part from the ontological theoretical 
commitments to the Piagetian cognitive pedagogy, by classifying them as trivial 
(Steffe & Kieren, 1994, pp. 720-721), as it intended to release the possibilities for 
expansion of the Piagetian claim for cognition through action. Although this is a 
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necessarily rough description of a rich movement that broke from behaviourism, 
empiricism and naïve idealism (cf. Steffe & Kieren, 1994), it may suffice for the 
space available to summarise by adding that constructivism never broke its ties with 
Kantian transcendental idealism, as it is in the core of its perception of individual 
cognition. 
In contradistinction to Kantian and Cartesian approaches the research adopts 
a Husserlian perspective, where “there is a level of experience that has not yet been 
subjected to the objective categories, a level of experience that is the ground of the 
objective categories” (Tito, 1990, p.78). This level is orchestrated through what 
Husserl and Merleau- Ponty call  the  living  body,  “which is  never  absent  from  
the  perceptual field”  (Husserl, 1970a,  p.  106). Husserl also distinguishes between 
operative intentionality and intentionality of act, and Merleau-Ponty's 
phenomenological analysis of perception is crucially using Husserl’s operative 
intentionality (Reuter, 1999, pp. 70-72). The operative intentionality is “already at 
work before any positing or any judgment” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 498), and it 
makes the intentionality of act possible. Τhe intuitive process, starts from the 
separation of forms that are imposed on the raw empirical material. “What is given 
in intuition for Husserl are components of reality, not our impressions of them, … at 
this absolutely  crucial  point  he remains  totally  foreign  to the  Kantian  way of 
thinking” (Hintikka, 2003, p. 174).  In this sense, intuition is approached as an 
essential mediator between the learner’s world-as-lived and her objectification 
process. The objects, in order to become objects for the cognisant’s embodied 
consciousness (i.e. to become consciously realised as such) they are intentionally 
synthesised from pre-objective (object-like) formations, in novel thematisations, 
and thus objectified. These constitutions of objects bring with them profiles of the 
real, through processes of ‘I can’, ‘I could’, rather than ‘I think’. Processes where 
intuition is responsible for bringing direct evidence for empirical or abstract 
constitutions of suitable objectivities for the tasks at hand.  
This spiral description concerns the motor drive of the achievement that 
objectification is, which is no other than the fulfilment of intentionality. 
Objectification takes place when intuition spots at last what was implicitly sought 
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already, it re-crognises it (cognises it anew) as fitting, fulfilling the web of intentions 
that were attracted to it, yet effected by the allure of the objects themselves. For 
phenomenology does not hand in the creative aspect of knowledge to the subject 
pole alone or to her constructions. Rather, it attributes significant importance to the 
object poles that are ‘constantly refreshed’. I move in the kitchen as I am ‘forced’ 
to notice a small dark discrepancy on the white kitchen counter to my left; I almost 
have to turn and look. It is my dark red pen. Oh yes, the one I was looking for. 
Equally well I’m drawing on the arsenal that I am afforded with when I am after a 
mathematical task, according to particular features that I choose to focus my 
attention; and it is most usually in these areas that I gain results.  
This genetic feature of the fulfilment of intentionality in the objectification 
process is also important for this study, since it is a precursor of the engagement of 
intuitions; since the only features missing from objectification as it was just 
described, in order to be realised intuitively are immediacy and the feeling of 
certainty (“filling of clarity”) that inevitably comes with it, due to the fulfilment. 
Intuitions in all these states play a crucial part, seen from the Husserlian perspective 
that is advocated here, since they make possible the association of distant 
neighbourhoods of the learner’s world of objects, and enabling new thematisations 
of previous objectifications.    and by what it makes visible as a possibility to explore 
further.  And this does not necessarily mean that what is discovered or unearthed 
(de-sedimented) is known in advance, but rather that it is intended and prepared 
pre-reflectively, before its appearance as an object. The interplay of the ever 
present indeterminacy of perception—i.e. the absence that co-determines the 
presence of consciousness 88  in transcendental (empirical) and abstract 
(mathematical) objects—demands that the evidence of the first prehensions 
(Tragesser, pp. 18-19) of the object, of the first incomplete apprehensions that 
intuitive processes bring to the surface  with the filling of certainty be lit by action, 
in order to be known for what they are, for their objective sense that will be specified 
                                                          
88 Husserl’s term for the co-presence of what is absent is apperception (cf. Glossary/Index of terms). See also 
Anthony Steinbock’s (2003), approach of Husserl’s home-worlds and alien-worlds. 
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in a certain judgment.  
When we speak of belief, of a consciousness of being, we indeed have in 
mind within the lived-experience in question, a directedness, an intending 
directedness toward the object. Doxa is intending. Intending can mean: I 
intend, I am directed toward something in a believing manner. But already 
within passivity we find an intention, as belonging to the structure of 
intentional lived-experiences as such without the ego coming into play as a 
subject who is [actively] directed, as a cognitively striving subject potentially 
making a decision. It is what in truth transforms a concrete lived-experience, 
perhaps like a remembering or an expectation already stirring in the 
background, into an intentional lived-experience. If, from the ego, this same 
lived-experience later becomes patent, the intention takes on the act-mode 
of the "ego cogito.” Intending, understood in its current sense, signifies 
something wholly determinate, something we obtain in a completely clear 
manner when we think of our analyses of experience; it is that intending that 
is ultimately an intending constituting a unitary objective sense, and that 
makes up the fundamental structure of a consciousness as a consciousness 
directed toward an object. (Husserl, 2001, p. 449) 
Husserl gives here indications of the subtle but crucial distinction between his 
approach to experience and Kantian/Cartesian ones. It is where immediacy (the 
direct, instant manner) will meet intentionality (directedness towards an object) in 
the intuitive act. 
For Husserl, objects are not perceived in isolation but against a background 
and in the midst of a surrounding world of other objects and also of other living 
bodies which are also other persons, animals, and so on (Husserl, 1989). The 
object’s life starts in the pre-objective, pre-reflective sphere of conscious (yet not 
reflected) raw impressions (Graph 3 in Part 1 §1.5.7), rendered intelligible through 
the living body, and integrated by the embodied consciousness, as the object is 
separated from the cognisant’s lived-experience, and learned as it is used for the 
intention that brought it to life in the first place. This is the story of objectification 
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in a nut-shell, from its intentional origins and the subjective way that it is taken up—
as a conscious striving for fulfilment of the intentional embodied consciousness—up 
to the achievement of the object constitution. Now, when this fulfilment takes place 
with immediacy an intuition is realised, as the ‘aha’ feeling, as a response to a gut 
feeling, releasing a feeling of certainty for the outcome, for the intuitive object, as 
the suiting fulfilment of the intentionality that brought it to surface.  
Of course for Husserl, what I just described is only the first stage of his five 
stages objectification process (1970a, pp, 359- 361). But we need not concern with 
his full theory of objectification here, since the aim is to look at the emergence of 
the object within the learner’s investigation, as something standing against 
(Gegenstand) the flow of appearances in his consciousness (Radford, 2003, pp. 39-
40; cf. Graph 3 in Part 1 §1.5.7), due to answering (fulfilling) a particular intention 
that the learner starts with or develops. The fulfilment of this intention with 
immediacy is the intuitive object, which can further the exploration of the learner 
and become a key moment for her investigation, as we will see in the analysis of 
the data. 
1.5.3 Two kinds of intuition and the categorical structure of knowledge 
Intuition is a highly controversial topic in science and philosophy and some authors 
even suggest that the concept of intuition may be misleading and that it should be 
avoided in scientific reasoning (Fischbein, 1999, p. 11). Many researches describe 
different kinds of intuitions that are supposed to function on different levels of 
cognition, from empirical to abstract knowledge. Piaget distinguishes empirical 
intuition—which concerns the physical or psychological properties of objects (Beth 
& Piaget, 1966, p. 224)—and operational intuition that “possesses an immanent 
logic” (ibid., 212). Fischbein (1994) classifies intuitions by their origins as primary 
and secondary, where “Primary intuitions refer to those cognitive beliefs which 
develop in individuals independently of any systematic instruction as an effect of 
their personal experience. (p. 64), while “the category of secondary intuitions 
implies the assumption that new intuitions, with no natural roots, may be 
developed. Such intuitions are not produced by the natural, normal experience of 
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an individual” (ibid., p. 68). 
Let us look more closely to the philosophical base of Piaget and Fischbein’s 
positions, since the latter’s approach is also endowed with a constructivist lens, 
originating from the Kantian theory of mind (Otte, 1998). For Fishbein intuition is 
an act of consciousness that presents empirical or mental objects to us, based on 
pictorial models, ideality, abstractness, absolute perfection and universality 
(Fischbein, 1994, 2001). In this approach intuition appears in an already structured, 
thematised world, as a “combination of incompleteness of information and intrinsic 
certitude” (Fishbein p. 51). The ‘blindness’ of constructivism to the pre-objective 
stage of the cognitive lived experience makes the constitution of abstract entities 
incomprehensible: it leaves the structure of the lived world unexplicated and the 
origins of constitution are lost in predisposed categories. 
For Husserl there is a level of experience that has not yet been subjected to 
the objective categories, a level of experience that is the ground of the 
objective categories. The ‘I’ is such an experience, an experience that is 
preobjective, and is not knowledge. (Tito, 1990, pp. 78-79) 
Husserl (1970b, 1983b) gave a privileged position to intuition for systematic 
knowledge (Smith, 2007), by placing it at the core of his principle of all principles 
(Husserl, 1983a, p. 44). He approached intuition as that act in which a person 
grasps something immediately in its bodily presence and also as a primordially given 
act upon which all of the rest is to be founded. For Husserl the source of intuitions 
is reality itself, constituted by the subject not in a metaphysical manner but through 
the immediate contact with it, the intuitive contact. “What is given in intuition for 
Husserl are components of reality, not our impressions of them, ... at this absolutely 
crucial point he remains totally foreign to the Kantian way of thinking” (Hintikka, 
2003, p. 174). 
1.5.4 Husserl’s Stages of intuitions - Empirical and Abstract intuitions 
According to Husserl, the intuitive process starts from the separation of the forms 
that are imposed on the raw empirical material (the hyletic data or simply hyle, 
deriving from the Greek word for matter), from the data themselves. 
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“Empirical intuitions are due to reality impinging on my consciousness, not 
to the activities of my own mind. ... In order to reach empirical intuitions, I have 
so to speak to look outwards, not inwards” (Hintikka, 2003, p. 178). Husserl calls 
this first stage Anschauung—intuition—and the outcome of this stage is an 
empirical object. For Husserl the empirical intuitions are not an experience in the 
Kantian sense, since consciousness is already embodied. The separation is not 
performed due to the categories that manipulate the empirical (sensory) data; nor 
is it a mere mental recognition of patterns that are so far familiar only to others. It 
is intuition that allows embodied intentional consciousness to distinguish objectlike 
entities from raw material and transform them into empirical objects. The objectilike 
entities reside consciousness until operative intentionality will call them forth to a 
new thematisation, a new unity that is constitutive for the new object. Embodied 
consciousness is what Husserl and Merleau-Ponty call the living body, “which is 
never absent from the perceptual field” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 106, also cf. Merleau-
Ponty, 2002a, p. 87, and Tito, 1990, p. 185). The body89 plays an essential role in 
the fulfillment of operative intentionality, since it is “a sensory-motor behavior 
through which the world is constituted for man (sic) as the world of human 
consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. xvi). The operative intentionality is 
“already at work before any positing or any judgment” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. 
498) and it “produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our 
life” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. xx). It is pre-reflective but this does not mean that 
it is unconscious (Reuter, 1999, p. 76); and it can be revealed: 
We do not see the operation, since it operates. We see what would be 
missing without it; we circumscribe it as what makes speech be a "speaking 
of" ... and not be the conscious having of the idealities implied in speech. 
(Merleau- Ponty, 2002b, p. 44)90 
Due to the operative intentionality the cognising subject does not construct objects 
(by imposing categories on experience) but rather enacts and inhabits them, by 
                                                          
89 The body as (intentional) subject, not as an object (cf. Reuter, 1999, pp. 71-72). 
90 The extract is from Merleau-Ponty's notes on Husserl's Origin of Geometry. 
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separating them from the unstructured raw material. Despite the immediate feeling 
of certainty that intuition brings there is a tension, since the intuitive moment with 
all its fullness of certainty is realised as a prehension, i.e. the “inadequate or 
imperfect grasp of something, where the content of the grasp adumbrates or points 
to something beyond what is given … a form of incomplete cognitive apprehension” 
(Tragesser, 1977, pp. 18-19). What is crucial from our cognitive point of view is 
that the operative intentionality makes possible the intentionality of act (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002a, p. 486), “which is that of our judgements and of those occasions 
when we voluntarily take up a position” (p. xx). The intentionality of act is 
responsible for the “more complete apprehension of the object” (ibid. p. 19) that is 
achieved through its application to the task. 
The other crucial novelty of Husserl’s approach towards Kantian 
epistemologies that concerns us here is his introduction of the categorial intuitions, 
which are intuitions of abstract objects (Husserl, 1970b). The categorial intuitions 
take place in two stages, (structurally) following empirical ones and (factually) using 
their products. 
When the second intuitive stage takes place—the categorial stage—an abstract 
object emerges, in a process that is “more like seeing than imagining’ (Hintikka, 
2003, p. 177). According to Husserl: 
Husserl's essences, do not come to us separated from the empirical objects 
whose "forms" they are. ... This intuition has the effect of opening to my 
consciousness, not only an empirical object consisting of matter and form, 
but that form or essence in itself, separated from its hyle. (Hintikka, 2003, 
pp. 177, 180) 
The intuitions of essences (Wesensschau) are a special case of categorial intuitions 
and I refer to both of them as abstract intuitions. For the same reasons 
Wesensschau will refer to both of them.91 Let us sum up the two main kinds of 
intuitions according to Husserl: 
                                                          
91 Examples of categorial intuitions and intuitions of essences are given in the data analysis section. 
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 The empirical intuition (Anschauung) enables the subject to extract forms- 
objects from the raw empirical material (the hyle) through her lived 
experience, due to operative intentionality. The disentanglement of forms 
turns them into empirical objects and they become known as such, as soon 
as they are separated. 
 The abstract intuition (categorial, and intuition of essence, or Wesensschau) 
enables the subject to extract abstract forms-objects from the products of 
empirical intuition, as well as from the results of more elaborated objectifying 
acts. The disentanglement of abstract forms takes place due to the 
intentionality of act, and turns them into abstract objects that are still based 
on the subject’s lived experience. 
1.5.5 Intuitions as interrelated forms, functioning in a similar way 
The stages of the categorial intuition, i.e. the empirical and the abstract stages are 
linked, although the second one may immediately succeed or take place long after 
the first one. 
Since the empirical objects of the first category can become materials for 
the second one that produces abstract objects, Husserl provides a strong indication 
for the emergence of abstract objects as interrelated with empirical objects, which 
either are or they are related to empirical material, previously objectified. And he 
approaches cognition as linked to the learner’s embodied consciousness, rather 
than to pre-existing objective categories. He grounds the seeing of ‘essences’ on 
an embodied perception of conscious activity, and identifies intuition as the 
operator “on the overlap of my consciousness and reality” (Hintikka, 1995, p. 82), 
as an actual mediator between the world-as-lived by the individual and her 
constitution of abstract mathematical objects. His inquiry concerns “the way in 
which the life-world constantly functions as subsoil, into how its manifold prelogical 
validities act as grounds for the logical ones, for theoretical truths” (Husserl, 1970a, 
p. 124). 
Categorial intuitions follow the pattern of empirical intuitions: The latter 
intend objectlike entities and by intuitive synthesis thematise them into empirical 
~ 111 ~ 
 
objects; the former collect invariable features (essences) of empirical objects and 
they synthesise them into abstract objects. 
Husserl’s theory elucidates how an empirical object is transmuted to an 
abstract object during the 2nd stage-category of intuition, how an abstract object 
undergoes the same process as it is transformed into another abstract object and 
so forth. Husserl, as a mathematician, is aware of the particular nature of 
mathematical norms and mathematical objects which can proceed higher and 
higher in a process of abstraction. 
1.5.6 Properties/features intuitive moments 
Intuitions have three principal properties/features, emanating from Husserl's theory 
and allowing us to detect and classify them as such. These properties have a genetic 
(existential) link to intuitions, since each one of them is a ‘component’ of the 
possibility for the intuition to emerge as such: 
 Intentionality, namely the directedness of consciousness towards objects, 
which is for Husserl a fundamental attribute of all conscious acts, especially 
in their ‘pregnant’ state (Husserl, 1980, p. 106), as intuition certainly is. 
Intentionality is the property that makes intuition an objectifying act: “what 
makes seeing an essence an intuition is not that it is seeing an essence, 
but that it is seeing an object which is ‘itself given’” (Hintikka, 2003, p. 181, 
italics in the original). 
  Immediacy is the intuitions’ critical feature, which distinguishes them from 
other concepts such as memory or imagination (Husserl, 1970b; Hintikka, 
2003; Held, in Welton, 2003). Immediacy is understood in a double sense 
of instantaneity and of the actual straightforward involvement in the world, 
i.e. a sense of  
 The feeling of certainty (“filling of clarity”, Husserl, 1970b) is a feature that 
comes inevitably as the object emerges, that is as the object fulfills the 
intentionality that brings it to the surface. It is nothing but the filling of 
intentionality, expressed as the feeling that ‘this is the sought object’, felt 
with immediacy. 
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These criteria were used in the analysis of the empirical data allowing me to 
understand the different kinds of intuition that the students used, according to their 
relations to the students’ lived experience. The Husserlian theory of intuitions 
offered a solid explication of their origins in the cultural and time dependent world 
of experience, and it shed light on their expansion to more elaborated intuitions. 
Being attentive to visual and kinesthetic evidences of the sensory-motor pre-
objective experience of the student I expect to have a glimpse on how intuition 
transforms raw material into objects, thus contributing something critical for 
mathematical education by better understanding the constitution of the 
mathematical objects by the students. 
1.5.7 A summarising table and an explicative graph 
The Table 1 and the Graph 3 that follow give an overview of the Husserlian theory 
of perception and cognition that my study employs in the analyses of the learning 
episodes in Part 3.  It is read from top to bottom and from left to right, and the 
‘final product’ appears at the bottom right box. Also, the last column is running 
parallel to the structure of the other three columns, being its constant source. The 
Table 1 makes use of Husserlian texts from (Husserl, 1969, 1973, 1999a, 2001). 
The quotation marks also refer to Husserlian texts (1999a, 2001). Although passivity 
and activity appear in the diagram as separated they are depicted as such only for 
the sake of the analysis. As Husserl (1973, p. 203) put it,  
When we distinguish two levels of interest and, corresponding to these, two 
levels of objectifying operations, viz., that belonging to receptive experience, 
on the one hand, and that of predicative spontaneity, on the other, this 
distinction of levels should not be construed as if the different operations 
were somehow separate from each other. On the contrary, things which must 
be treated separately for the sake of analysis and which, genetically, are 
recognized as belonging to different levels of objectification are as a rule 
actually closely entwined. 
The operative intentionality and the intentionality of act that are linked to the 
passive and the active stages respectively are “closely entwined”; they belong “to 
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receptive experience, on the one hand, and that of predicative spontaneity, on the 
other”, thus corresponding to the “two levels of objectifying operations” (ibid.).  
The fact that the operative functions precede the active, constitutive activities 
does not mean that the former are in fact something independent from the latter; 
or, as Husserl put it, “[t]hat receptivity precedes predicative spontaneity does not 
mean that the former is in fact something independent” (ibid.). Moreover, and most 
pertinent to my study, these intentionalities operate with corresponding intuitions, 
as they proceed towards objectification. A new intentionality transforms the sense 
that I had endowed my table, as soon as I notice its beechen drawers; by 
thematising them I recall that I have a beechen armchair at the basement, one that 
I had long forgotten. The levels of receptive experience and of predicative 
spontaneity succeed each other, yielding objects in their entwinement. And “only 
that can be originally predicated which has been originally given in an intuition, 
apprehended, and explicated” (ibid.). 
The Graph 3 contextualises the Table 1, as it places the learner’s cognitive 
acts within the broader life-world of her mathematical activity. It depicts the general 
structure that links objects and tasks, objects and object-like formations, and object-
like formations and the primordial lived-experience, i.e. the three temporal stages 
of the present ‘moment’. Finally, it relates the functions of the active (pertaining to 
actions) and the operative (pertaining to operations) syntheses, as leading to 
objects and object-like formations respectively. Both the Table 1 and the Graph 3 
could be functional as points of reference during the analyses of the three learning 
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Table 1: From passive genesis and passive synthesis to the thematised object 
and the commencing of objectification.  
From passive genesis and passive synthesis to the thematised object  
and the commencing of objectification 
Processes / stages 
Intentionalities 
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PART 2 – Methodology/Methods 
A few words for the following sections of this chapter 
As we need to know how the theory that we were implicated with in the previous 
part of the study will help us understand the analysis of the data that follows, this 
chapter aims at delineating the methods used and the overarching methodology, 
their close connection to the chosen theoretical framework and the inevitable choice 
of the methodology, as the only one that could afford the findings of the study. 
More than a tautology, the expression just used indicates the critical part that the 
methodology played for the accomplishments of this research study.  
A summarising diagram is used (§ 2.2) and the general methodological routes 
that are necessary before delving into the data are given, for each of the three 
cases. Since each case is studied by focusing on the diversity of expressions that 
are met particularly for that case, rather than on the commonalities across the 
cases, which are expected to arise only after the data will become findings. Only 
after immersing in each students’ mathematical accomplishments (shaped as 
mathematical objects), and after arriving at the phenomenological description of 
each case, with its emphasis on the intentional character of conscious acts, may we 
be able to argue that the methodology/methods employed here were justified, post 
factum. As anticipated by the phenomenological approach of the study, the latter is 
faithful to the students’ thoughts, acts and strategies, as I implemented a novel 
approach to mature Husserl, one that resorts to concrete data in order to bring 
evidence of the constitutive accomplishments of the students, and the stimulus of 
these intuitive ideas for theoretical—mathematical—actions. While the transition 
from empirical to abstract contexts is also under investigation. Bearing in mind that 
all these actions are seen as phenomena, under the phenomenologist’s special 
attention (specific “regard”) that its principles are delineated here. 
Hence this part of the study concludes with the methodological implications of a 
historical-philosophical issue that lies at the core of the philosophical research 
questions of the study, also related to the question concerning the possibility of 
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knowledge, known as Meno’s paradox. The introduction of this issue is also expected 
to deepen methodologically the theoretical distinctions that were clarified in the 
previous part of the study, between my phenomenological approach and other 
theoretical approaches to learning—the cognising praxis. 
2.1 Introduction  
The driving force of this study is my intention to explore the genetic moments of 
cognitive activity, in the sense that Husserl (1936, 1989, 1973, 1991, 2001) gives 
to it and Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2002a, 2002b) develops it to the primacy of 
perception. I aimed at describing the mathematical phenomena as they occurred in 
the tasks, from the students’ individual perspectives, and to start from a viewpoint 
free from hypotheses about what the students’ constructions should be and as free 
as possible from preconceptions (Husserl, 1970b). For this reason I attempted to 
apply a phenomenological reduction that focuses on the experience in which the 
objects in general and the mathematical objects in particular are given to the 
cognising subjects, instead of analysing the objects of experience themselves. Under 
this perspective, bracketing was necessary in order to approach the students’ 
objects as they appeared. Starting from ‘bracketing’ the body of the mathematical 
tradition and ‘bracketing’ cultural interventions in the learning process I was driven 
towards “bracketing of questions regarding the actual existence of the experiences 
on which we reflect and the object of those experiences and focusing instead on 
the object just in the manner of its appearance” (Drummond, 2007, p.160). I 
participated in the whole course of learning sessions and I adopted the teacher’s 
strategy (who withheld directing the students), in order to draw on embodied 
experience to proceed through empirical intuitions to abstract intuitions. Inevitably, 
I was not a detached and impartial observer but an internal participant who tried to 
enter into the perceptions of the students and see the learning situations as they 
saw them. It was an ongoing and adjusting process of bracketing and coming to 
the phenomenological attitude (Moustakas, 1994; Lester, 1999). In this context the 
current study approaches the learning process from a point of presence within and 
through it, attempting to make it as transparent as possible by accessing its origins 
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in the student’s conscious acts, deeply rooted as they are in the individual and 
common horizons of the world-as-lived and perceived by the learner. 
2.1.1 From the communicable expressions to the intrapsychically 
constituted structures – The methodology and the methods used in the 
study 
Under the perspective that I adopted during my participation in the sessions (as it 
was delineated in the previous section), and while I was aiming at the investigation 
of the students’ key ideas, I explored the student’s communicable expressions 
(verbal, figurative, diagrammatic, etc.); different levels of systematisation, 
generalisation and abstraction surfaced, as I tried to gain access to the 
“intrapsychically constituted structures” (Husserl, 1936, p.163), from which these 
expressions originated. Through the students’ communicable expressions of their 
key ideas I came to intuitions as critical acts for the emergence of mathematical 
objects. Hence my focus was specified, from objectification ‘in general’ to the study 
of the role of intuition in the process of objectification. 
By applying the phenomenological reduction I was “led back” from natural beliefs 
to the reflective consideration of intentions and their objects” (Audi, 1999, p. 405). 
My argument is that the treatment of the particular case studies could gain 
generality towards the mechanisms of objectification that they exemplify, not by 
inductive conclusion but by phenomenological evidence that “covers other acts 
besides simply perceptive seeing”, while “[s]ense-formations whose nature it is to 
exist as subjectively produced results are 'grasped' originaliter92 in being produced” 
(Dorion Cairns cited in Husserl, 1936, p. 13).  
It is in this sense that I achieved evidences of different kinds of intuitions, which 
were revealed not as empirically existent and observable, but as the residue of my 
phenomenological analysis. The foregoing approach resulted in a methodology that 
was consistent with the phenomenological attitude, i.e. with my “leading back” from 
                                                          
92 The term ‘originaliter’ is used by Dorion Cairns and Husserl in order to express the ‘grasping’ in its 
'personal' actuality; another term used by Husserl for the same reason is originarily (cf. Moran & Cohen, 
2012, p. 264 and the Glossary/Index). 
~ 119 ~ 
 
natural beliefs to the reflective consideration of intentions and their objects” (Audi, 
1999, p. 405). Thus the phenomenological instruments used in this research were 
as follows: the phenomenological attitude, which was the overarching 
phenomenological instrument that developed through the study, the 
phenomenological reduction, and the bracketing or epochè. 
2.2 Delineating the methodological instruments that are used by this 
research – The methodology as the movement from the natural to the 
phenomenological attitude 
In order to apply the theory that was introduced in the theory chapter, it was 
necessary to use a phenomenological methodology, which was realised through the 
phenomenological attitude. The latter approaches the world as a phenomenon in 
the phenomenological sense, in contrast with the natural attitude, which involves a 
presupposed commitment of belief in the existence and reality of the objects of the 
experiences in question (Husserl, 1983a, § 30). This distinction was crucial for the 
application of the theory, since it is one that distinguishes phenomenology from 
phenomenalism, as Husserl (2001) explains.  
In order to enter the phenomenological attitude it was necessary to apply 
the phenomenological reduction. The phenomenological reduction, which is “the 
name for the process by which we move to the phenomenological attitude” (Audi, 
1999, p. 405) involves a “suspension of judgment” (ibid., p. 373), a bracketing that 
Husserl (1999a, § 8, p. 20) calls epochè. In other words, entering the 
phenomenological attitude entails, apart from and alongside the reduction, the 
putting out of action or suspending all the intentions and convictions of the natural 
attitude. But it is important to note that “this does not mean that we doubt or negate 
them, only that we take a distance from them and contemplate their structure” 
(Audi, 1999, p. 405). 
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Another term that is used by Husserl for the aforementioned suspension of 
the general thesis93 of the natural attitude (Husserl, 1983a, § 30) is bracketing, and 
it is the term that I will mostly use for the epochè. The image of bracketing 
presumably comes from mathematics, where the expression within the brackets can 
be kept separate from the operations going on outside the brackets. Bracketing is 
not a negation, but rather like putting something in quarantine, a putting out of use, 
a ‘switching off’ of the activity of the thing (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 52). But 
bracketing does not mean to deny my prior knowledge of the analysed experience 
and my prior knowledge in general, since both sources of knowledge are needed in 
order to understand what is happening in the first place and in the last instance; 
bracketing is rather to put into question all that appears, in exploring the how of 
their appearance; to use my prior knowledge of the experience in re-cognising the 
objectification process, as it becomes meaningful for the person who constitutes it 
as sensible, who discerns objectivity in her constitution, from the viewpoint of the 
person, and using my suitable prior knowledge that is related to what the person’s 
constitutions within the given task are, according to what is at task for her each 
time. Deactivated in quarantine, my knowledge is activated again at the point of 
relevance, or be discarded fully, as interfering with my reduction to the radical 
questioning that I’m undertaking. 
Moving from the natural attitude, with its naïve, “unquestioned belief in the 
world” (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 49), to the phenomenological attitude—which 
examines the world as a phenomenon—by using the method of the 
phenomenological reduction,94 corresponds to my movement from the data sources 
to the data (Graph 4); and in the following sections I will clarify the elements of 
these relations. 
                                                          
93 “Thesis” in Greek means position, and Husserl speaks of it as 'positing' (Thesis, Position, Setzung) (Moran 
& Cohen, 2012, p. 136). For Husserl’s description of the suspension or bracketing of the naive acceptance of 
the general thesis of the natural attitude cf. Husserl, 1983a, § 31, pp. 59-60; 1999a, §8.  
94 And including bracketing or epochè (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 110). 
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Graph 4. Summation diagram of the phenomenological methodology 
 
2.3 The three settings and the corresponding data sources 
My aim when I started this research was to study objectification, since I wanted to 
explore and understand better how the students conceptualise mathematical 
phenomena, and how they produce knowledge in order to tackle the problems that 
they encounter during their learning activities. The bracketing that was mentioned 
in the previous section was a specifically phenomenological one, since it bracketed 
everything but the shifting of my attention from the object to the manner in which 
the object is apprehended by consciousness (Moran & Cohen, 2012, pp. 52-53). It 
is in the same sense that the data analysis is a reduction to the critical acts that 
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determined the judgments of the students, when they were ‘forced’ to devise their 
own mathematical expressions. As my investigation progressed, intuitions became 
the key in unlocking the objectification process; intuitions presented by Husserl in 
their objectifying and embodied nature. And my methodology consisted in putting 
out of play all aspects that did not allow me to focus on objectification as a 
phenomenon, as a challenged existent of subjective acts in and for the world, not 
as a ready-made social-cultural transference of information. 
As my research progressed and the phenomenological reduction and bracketing 
were employed in more and more areas of the learning episodes, new data were 
appearing as associated in one way or another with the analysed ones, or as 
products of previous reflection and analysis themselves, and at the same moment 
as  ‘raw material’ for a novel thematisation. The process of the flow of data that 
were transformed to findings due to the phenomenological methodology, and the 
latter being applied to the findings, i.e. to the products of the analysis, is depicted 
in the diagram with the frame that focuses on the pair of real and intentional 
components of the study. In this iterative process where the flow of data was 
transformed to findings, according to the theory, intuition became the key in 
unravelling the students’ conceptions and understandings. The analysis, the 
methodology and the theory converged in triggering findings from the data. But in 
order to arrive at the appreciation of intuitions as the critical feature of the abstract 
mathematical objects’ constitutions by the students, it was essential to bracket all 
aspects that intervened and blurred my view, such as the sociocultural cognitive 
aspect. My bracketing did not negate or cancel the sociocultural influences; it rather 
parenthesised them (Husserl, 1983a, §31, pp. 59-60) in order to focus on the 
phenomenon in question, from the first-person perspective.  
My data sources concern 3 settings from the course that took place at the academic 
year 2010-2011, set up by a certain teacher, whom I will anonymise. These settings 
are the classroom, the students’ coursework and the lengthy interviews’ settings. 
The settings were distinctive clusters of data sources from which data could be 
selected. The data sources for each of these settings are as follows: 
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 Classroom setting: 
o Audio recordings of the sessions. 
o Some video recordings of the sessions. 
o My observations during the sessions. 
o The students’ written reflections during the sessions. 
o Short interviews during the sessions. 
 The students’ coursework setting: 
o The documents that the students submitted as their coursework, at 
the end of the sessions. 
o Written reflections during the sessions. 
 Lengthy Interviews’ setting: 
o Recorded interviews that took place after the end of the sessions. 
o E-mails that followed up the interviews. 
My data sources were not phenomenological when I collected them, since they were 
‘open’ to any approach and any interpretation. In order to transform the data 
sources to data I made certain choices, in a process that involved reduction and 
bracketing.  
Firstly, I chose the first person perspective. I made this choice because I 
wanted to be faithful to my phenomenological perspective, as I perceive it, since I 
wanted to explore the students’ understandings from their point of view. Wishing to 
gain a better understanding of the students’ objectification process as it appeared 
to the learners, I would not be able to do it if I would adopt any other perspective, 
like for instance the third person perspective. In the latter case, I would have 
examined the phenomenon in question as a natural scientist does; I would have 
created a distance between me and the students’ experiences, which would have 
led me to quantifying and measuring them. The perspective that I chose, i.e. the 
first person perspective put the learner (the first person) at the centre of 
investigation. My aim was to ‘look over the shoulder’ of the learner, as she 
objectified her key ideas, in order to tackle the problems she encountered during 
her investigation. 
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Secondly, I bracketed my convictions concerning mathematics. I had been 
teaching mathematics for more than 15 years in Greece, and it was my first year in 
England, having close access to a very different educational environment, where 
the emphasis is put on problem solving (Brown & Coles, 2012) and high 
achievement in international competitions such as TIMSS and PISA (Brown, 2012), 
in contrast to the more traditional and theoretical emphasis that is the case for the 
Greek educational system. For instance, I did not use my mathematical knowledge 
in trying to predict what the students were trying to find, although I inevitably used 
it as I tried to recognise what they were doing. In other words, my mathematical 
knowledge was important in the understanding of what the students were doing, 
but I did not judge their methods as effective or not, according to my previous 
experience as a mathematics teacher, but I rather attempted to re-cognise what 
sort of achievements their objectifications signaled, from their viewpoint. My views 
about the nature of mathematics and as a teacher of mathematics were important, 
but they were not in focus.  
Thirdly, the teacher helped me bracket the ‘traditional’ teaching part in the 
students’ objectification activities, since his teaching was based on the limited 
direction of the students and the promotion of their confidence in posing and 
addressing their own questions. It is not implied of course that the teacher put 
teaching per se out of play, since he was actually exercising his teaching style; but 
he certainly removed issues that would be taken for granted in most everyday 
institutional form of teaching (schools, universities, training courses etc.), namely 
the guidance of students towards particular mathematical ‘answers’ and specific 
paths in order to acquire them, or the deployment of his knowledge of and about 
mathematics and the usefulness of the teacher’s methods.  The courses did without 
all this,95 in order that the students themselves would take the initiative. If the 
                                                          
95 These features as well as others, such the openness in legitimising the students’’ methods and results, were 
strictly kept by the teacher throughout the courses, and my process was an adoptive one, as I was realising 
that everything I was doing was somehow interpreted by the students and possibly influencing their 
strategies, as they wanted to know more about it—the teacher had introduced me as a Greek teacher of 
mathematics who is doing research on the students’ understandings of mathematics. 
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students would act as protogeometers (see Part 1, §§ 1.2.2, 1.3.1) or just follow 
ideas of others in their groups was totally up to them. But what was most important 
from my research perspective is that the teacher’s methods were opening space for 
the learners in acting out the tasks as they chose, and the according space for my 
study to acquire ‘material’ for reflection.  
Another critical feature of the whole project was the reflective character that 
the teacher brought to the sessions, in the form of short (2-5min) reflective breaks. 
This practice was added smoothly, as a ‘useful practice for all’, and the students 
were quickly adjusted to it. While the reflective practice developed with the sessions 
up to the end, when the students were expected to add a reflective aspect to the 
assignments (coursework) that they delivered to the teacher. What also became a 
valuable data source for me was the students’ written reflections in their coursework 
(useful in all three cases that will be analysed), and those classroom reflections that 
I managed to gain access (see the first case in this study). The reflections facilitated 
the students to evolve their strategies and even their attitudes towards the sessions 
(see the second case in this study), and they helped me to 
 Track important ‘details’ of the student’s feelings towards their treatments of 
the tasks. 
 Formulate questions and topics of discussion for the interviews that followed. 
 Gain a fuller picture of the learning episodes through the more detailed view 
of the students’ objectification ‘moments’ that these reflections offered.  
The students’ ‘systematised’ reflections, combined with the teacher’s methodical 
abstention from guidance and his minimised intervention to the students’ treatments 
of the tasks, were integrated by my study’s methodological choices. And they 
facilitated the emergence of processes that my theoretical filter was aiming at. Thus 
the methodology was combined with the theory, since the methodology allowed to 
be discerned what the theory was ready to build upon. 
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2.4 Common features of the data sources that I selected from the whole 
of the classroom data sources 
Thirteen students participated in the Nature of Mathematics course (hereafter NoM) 
and 18 sessions took place, which were all audio recorded, and two of them were 
video recorded. Out of the data sources that belonged to the classroom setting I 
selected three sessions, and three students, in three different activities. I will now 
explain what led me to this selection (the preliminary reduction and bracketing), 
starting from the common features that drew my attention to each of these data 
sources. 
These three data sources had some things in common, which made them important 
for me: 
 They were all considered very important for the students, since they were 
included in the coursework that they delivered at the end of the course. The 
fact that the students included their work for these three activities in the 
coursework also meant that they put their best efforts in them, which is one 
feature that drew my attention. In particular, Diana’s investigation of the 
Doubling modulo (the 2nd case study) was her favourite of all her 
investigations, and the same was the case for Mary (the 3rd case study). Ivan 
(the 1st case study) had more than one activities as his favourites, but the 
one analysed here was certainly one of them. 
 They were all rich data sources, for the following reasons: 
 I got more familiar with these three students than with the most of 
the other students. One reason for this, in the case of Diana and Mary 
was that I happened to sit with their groups more often than with 
other students, although I was trying to share my presence to all the 
students’ groups. Also, Mary and Diana were extrovert and open to 
me. Their openness allowed me to approach them, to have a deeper 
look at what they were trying to achieve and get a better 
understanding to what was happening from their point of view. It was 
not as straightforward with Ivan, since his inquisitive approach 
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towards me concerning the tasks did not allow me to sit with his group 
too often, as I was keeping an observatory rather than participatory 
part during the students’ mathematical investigations. Yet, there was 
a growing mutual respect, between Ivan and I, which paid off in his 
interviews, and the excellent cooperation we have had even three 
years after the sessions, concerning clarifications of his work and 
providing help in order to contact other students of the same class 
(Mary and Carry), since they had finished their studies in the 
meantime. 
 Each data source was very rich in the sense that in each of the three 
learning episodes I managed to get very close to an incident where 
each student struck an impasse, persisted in his or her individual way 
and finally overcame the difficulty, through mathematical objects that 
the students constituted for this purpose. I witnessed in the course of 
the data collection how their state of indeterminacy, confusion or even 
despair gave results, in each of the cases that were analysed: 
 Ivan, with his insistence for appealing aesthetic forms persisted 
in his particular method throughout the session, he did not 
manage to get results, but he had a feeling in the end that he 
could make it; he went home and he discovered how previously 
neglected findings could yield a complete solution to the task. 
 Diana got into a state of despair as she could not understand 
what the other students were doing, and the teacher would not 
provide any guidance. But she managed to follow her own 
method—for the first time in these sessions—and she 
constituted mathematical objects that were different than 
anyone else. 
 Mary was fully confused during the classroom investigation, 
having misunderstood what the activity was about. But she 
persevered when she went home and she unlocked the task in 
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the most surprising way, going further than the requirements 
of the particular task. 
After the end of the sessions these three data sources stood out for me due to their 
rich environments, and their significance for the students themselves. 
2.5 How the data sources yielded data 
Each of the three data sources provided me with data—which later gave me case 
studies—due to the following additional reasons: 
 The data source in Ivan’s classroom setting, as it was enriched by the 
structure of the classroom investigation, his coursework and a lengthy 
interview, yielded data as follows: 
 Due to a previous session where many diverse student approaches 
were observed but not recorded, one of the aims of the session that 
became one of my three main data sources was to record different 
methods that the students would follow. Since it would be senseless 
to record different groups simultaneously I decided to record the 
activity of one of the groups—which happened to be Ivan’s, Carry’s 
and Donald’s group—and the teacher asked the students to volunteer 
giving short interviews at the beginning of the second part of the 
session, after the break. The students warmly agreed and I took seven 
short interviews, including Ivan’s and Carry’s interviews. Moreover, as 
a usual practice of these sessions, there were three five minutes 
‘reflective breaks’ during the session, when the students were asked 
to write their current understandings of the task, and summarise 
where they thought they presently were, in terms of the maths. Most 
importantly, the students agreed to deliver their notes at the end of 
the session and take them back after I had photocopied them; thus, 
all the work that Ivan and his group did during the session, including 
their reflective texts, became part of the particular data source. As I 
looked at the written material of Ivan and his group, and I listened to 
the interviews of Ivan and Carry, I already thought that it was a very 
~ 129 ~ 
 
interesting data source, which could give interesting data. In 
particular, my attention was drawn to the distinctively different 
strategies that Ivan and Carry followed throughout the session (I was 
not able to detect any particular method in the case of Donald), and 
Ivan’s aesthetic approach to the task. The conflict between Ivan’s and 
Carry’s methods was not resolved—despite the exchange of ideas 
between them—and this was particularly interesting for me because 
from my experience as a teacher I am aware that this is a case that 
most often takes place in a mathematics classroom, and the difficulties 
in communicating different approaches prevail, either between 
students or between the teacher and the students.      But there was 
still a problem concerning my interest in objectification and the 
fullness of the particular data source, since none of the students had 
managed to overcome his or her impasses during the session. Two 
months later, Ivan’s coursework came to my hands. It was the 
moment that the particular session data sources—i.e. my 
observations, the recording of the group’s activity, Ivan’s and Carry’s 
short interviews, and the photocopied material from the group’s 
activity—became data, since Ivan, alone from his group, had shown a 
fervent activity at home, depicted by his detailed reflection, and 
culminating in an interesting objectifying moment that yielded 
amazing results. This data source (i.e. Ivan’s coursework) gave me 
further insights into Ivan’s thinking, crucially complementing my 
preliminary observations of the aforementioned data sources. A 
lengthy interview with Ivan followed, which focused on the 
aforementioned investigation at university and at home, and unfolded 
the richness of his particular objectification. Finally, my e-mail 
communication with Ivan, which extended up to three years after the 
end of the course, clarified important issues that had remained 
obscure in the initial data sources. It was through the aforementioned 
process that I collected rich data for the particular investigation.  
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 The data source in Diana’s classroom setting, as it was enriched by her 
coursework, and a lengthy interview, yielded data as follows: 
 One of the main reasons that Diana’s data sources were chosen was 
that they were a striking contrast to Ivan’s, since unlike Ivan, she was 
struggling throughout the sessions. Although Ivan had difficulties, he 
was not struggling to the extent that Diana was. During the learning 
episode—the classroom setting—that I selected it was obvious that 
she was desperate, although at that time I was engaged in another 
group’s investigation. I could hear her almost shouting that she could 
not understand how to proceed and how the other students were 
dealing with the task. I went closer in order to understand what was 
going on and I noticed that she had written some notes that looked 
like an algorithm to me. I happened to recognise what Diana had 
written—as a set of commands that seemed to have acquired the form 
of algorithms—since I was familiar with computer programming. I 
thought that something interesting was taking place there and I did 
not want to intervene; so I deliberately ignored her call for help and I 
moved back to the group that I was observing at the time. But I kept 
this incident in my mind as a potentially interesting source of data, 
wanting to explore further what was happening. Diana, quite 
unexpectedly, managed to work out a solution, a way out from her 
despair and confusion. It was another case that interested me as a 
teacher, since I was aware from my experience that no matter how 
hard teachers try, nothing can guarantee that their efforts will pay off. 
I had been a witness of the help that many of Diana’s classmates tried 
to offer, by explaining what they were doing in order to attain results. 
But she could not understand their ways, and the teacher would not 
offer any guidance, being faithful to his “limited direction” method of 
teaching. Diana had to move on her own or give up. When the session 
finished my only data source from Diana’s investigation was my 
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observation of the difficulties that she encountered, and I arranged a 
lengthy interview with her, partly because I wanted to understand 
better what had happened and how she dealt with it. Although the 
interview took place five months later Diana had kept her notes during 
the session, and I was surprised to know that the particular task was 
her favourite one; not only had Diana not given up, despite the 
difficulties that she had encountered, but she had managed to devise 
an answer to the task that was different than anybody else’s way of 
tackling it. The objects that Diana constituted became the focus of my 
interest, and she helped me to take a close look at them by e-mailing 
me the material from her classroom investigation. The coursework 
that Diana submitted at the end of the sessions (which obviously 
included her reflection on the particular task) became another rich 
data source, and it also became a source of validation of what we had 
discussed in the interview; and a few more e-mails that she readily 
sent me helped clarify some issues that had remained unclear in the 
aforementioned data sources. Another interesting aspect of Diana’s 
solution, which goes beyond the purpose of my research was that her 
solution would probably be disregarded by many teachers, as not 
being relevant to what the students were supposed to find; but the 
course’s open-endedness towards the students’ preferred strategies 
and results legitimised Diana’s solution, thus enabling her to adopt a 
new perception of learning and teaching. The aforementioned data 
sources—my observations during the session, Diana’s interview, 
Diana’s coursework, the material from her classroom investigation, 
and the e-mails that we exchanged—enabled me to collect rich data 
for Diana’s investigation. Once I had seen all this I knew clearly that 
Diana was another person on whom I wanted to focus as a case study. 
 Finally, another aspect emerged in Diana’s interview, which 
augmented the grounds for choosing Diana: 
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 The last three sessions of the course were dedicated to the 
students’ presentations: each student prepared and presented 
a task to the other students, the teacher and me. Each 
presentation lasted twenty minutes and it was followed by a 
ten minute discussion. Diana’s impression from her 
presentation, as it came out in her interview, was a 
confirmation of the impact that her previous investigation had 
on her (due to the particular circumstances of her object 
constitution, and the legitimisation of her results). This aspect 
accentuated even further the contrasting character of Diana’s 
data to Ivan’s. 
 The data source in Mary’s classroom setting, as it was enriched by her lengthy 
interview and her coursework, yielded rich data as follows: 
 In one of the investigations that took place during one of the sessions 
I participated in a group with Mary and another student. Neither of 
the two students managed to resolve the task, and Mary in particular 
struggled with it, and she seemed to be confused even on how to start 
the investigation. The particular group activity was audio and video 
recorded (after the students’ permission), but my attention was not 
drawn to it until almost four months later, when the teacher told me 
that Mary had produced a fine diagram for this activity. I then 
arranged a lengthy interview with Mary, in which I focused on the 
particular learning episode, trying to gain a close understanding of her 
transition from confusion to clarity, and the objectifications that might 
have enabled it. As soon as we had the interview I had the clear 
feeling of certainty that fascinating data could be produced from 
Mary’s data sources. The student’s coursework—which included her 
diagram and came into my hands a few days after the interview—
enhanced this feeling of certainty. The indications that were related 
to important features of my research, and which supported my 
certainty were the following: 
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 The learning episode was one of Mary’s favourite ones. 
 The student’s transition from perplexity and confusion to 
articulateness and lucidity called for an explication of the part 
that objectification may have contributed to it. 
 Mary’s treatment involved the constitution of many 
mathematical objects, which could be thoroughly explored due 
to the detailed and ample data sources (i.e. the audio and video 
recordings, the interview and the student’s detailed description 
and reflection in her coursework). 
 The student vividly recollected her investigation, despite the 
length of time that had passed until her interview, expressing 
clear and detailed articulations and showing openness towards 
me. 
 Mary’s treatment of the task included ‘balanced’ empirical and 
abstract approaches. 
 The strong embodied aspect that was involved in the student’s 
treatment enabled an exploration of the origins of 
objectification and mathematical abstraction. 
In other words, the interview was the first data source related to Mary 
that gave rich data, and it shed light on the classroom data (on what 
had happened in the classroom) and on the coursework data (on what 
had happened when she continued the investigation at home). Finally, 
I arranged a second lengthy interview with Mary, in order to clarify 
issues that had remained unclear from the previous data, and she 
kindly responded to my e-mails, thus allowing me to gain the deepest 
possible understanding of her investigation, and transform her data 
sources to rich data. 
An example of the actual way that I determined what counts as data for this 
research study is indicative of the methods used and the results that I achieved: 
Mary perceived her diagram she drew at home with her embodied sense, as a bird’s 
eye-view of her classroom investigation (Part 3, §3.4.2.2). It was a significant 
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moment for Mary, since it enabled her a gaze of the maze that the task was for 
her—who knew not what it looked like what she was looking for—from above, in a 
totalising yet ‘static’ view; thus coming to contrast with her ‘dynamic’ embodied 
participation to the task in the classroom, where she was a few hours ago. Yet these 
two views joined together as the student’s perception brought them to a conjoined 
embodied sense, on the graph, on the piece of paper. I understood that the silent 
lived body had operated as an organ of perception, in the transformation of lines 
and points of the diagram to class locations. And I wanted to know how and where 
this embodied, intuitive drive would lead the student. We will see the learner’s 
consequent acts in the analysis, as synthesising on intentional ground, as retaining 
the sense that they endowed their intuitive objects, and as evolving it to expanding, 
generalising mathematical expressions. Hence, we will manage to take a closer look 
to the transition from empirical to abstract knowledge, though (interrelated) 
empirical and abstract objects respectively. Therefore, anything that stood out for 
the learner, utilising it in various expressions towards the mathematical ones was 
data for my study, since it signaled the beginning of the exploration towards the 
intentional relevance of the new object to the task, from the student’s intentional 
perspective. 
2.6 The phenomenological methodology involved in the analysis of the 
data and the 3 cases 
In the previous section I gave a description of how I focused on the data sources 
related to three students and the corresponding learning episodes, starting from the 
data sources related to the three settings (the classroom, the coursework and the 
lengthy interviews). The aforementioned process already involved reduction and 
bracketing, since my attention towards the data sources that triggered the 
generation of data was not anymore a straightforward involvement with the events 
that had taken place and the persons involved in these events.96 By its nature, 
attention “first of all presupposes a transformation of the mental field, a new way 
                                                          
96 As was the case when the classroom data sources were generated; the issue of my own presence in the 
classroom data sources is addressed in the text that follows. 
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for consciousness to be present to its objects” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. 33), in this 
case my own consciousness, as it attempted to thematise my research object-like 
formations (the data sources) into research objects (the data). As I reflected on the 
collected—not yet phenomenologically instigated—data sources, and having already 
the intention to bracket anything that would get in my way, between the students’ 
acts and their intended objects, my attention was drawn to the students’ acts as 
data, instantiated as such by the act of reduction that my attention entailed. 
One of the important criteria of the selection of the data sources that would become 
data was the control over (in the case of Mary) and the minimisation of (in the cases 
of Ivan and Diana) my own participation in the learning episodes in question: 
 I had already made sure that Ivan’s classroom investigation would not in the 
least be effected by my presence to his group, and the same happened in 
the case of Diana, as I have already explained in the previous section. 
 My presence and participation in Mary’s classroom investigation could be 
monitored by subsequent phenomenological methodological and analytical 
instruments, as the analysis of the data will manifest. The feeling of certainty 
that was mentioned in the previous section—in the description of Mary’s 
initial data generation after her first lengthy interview—was also related to a 
preliminary certainty that my participation in Mary’s classroom investigation 
would not become an impediment in the analysis of her data, by crucially 
interfering with her acts and their intended objects. 
2.7 How the data were analysed and became findings – The application 
of the phenomenological reduction and the epochè, and the arrival at 
the phenomenological attitude 
Since my aim was to explore objectification I started looking at the data for instances 
where the students constituted mathematical objects in order to overcome their 
impasses. My reduction was now directed to the students’ acts that intended these 
objects, investigating the intentional relation that enabled the objects to surface. In 
other words I was exploring the mathematical objects as they emerged, focusing 
on the intentional origins of these objects. 
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I have indicated in the previous sections how my preliminary reduction and 
bracketing yielded data, where the teacher’s and my own participation in the 
students’ object constitutions were bracketed, but now, as I was exploring the data 
intending to apply the phenomenological reduction, and while calling “all knowledge 
into question” (Husserl, 1999b, p. 61), a more fundamental problem emerged: how 
one can even start the investigation of knowledge production if “every piece of 
knowledge that might be chosen as a point of departure is thereby also called into 
question?” (ibid.). In other words, what is the sense of the phenomenological 
reduction if its task is unattainable in advance? A radical reflection was needed, in 
order to address this fundamental epistemological issue, namely a reflection that 
turns around the aforementioned question, by asking if knowledge is actually 
denied, or regarded as doubtful in every sense, when it is “called into question”. 
And the answer to the latter question, concerning my methodological inquiry was 
addressed by Husserl (1999b, pp. 61, 62) as follows: 
if epistemology is to address the possibility of knowledge, then it must 
possess forms of knowledge concerning the possibility of knowledge that are 
themselves indubitable, that count as knowledge in the strictest sense—
where there is absolutely no doubt about their own possibility or the fact that 
they have made contact with their object. 
Therefore, in order to apply the phenomenological reduction I needed to address 
and attain three interrelated methodical (i.e. pertaining to method) issues:  
 I needed to “consider indubitable cases of knowledge or possible 
knowledge—ones where knowledge actually reaches, or would reach, its 
object” (p. 62). 
 I needed to drive my inquiry back to the “things themselves”, not as Kantian 
things in-themselves, but as they were intended and as they appeared to the 
learners, and related as they were to the learners’ lived experience. 
 The point of departure needed to be an “attitude focused upon life-world 
phenomena” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 174) and upon the constitution of “things” 
or thing forms. At the outset I needed to refrain from simply assuming that 
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some example of knowledge is indeed knowledge; in this attitude only 
experience itself is indubitable, as it occurs and is simply being reflected 
upon. This focusing on the learning episodes as life-world phenomena, with 
the application of bracketing—i.e. the epochè or transcendental attitude—
was expected to transform the world that I analysed “into the mere 
transcendental ‘phenomenon’”, serving as “transcendental guideline for 
correlative attitudes on higher levels” (ibid.). 
As I indicated earlier in this section, my aim was to explore the emergence of 
mathematical objects and investigate their intentional origins. But as I explicated 
just now, my methodological inquiry oriented my analysis towards the inclusion of 
the ‘non-mathematical’ origins of these objects (examples will be given in the next 
chapter), namely in the object-like formations that supported the emergence of the 
mathematical objects, and the study of their links. My methodological inquiry back 
to the original ‘self-evidence’ of these objects (Husserl, 1936 pp. 163), as ultimately 
founded on the overlap of the learners’ consciousness and their lived reality 
(Hintikka, 1995, p. 82) finally afforded me with the starting-points of the constitutive 
activity (Hintikka, 2003, p. 178) and the end-points of the reduction (ibid. p. 180). 
In other words, my methodological and theoretical lenses converged at what 
became the key of my study of objectification, namely the Husserlian intuitions. 
Finally, my key finding sprouted from the integration of my methodological demand 
and my theoretical “principle of all principles” (Husserl, 1983b, p. 87/151), which lit 
different modes of the intentional fulfillment of genuine concrete experience. It is 
in this sense that my phenomenological attitude enabled my findings by actually 
rendering them visible, from the passive to the active areas of cognitive 
engagement, due to my converging methodological and theoretical lenses.  
All the foregoing exposition concerns the left-hand side of Graph 4 (Part 2 § 2.2), 
which informed the way that the data analysis was conducted. The bottom-up 
process that followed, and the constitution of the three profiles (i.e. the data 
concerning the three students) as three cases for my research, is the topic of the 
next section. 
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2.8 The methodology used in the context of the data analysis that 
follows – The Husserlian method of overcoming the Cartesian 
doubt, in service of the main argument of the study 
In order to clarify a principal claim of my method I need to explicitly distinguish the 
Husserlian phenomenological reduction from the Cartesian doubt.  The radical 
question that was set in the previous section, concerning the investigation of 
knowledge when “every piece of knowledge that might be chosen as a point of 
departure is thereby also called into question”, is in principle a Cartesian question, 
that starts its query from the fundamental doubt that there is nothing in one’s world 
that could be automatically accepted as truth, not even one’s own senses. The result 
of the Cartesian doubt posited thought—the cogito—as the indubitable ground of 
all knowledge and cogitatio/cogitationes, the object(s) of thought as existing beyond 
doubt. Husserl treats the Cartesian question in a new manner, starting with his 
perception of the Cartesian doubt as a latent, unfinished query for the intentional 
act (noesis) and the intended object, as intended, and its peculiar profile (noema) 
that stands out as it is separated for use.  Husserl thematised three “headings”, 
namely the “ego-cogitatio-cogitata: the ego-pole (and what is peculiar to its 
identity), the subjective, as appearance tied together synthetically, and the object-
poles” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 171). Instead of resting on the indubitability of the 
thinking ego, he decides to pursue the three headings “one at a time and in an 
order opposite to that suggested by the Cartesian approach” (ibid., emphasis 
added). He starts with “the straightforwardly given life-world, taken initially as it is 
given perceptually: as ‘normal,’ simply there, unbroken, existing in pure ontic 
certainty (undoubted)” (ibid.). Husserl’s new beginning is “the being of the cogitatio, 
of experience as it occurs and is simply being reflected upon” (Husserl, 1999b, p. 
62).   
Here the Cartesian meditation on doubt provides us with a beginning: the 
being of the cogitatio,97  of experience as it occurs and is simply being 
                                                          
97 Object of thought, more precisely of “experience as it occurs and is simply being reflected upon”. 
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reflected upon, cannot be doubted; the intuitive, direct apprehension and 
possession of the cogitatio is itself a knowing, the cogitationes98 are the first 
absolute items of givenness. (italics in the original) 
This answer allowed my analysis to move in a productive way, with a certainty that 
supported the findings of each stage of my recurrent analysis. My acquisition of the 
primal genetic ‘material of abstraction’ had found its end point, concerning this 
study. “[T]he cogitatio is itself a knowing”, and abstraction is already the next move, 
since what comes after the cogitationes of immediate lived experience is the 
idealisation of the following judgments; “every judgment has a closing [Abschluss] 
in itself; it is in itself something thematically independent. And yet it is a member of 
an open and, according to ideal possibility, constantly widening thematic complex, 
which therefore is not closed” (Husserl, 1973, p. 214). Irrevocably non-
constructivist, Husserl deals with the openness and the potentiability (potential and 
ability) of lived experience, refusing to yield reason to the logicians; he traces the 
constitution of logical predicates in lived experience and in the powers of the lived 
body, while unfolding the constitution of further abstractions when he writes: 
Independent unities constantly arise, but only as judgments of a higher level, 
founded on those of a lower level. Hence, every theoretical unity of judgment 
must be identified as a single moment of a higher order, which, in its much 
greater complexity, is founded in judgments which are again founded in 
judgments, and so on. (ibid., italics in the original) 
Inspired by such a frame of lived experience and being interested in the theoretical 
truths that in our case are the mathematical ones, I reflected more and more on 
the data, as I collected and analysed them. Each of the three cases that will be 
presented in the next Part of the study was formulated as its ‘fragments’ were 
‘coming under the light’ of the theory. Husserlian terms were entering one by one 
the dressing process of the students’ strivings. From the researcher’s point of view 
there is a mutual interplay of clarification and exemplification between the 
                                                          
98 Multiple tense of cogitatio (see the previous footnote). 
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theoretical ideas and their application in the data analysis. The foregoing is a general 
description of the transformation process of data sources to data, and of data to 
more analytically elaborated data (findings), in a cyclical process (cf. Graph 4, Part 
2 § 2.2), through successive phenomenological reflections. 
The teacher’s practices remain bracketed throughout the process, since I 
focused on the students’ acts, and since the latter were not affected by these 
practices, due to the teacher’s own care. A similar method was followed in my own 
case of participatory observation, since my observatory aspect was stressed and the 
participatory one followed the teacher’s non-guidance strategy, although not 
practiced as masterfully as he did. What was important for me was the open and 
friendly access to their groups and their activities; and one of my passports was 
that I was registered as ‘someone who understands mathematics’. This generous 
access was opened by the teacher’s warm introduction and was given to me by all 
the students throughout the sessions, without any problems. 
Overall, intuitions as objectifying acts is a suggestion for another approach 
to intuitions and objectification in our field, and the exemplification of this 
suggestion is precisely what is at task in the ensuing analysis. All the cognitive 
‘moments’ that will unfold in the following Part of the study are instances when 
abstraction (shaped as objectification) is shown as it is being constituted for and by 
the learners. The constitutive process starts from empirical material, which is further 
integrated by the lived body as embodied consciousness, and tethered into the task, 
and finally posed as an object worthy for exploration, due to reflective conscious 
actions. It is a bottom-up process that is unfolded, after the intentional origins of 
the mathematical objects are traced and explored sufficiently (phenomenologically). 
The three learning episodes were shaped as three different adumbrations of 
the same phenomenon—intuitions as objectifying acts—each case with its own 
particular features, its own character. The generalisation of my observations will 
come when, after delving into the lived empirical account of the presented 
mathematisations, we will see each case been transcended by common features 
with other cases, which have different character. In other words, when in reflective 
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variation we will sense the “indifference with regard to actuality which is generated 
in variation, whereby what presents itself as actual acquires the character of an 
arbitrary example, an indifferent point of departure of a series of variations” 
(Husserl, 1973, pp. 348-349). Which is a quality that makes generalisations possible, 
from particular singularities. In the micro level, such case is the intuition of essences, 
as well as the more general case of the so called categorial intuitions, each 
presented twice in the following sections. Such is also the case, namely of 
singularities that reveal generalities, with the general sense that my 
phenomenological research is expected to endow its particular cases,99 due to the 
theoretical and methodological choices that enabled the particular in-depth analysis.   
Inspired by the Husserlian frame of lived experience and being interested in the 
abstract truths that are the mathematical truths in our case, I reflected more and 
more while the data were collected and analysed; that is analysed over and over 
again, shaping each case with the theoretical concepts that fitted well to data 
sources, which thus became data. Each of the three cases is an investigation 
standing in-itself, while they all adumbrate the same teaching rules of non-
intervention or guidance, which remain unnoticed (bracketed) as we focus on the 
students’ acts, and as the latter are not affected by them.  
And most importantly, these three cases support the same argument 
concerning the importance of intuitions in the objectification process, of all sorts of 
intuitions, bearing objects and object-like formations that are vital for the learners’ 
mathematical explorations. Intuitions being the instigators of the learners’ key ideas, 
being vital even when they are erroneous, for our understanding of the diversity of 
the cognitive praxis, as an expression of the living body and its powers.  
Intuitions as objectifying acts is a suggestion for another approach to 
intuitions and objectification in our field, and the exemplification of this suggestion 
                                                          
99 This issue occurs from the philosophical set of the research questions and is dealt with in the general 
discussion and the conclusions; in particular, in my response to issues of validity and generalisation of this 
research study, which rather than being pre-conceived they emerged as evidence of mathematics-in-the-
making and as the exemplification of theoretical terms in the phenomenological sense. 
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is precisely what is at task in the ensuing analysis. It is all these moments that will 
unfold in the following Part of the study, when abstraction (shaped as 
objectification) is shown as it is being constituted in a process starting from empirical 
material, integrated by the lived body as embodied consciousness, and tethered into 
the task as it is posed as an object, worthy for exploration, due to reflective 
conscious actions. It is a bottom-up process that is unfolded, after the intentional 
origins of the object are traced and explored sufficiently (phenomenologically).  
The three learning episodes were shaped as three different adumbrations of 
the same phenomenon—intuitions as objectifying acts—each with its own particular 
features. And the methodology achieved precisely this: to clear the view of the 
fundamental process of objectification by successive reduction and bracketing, and 
lay bare the key role of intuitions in the process, in particular during the preparation 
of the object, in the pre-objective, pre-reflective stage and its transition to its 
(constituted) objective state. 
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PART 3 – Data analysis 
 
CHAPTER 1. Introduction to the data analysis 
3.1 Introduction – critical questions that the research addresses 
Mathematics is the deeper layer of this study, as well as the form, the telos of the 
learning episodes that will be analysed. The form of the learning episodes is itself 
an important topic, since I decided to limit myself to the first year of my data 
collection, especially after I employed the Husserlian theoretical and methodological 
approach that is deployed here. There are many things to be said, and those 
selected to be written were considered as necessary and adequate in order to shape 
an argument theoretically, analytically, methodologically and empirically. An 
argument that derived from the data as I was delving in them in order to bring to 
the surface the kernel that allowed me to see them as findings, and delineate the 
origins of this kernel theoretically,100 and analytically in the ensuing data analysis. 
My approach to the discussions of the data analysis that follows is framed by a 
question that was already set in Part 1, §1.3.1, which I want to elaborate more fully 
here, as we are ready to look closely at how the students found what they originally 
did not know. 
3.1.1 The origins of the subject of the thesis in Meno’s paradox 
The actual subject of this research is addressed widely in the long history of human 
cognition, going back as far as Aristotle and Plato, and the pre-Socratic philosophers 
like Parmenides, Heraclitus and the Pythagorean school, who sought the origins of 
understanding and of the phenomenal being101 in different forms of Logos, rather 
than in mythological entities and genealogies. It is clearly stated in Meno, Plato’s 
                                                          
100 Cf. the process of thematising that I have exemplified in the theory chapter (Part 1, Ch. 3). 
101 The Greek term for the phenomenal being is φαίνεσθαι (phenesthe), which has the same root of the word 
phenomenon. The φαίνεσθαι is juxtaposed to είναι (being), in different ways for each of the aforementioned 
philosopher or philosophical group. 
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dialogue, in a haunting question for education in general and mathematics 
education in particular: 
Whoever tries to limit the spiritual light to what is at present before the mind 
always runs up against the Socratic problem. “How will you set about looking 
for that thing, the nature of which is totally unknown to you? Which, among 
the things you do not know, is the one which you propose to look for? And if 
by chance you should stumble upon it, how will you know that it is indeed 
that thing, since you are in ignorance of it?” (Meno, 80D.). (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002a, p. 431, emphasis added)  
This is the age-old existential question concerning knowledge, and the starting point 
in answering it—according to Husserl—is that perception always finds an answer, 
since “perceptual consciousness is not an empty box” (Husserl, 2001, p. 606) and 
the answer that it provides is part and parcel of the always (“necessarily”) 
incomplete presentation of any object that we encounter with our lived body; we 
always sense a first object envisaging it as a whole, even when we do not have a 
‘name’ for it, and our anticipations concerning the object that we encounter go 
beyond what we actually perceive; we co-presentify, without thematising it the 
building where the room that we currently are in is located. But we will thematise it 
as soon as an intention to leave the building will appear. Everyday perception of 
public and private affairs is a flowing reality for the cognising subject, performed by 
relentlessly constituted objects, each of them in its intentional horizons and 
particular ontic meaning, narrowly or widely thematised. This theoretical clarification 
is linked with my methodological and methodical choices to the extent that what 
one determines to look at determines also certain features of the methodology and 
methods that are adopted; therefore, the reduction, the bracketing and the 
phenomenological-transcendental attitude, seemed to be the natural 
methodological milieu in which the research could be accomplished; since it sees 
lived experience through a multiplicity of concepts that aim at bringing the genetic 
features to the surface. Only at the moment of the analysis of the episodes will be 
apparent why the theory insisted on certain concepts like the living/lived body, the 
operative intentionality, the determinable indeterminacy as a stimulus for action, 
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the protention as an igniting feature for new knowledge to appear by reactivation 
of sedimented ready-made objects. Finally, it will be apparent why the better 
grasping of the detailed Husserlian method, after pure reductions can facilitate 
understanding the depth of these operative and these constitutive moments. For 
this reason I will insist a bit more in key theoretical notions that are mutually clarified 
with the methodological approach, thus adding the analytical background for the 
section that follows.  
Merleau-Ponty delineates the starting point of lived experience, in which one 
finds what one seeks: one finds what one anticipates to find, but at the same time 
one realises that there is much more to find. In a true (actual) sense consciousness 
is always ahead, protending in partial anticipation what the apparent (in 
appearance) sides of the object indicate. This is a source of new knowledge for 
consciousness, as it protends, in not fully-fledged anticipation, what the object could 
be.  
And according to Husserl consciousness is (also) always behind, keeping 
temporal re-presentations alive, as empty indications now that they have not 
intuitive—immediate—contact with their once lived reality. The latter are called 
retentions, memories of the past, and they are ready to be presented again if 
intentionally called for. In particular called for objectifications and the constituted 
objectivity that emerges with them.      
Moreover, to any constituted objectivity corresponds an embodied 
intersubjectivity, which belongs to the pre-objective realm of ‘I can’, ‘I sense’, rather 
than ‘I think’. I not only perceive this glass on my table by I also can co-presentify 
how the glass looks from the loudspeaker, to my right; or how my brother sees it, 
behind and to the left of me. It is an intersubjectivity that is primarily embodied, 
through the apperception of the other(s) as other living bodies. Thus in the study 
of the three students’ constitutive activities that will be unfolded in the following 
chapters, they are living bodies expressing their powers on the abstract field of 
mathematics, in the classroom or at home. Their peers are also present as living 
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bodies, insofar as they play a role in the analysed object constitutions (even the 
absence of communication is crucial in Diana’s case –Ch. 3). 
The teacher’s contribution is not denied nor is it prevented from becoming the 
particular theme of another research study, quite the contrary; the study’s residue 
is expected to become a source of understanding the learners’ mathematical 
constitutions, in which the teacher may extract useful perceptions of her learners’ 
practices, and benefit from a better understanding of their cognitive processes. But 
it was necessary to bracket the teacher in order to study how the students 
themselves thought and acted about the tasks; not arbitrarily though, since the 
teacher himself was practicing teaching in an experienced and deliberate way, with 
the absence of any form of guidance towards the students.  
In the phenomenological methodological perspective adopted by my study 
the researcher may unfold the key-moments in the students’ thoughts, as genuinely 
(“originarily”) intuitive, thus revealing the roots of these thoughts in lived-
experience. What is at stake in the cognitive experience from the perspective of my 
research is the tension between the logical objectivity and the carnal 
intersubjectivity, which “are related as the founded and the founding” respectively 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p. xix): 
the pre-objective order of our carnal intersubjectivity, which is both the 
founding source of logical objectivity and the measure of its value, begins to 
exist fully only in the objective order that it founds, which is itself the 
culmination of the advent of the pre-objective meanings of perceptual 
experience to explicit existence. (ibid.p. xix)  
As it is ‘expected’, the “objective order” is the only ‘visible certainty’, the only sign 
concerning the pre-objective realm of the pre-constitutive activity, which Husserl 
called passive stage. Husserl102 moves beyond any signs in his quest for the origins 
that lie at the core of the justification of all founded objectivities in lived-experience. 
And perhaps the transformation of a classroom to an organised collective that 
                                                          
102 And Merleau-Ponty follows Husserl to a great extent, up to the end of his work. 
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produces new objectivities by promoting intuitive expressions is an answer to 
promoting mathematics in the making, as my research advocates for.  
The experience itself for Husserl includes the (inner and outer) horizons of 
the acts that we perform and of the objects that we constitute for the tasks at hand, 
that is within and through the experience of the flowing present, which is irreducibly 
embedded in the world, more precisely in the life-world of the learner herself.  
A thought finds an object “being ahead of itself”, a thought has an adequate 
a-structure (non-structure) for the hosting of a new object. The experience-in-itself 
is non-objectifiable and each attempt corresponds to an idea in the Kantian sense; 
but what is really important is the relation of origin that the intuition holds to the 
real, allowing the indeterminacy of the perception of the real to regulate the 
symbolic forms, the signs and the artefacts. For, artefactual thought (Kiera & Santi, 
2013) is primarily a thought constituted as such, by an embodied subjective 
intentional move, which grounds the (constituted) nature of our own ‘divisions’ and 
instrumentalisations.  
The symbolic realm may need actual experience without any resource in 
actual experience of the embodied character of the constituted objectivities, yet, 
there are certain embodied aspects involved, inevitably: “the x2 is a concrete 
metaphor for me”, replied the known geometer Aggelopulos V. (2012) during a 
presentation of the historical course of geometry, when he was asked what the 
empirical material of his intuitions are. Thus, what we may call abstract may acquire 
a deep transcendental sense for someone who knows geometry in all its 
expressions, not less transcendental than an object like a chair (Tragesser, 1977), 
and that is only an example of different levels of abstraction that are based on 
abstract material that has become empirical (hyletic).  
What is unique in the history of epistemology is that there is a science of 
experience based on phenomenology, as Husserl envisaged it in his endless 
reworking of his research, with his ever new introductions to phenomenology, up to 
the Crisis (Husserl, 1970a) and his enormous unpublished work. This science of 
experience allows abstract intuitions, and moreover they are based on empirical 
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ones which, in their turn, are based on pre-objective ones. As a result of his theory 
more and more abstract intuitions are developed. And more hyletic material is 
produced after the introduction of the first intuitive product, which is an object of a 
new category—therefore justifying the term categorial in another, significant sense. 
What is unique in the history of epistemology is that a theory dares to become 
engaged in the lived-experience, and it anticipates the complexity that intuitive 
expressions may take. Husserlian theory, with its close description of structural 
necessities that permeate the lived body, affords an understanding that is 
transcendental rather than empiricist.  
The evidence acquired by the analysis of the learning episodes that follows 
aims at testifying the theory, not in an empiricist sense but as essentially and 
critically transcendental. Husserl’s authorisation for more and more abstract objects 
is in contradistinction to Kant (Hintikka, 1972, 1998, 2003) indicates the richness 
that is already anticipated by the Husserlian theory. And if the cognising subject 
somehow develops her empirical intuition to further abstract intuitions, the new 
intuitive objects belong to a new category. Kant lacks oxygen in his contact with 
unformed and categorically unshaped objects. Experience for Kant starts from the 
body-as-object and as being objective; the perceptive component that is the ground 
of our lived experience, the kinesthetic, tactile, auditory, etc. is for Kant “simply 
received, grasped, and then elevated to the realm of the intellectual” (Radford, 
2014, p. 131). Husserl simply justifies and focuses on this real, which he called the 
life-world (Lebenswelt). Husserl’s term, passivity, hides the activity that takes place 
in the pre-objective world, which, also constitutes the void of many theories in 
mathematics education, 103  due to their “blindness to intentionality”, and their 
                                                          
103 Starting with constructivism and its numerous explicit or implicit ramifications—for an implicit 
ramification that lends its theory on intuitions by Fischbein’s Kantian tradition, filtered by a socio-cultural 
methodology and a concomitant data analysis, see Andrà and Santi (2013, PME Proceedings). In the 
aforementioned research no thematisation or clarification of any link between intuitions and objectification 
appears, since it is concerned with intuition only when it becomes shared within the collective activity; 
although it addresses a complementary aspect of my research that deals with the constitution that is driven by 
the ‘we-consciousness’, it misses intuition and objectification as it fails to see the crucial links between them. 
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“blindness” to the embodied subjective that synthesises the ego-pole and the 
object-poles.  
A thought really transcended by its objects would find them proliferating in 
its path without ever being able to grasp their relationships to each other, or 
finding its way through to their truth.... We must  define  thought in terms  
of that  strange power  which  it possesses  of being ahead of itself, of 
launching itself and  being at home everywhere, in a word,  in terms  of its 
autonomy. Unless thought itself had  put  into  things  what it subsequently 
finds  in them,  it would  have no hold  upon things,  would  not  think  of 
them,  and  would  be an ‘illusion of thought’. (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, pp. 431-
432, my emphasis) 
The Husserlian theories of pre-reflective and reflective lived experience of the 
cognising subject, informed by Merleau-Ponty’s radical reflection and primacy of 
perception, were put into place, and the data confirmed the theory in expected and 
unexpected details. 
3.1.2 Issues and questions emerging from the choices towards the data 
collection and analysis – A mapping of the three cases that will be 
analysed 
A core-issue during the exploration of the material was mathematics, as a subject 
taught and learned, learned and taught, in the same or different cultural 
environments, where mathematical conceptualisation is a highly rated target. I have 
been a teacher, formally for nineteen years and informally for a decade more, in a 
varied teaching environment (private as well as state education) of a European 
country, and I based my current data on participation and observations of a different 
environment, the first year that I came to England. Why a different environment? 
Why the first year? And which mathematics are these that are studied here, since 
the age, the experience and the motivations vary? In other words, which is the 
‘invariable’ that makes the three cases of this study a significant introduction to an 
originally new perception on mathematics education, as this study argues that it 
explores/suggests? 
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Opening up these issues means starting from the mathematics as: 
 The subject of the investigations (the tasks, as they were defined by the 
teacher)  
 Mathematics in the (chosen) context that they were performed, and the 
particularities that they developed as they were observed, recorded and 
interviewed.  
Given that these two aspects, the mathematics as a subject-matter and the context 
that they are performed, are essentially interrelated, the simplest way of bringing 
these issues to clarity might be to elucidate the nature of the mathematics involved 
in the analysed tasks,104 in relation to the results that emerged. I will delimit the 
knowledge of mathematics to the explicit and implied intentionalities of the teacher 
and the students involved, according to the degree that they influenced the 
cognitive ‘moments’ that will be analysed. This of course does not mean forgetting 
the mathematics but only bracketing them in order to conceive the learners’ 
intentional horizons in the studied cognitive ‘moments’, and to study their paths 
towards mathematical abstraction. As I was a participant observer, I will delineate 
my adaptation to the conditions as they appeared to me, but limit my focus on the 
aspects that had significance for the whole process and the process as a whole, 
which is not the same thing. 
 A key issue that will also be addressed is the ‘mathematical neutrality’ of the 
teaching approach, and how it helped particular (intuitive) methods to take 
hold. A key issue that played a part in the fruition of the research was the 
reflective character of the sessions, which was mildly introduced and 
developed towards becoming more systematic way : the students were asked 
to participate in reflective breaks, where they wrote every 20-30 minutes or 
between two different tasks during the sessions, each time with a given topic; 
the most regular of these topics was to report on their actions and their 
position towards their targets. 
                                                          
104 As well as a broader though necessarily more general picture of the nature of the mathematics involved in 
the broader context of the sessions. 
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 Processes such as the teacher prompting the students towards collaborative 
work, although individual strategies and findings were also well accepted and 
considered positively. 
The freedom to go as they chose to a great extent, as Diana’s work (Ch. 3) will 
manifest, determined the responsibility that the students developed for their 
creations, in a course that was not always easy, despite (and rather due to) the 
freedom that it endowed the students for their strategies, as no direction/“guidance” 
was provided.105 Most importantly, it gave the answer to what counts as data for 
this research study, in which tracing mathematical objects that the students devised 
and their origination was the central theme of investigation; and the answer from 
my phenomenological perspective was that data is whatever was objectivised for 
the given task, as standing out from the learner’s flow of appearances, in conscious 
perceptual acts. But this is only the beginning of the story, since this standing-
against (objectum in Latin and Gegenstand in German) is where conscious acts are 
intentionally directed towards; while each aforementioned drawing of attention 
signals a certain sense endowing act that follows, after reflection. 
In the broad notion that Husserl means the term, object is defined as 
“anything at all, e.g., as subject of a true (categorial, affirmative) statement” 
(1983a, pp. 40-41). Being on the side of Husserl, I followed his methodological 
framework not simply trying to prove what I already knew; it was about 
philosophically clearing the way, the prejudices, the taken-for-granted, so that what 
I would be left with, in Husserl's terms, would be a set of phenomenological 
descriptions that stand up to rigorous questioning.  
Ivan’s and Diana’s cases are also cases due to their complementary features, 
due to their contrasting features, which is the same thing. One case can be seen as 
the negation of the other in many of their features (thematisations), originating in 
their contrasting approaches towards the course and the freedom it allowed to the 
students: while the freedom was welcomed by Ivan, it was perceived as lack of 
                                                          
105 See Diana’s interview (Appendix C) for the use of “guidance”. Diana’s case is also informative of the 
negative aspect that some students expressed. 
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guidance by Diana; where Ivan was perceiving each task as a new chance to apply 
his intuitive methods, for Diana it was a case where the other students moved too 
fast to track them, and where her late realisations were most usually washed out 
by the other students’ ideas, unless they were compatible to their ideas. 
But there is something significant that Ivan and Diana share, concerning the 
feature of satisfaction from the course as a whole, when the sessions were 
concluded; namely their feeling that the course gave them important re-
conceptualisations of mathematics as heuristic forms of pro-active/pre-active 
experience, as mathematics-in-the-making. And that was enough for Diana and 
Ivan, in order to preserve this course in their memory as a landmark of their studies 
in order to become teachers of mathematics. And this attitude was shared by the 
third part of this collection of cases, Mary, who is the representative case of all 
detected intuitions and objectifications of this study. Mary explored a theme that is 
considered ‘common’ for mathematical classrooms 106  brought about issues of 
reactivation and de-sedimentation of culturally/historically acquired knowledge. 
A crucial aspect that will not be neglected is the particular perception of 
mathematics and of the students’ mathematical ideas by the teacher; but this subtle 
issue will be explored only to the degree that it affected the students’ perception of 
the tasks. In other words the teaching aspect is bracketed but not neglected, as it 
will return in the discussion of the findings of the three cases. Closely related to that 
is how this environment facilitated my intended observations during the data 
collection, and how gradually informing the data theoretically and methodologically 
brought this study to life, i.e. with its inscription to a Husserlian phenomenological 
discourse that affords a rich cognitive theory and an according methodology. Testing 
the theory with the data led to the clarification of the theory rather than any 
amendment in order to conform to the findings. The results of this happy interplay 
of theory and data are tracked here, and they are perceived as applicable by 
mathematics teachers and mathematics education researchers. It is a case where 
theoretical ideas are shown to be applicable to empirical studies, and the 
                                                          
106 I.e. the parabola as a curve that is equidistant from a fixed point and a line. 
~ 153 ~ 
 
phenomenological methodology to be essentially constituting, while showing how 
the lived body is constituted. By deploying the aforementioned issues it will become 
apparent how these three cases that are analysed here were judged as adequate 
for the study, and how they are adequate cases as such.  Main points that support 
their double-folded adequacy and that will be explored in the following sections 
are… 
 That they exemplify in detail a phenomenological methodology, as described 
in the previous chapter. It all becomes possible due to the exclusive focus on 
the operative acts that prepare the ‘visible’ constitutive ones, and make them 
possible. It is through the successive deepening of the reduction that we are 
legitimised to anticipate where the unseen operative forces of the lived body 
are present; to detect them where the traces ought to appear. More 
precisely, it is due to the theory working with the methodology, detecting 
what the methodology allowed to be sensed as significant for the theory, that 
the broader understanding of intuitions and the commencing of 
objectification that this study argues for is expected to be unfolded. 
Therefore what counted as data from the operational aspect of the study is 
what made sense for the theory, as it was revealed by the concordant 
methodology. 
 That they offer different profiles of the same intentional phenomenon, 
namely intuitions in the Husserlian sense, in service of objectification, as they 
were detected on the students’ activities—i.e. the perspective adopted by my 
research. It is a bond between intuitions and objectification that is thematised 
for the first time in mathematics education research. And the three learning 
episodes operate further than triangulation, aiming at been perceived as 
adumbrations of well-known phenomena—intuition, objectification—under a 
new perspective, namely the objectifying aspect of intuitions. This is precisely 
what the empirical (analytical) part will be for the theory, namely the 
exemplification through evidence of abstract Husserlian concepts that allow 
access to understanding embodied cognitive conscious acts towards the 
constitution of mathematical objects.  
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The three learning episodes/students support their double-folded adequacy in the 
sense that they support the argument of the link between objectification and 
intuition in the Husserlian sense, and they elaborate through their differences and 
similarities aspects of intuition in service of objectification, which would not be 
visible in the straightforward approach of each single case: 
 Each one of the three learning episodes/students is a case, since they cast 
light on different aspects of objectification, including:  
 Different and overlapping types of intuition according to the objects that 
surfaced and the structure that was at play for each object. 
 Different types of engagement in intuitions (different states of affairs) for 
each student, which determined the intended objects, as intended. 
 Different “manners of giveness” of object-like formations that became 
objects. 
 Examples of empirical intuitions and of different kinds of abstract intuitions—
categorial and intuitions of essences—are given in the three learning 
episodes/students which, following the order of the presented cases:  
(A)  The intuition of essence will be detected twice in the study, firstly in the 
case of Ivan, where it will be manifested as a double shifting of attention 
to previously neglected evidence and to new aesthetic patterns, due to a 
symmetry intuition that finally collapsed, both resulting to the three steps 
of the synthesis of coincidence and the concomitant intuition of essence 
(§3.2.3). 
(B) A categorial abstract intuition in two stages, starting with an empirical 
intuition that originated in trial-and-improvement, and followed by the 
categorial transformation of questions/answers to an algorithm and then 
to a flowchart (§§ 3.3.1, 3.3.2). The legitimisation of the results by the 
teacher had a major impact to the student’s attitude towards the course, 
and her learning and teaching attitudes in general, which could be the 
theme of a separate study on attitudes and affect. From the perspective 
of the research, the significance of intuitions for the learner’s 
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mathematical interface and the key part of the teacher’s legitimisation of 
the student’s objects are two main features of this case. 
(C) An empirical (visual and kinesthetic) intuition that enabled the shifting of 
attention to the classroom experience, through a re-presentation 
substantiated in a diagram, and the bird’s-eye-view perspective of the 
classroom through the diagram (§ 3.4.2.2). The last learning episode as 
a whole (Ch. 4) is already a case from the perspective of intuitions as 
objectifying acts, due to its intuitive diversity and its embodied fullness, 
fed as it was by the embodied start-up in the classroom. All kinds of 
intuitions were detected in this case—including the categorial abstract 
intuition in two stages and the intuition of essence in three steps—and it 
is the episode that most consistently studies embodiment and its 
grounding qualities. 
…as they will be unfolded in the coming sections. 
3.1.3 Preliminary manifestations - The main points of what is at task for 
the study - Rationale of the data analysis 
The study of the three cases were chosen in order to show the complexity of the 
learner’s lived experience and a phenomenological approach to it, concerned with 
the living present of each prospective teacher of mathematics that is analysed, and 
attempting to delve as deep as possible into the origins of the learners’ 
achievements. 
The phenomenological lens that was used, both in the theory and in the 
methods/methodology allowed the particular view of the data, which thus became 
findings. The data analysis itself is the clear evidence (and in some sense the result) 
of the methodological, theoretical and analytical interplay. The analysis is driven by 
phenomenological methodological instruments and according theoretical support. 
What initially appeared as the students—prospective teachers of mathematics in 
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English schools—“key ideas”107 evolved to the students’ intuitions, under a very 
particular Husserlian approach that draws on pre-Cartesian understandings of the 
term (Hintikka, 2003). Merleau-Ponty’s advancement of Husserlian key ideas 
allowed the theoretical and methodological lenses to approach the lived-experience 
of the learners from a novel Husserlian perspective. The aforementioned perspective 
casted light to the structure of empirical and abstract intuitions, and it was enriched 
empirically by bringing evidence to and for the theory. The generality and originality 
of the three cases are expected due to evidence that the analysed episodes concern 
practices that may be common although neglected in mathematics classrooms. It is 
for the latter reason that this research study calls for awareness of  
 The learning praxis, as a phenomenon where intuitions in the Husserlian 
sense are key features of objectification (and thus of knowledge production), 
allowing access to the objectification process from the intuitive operations in 
the pre-reflective stage to the intuitive acts in the reflective stage. 
 The teaching praxis, primarily as an event that could allow learning to take 
place rather than being “the procurement of useful information” (Heidegger, 
2004, p. 15). Teaching is expected to let learning take place by nurturing and 
provoking intuitive happenings and being ready to rip the fruits, by 
legitimising mathematically what is intuitively grasped, rather than canceling 
what is outside the scope of the curriculum in the narrow, classroom sense. 
Such a style of teaching would go against the promotion of the prestige of 
the learner, or of any authority, including the self’s own teacher 
persona. 108The legislated body of mathematics itself, allows a range of 
alternative approaches that transcend the legislated curriculum, in favour of 
                                                          
107 The term “key ideas” will not appear often in the study, since they will be soon replaced by the key ideas’ 
constituent parts, namely various kinds of intuitions. The term appears again in the description of the natural 
attitude, which is the naïve belief in the appearance of things as already there, and in that case it amounts to 
the ‘blindness’ to the intentional direction of constituted objectivities by constituting subjectivities and their 
collective communities (the ‘we-intentionality’). 
108 “persona: The Latin word for person, q.v., used in certain phrases: b.4.b In Jungian psychology, the set of 
attitudes adopted by an individual to fit himself for the social role which he sees as his; the personality an 
individual presents to the world;” (Oxford English dictionary, digital edition, emphasis added). 
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the students’ intuitions. And these intuitions anticipate the teacher as the 
introducer of the learners’ lived experience to the formal mathematical 
domain. The introduction of the learner’s intuitions to formal mathematical 
expressions amounts to the inclusion of the learner’s experiences, through 
their transformation to genuinely mathematical experiences; thus 
transforming teaching and learning to teaching and learning praxis 
respectively. 
This was the pathway chosen in this study in order to investigate closely the 
students’ deep engagement with mathematics, the abstract queen of the sciences, 
by bringing mathematical abstraction down to its origins in lived experience. This 
path is mediated for the learner to mathematics through the teacher who 
understands, translates, promotes, communicates and enhances the intuitions he 
receives and unearths in the classroom.  
3.1.4 Ethical issues 
The ethical implications of my academic activities include the consideration of the 
data that was collected, although there was not sensitive data with particular regard 
to matters such as age, colour, race/ethnicity, nationality, disablement, religion, sex, 
gender, sexual orientation, personal medical records and political beliefs. There was 
not any relationship with the participants, other than that required. The 
arrangements for the security of data, participants and confidentiality include using 
pseudonyms throughout the study, as well as in my published material (ESM, RME) 
and in all presentations of my research in conferences (BSRLM, PME). I have also 
made sure that any original data sources (c.f. Part 2, §2.3) are only in my possession 
and nobody will have access to it. Concerning the written work of the students in 
particular, nobody except the teacher of the class will have access to it. In other 
words, what I am using as data is only for my research and for no other purpose, 
and the anonymity of participants is ensured.  
No payments were made to the participants for participating in this research. 
And no other external rewards, such as increased marks were given to the students. 
No special indemnification arrangements were required. Due to the nature of 
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research, in which no harm could come to the participants, and no external rewards 
were offered there was no external agent needed; and there was no third party 
involved in the University’s activities. The size of sample proposed was not an issue 
for my study, due to the qualitative character of my research. My research did not 
cause any distress to the participants; on the contrary, it might have been beneficial 
for them. My purpose was open for the participants right from the beginning; the 
students were aware of the target of my research, expressed as ‘the better 
understanding of their mathematical investigations’, and I was not deceiving the 
participants in any way. Explicit verbal consent was given by all the participants, 
and the students were aware that they could withdraw from this research project 
at any time. There were no participants who might be unable to assess the 
implications of the proposed work, and there is no potential risk to the University, 
in order to be outweighed by the value of the academic activity. The risk to the 
University in terms of external (and internal) perceptions of the worthiness of the 
work has been assessed and is deemed acceptable; the positive assessment of my 
research concerns the publication of a major part of the study to peer-reviewed 
journals (ESM, RME) and conferences (PME, BSRLM). Arrangements are in place 
which safeguard the interests of the researcher(s) being supervised in pursuit of the 
academic activity objectives, and permission was obtained for the special 
arrangements that have been made for the security of related documentation and 
artefacts.  
In summary, all ethical considerations were taken into account in this research. 
The aforementioned response to the list of ethical principles covers all issues 
related to my research project, and my response to it indicates how I complied 
with all the ethics principles that are relevant to my study. 
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CHAPTER 2. Ivan – A mature intuitive approach on mathematics 
that was released due to the special character of the NoM course 
3.2.1 Introduction to Ivan’s case study – Rationale of the research – 
Methodological considerations  
This is the case study of Ivan and his decisive intuition, as my research attempts to 
shed light on the objects that the student constituted in order to manage his 
mathematical experience. We will follow the emergence of such an object, whose 
appearance became possible due to a particular kind of intuition that the Husserlian 
theory anticipates, the intuition of essence. In order to do so I will employ the 
Husserlian frame that intuitions are seen through, and their main 
properties/features that make them detectable in everyday learning praxis, such as 
the one that will be analysed here. I will focus on the findings, and exemplify the 
theory through the structures that emerged from the analysis of the data, after the 
application of the Husserlian theoretical and methodological frames.  
Some allusions concerning the distinctions between the theory proposed here 
and Cartesian and Kantian approaches to cognition will be given, after certain 
evidence will be traced in the analysis of the learning episode. But the main theme 
will be to exemplify the theory with concrete examples, which were made possible 
due to participation, observation, three interviews (two short and a lengthy one) 
and copies of the students’ coursework. The students’ warm and open cooperation 
and the teacher’s generous access to all these sources made this work possible. The 
teacher's nonintervention approach to teaching allowed bracketing his involvement 
and focusing on the students’ own ideas and strategies;109 The teacher's particular 
method of abstaining from any guidance during the sessions allowed to concentrate 
on the students’ own actions; in phenomenological language, the teacher’s 
nonintervention strategy allowed bracketing his involvement and facilitated the 
reduction to the students’ own ideas and strategies. In general terms, my study 
                                                          
109 The shift from the singular (the particular student) to the plural (the students of the course) is due to the 
applicability of this statement to the other two cases of this study, as we will see in the following 
sections/chapters. 
~ 160 ~ 
 
employs the aforementioned phenomenological methods of bracketing and 
reduction in order to explore intuitions as critical objectifying acts (Zagorianakos & 
Shvarts, 2015). 
The learning episode concerns prospective teachers of mathematics and it 
starts in the classroom, where the students worked in groups of 3, 4 or 5 people of 
their own choice. I will focus on Ivan and follow his actions in his group, the 
exchange of ideas, and the manner in which he used them when he went home. 
And I will do that by bracketing anything but the student’s intentions and the 
intended objects (his empty indications and how they were fulfilled, as well as the 
objects that were constituted due to the fulfillment).  
It is a learning episode where the student followed his instinct throughout 
his investigation, although exploring ideas coming from another member of his 
group. And the teacher’s withdrawal from any sort of instruction or guidance helped 
immensely to focus on the relation mentioned earlier, between the student’s 
intensions and the intended objects. Bearing this in mind we will realise that the 
tracing of the structure that emerged and its recognition (identification) as an 
intuition of essence in the following sections has become possible due to the 
particular manner of looking at the student’s experience. This structure will be 
analysed as it appeared in three steps, namely the step of the starting example, the 
step of the variation of the starting example—when the starting example is modelled 
on another example—and the step of the synthesis of coincidence, when the two 
examples lead to the intuition of generality. 
Although from the point of view of this research every learning episode may 
be transformed to a case, under the appropriate phenomenological lens, Ivan’s 
learning episode is primarily a tribute to a student whose intuitive tendencies had 
already acquired a seemingly ‘natural’ sense. As it was the case with all sessions 
that I participated anywhere near Ivan, he was following his rules, he was 
incorporating ideas easily, and in this ‘flexibly self-determined’ manner he was 
deeply concerned with the results he wanted to achieve and his ways of getting to 
them. Being very intuitive and innovative he was also examining me for any kind of 
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information he might get.   
And it did not take me long to discover (revealed also by his lengthy 
interview) that under this ‘natural’ intuitivity there was a long mathematical practice 
involved, which was bringing together his mathematical competency and his 
mathematical interface in general, with an idiosyncratic tendency to aesthetic forms, 
as the following learning episode will only exemplify.110 Ivan’s genuine interest in 
mathematics also led him to reflect on his mathematical experience, as his lengthy 
interview will show.111 My exceptional cooperation with him for more than 3 years 
was invaluable for the completion of this study. 
The NoM course was Ivan’s favourite and it remained so up to the end of his 
studies, as he has had expressed it to me for a few times. It was the only course 
that had allowed him to constitute freely his conceptualisations of the given tasks 
and put his mathematical ideas into motion. 
3.2.2 The course and the ‘New York cop’ task 
The nature of the course allowed many initiatives to every student, concerning the 
directions they might take, encouraging group and inter-group collaboration. The 
13 students (prospective teachers) had the opportunity to choose 3 or 4 of their 
favourite activities in order to further develop and present them in a written form 
at the end of the course, in order to get their marks for their overall performance. 
During most of the activities there were ‘reflective breaks’, where the students wrote 
what they were doing. The students were asked to add this ‘reflective practice’ to 
the writing of their aforementioned coursework, delivered at the end of the course.  
 The minimised instructional character,  
 the open-endedness of the activities  
                                                          
110 For further familiarisation to Ivan’s tendency to aesthetic forms one may refer to the appendix, for Ivan’s 
chosen activity—that each student produced at the end of the term—as well as his approach to the ‘doubling 
modulo’ activity, which is analysed in Diana’s case. Even more evidence can be found in Ivan’s coursework 
and his interview (also in the appendix section). 
111 Apart from the extracts used in the following analysis the whole interview can be accessed in Appendix B, 
Paragraph B). 
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 and the reflective feature of the tasks and the coursework  
facilitated the students’ intuitive approaches, which became more explicit than 
in many ‘typical’ conventional or even exploratory teaching frames.  
The teacher adopted a merely operational instructional disposition during the 
sessions, which enhanced the effect of the reflections and the individual/group 
independent methodologies and practices (individual and collective). One of the 
students that took seriously the teacher’s call for taking the initiative and their own 
ways of tackling the problems/tasks, was Ivan. He acknowledges it clearly in his 
lengthy interview, when he       I was invited to the sessions by the teacher and I 
was given access to their coursework, in order to collect data for my research, and 
the students gave me permission to participate, observe and record their activities. 
I’ll acknowledge my thanks properly, at the conclusive section, and at the 
corresponding sections to the according analysed cases, in the analysis chapter. All 
the students’ permission to participate and record the activities was genuine, and 
they were very open, throughout the sessions. 
3.2.2.1 The first part of the session 
The task that will be analysed was called ‘New York cop’, and it lasted two and a 
half hours, while there was a half hour break after one and a half hours. My research 
concerns the activity of the group consisted of Ivan, Carry and Donald 
(pseudonyms). The teacher described the task as follows: 
T: Here we’ve got a small precinct [the teacher drew one small square on 
the board] and basically you’ve got a policeman standing there, [he added a 
‘cop’ at the bottom right corner] who is able to see two blocks along. [he 
added three more squares –Figure 1] Now, this isn’t New York in the old days 
where you had crime; how many policemen would you need to see along 
every street, in that configuration? [Donald says 3] So where would you put 
your 2 [cops] Donald? 
D: The way it is at the moment I would put one at the opposite corner, one 
in the middle and one at the opposite corner. 
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T: Is that ok? So 3 policemen could actually cover every single street; now 
these policemen are relatively short-sighted policemen, who can only see two 
blocks. So the question is, as the precincts get bigger how does the number 
of policemen you need increase. Ok? 
 
Figure 1. The teacher's first drawing; the dotted square and the cop in the middle were 
drawn first, and the other 2 cops were suggested by Donald after the teacher drew the 
other three squares. 
The students were divided into 4 groups of 3 students of their own choice (one 
student did not come that day). I recorded the activity of the group consisted of 
Ivan, Carry and Donald, sitting next to their table and observing their activities most 
of the time, and I did not intervene during their investigation. I took short interviews 
from Ivan and Carry at the beginning of the second part, after obtaining the 
students’ permission. At the end of the session the students gave me the notes that 
they kept during the session, which I photocopied before I returned them to the 
students. 
The task was targeted in pursuing generalisations related to configurations of the 
‘short-sighted cops’ that would give the minimum number of cops for each grid, and 
eventually consistent patterns that would allow them to find formulas. But, as the 
teacher put it half way through the session, 
What I think we are aiming at here and I think it’s extremely important is 
rather than just being about getting the formula, is actually being aware of 
the systematicity of the ways that you’ll locate it, that you’re actually learning 
to position the policemen in a consistent way, because you’ve got an 
intelligence about moving around the space, and seeing how you can cover 
it. (italicised words are due to teacher’s emphasis) 
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Ivan and Donald started by exploring square precincts, while Carry was investigating 
2×n precincts. Ivan and Carry developed radically different methods, since Carry 
was focusing on more local generalisations (for the 2×n precincts and later for the 
square precincts), not necessarily related to formulas (as her interview revealed), 
while Ivan was aiming at the broadest generalisations possible and the formulas 
that could pin them down, as his actions up to the end of the classroom and home 
investigation revealed. Donald did not manifest any particular methods throughout 
the session, nor did he influence either Carry or Ivan's investigations. Nine minutes 
after the students started exploring the task Ivan introduced the ‘inside cops’ idea 
and his strategy—which became consistent later in the task—emphasised the 
prominence of how the cops should be placed inside the precincts. Carry, on the 
other hand, prioritised the placement of the ‘outside cops’, that is the cops around 
the precincts, since she believed that “you can always work out the minimum 
number of cops you’ll need on the outside because of how far they can see” 
(interview extract). As a result of her strategy, Carry was starting her positioning of 
the outside cops by consistently putting the first cop at the top left corner (second 
drawing in Figure 2), which is what Donald also did with his square precincts, and 
both following the initial drawing that the teacher did on the board (Figure 1), which 
remained drawn there throughout the session. Ivan started by doing the same, but 
his ‘inside cops’ strategy eventually led him to a method that was based on starting 
with 2 cops on the outside, which both had a 2 blocks distance from the top left 
corner of his drawings (Figure 2). The different strategy had major implications for 
the methodical coherence of the group, since Ivan and Carry developed different 
strategies throughout the session, while Donald’s treatment was a combination of 
Ivan and Carry's methods.   
 
Figure 2. Ivan and Carry's different strategies for the 'outside cops' 
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Carry came to a conclusion about her 2×n precincts, before the end of the first half 
of the session: “as you add a column at each time, you will need one cop more than 
that column, to cover all the streets” (interview extract). She did not seek for a 
formula in order to describe this result, since “what I’ve been trying to find is not a 
formula, I’m trying to find a common way of increasing the cops each time, and 
seeing from that pattern something that matters” (interview extract).112 As she was 
trying to find a “pattern”, i.e. “a common way of increasing the cops each time” she 
did not explore different cases where the number of rows is fixed, such as 3×n, but 
she explored the square grids; and that is when her different strategy (outside cops) 
to Ivan's (inside cops) came out. The two students did not come to a settlement of 
their dispute, but from her engagement with the 2×n grids she brought to the group 
the ‘vertical streets’ concept, that is the amount of cops for each vertical line of the 
grid, which Ivan adopted.113 
Ivan was also struggling to find configurations that would give the minimum number 
of cops for his grids, which would lead him to generalisations. He was keeping an 
account of the cops in each vertical street, the amount of the inside cops (a number 
under each grid at Figure 3) and the shape of the inside and the outside cops (at 
the top right of each grid at Figure 3), while checking symmetry in his drawings 
(Figure 3). At his interview that took place at the beginning of the 2nd part of the 
session,114 he mentioned the diagonal symmetry that he noticed for the 4×4, 5×5 
grids (Figure 3) and his prediction that it might “go on to six or so on”. Being 
preoccupied with symmetry, Ivan was puzzled when he discovered an asymmetrical 
configuration that gave a smaller number of cops for the 3×3 grid (Figure 5). Right 
at the end of the first part of the session, just before the break, he mentioned to 
Carry that “[t]hey [the patterns] might have to be asymmetrical”.  
                                                          
112 Carry’s short interview can be accessed in Appendix B, Paragraph 2). 
113 See the numbers that Ivan has written under his grid in Figure 6. 
114 Ivan’s short interview can be accessed in the Appendix B, Paragraph 1). 
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Figure 3. Ivan's initial drawings of squared precincts, from his notes during the 1st part 
of the session 
 
Figure 4. Ivan’s drawing during the 2nd part of the session 
 
Figure 5. Ivan's asymmetrical drawings for the 3x3, 4x4 grids 
3.2.2.2 The second part of the session  
Towards the end of the activity the students wrote a summary of their findings. 
Carry did not systematically explore cases where the rows are fixed and different 
than 2, and she did not manage to find patterns for the cops in the squared 
precincts. Her findings were limited to the relation she had found during the first 
part of the activity, related to the 2×n grids, still without using any algebraic 
notation; and the only reference to the square grids was the following: 
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With regard to squared precincts I know how to work out the min number of 
cops around the outside of the precinct in relation to the number of columns. 
Perimetre of 4 → 2 outside cops 
     of 8, 12 → 4 
        16, 20 → 6 
Donald merely summarised some of the findings of his peers (e.g. Carry's 2×n 
finding and Ivan's diagonals), adding that “I think I need to do a lot more work on 
this problem to find an answer”. Both Carry and Donald did not continue their 
investigation at home. 
Ivan wrote in his summary that “I feel if I carry on I will eventually come to 
a solution but I don’t know how long it will take”; and he continued his investigation 
at home. But where did his feeling that he would come to a solution derive from? 
His notes during the second part of the session are quite revealing: Ivan found 
another asymmetrical pattern for the 4×4 grid (Figure 5)—using the same pattern 
as the asymmetrical 3×3 grid he had already found (Figure 5)—that gave the same 
(minimum) amount of cops as the symmetrical one at Figure 3. He drew the 
symmetrical and the asymmetrical 4×4 grids next to each other and underneath he 
drew the 5×5 grid, in which he used the same pattern; but the 5×5 grid also had 
diagonal symmetry (Figure 3). He decided to pursue the asymmetrical 3×3 pattern 
for more grids, and a diagonal pattern emerged (Figure 4). But, as he explained in 
an e-mail that he later sent to me, “I had the pattern down before the end of the 
lesson, but hadn't fully understood at that point the significance of this”. 
The richness of different options and ideas that either he had found or Carry 
had suggested, and his preoccupation with symmetry did not allow him to further 
pursue his attention to asymmetrical patterns that he had expressed at the end of 
the first part of the session, but the discovery of the 4×4 grid and of the diagonal 
pattern had opened a new field of exploration for him, one that he took up as soon 
as he returned to this task at home. Therefore the legitimate claim here is that the 
aforementioned activity towards the end of his classroom exploration afforded him—
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through his lived body— with the feeling that he expressed in his last classroom 
reflection. And it is the reason that his last reflection is registered as expressing an 
intuition (that a solution is within his grasp), which we will see how it was fulfilled 
during his investigation at home. 
3.2.2.3 Ivan's investigation at home 
At home, Ivan put next to each other his symmetrical and asymmetrical drawings 
for the 3×3 and 4×4 grids. He drew the 3×3, 4×4, 5×5, 6×6, 7×7 and 8×8 grids 
using the same ‘asymmetrical’ pattern for all these grids. As he wrote in his 
coursework:  
I decided to review it [i.e. the table] to see if there were any patterns 
forming. At first it seemed like there wasn’t any logical way forward so I 
decided to approach this task from a different way. I decided to concentrate 
on grids with the same height. The first group of grid sizes I looked at were 
ones with height 3 but this time I was also looking for a pattern I could use 
to get the optimum amount [of cops]. 
His first step forward was that he was testing a unified way of dealing with the 
precincts and the first time that he “decided to concentrate on grids with the same 
height”, i.e. different than the square grids. His second step forward was that he no 
longer identified pattern with symmetry, since he started with the asymmetrical 3×3 
grid (Figure 5) in both the square and the 3×n grids. Ivan described in his 
coursework what happened after he drew the 3×3, 3×4, 3×5, 3×6, 3×7 and 3×8 
grids (Figure 6): 
These grids were a break through moment for me for two reasons. The first 
reason was because there was a logical order to the number of cops per 
column, it is a sequence of 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2. The second break through 
was a pattern of cops that was the optimal solution, it seemed the best way 
to arrange them was in diagonals. (italics added) 
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Figure 6. Ivan's 3x3, 3x4, ..., 3x8 grids, copied from his coursework 
3.2.2.4 Linking Ivan’s case to the theory (theoretical analysis of Ivan’s 
case) 
The “break through moment” indicates the immediacy that intuition operates. In 
the first place, what Ivan depicts here is a form of “perception [which] is 
characterised as bringing its object to an originary kind of presentation”, “[i]n 
contrast to various kinds of presentifying (vergegenwärtigende) acts, such as 
recollection, fantasy, or empathy” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 162). According to Husserl the 
element of immediacy, accompanied with the intentionality to find a pattern for the 
optimal number of cops that is not necessarily symmetrical, and the feeling of 
certainty after he saw that the pattern was also working for the 3×n grids, are what 
make this perception an intuition. 
But there is a deeper reading of the “break through moment” that Ivan 
expressed in the summary of his activity, which Husserl’s theory allows us to realise, 
from the point of view of Ivan’s intentional origins: Ivan resisted exploring any other 
case apart from the square grids in the classroom, as he prioritised finding an 
appropriate pattern for the optimal amount of cops. Even at home, Ivan did not 
explore the 3×n case before he had a hint that he had found such a pattern, one 
that could suit every particular case (“a pattern of cops that was the optimal 
solution”). His feeling of certainty that “the best way to arrange them was in 
diagonals” meant that his intention was finally fulfilled by an object, namely the 
diagonal pattern.  
This is how, according to Husserl, we can detect when an intuition takes 
place: by a new object that fulfils an intention, in a ‘moment’ (i.e. with immediacy). 
The object is brought to the surface of consciousness as it is separated from the 
subject’s world-as-lived. And it is in this sense that the object of intuition is not a 
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construction, since it becomes known as it is separated from the subject’s reality, in 
the “overlap of my consciousness and reality” (Hintikka 1995, p. 82). There, on that 
piece of paper, the object was suddenly detected as such; it became a figure on the 
ground of the paper and the drawn grids, 115  when Ivan separated it as the 
asymmetrical pattern that could be the actual starting point of his investigation of 
particular cases such as the 3×n one. And, most importantly, this research suggests 
that Ivan's investigation reached its vocation only when Ivan had the feeling of 
certainty that his original intention was fulfilled, due to his intuition that the diagonal 
pattern was the essential pattern that he could use for every grid.  
3.2.3 Ivan's intuition of essence – a detailed account back to the 
intentional origins – an X-ray view of the startup of objectification 
Let’s take a closer look at Ivan's pursuit of the appropriate pattern for every grid, 
throughout his investigation: the diagonal pattern had already appeared in the 3×3 
grid (Figure 5) during the first part of the session, but Ivan ignored it since it was 
asymmetrical. It appeared again in the case of the 5×5 grid but this time the pattern 
was symmetrical and he did not see the connection between the 5×5, 3×3 grids; 
thus he grouped the 5×5 grid with the symmetrical 2×2, 3×3, 4×4 grids (Figure 3). 
It appeared again in the case of the 4×4 grid during the second part of the session, 
and at that time he saw the connection between the 4×4, 5×5 grids, and he 
eventually found the diagonal pattern (Figure 4); but he still could not understand 
“the significance of this”. Ivan wrote in his summary that he had the feeling that if 
he would carry on he would eventually come to a solution, and he decided to 
continue his investigation at home; it was this ‘gut feeling’ that made him persist 
and continue his exploration at home.  
When he reassessed his classroom activity he isolated the asymmetrical 3×3, 4×4 
grids and he put them next to their corresponding symmetrical ones, thus realising 
                                                          
115 The way that the ‘figure on the ground’ is meant here derives its use from Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of 
Perception (2002, p. 4) 
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that they are more effective.116 It was an act of attention to the ‘asymmetrical’ 
diagonal pattern and according to Merleau-Ponty (2002, p. 33), attention “first of 
all presupposes a transformation of the mental field, a new way for consciousness 
to be present to its objects”. Ivan used the 3×3 grid as the starting point for the 
square and the 3×n grids. His feeling of certainty that the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal 
pattern could be effective for all the grids was enhanced when he saw that this 
pattern worked in the case of the square grids (3×3, 4×4,…, 8×8) and the 3×n 
grids (3×3, 3×4, 3×5,…, 3×8). Ivan needed a mathematical verification that this 
pattern was significant and he found it for the cops in the vertical streets of the 3×n 
grids (1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2 – Figure 6). This simple arithmetic sequence or “logical 
order to the number of cops per column” as he called it, offered Ivan mathematical 
legitimacy, in order to establish the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern as the 
appropriate one, in his quest for a pattern that could fit every grid. In Husserl’s 
theory intuition is the act of perception that takes place precisely the moment that 
an empirical or abstract object fulfils a particular intention. The second test that 
Ivan put the diagonal pattern into (i.e. the 3×n grids) allowed what Lohmar (2010, 
p. 79) calls the “synthesis of coincidence”, which is the core of Husserl's intuition of 
essences that we saw it being performed in three steps, as Lohmar indicates: 
 The starting example of the 3×3, 4×4, …, 8×8 grids (ibid., p. 78), where 
the pattern that appeared in the 3×3, 4×4 grids is applied ‘extensively’ 
(specifically), being recognised as worthy for exploration. The 3×3, 4×4 
grids where the pattern is spotted for the first time is what Lohmar calls the 
object of experience (ibid., p. 83), and the pattern is already there but not 
yet objectified, i.e. not yet separated by Ivan, from his lived-experience. In 
concrete terms, he cannot yet see it as an object,  as an autonomous knot 
of features that satisfy the terms of the task at hand. But as his attention is 
drawn into it he does see that there is something there, something worthy 
to investigate further. 
                                                          
116 This time he chose a different symmetrical configuration of cops than the one shown at Figure 3, which 
gave 9 cops instead of the 8 cops that the asymmetrical 4×4 grid gave. 
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 The variation of the starting example (ibid., p. 78), when Ivan modelled the 
pattern he used for the square grids on 3×n grids. The reflection of the 
effectiveness of the 3×3, 4×4 grids’ pattern on the 3×n grids, after it was 
applied on the square grids, became decisive for the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal 
pattern of the next and final step, since it paved the generality of its 
applicability as a pattern. 
 The synthesis of coincidence was realised at the moment of the immediate 
recognition of the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern as “the best way to 
arrange” the cops, as the generalisable pattern that he was intending from 
the start. The view of the intentional origins of the pattern appearing in the 
3×3, 4×4 grids, namely of the intention that synthesised them as a pattern 
that could give the best results in general, becomes possible due to my 
Husserlian approach to (lived) experience, to learning as learning praxis, to 
teaching as invitation to common learning. In terms of the theory, the 
intuition of essence takes place at this moment, the moment of the synthesis 
of coincidence, when an essence emerges out of the successful mirroring of 
the starting example to its variation; and in this case it was the essence of 
configuring the infinite space, by using one pattern while complying with the 
terms of the task at hand—the short-sighted policemen.  The pattern 
appearing in the 3×3, 4×4 grids was stripped of its origination, and it was 
seen (abstracted) as the “pattern of cops that was the optimal solution” for 
all grids. This moment brings to the surface an object of a new category, 
and in this sense the intuition of essence is a categorial intuition, as Husserl’s 
theory anticipates (Lohmar, 2010; Hintikka, 2003) Additionally, the 
arithmetic pattern of the vertical line cops testified the mathematical 
legitimacy of the shape pattern, and it would soon be recognised and cashed 
in as a source of mathematical abstraction (figures 7, 8, 9 in Part3 §3.2.3.2). 
Through these three steps, the asymmetrical diagonal configuration of the cops that 
appeared at the 3×3, 4×4 grids was recognised by Ivan as the ‘leading pattern’. 
The first two steps were preparatory, while the 3rd step was the conclusion and the 
core of the intuition. The “logical order to the number of cops per column” (i.e. the 
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“sequence of 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2”) confirmed the embodied (visual and 
kinesthetic)117 intuitive recognition of the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal configuration of 
the cops as the “optimal solution”, and it attributed intersubjectivity to what his 
operative intentionality had recognised as the diagonal pattern configuration. In 
other words, the intersubjectivity achieved by the arithmetic pattern made his 
realisation communicable, as Poincare (2007, p. 348) explains: 
Sensations are intransmissible, or rather all that is pure quality in them is 
intransmissible and forever impenetrable. But it is not the same with relations 
between these sensations. From this point of view all that is objective is 
devoid of all qualities and is only pure relation. 
Moreover, Ivan arrived at the arithmetic pattern due to his persistence in finding a 
pattern for every grid, and I had not initially confirmed to which extent his 
recognition of the 3×3, 4×4 grids’ pattern as the one he was looking for was decisive 
in gaining the arithmetic pattern itself. What I was certain of was that Ivan’s gut 
feeling that there is a pattern for every grid fueled his investigation from his quest 
for symmetry, up to the exploration of the asymmetrical pattern. And that the 
arithmetic pattern provided the shape pattern with apodictic evidence (formally 
verified) that the diagonal pattern was appropriate for generalised use. 
The ‘synthesis of coincidence’, as it is exemplified in Ivan's intuition of 
essences concerns the qualitative transformation of the particular, out of the 
awareness of generality. The particular is in this case the 3×3, 4×4 grids’ pattern 
(Figure 5).  The generality concerns the transformation of the object of experience, 
i.e. the cops’ configuration of the 3×3, 4×4 grids’ pattern, to the diagonal pattern 
that will be used for all grids, which was what Ivan intended to ultimately find. The 
teacher had repeatedly asked the students to realise how they make sense of space 
                                                          
117 I will not explore here the pre-reflective kinesthetic aspect of this intuition, nor exemplify the kinesthetic 
(sensorimotor) substratum of the (apparent) visual aspect of Ivan’s intuition. It may suffice to hint that the 
creation of subjective sense of space through the drawing of these grids was a premise for the visual 
apperception (i.e. the perception of the pattern as a solution for all the cases that Ivan had not yet drawn –for 
Husserl, seeing another living body as a subject or cogito is a typical example of an apperception (Moran & 
Cohen, 2012, pp. 39-40; cf. Glossary/Index). 
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in this task: “What you are trying to do is actually understand the space prior to 
fixing a formula”; and Ivan's intuition that brought the diagonal pattern to the 
surface of his consciousness—thus objectifying it—was a sense-bestowing act that 
allowed him to achieve his own understanding of the grids’ space; it was the first 
essential step towards unlocking the task and arriving at 9 formulas (Figure 9 in 
Part 3 § 3.2.3.2), that gave the optimal number of cops for every a×n grid. 
We also notice here as in an X-ray the interplay of intentionality, immediacy 
and the feeling of certainty in all three steps of the intuition of essence: The second 
step of the variation of the starting example has the effect of enhancing the feeling 
of certainty that the pattern in the 3×3, 4×4 grids is the ‘right’ one, although the 
feeling came to its peak only in the accomplishment of the third step. Intentionality 
is performed throughout the three steps, as Ivan checked that the amount of cops 
is the optimal one in the square grids and in the 3 × 𝑛 grids, as he was extending 
the validity of the square to the orthogonal grids; it is clearly expressed when he 
wrote “I decided to concentrate on grids with the same height”. Immediacy, which 
is the critical identifying property of intuition, is performed at the third step. It is the 
“break through moment” that Ivan writes about, that this particular diagonal pattern 
of cops is generalisable, as he recognised it as the optimal solution; it is the moment 
that Ivan grasped with a feeling of certainty the idea that this pattern is the object 
“that it filled the space” in “the best way to arrange” the cops. 
The intuition of the “shape pattern”, of the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern 
as the optimal solution, came first; the lived body signaled first that this is the figure 
to work with. It was an embodied operation that started during the first two steps 
of his intuition, when he persisted in using the same pattern in 3 × 𝑛 orthogonal 
grids although “there wasn’t a logical way forward” in the square grids, although he 
could not detect in the square grids any regularity that would allow him to gain 
further evidence for the mathematisation of the cops’ configurations. It was after 
the lengthy interview that I testified that the arithmetic pattern 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 
1, 2 in the vertical street cops came only after Ivan was intuitively convinced that 
the pattern serves its purpose in keeping the minimum amount of cops not only in 
the starting and in the modelled example, but also for all grids. It was then that the 
~ 175 ~ 
 
arithmetic pattern sealed the intuition as mathematisable and made him “decide 
things”, which led to his formulas. Ivan makes it clear in his interview: 
R:  So the “breakthrough moment” that you mention in your coursework is 
the moment that you found the arithmetic pattern, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2? 
I: Well, the shape pattern came first, that was the main breakthrough 
because I could see that it worked, that I could apply that; then, looking at 
the verticals is what made the breakthrough for me to decide things. So, it 
was first the diagram sight, … that the major thing is that it filled the space, 
you could see everything, and that’s what, what’s the task really. 
R: What did you need in order to realise the “significance” of this? 
I: [I needed to] sit down and write it, that’s it! [laugh] I don’t know, I don’t 
know what made it purely significant. I knew it was significant because, no 
matter how much I extended it the pattern would go on! And, a pattern is 
generally what you look for in maths, it’s how you determine certain things 
are going to happen over and over again. Looking for constants in nature as 
well if you… but that’s a different side of things. Looking for a pattern was 
the first part, then I think I went “oh! That goes 3, 3, 3, and I can do it formal 
from that! That’s what I think, except I did it with twos, 2, 1, 2, 1… [he 
remembers what the pattern was] 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, I think that’s what the 
pattern form was. 
The arithmetic pattern sealed the intuition as mathematisable since it 
triggered him to “do it formal from that”. But the pattern that would “determine 
certain things are going to happen over and over again”, the pattern that “no matter 
how much I [Ivan] extended it the pattern would go on” is the “shape figure”, the 
‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern, and it should not be confused with the arithmetic 
pattern. He was convinced that the pattern worked after he intuitively synthesised 
a coincidence out of the two cases (the square and the orthogonal grids) to which 
he applied it; the synthesis of coincidence of the two cases brought out an essence 
concerning the diagonal pattern, it was a sort of miniature proof by example that 
took place, in an instance. Two cases, the starting example and the 
variation/modeling of the starting example created a sort of stereoscopic vision 
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where the new object was born, i.e. seen for the first time. As the teacher had told 
the students during the session: 
What we are trying to do is actually develop sensitivity and intelligence to 
moving about the space, getting a sense of where you locate the place in a 
consistent way, so that you’ll get a feeling of how this space grows, of how 
the supply of policemen increases in relation to the different ways in which 
the precinct expands. (italicised words indicate his emphasis) 
And Ivan actualised just that, in a unified way with his intuition of the diagonal 
pattern, stating it clearly when he says that “the major thing is that it filled the 
space, you could see everything, and that’s what, what’s the task really”. 
3.2.3.1 Reflections on Ivan’s intuition of essence and two features 
anticipated by the theory – Response to Cartesian and 
Kantian/constructivist views 
The Husserlian approach to intuition that I exemplify here is also a strong indication 
of the distinction between the Husserlian intuitions and Descartes' cogito insight or 
the Kantian perception of experience. In Cartesian and Kantian based theoretical 
frames knowledge originates (respectively) from the cogito (the thinking mind, the 
‘I think’), and from the process of understanding as separated from sensibility and 
already categorically operating. But this constructivist approach to cognition simply 
will not do for Husserl, who sees the problem of the (naïve) empiricist notion of 
representations entangled in the schism of sensibility and understanding. Mature 
Husserl clearly points to the lack of an intuitive exhibiting method as the reason for 
Kant’s mythical constructions (1970a, §30, cf. Husserl’s marginal comment in p. 
116), showing how experience in the Kantian sense is ready-made experience, 
where Meno’s paradox cannot acquire any legitimate cognitive answer. Husserl 
brings about similar questions when he states… 
If Kant, on the other hand, in the questions he posed and in his regressive 
method, also naturally makes use of the pregiven world but at the same time 
constructs a transcendental subjectivity through whose concealed 
transcendental functions, with unswerving necessity, the world of experience 
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is formed, he runs into the difficulty that a particular quality of the human 
soul (which itself belongs to the world and is thus presupposed with it) is 
supposed to accomplish and to have already accomplished a formative 
process which shapes this whole world. But as soon as we distinguish this 
transcendental subjectivity from the soul, we get involved in something 
incomprehensibly mythical. (p. 118) 
The soul here is the living body, participating in the paradoxical double feature of 
the ego according to Husserl, the coexistence of the subject-for-the-world and the 
object-in-the-world (Husserl, 1970a, p. 180, Carr, 1999). The body is the field for 
this tension, since it is where this double feature is expressed in the body’s Leib and 
Kőrper nature, namely the body-subject or living body, and the body-as-object. 118   
Husserl’s introduction of the living body and its powers brings into play the 
embodied consciousness, which is crucial in understanding Ivan's building up of his 
feeling of certainty, up to the intuitive moment of the third step. This building up of 
certainty for the effectiveness of the pattern was not primarily a thinking process or 
a separation of already existing or imposed categories from experience, by a 
categorically afforded mind; rather, he separated what he himself allowed to 
emerge as a result of his methodology, shaped around the quest for a unifying 
pattern, and of his openness to visual patterns. It was not a result of acts of thought, 
but rather a process of ‘I can’ and a result of ‘I see’. The objects that he drew, the 
different grids with different or similar patterns, where space was covered in 
different or similar ways drew his attention, firstly through symmetry and then with 
new forms, as he saw the consistency of a particular, asymmetric pattern on two 
sets of grids (the square grids and the 3 × 𝑛 ones). What makes the Husserlian 
approach for which I am advocating here for distinct from Cartesian and 
Kantian/constructivist views is that the object of the “diagonals” configuration that 
the intuition brought to the surface was given to him, in the overlap of his lived 
                                                          
118 This tension between the body-subject and the body-as-object is also expressed in the well-known 
example of the hand that touches the other hand, which Merleau-Ponty (e.g. 2002, p.367) took over from 
Husserl (). 
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reality and his embodied consciousness, hence separated from his experience; 
rather than being established in his mind due to an internal representational 
capacity. Since “as soon as we distinguish this transcendental subjectivity from the 
living body (the “soul”), we get involved in something incomprehensibly mythical” 
(Husserl, 1970a, p. 118). 
Immediacy—the non-mediated perception that brought the asymmetrical 
pattern to existence as a consistent form that may be applied to all grids, in the 
third step of the intuition of essence—is the key property that makes the 
intentionality fulfilled in this particular way, i.e. the intuitive way. It is what 
distinguishes intuition from imagination or remembering. And it marks the 
distinction mentioned earlier between Husserlian and Cartesian/Kantian approaches 
to the cognitive experience, since immediacy takes a new meaning under the 
Husserlian perspective: there is actual straightforward involvement in the world and 
sensuous experience is already a form of understanding, different from and 
indispensable for the positing, active constitution of the object as such. In other 
words for Husserl, understanding is not separated from our conscious—though pre-
reflective—embodied processes, and the borders between Kantian sensibility and 
understanding are blurred and finally cancelled. In the detailed Husserlian/Merleau-
Pontyian analysis of Ivan’s intuition, immediacy was detected as operating through 
processes like the stereoscopic vision that I mentioned earlier (end of Part 3, 
§3.2.3), concerning Ivan’s intuition of essence. What is particular about Husserl’s 
theory is that immediacy in the sense just described brings with it an intentional 
act—a shifting of horizons that allowed Ivan to see the two examples, the square 
and the orthogonal grids as one, concerning the shape pattern, due to his intention 
for a unified pattern.  
It is in the third step of the intuition of essence that the interweaving of the 
mental and the embodied is traced, not separated for Husserl, due to his living body. 
The stereoscopic vision brought the new object to the surface, an object of a new 
category, not involving any particular grids configurations and at the same moment 
involving precisely any grids’ configuration. Since this is the other main finding of 
the analysis, namely the generality that the Husserlian intuition of essence invokes. 
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Ivan literally figured out a pattern that gave best results for any grid configurations 
and then he sliced the 2-dimensional space in sets of three, both in length and 
width, according to the rhythm of the arithmetic pattern (1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2,…). 
Ivan’s transition from the arithmetic pattern to his formulas also has an embodied 
aspect that cuts across Kantian dichotomies, as well as current constructivist 
inspired research, based on Fischbein and adopting Piagetian ideas (e.g. the 
“cognitive conflict”, Garcia, 1996, in Barach, Klein, ), even when the attention is 
drawn on “the influence of the intricate interplay between intuition and logical 
thinking on the emergence of justifications and proofs” (Kidron & Dreyfus, 2014, p. 
297).  Since without the intentional organisation of Ivan’s embodied conscious 
understandings (such as the allure that the rhythm of 1, 1, 2 evokes) into 
mathematical objects (such as the nine formulas), without the intentional history of 
the mathematical objects that Ivan devised being disclosed, the products of his 
cognitive process would become mythical constructions. 
Ivan’s intuition of essence was precisely the fulfillment of the sense of 
generality, found in the ‘asymmetrical’ pattern. Ivan managed to regulate the whole 
2-dimensional space due to this intuition, and he was looking for nothing less. 
Intentional act and intended object are clearly manifested here, through the 
generalising positing of the pattern as the “pattern for all grids”. The stereoscopic 
vision allowed the synthesis of coincidence. This abstract intuition is not only very 
effective but it also has an empirical dimension, as it can be taken up again and 
again, in different areas of mathematics, up to the point that evidence is brought to 
the surface, due to synthetic processes of confirmation and identification. But the 
principal perspective that makes it possible in the first place, as a meaningful 
experience of abstract, mathematically expressed objectifications is transcendental, 
rather than empirical; it is due to the interwoven empirical and transcendental ego, 
due to conscious acts of the intentional ego, in its diverse intentionalities that the 
abstract objects (finally) appeared. And the generalisation is a feature anticipated 
by Husserl's theory, considered as a particular feature of the intuition of essence. 
Immediacy was the manner through which an invariable feature was spotted (the 
shape pattern) and was chosen to express the configuration of all grids in the final 
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step of the process, where it was finally endowed with an intuitive sense of proof 
(apodictic quality), as the general pattern for all grids, after testing it in two 
instances (the square and the 3 × 𝑛 grids). And this sense of proof is the second 
feature of the intuition of essence, according to the Husserlian theory. 
The living body was shown as preparing objects to emerge in the two stages 
of the intuition that preceded the final one of the synthesis of coincidence. The 
analysis has shown how the operative intentionality synthesised the pattern 
appearing in the 3 × 3, 4 × 4 grids and persisted in it until it was posited as an 
object, namely the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern. And Diana transliterated her 
trial-and-improvement empirical method into a description of the rule of the task, in 
the shape of an algorithm. It is in this sense that the living body expands its territory 
of influence on abstract mathematical ideas, and supports new levels of abstraction 
and systematisation of primal material. , seen through the syntheses that it itself 
makes possible and the appearances of new objects, gives an alternative view of 
intuitions in relation to objectification. 
3.2.3.2 The results of Ivan’s successful intuition 
The following drawings and e-mail that I received from Ivan give a description of 
what he did after he found the arithmetic pattern, as soon as he noticed the iterative 
structure of his shapes (Figure 6): 
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Figure 7. Ivan's building of formulas 
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Figure 8. Ivan's building of formulas 
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Figure 9. Ivan's final formulas 
I realised that I could break it up into 3 sequences. Starting with a 3x2 grid, 
(3 up 2 along), [Figure 7] then the next grid in the sequence was 3x5, then 
3x8... which gave me a pattern of 4,8,12,.... This pattern I called "when, 
(n+1)/3, is an integer".  
I then applied this method to 3x3 (when, n/3, is an integer) to 3x6, 3x9... 
which gave me a pattern of 5,9,13,... and with the last sequence (when, (n-
1)/3, is an integer) which starts on 3x4, then 3x7, 3x10... which gave me a 
pattern of 6,10,14... 
This allowed me to apply so simple arithmetic sequence knowledge where 
the term no. was equal to the type of sequence that it was e.g. term 1 for 
the, (n+1)/3, set was worked out by using the formula, (n+1)/3, and 
substituting in 2 to get the number 1 (for term 1), when you substitute in the 
no. 5 you get 2 (for term 2), and so on. 
I then applied the same thinking to the 4xn grids, 5xn grids, 6xn grids, and 
7xn grids [Figure 8]. I then wrote out each of the formulas in a table, and 
this allowed me to see how the height can be related to the formula (which 
I called 'a'). This allowed me to generate 9 formulas based on when: (n+1)/3, 
is an integer; n/3, is an integer; (n-1)/3, is an integer; and when: (a+1)/3, 
is an integer; a/3, is an integer; and (a-1)/3, is an integer [Figure 9]. 
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Chapter 3. Diana –feelings and enculturation in the emergence of 
an empirical intuition and the abstraction of a flow chart.  
3.3.1 The course and the Doubling modulo activity 
The nature of the course allowed many initiatives to every student, concerning the 
directions they might take, encouraging group and inter-group collaboration. The 
teacher adopted a merely operational instructional disposition during the sessions, 
which enhanced the effect of the individual/group independent methodologies and 
practices. The students had the opportunity to choose 3 or 4 of their favourite 
activities in order to further develop and present them in a written form at the end 
of the course. The minimised instructional character and the open-endedness of the 
activities facilitated the students’ intuitive approaches to be more explicit than in 
many ‘typical’ conventional or exploratory teaching frames. 
The task that will be analysed was called ‘doubling the modulo’. The teacher 
would think of a certain number (the ‘fixed number’) and he would write a smaller 
number on the board, double it, and write the new result on the board, next to the 
previous one, if the result was smaller than the initial number. He continued this 
process until the doubled number would exceed (or become equal to) the fixed 
number. In this case the teacher subtracted the fixed number from the doubling 
number and the doubling process continued with the residue, the ‘modulo’, until he 
would find zero or a number that he had already used (a loop). He then started the 
same process again with any unused number smaller than the fixed one, until all 
numbers smaller than the fixed number would be recycled. It was an open-ended 
task in terms of the expected results, while the teacher prompted the students to 
pursue the strongest generalisations possible.  
The students knew that the teacher would not respond to questions concerning the 
treatment of the task, and it was not always a case of a more or less smooth self-
organisation or mutual adaptation in meanings negotiation and construction 
between the students. The teacher started the task by writing the first two or three 
numbers and then he was waiting for the students’ response, writing the next 
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number either when the students got it right or after they couldn’t find it. He did 
not give any clue, expecting the students to understand and share their 
understandings only by the repetition of the process. Luck [pseudonym] conveys 
his impressions of the introduction of the task until the “pattern finally clicked” for 
him: 
My head was spinning with numbers, I just couldn’t connect each one to the 
next. I was doubling numbers without reason and trying to subtract any 
number that was in any way connected. Factors, multiples, divisors, nothing 
worked. My head was beginning to hurt when a number was added to the 
board that was not part of the list and yet connected all of them.119 Not one 
of the listed numbers was higher of this number. In fact not one of the listed 
numbers was even equal to this, stopping just short. I’m not too sure how 
long I stared at the list and the mysterious circled number before the pattern 
finally clicked. That was when I truly felt that I deserved to feel slightly 
triumphant.120 
As soon as some of the students had an idea they checked it and started sharing it 
with the other students. They followed different strategies while working in groups 
of 3, 4 or 5 members of their choice, and their strategies were related to the 
exploration of the natural numbers’ properties (i.e. even, odd, prime numbers, 
                                                          
119 After the first examples when the ‘fixed number’ was not written or mentioned it was the first time that 
the teacher wrote on the board the ‘fixed number’ and put it in a circle. 
120 See Figure 10 for Luck’s drawings for the activity. 
Figure 10. Luck’s drawings for the activity.  
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powers of 2, prime factorisation etc.) and how these properties were related to the 
results (see Figures 10, 11). 
   
Figure 11. Ivan’s drawings for 𝟏𝟐 = 𝟑 ∙ 𝟐𝟐, 𝟒𝟖 = 𝟑 ∙ 𝟐𝟒 
Diana was trying to understand how the other students thought about the activity, 
without any success. 
I still don’t understand how they do it; because a couple of people tried to 
explain it to me but I was just completely lost, I didn’t know how they could 
look at a number and go “alright that the 1 so the next one needs to be 2 
[or] okay that, the next one needs to be 4”. I still don’t understand it, their 
way. (interview extract) 
The teacher did not provide any guidance, which is something that frustrated her: 
And sometimes it’s just really frustrating, because I think, well, “am I doing 
it right or am I doing it wrong?” and he says “what do you think?” And I’m 
thinking that “I don’t know, that’s why I’m asking you!” And it frustrates me. 
(interview extract) 
I noticed her frustration while working with another group, I approached her, I saw 
these ‘strange’ set of commands written in her papers (see Figure 12), and I realised 
that she was already engaged in a process of her own; thus I decided not to 
interrupt her and I chose to return to my previous group. The result was that she 
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developed her particular understanding alone. Her first intuition, as it came out in 
her coursework was to “look at the rule” of the task: 
I understood the rule and what we were doing but for some reason I couldn’t 
get my head around the flow diagram that everyone was doing [Figures 10 
&11]. I started looking at the rule we had been given and what we had found 
from the other numbers we had used. I decided I would use a flow chart and 
above it write out the numbers from 1 to n-1 [Figures 12 & 13]. This way I 
could see if there was more than 1 cycle and if there was more than 1 cycle 
I could cross the numbers out as I went along to make sure I had used them 
all. 
The intuition of the ‘task rule’ has a particular significance, since it shaped her 
treatment of the investigation. The relevant data for this intuition are her notes and 
drawings during the session (e.g. Figures 12, 13), my observation during the 
session, her interview and her reflection after the session (delivered with her 
coursework at the end of the course). They deserve a closer examination, since they 
will be used for the phenomenological analysis that aims at the critical features of 
Diana’s treatment of the investigation. 
 
Figure 12. Diana's drawings during the session  
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Figure 13. Diana's drawings during the session 
 
Figure 14. Diana’s algorithm 
She illustrated the structure of the activity (“the rule”) in her own way (Figure 12), 
as a trial-and-improvement process, in a question/answer (q/a) manner: 
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…so I was having to devise this kind of system, where I’ve said “right, okay, if I 
do this to that, if I times this number by 2, is it bigger than the 9? No it isn’t! So 
what do I have to do to it? Then I have to do this to it”. (extract from her 
interview) 
We also notice her q/a approach in her text in Figure 12: Is 2>7? “No”. Is 4>7? 
“No”. Is 8>7? “Yes”. Then, 8–7 = 1 (written on the same line as the q/a). Is 2>7? 
“No”. A dotted line above the last q/a indicates that the latter part is unnecessary, 
since number 1 has already occurred. A ‘loop’ is completed and the corresponding 
numbers are crossed at the top. This series of q/a, written line after line for each 
number, gave full account of what happens when one doubles a number until one 
‘stumbles’ on a number that has exceeded the fixed number or a number previously 
used (a loop), and her notes are a clear re-presentation of the actual raw judgments 
involved. The trial-and-improvement process that she used with immediacy, 
intentionality and a feeling of certainty is an empirical intuition according to Husserl, 
as it transformed her experience of her world-as-lived to successive questions and 
answers concerning numbers. Although the analysis could not go as far as finding 
an empirical equivalent of this intuition in her experience, we can only say that its 
crucial feature is the separation of the q/a sequence from her lived experience, 
similar to a situation such as ‘finding objects in the dark’. It is an empirical intuition 
(since it draws forms directly from our lived reality) employing “[i]magination, for 
instance imaginary variation, [which] can serve the purpose of disentangling 
essences from the hyletic data”121 (Hintikka, 2003, p. 177). 
                                                          
121 ‘Hyletic data’ or ‘hyle’ is for Husserl the unstructured raw material that perception brings to our 
consciousness. 
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Figure 15. Diana's method, depicting what is implicit in other students' drawings 
She filled pages of questions/answers sequences for each natural number from 4 to 
18. Finally, these structured questions/answers became a new layer of data for her, 
and she intuited them as commands and judgments, similar to a computer 
algorithm. We see the dialectics of a new synthesis in the algorithm (Figure 14), 
which is the condensation of the 15 patiently repeated individual algorithms 
(drawings). These 15 drawings are prehensions (Tragesser, 1977, pp. 17-18) 
according to Husserlian theory adopted by this research study (Part 1, §§ 1.4.3.1, 
1.4.5); The constitution of the algorithm that summed up the previous 15 drawings 
is a new intuition, which took place as she was attempting to describe the process 
she followed for the 15 numbers for any given number. It was an intuition since, as 
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Hintikka puts it, “according to Husserl such an abstraction of an essence can only 
take place in intuition”, and in Husserl's words, “[s]eeing an essence is therefore 
intuition”(ibid, p. 181). This time her intuition was based on the previous empirical 
one. The q/a material was a result of her previous empirical intuition, being given 
in direct sensory awareness; but the intuition that followed separated the algorithm 
form from the q/a material, and it was what Husserl describes as the 2nd intuitive 
stage of the categorial intuition (the abstract stage), which in this case is also an 
intuition of essence (Wesensschau):  
[A]n analyst can separate in consciousness the forms (eide) from the material in 
which they are imbedded, turn them into objects of another sort, and … direct 
one's intuitive attention to them. This is what Husserl's Wesensschau is supposed 
to accomplish. This intuition has the effect of opening to my consciousness, not 
only an empirical object consisting of matter and form, but that form or essence 
in itself, separated from its hyle. (ibid, p. 180) 
For Husserl the categorial intuitions—and the intuitions of essences—are the ones 
that actually create abstract objects, and Diana’s example shows how abstract 
objects are formed on the basis of empirical ones, thus projecting an approach to 
knowledge that is essentially based on our lived experience, rather than internal 
mind processes. Diana’s categorial intuition took place in two stages, since it started 
with the empirical intuition—the intuition of the ‘task rule’—that separated the q/a 
form of commands from her trial-and-improvement lived experience (the first, 
empirical stage), and it was followed by her categorial  intuition—the intuition of the 
algorithm—that separated the form of the algorithm from the 15 drawings (the new 
‘hyletic’ (raw) products) of her empirical intuition (the second, abstract stage). The 
new object, namely the algorithm was an object of a new class (a new category), 
leading her previous results to mathematical abstraction and formal language. But 
as I just mentioned there is also another way to interpret her new object, i.e. as the 
essence of her 15 drawings, which transformed the 15 “sensible particulars” to 
something different and essentially abstract. Hintikka’s explication of Husserl's 
intuitions of essences finds here a clear instantiation since, “Wesensschau, too, 
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pertains to objects, albeit objects different from sensible particulars. For Husserl 
Wesensschau transforms sensory intuition into intuition of essences” (p. 182). 
3.3.2 The flowchart and the legitimisation of her efforts by the teacher 
In understanding Diana’s actions and the origins and evolution of her material the 
phenomenological analysis did not raise questions concerning the effectiveness of 
the produced objects for the task at hand, from any other perspective apart from 
the student’s perspective, as she was intentionally driven towards the object (the 
algorithm), recognising at it an effective artefact for the task, as it was perceived 
by her. We followed the object’s genetic course, as it emerged from the learner’s 
constitutive acts, namely from her intuition of the ‘task rule’, her ever closer 
apprehension of the rule of the task in her 15 drawings that followed (considered 
as prehensions that led to the next intuitive apprehension) and finally, from the 
intuition of the algorithm, which brought the algorithm to the surface of her 
conscious investigation, thus concluding her efforts during the session. 
The algorithm was the state-of-the-art product of the student’s investigation 
during the session, but Diana was not too happy about her results, since she was 
convinced that no one would be able to understand them, let alone the teacher, 
who would evaluate the productions that the students would choose as their 
favourites at the end of the sessions,122 as this one certainly was for Diana: 
Well, when I was looking at this, I was thinking if I was to give this to the 
teacher, he’d look at it and he’d be thinking “what on earth has she done?” 
Because he would not understand it! So I thought the only way I can do it is 
by doing some kind of flowchart, flow diagram or algorithm or whatever to 
be able to explain my steps in the thought process that I went through, to 
be able to understand this activity… (interview extract, her emphasis) 
Since the bracketing of the teacher in my research goes as far as the teacher’s 
actions did not interfere with the student’s acts and the objects that were 
                                                          
122 Up to 8 different reflections on different tasks were delivered by each student at the end of the course, 
which was about the time that my interview with Diana took place. 
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constituted due to these acts, there is an occasion here that the teacher—as any 
other teacher, and despite this teacher’s masterfully performed withdrawal from 
instruction—is vital, since he is responsible for the legitimisation or the rejection of 
the students’ constitutions and constructions. The teacher’s legitimisation of her 
(coherent) mathematical description, was critical for the impact that the task had 
on her. The appreciation of her way of managing the activity was also a motivation 
for her, as she explains in her interview, saying that she made the flow chart in 
order to be better understood by the teacher, as she was aiming to deliver the 
description of this activity as one of her final assignments (her favourite one – see 
interview). 
But the other side of the story is the transformation that she went through, 
in order to alone construct an algorithm, after her 15 empirical attempts.  It was by 
managing “to understand this activity” that she arrived to the algorithm (Figure 14); 
the algorithm was explicative of her “steps in the thought process”. The algorithm 
was depicting the steps that she “went through, to be able to understand this 
activity”. 
What we are basically told by the student is that she transformed her trial-
and-improvement method to sets of questions/answers, due to her empirical 
‘intuition of the rule’; and that she then intuited her 15 applications as a generalising 
algorithm, at the second stage of her categorial intuition. And even in her final object 
(the flowchart, Figure 16) the “thought process” is visible, hence the object becomes 
a re-presentation of the initial trial-and-improvement method. 
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Figure 16. Diana's flowchart 
Exploring the intentional origins of the transformation of the algorithm (that 
she created at the end of the session—Figure 14) to the flow chart (that she 
designed when she went home—Figure 16), also serves as a testification of her 
originally intersubjective intentionality. The flowchart indicates and moreover 
designates intentional horizons that remained invariant throughout her 
investigation, which can be brought to light by the phenomenological analysis, 
although they are not my primary focus of investigation: under these horizons the 
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flowchart can be seen as an extension of her intention to constitute something 
intelligible for others as soon as she ‘decoded’ the rule of the task, during the 
session, and alongside depicting and thematising the ‘rule’ of the task fifteen times 
on paper. Her intention to convey her ideas to others (and in particular to the 
teacher), led her to the conversion of her work to more intelligible forms (according 
to her). Thus she expressed her need to better present her investigation findings, 
which was an ever appearing process, from the beginning until the end. Her 
interview,123 performed in the open and spontaneous frame that Diana set (and 
which I also encouraged), with her marvelous sense of communicating her ideas is 
telling, up to its details… 
R: The flowchart is much more advanced than this one [the algorithm], 
although it might describe the same thing, but the flowchart is far more 
advanced, I think. 
D: Well, I knew that if anyone else other than me looked at this they wouldn’t 
know what was going on. 
R: I did! 
D: Oh, did you? Well I just assumed then, shall I say, that if anybody looked 
at this they wouldn’t [know] what was happening and how I’d got my 
answers; which is why I did that [the flowchart]124 
R: That is far more sophisticated! 
D: It’s a little bit confusing though, isn’t it? 
R: Why? 
D: It’s easy to follow but there’s just lines everywhere [laugh] 
R: [laugh] is it your thought depicted here? 
D: Yes! 
R: Is this precisely how you have to think and how you thought… 
D: That’s how I thought to be able to do it. 
                                                          
123 The whole interview can be accessed in the Appendix. 
124  Diana is emphatically repeating that her motivation for advancing her initial ‘sequence of commands’ to a 
flowchart was the need to be understood by the other people. 
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R: It’s a bit of a maze, isn’t it? 
D: It is [laugh] but...  
R: [But] there is an outcome, somewhere, isn’t there? 
D: To me that makes perfect sense! 
R: Yes, yes, absolutely, I like this one… I’ll photocopy it actually125 
D: Yeah! 
R: I like it very much. 
D: Well, I’ve got on my… I can e-mail it to you, if you like. 
R: Oh please, yes. 
D: Because I’ve got it on my computer; so if it’s easier I can email it to you. 
A: Oh yes, that would be even better. 
D: I still need to double check it because again it’s a while ago since I’ve 
looked at this;126 and I did double, triple and quadruple checked that this 
worked and it did, but I’ll double check it again [laugh], just for my own 
benefit. 
R: Alright, I would accept it as it is, even if it had errors, 
D: Yeah! 
A: I mean it doesn’t make a big difference to me; to me it is the construction 
that matters. 
D: Right, okay. 
R: And I can understand what you’re trying to do here; so, that was about it 
with this activity, which I call it ‘rings’… the doubling 
D: I think it was called ‘doubling’, yeah… 
R: Doubling, yes, ‘doubling modulo’. 
                                                          
125  My statement is formed as a question—asking for her permission to photocopy the flowchart. 
126 The interview took place at the end of the sessions (11-4-2011), five months after the Doubling modulo 
session (11-11-2010). But her recollections are expressed without any sense of doubt. 
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D: Yeah but the reason… I did quite enjoy that one but that was because I 
had a different way to everybody else; that’s why I liked it [laugh]127 (12:20) 
R: Do you usually have a different way to everybody else or do you usually 
have the same way with somebody else? 
D: No, usually my thought is… my thought is the same as everybody else’s, 
so this one quite intrigued me because I thought it in a different way than 
nobody else seemed to, so it intrigued me, because of that. 
It now makes better sense what Diana expressed in the previous extract, concerning 
her “steps in the thought process that I [she] went through”, when she emphatically 
states in this extract, that the flowchart illustrates how she “thought to be able to 
do it”, when I asked her if her thought is depicted in the flowchart. My bracketing 
of the teacher due to my focusing on the primal constitution of each key object in 
the students’ learning experiences does not turn me blind to the social aspect that 
this particular teaching made available, especially when the student herself raises 
the issue of the uniqueness of her treatment of the Doubling (the) modulo task . 
This uniqueness also manifests the uniqueness of a teaching approach that is 
tolerant to different approaches by the students; the teacher’s withdrawal from 
instruction, and his broad acceptance of the students’ mathematical suggestions, 
matching with a good sample of students and a joyful disposition towards the 
mathematical investigations of the course, with me as an unexpected attraction of 
the sessions,  are precisely the main reasons why these courses, organised by that 
teacher, that particular academic year, shaped a particularly hospitable milieu for 
my theoretical and methodological research approach; and allowed my 
phenomenological methodological instruments to be implemented.  
It is in this sense that the teacher’s legitimisation of Diana’s object—the 
flowchart—was pivotal for Diana’s success. It is clear that Diana’s “different way to 
everybody else” was exactly what she needed, and she acquired it not only due to 
her efforts but also due to the teacher’s open attitude towards the students’ 
                                                          
127  The short laugh comes after a statement that was uttered very seriously. All italicised words are due to her 
emphasis, apart from the one related to this footnote. 
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mathematical suggestions. It was exactly what she needed in order to build up a 
more coherent and self-confident mathematical interface. 
D: Yeah but the reason… I did quite enjoy that one but that was because I 
had a different way to everybody else; that’s why I liked it [laugh]128 (12:20) 
R: Do you usually have a different way to everybody else or do you usually 
have the same way with somebody else? 
D: No, usually my thought is… my thought is the same as everybody else’s, 
so this one quite intrigued me because I thought it in a different way than 
nobody else seemed to, so it intrigued me, because of that. 
I can easily think of many classroom contexts—including Diana’s own school 
experience (as it comes out from her interview - see Appendix C)—where Diana’s 
devise would be deemed inadequate or irrelevant. 
3.3.3 Diana’s presentation at the end of the course.   
3.3.3.1 Diana’s presentation – A bold decision to go against her previous 
conceptions 
The last three sessions of the NoM course were dedicated to the students’ 
presentations of a task of their own choice, while the other students, the teacher 
and I participated in the investigation. The intention for these sessions was to give 
the opportunity to reflect on what the students possibly gained from the sessions, 
and express it from the ‘other side’, the side of the teacher. Each student’s 
presentation lasted 20 minutes, followed by 10 minute discussion concerning the 
presented activity. Again, no rules were prescribed on what they might choose to 
present, no intervention by the teacher or me, no ideas introduced, and the students 
were left to choose whatever they wanted, in order to present it in any way they 
had chosen.  
The teacher organised a session before the aforementioned students’ 
presentations, with a lot of books that could offer many ideas for mathematical 
                                                          
128  The short laugh comes after a statement that was uttered very seriously. 
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activities. The ideas had a suggestive rather than an obligatory character—Ivan for 
instance chose a theme that was inspired by one of the books that he had at home. 
On the contrary, Diana chose to present a task from one of the teacher’s books, 
related to the Braille system. For the description of the task I’ll use Diana’s own 
words, from the coursework that she delivered at the end of the course: 
Louis Braille completed the Braille system at the tender age of 15. It was 
introduced as an aid for blind people to be able to read. The system is composed 
of a 2x3 rectangle with 6 dots. When the dots are raised it represents a letter, 
a word or sometimes a number. The diagram below shows a couple of 







The idea behind this investigation was to see how many different possibilities 
there were if there was 1 [black] dot in the grid then 2 dots and so on and so 
forth. I decided against looking into this myself so I could learn with the class 
when they were doing it. Another reason for not knowing what would happen 
was so that I had no preconceived ideas when it came to how people worked 
out the answers. 
Diana sets the target of the task when she writes that “The idea behind this 
investigation was to see how many different possibilities there were if there was 1 
[black] dot in the grid then 2 dots and so on and so forth”.  
She explicitly mentions that she “decided against looking into this myself”, and she 
justifies it in two ways: 
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 That she would have “no preconceived ideas when it came to how people 
worked out the answers”, so that she would not intervene during the process, 
by giving straightaway answers.129 
The black dots signify raised dots, i.e. tiny palpable bumps, in order to be identifiable 
by people with vision difficulties. And the task that was introduced by Diana to her 
peers, the teacher and me was to find out how many different positions of black 
dots are available for the Braille system, that is how many different positions of 1, 
2, …, 6 black dots exist. The mathematical ready-made answer concerns the 
computation of the permutations expressed by the formulas  
n!
k!∙(n−k)!
 , where 𝑛! = 1 ∙
2 ∙ 3 ∙ … ∙ 𝑛, n equals to 6 and k = 0, 1, 2, … , 6. But the mathematical ready-made 
answer is not in focus here. What is significant from the point of view of the study 
is that Diana did not fix the results of the task in advance nor did she have 
“preconceived ideas” concerning how people should work out the answers. She 
decided to go “against looking into this” herself and she used the freedom that the 
course offered, by following one of the course’s tenets, namely that the teacher 
“learn[s] with the class”, rather than imposing the teacher’s mathematical model to 
the students. The second reason she mentions is related to the first, since by “not 
knowing what would happen” she would have “no preconceived ideas when it came 
to how people worked out the answers”; therefore she would refrain from giving 
the answers “straight away”. It was obviously one of the things that had stood out 
for her, especially after her ‘doubling modulo’ experience, where she came out with 
her unique answer, although no guidance was provided by the teacher nor the help 
she received from her peers was ‘adequate’, in order to advance by using one of 
the methods that they did.  
D: I think when I’m teaching I need to get over the urge to give answers… 
not straight away. If somebody doesn’t know the answer to something I’m 
very… I want to be able to tell them rather than help them to understand. 
                                                          
129 See the next section for an exploration of this feature of her teaching attitude, and its subversion due to the 
sessions of this course. 
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R: [You mean] to understand themselves? 
D: Yeah, I sometimes have an urge to say “the answer is this”; rather than 
try and explain it. (interview extract, her emphasis) 
And she consciously decided to use the NoM strategies against her previous 
conceptions of teaching and learning. 
3.3.3.2 The answer-feeding teaching method and the impact of the NoM 
sessions 
Diana articulated in her interview the mixed feelings she had before, during and 
after her presentation. One of the issues that were critical in understanding her 
presentation is related to her tendency to provide the learners with answers. Let us 
see how Diana described this issue, her frustration when she did not have any 
guidance during the NoM sessions, and the influence that she acknowledged to have 
received from the NoM sessions and her own presentation: 
D: I think when I’m teaching I need to get over the urge to give answers… 
not straight away. If somebody doesn’t know the answer to something I’m 
very… I want to be able to tell them rather than help them to understand. 
R: To understand themselves? 
D: Yeah, I sometimes have an urge to say “the answer is this”; rather than 
try and explain it. I am controlling the urge I am doing quite well with that; 
I’m having training when I’m teaching [laugh] but I… but I don’t know... I 
don’t really know because I have to admit in the NoM sessions I have 
sometimes been really frustrated because I sometimes felt as though… I’ve 
asked a question and he’s [the teacher] answered it with a question! And 
sometimes it’s just really frustrating because I think, well, “am I doing it right 
or am I doing it wrong?” and he says “what do you think?” And I’m thinking 
that “I don’t know, that’s why I’m asking you!” And it frustrates me 
R: [laugh] Yeah, all he means I suppose is “do whatever you want… 
D: Yeah, yeah 
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R: …it’s all about your way of doing it, not me telling you how to do it” 
D: Yeah, I understand that, I do understand that but I had times that I found 
it really frustrating. 
R: Because you need somebody to really tell you the answer? 
D: Yeah, because I feel I’ve got to a point where I really don’t understand it 
anymore and I don’t necessarily need an answer! Just a little bit of guidance; 
maybe guidance would be a better word rather than answer, you know, a 
push in the right direction; but sometimes I felt as though I wasn’t getting 
that and it frustrated me. 
... … … 
So it has, yeah it’s been good for me! I have enjoyed it but it’s been a hard 
work [laugh] 
R: [laugh] 
D: It’s taken me a while to fully appreciate it! Let’s put it that way. 
R: Do you think that you will apply any of these things to your teaching? 
D: Yeah, well, like I said before about the… about my need to just give people 
the answers but… I think I have realised from these lessons that it helps 
people more if you help with their understanding of it rather than just give 
them an answer straight away; and naturally make them think about it and 
what they are doing and why they are doing it, which obviously is very 
important with wanting to be a teacher. It has been good! Yeah! 
R: After so much ‘pain and suffering’… 
D: After so much ‘pain’, yes! It was worth it130 
In order to understand what it was that changed Diana’s mind about her “need to 
just give people the answers” we will start by exploring her mixed feelings about 
                                                          
130 See the text around footnote 89 in ‘Diana's transcribed interview 150411’; by saying that it was ‘pain and 
suffering’ I actually repeat what she said a while ago. 
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the NoM sessions. 
Diana expresses her mixed feelings for the task that she presented: 
Well, partly, the activity was alright, I was doing it and it seemed like a good 
idea; I felt okay about it before I started doing it and then I started doing it 
and I just thought “this is rubbish” 
And she explains how she resolved the ‘problem’ of not being able to provide 
guidance to the students’ findings… 
because I hadn’t put as much thought into it [the Braille system task –her  
presentation] as I should have done, which I’ll admit, I completely admit I 
should have put a lot more thought into it than I did; and I never thought to 
see the pattern,131... and then obviously I saw a pattern in it but… in a way 
I was just going with the flow of the class and what they found because I 
didn’t really have any answers to it,132 I didn’t know what was going to 
happen!133 
…and how she arrived to a new position, different to the answer feeding model… 
In a way I liked it that I didn’t know the answers because I was learning with 
the class. And it was nice because I had certain ideas of… sort of a rough 
idea of what might happen but then it was interesting to see everybody else’s 
ideas; so in a way I suppose it was a good thing because I had no 
preconceived ideas of what might happen, it left me open to all the 
possibilities, so I wasn’t saying “right, well this is the answer to it”; it wasn’t 
this definite answer, it was like “right, like okay let’s just explore it together 
                                                          
131 She means that the results for the task that she set followed a pattern that the students discovered during 
her presentation. The pattern is also revealed from the formula 
n!
k!∙(n−k)!
 , since the results are symmetrical 
(palindromic):  (k,p)={(0,1),(1,6),(2,15),(3,20),(4,15) ,(5,6) ,(6,1)}, where k is the number of the ‘raised’ 
black dots, and p is the number of positions of these k tots for the total number of 6 dots; The just mentioned 
solution is a more general mathematical articulation of the answers, since the case (0,1) does not appear, 
since there is always at least one raised dot. 
132  See means the students’ findings; she did not have ready answers or guidance for their findings. 
133 For the previous extract see the footnote 61, for this extract see the text before the footnote 60, and for the 
next one see the text before the footnote 63 in ‘Diana's transcribed interview 150411’. 
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and see what happens”. So it left me open to suggestions. 
…since she allowed herself to come to the position where she could not say “right, 
well this is the answer to it”. 
It happened in the same way that she was ‘forced’ to devise and construct her 
algorithm, because “everybody else seemed to be able to say the next number but 
I couldn’t, so I was having to device this kind of system”. This time, she was ‘forced’ 
to acquire a new strategy towards teaching, since she had to avoid providing 
answers, in order to be in conformity with the NoM setting—as she thought of it—
where the presentation was supposed to take place. She ‘burned the bridges down’ 
by not “put[ting] as much thought into it”, by not “know[ing] what was going to 
happen”. She forced herself to think with the others until she saw the pattern that 
they uncovered. As Badiou puts it:  
thinking is never a matter of voluntary decision or natural inclination. We are 
always, he declared, forced to think. Thought pushes us, as it were, from 
behind. It is neither lovable nor desired. Thought is violence, done to us. 
(Badiou, 2011, p. 110, emphasis in the original) 
She was forced to adopt the strategy that she followed during her own presentation: 
“I was just going with the flow of the class and what they found because I didn’t 
really have any answers to it, I didn’t know what was going to happen!” And this 
strategy was to “explore it together” with the class “and see what happens”. Shifting 
from the student to the teacher role gave another perspective to the previously felt 
frustration. But this realisation did not come alone; it followed the realisation that 
her constructions are just different than those of other people rather than wrong: 
R: What have you discovered from these sessions? Have you discovered 
anything in your personal way of… 
D: I think, personally, when I put my mind into it I can actually come up with 
things myself rather than relying on other people and saying “well, what have 
you got for this and what have you got for this”; and I think I’ve learned to 
trust myself a little bit more. Because a lot of the time –and it’s not just with 
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maths, it’s with other subjects- I’ve been very cautious when I found an 
answer, if my answer isn’t the same as everybody else’s I’ve just assumed 
mine is wrong! Because it’s not the same as somebody else’s [answer].134 
But I think the lessons that we’ve had and because of the way that we have 
been taught to think for ourselves, and it is a lot of independent thinking, 
that I think I’ve possibly become a bit more confident with what I’m doing; 
because I’m thinking “well, because I’ve got a different answer to somebody 
else it doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s wrong, it just means I thought about 
it in a different way”. So it has, yeah it’s been good for me! I have enjoyed 
it but it’s been a hard work [laugh]135 
Her realisation originated from another survival moment, i.e. from her devise of a 
very personal method of managing the ‘doubling modulo’ activity and the 
construction of mathematical objects, namely the algorithm and the flowchart. 
So how one survives when she thinks that she should provide answers and she does 
not happen to have any? When the students have the initiative and they surprise 
the teacher by producing results that neither the student nor the teacher had 
expected? The context of the Nature of Mathematics (NoM) course was not in favour 
of supplying guidance, as Diana had experienced in an unpleasant way, but she 
adopted a NoM approach during her presentation. It was probably not something 
that she had predicted but it seems like it was something she was ready for. And, 
as she reflects on her previous frustration she relates it to the more or less traditional 
way that she was used to: 
R: And I was just asking how you feel how you think about this alternative 
way if you like,136 now that the sessions are over; how you feel about this 
alternative way of learning and constructing knowledge 
D: I think it’s good because encourages you to learn for yourself and you can 
then see how you learn and apply it to other things; other than just maths 
                                                          
134  My emphasis. 
135  See the text around footnote 91 in ‘Diana's transcribed interview 150411’. 
136 That is the NoM way of learning and constructing knowledge. 
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you can apply it to different things whereas… I’m thinking in schools and 
everything it is as we’ve spoken about before you are not developing 
necessarily your understanding, you are been taught to pass an exam!137 So, 
I think it was… I think part of it I found it frustrating because I never had 
this kind of teaching before; throughout college and throughout school it’s 
alright “you need to do this to be able to get this grade, you need to be able 
to do this to be able to get this grade” whereas this was a lot more of my 
own thought processes and understanding and…138 So it’s good but I think 
because it’s new and maybe because I’m a bit older and I’ve never come 
across it before 
R: A bit older? So you think the others have come across it before? 
D: Not necessarily! I don’t think Donald or Ivan have ever come across it 
before, but because I’ve got through say 9 years more teaching than Donald 
and Ivan for example, then, you know on different teaching methods I’ve still 
never come across it. So, maybe it’s harder for me than it is for them because 
they’re more… open to it?139 
But what I thought, especially after the interview was that Diana was indeed open 
to it! 
Chapter 4. Mary – The representative case of all detected intuitions 
and objectifications 
An introductory example 
My observations aimed at ‘moments’ when objects were brought anew in front of 
the students’ consciousness; I aimed at such objects as they appeared for the first 
time, attempting to track such ‘moments’ in any way possible, and as close as 
possible to the time that they took place. But my presence was not facilitating such 
moments, since I often became a point of reference, mostly due to the students’ 
                                                          
137 My emphasis. 
138 My emphasis. 
139 See the text before footnote 89 in ‘Diana's transcribed interview 150411’. 
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attempts to extract information concerning the tasks. The tracking of a moment 
when an object appeared for the student as new gave me a rear feeling of 
excitement and achievement, as if I was next to a realm of untold richness and 
mystery. Such was the feeling I had when I read Mary’s reflection on one of the 
activities early in the course, when I was not yet familiarised with the students. The 
activity was about building solids, such as the stellated octahedron, and I’m using 
it here as a first taste of the data that will be analysed in this chapter: 
I knew in this shape it was going to be made of triangles, and was only going 
to have a base, with no top if you like, or a top with no base. So we set out 
cutting out the triangles and squares to make the square based pyramids so 
it was going to make it easier to visualise. It took us a while but we got 
therein the end and we began to stick the shapes together. During this task 
when I first suggested it was told “that’s going to take a really long time”. 
My response was “We have all the time in the world Yvette!” I genuinely 
thought we were going to need it to accomplish this. 
From working out the octahedron found that creating a net first made it so 
much easier to stick together at the end. This is what me and Barbara chose 
to do where the other groups just started sticking. In my head I had a picture 
a star with a square on one side, it wasn’t a shape it was just another piece 
of crazy imagination. And by the time we had finished our net it was so far 
from the shape in my head it was laughable. 
We’d gotten to a net that looked like some sort of weapon from Robin Hood, 
and we were just getting ready to stick it together to make a solid when BAM 
time was up. The other two groups had finished and the teacher performed 
his magic of placing the two squares of the two shapes the groups had 
created and before your eyes the stellated octahedron was born. He asked 
“does anyone know what this shape is called?” The general consensus was a 
star, he corrected us with the correct term. It’s not something I’m likely to 
forget again. And in a way it was lucky [that] Barbara and I never finished 
building our shape as we then had three stages of creating the “star”; we 
had the net, the solid that would fill the hole in the large square based 
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pyramid, and the final “star”. It was indeed a revelation. 
 
Figure 17. Stellated octahedron. Each group constructed half of this shape. 
A sense of immediacy is felt in Mary’s reflection (written the same day that the 
activity took place), one that only a re-lived experience can manage to bring to the 
surface. Such moments, even though I hadn’t managed to record them at the 
moment that they took place, brought due to their vivid reflection clear evidence of 
the constitution of objects by the students. 
3.4.1 The description of the course – The case of Mary 
The data analysis that follows is a case study from a course that took place 
in the academic year 2010-2011 and involved a group of 13 students, training 
to be teachers in British secondary schools. The course consisted of twenty 
3-hour sessions, where the main targets were the production of 
generalisations by the students and their diverse conceptualisations of 
mathematical phenomena, such as the embodied understanding of curves. 
The teacher avoided the provision of information concerning the tasks, 
intervening in the students’ methods or interrupting their discourse (as 
described by Brown, 2012); he deliberately and explicitly limited his 
interaction to the description of the operational aspect of the tasks. This was 
one reason that this course was particularly appropriate for my research, 
since I intended to look at the learning process from the first person 
perspective and to bracket (i.e. set aside from the present consideration) 
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influences of cultural tools and practices, which inevitably accompany any 
education. 140 
The students were invited to use their common sense and 
mathematise their results in any way they thought appropriate. They were 
working in small groups of 3 to 5 people of their own choice and it was 
suggested to continue their investigations at home and push them as far as 
they could in order to submit their findings in their coursework. 
In the episode that will be analysed141 the students were asked to 
make sense of a curve through exercises centred on the students’ bodily 
movement. The teacher of the course asked the students “to think how they 
can move whilst remaining equidistant” from the wall (10 foot-paces) and a 
student who remained stationary. No other direction or indication on how to 
proceed was given to the students, who were free to handle the activities 
any way they thought suitable. 
The student of this case study, Mary (pseudonym), was embodying 
the fixed point, while another student was acting out the curve (Figure 18). 
I participated in Mary’s group while avoiding to facilitate the students’ 
investigations. A few days after the session Mary presented an elaborate 
drawing (Figure 19) and a detailed account of her treatment of the activity 
at home. At the end of the course she submitted her report on this activity 
as her favourite amongst several. 
The session was audio and video taped (after gaining the students’ 
permission) and Mary’s home work was analysed through interviews and the 
                                                          
140 It doesn’t mean that I suppose intuitive processes to be limited to individual processes: I acknowledge that 
for the fullest understanding of intuitive processes in the learning practice attention needs also to be paid to 
the social-cultural dimensions, as it is attempted in Andrà & Santi, 2013, Andrà & Liljedahl, 2014, although 
these dimensions are bracketed for the purposes of this study. 
141 A different perspective of this session appears at a paper that was published recently (Brown, 
Heywood, Solomon, & Zagorianakos, 2013). 
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text of her coursework. An interview was conducted a few days before the 
student delivered her coursework, then an additional interview took place 
and an e-mail was used in order to clarify a few issues. In the following 
sections I analyse Mary’s data, as they were triangulated or cross-checked 
from the aforementioned data sources. 
 
3.4.2 The three stages of the student’s investigation 
In further analysing the empirical data my phenomenological method allowed 
essential structures to be revealed by acknowledging the learner’s intentional 
transcendental ego as an objectifying unit. In the course of close exploration of all 
the material three stages emerged from Mary’s investigation, namely the embodied 
(when she was in the classroom) the diagrammatic and the formal. 
3.4.2.1The embodied first stage of Mary’s investigation 
The analysis of the audio and video recordings of the first stage revealed important 
clues about the curve and her formal negotiation that followed: 
 Mary, who acted as the fixed point, thought that the curve was a straight 
line parallel to the wall, midway between the wall and the fixed point, while 
the other student, who acted as the curve, thought that it was a semicircle 
with a radius of 5 foot-paces and its centre located at the fixed point. She 
was moving to different positions—curve points—with her back to the wall 
and looking at Mary, repeatedly moving her hands perpendicularly towards 
 
Figure 18: The other student with her back to the wall and looking at Mary (the fixed point) moves her 
hands perpendicularly towards the wall. 
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the wall (Figure 18),142 in order to indicate each curve point’s distance from 
it. 
 The other student and the first author, in order to show that the curve 
could not be a straight line parallel to the wall, used the right triangle formed 
by the fixed point, the midpoint—located on the straight line segment midway 
between the fixed point and the wall—and another point on the line parallel 
to the wall from the midpoint. 
 The students could not reach an agreement on what the curve would 
look like, so they could not conceptualise it and try to identify mathematical 
relationships; and they chose not to use notes, only their bodies. At some 
stage the first author suggested that finding more curve points might help 
them understand what kind of curve it is. 
Mary seemed puzzled throughout the activity, and after the break the teacher, 
who was engaged in another group during the particular investigation, asked 
what the students thought of it; the other student said “we were trying to find 
out another point” and Mary responded “we were struggling with it”. 
 
                                                          
142 The picture is included with the permission of the student. 
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3.4.2.2 The diagrammatic second stage - The empirical ‘bird’s eye view’ 
intuition 
Mary started the second stage of her negotiation at home the same day with a 
diagram of the fixed point and the ‘wall’ (Figure 19 shows the same diagram when 
it was completed). Her diagram has its intentional origins in the portrayal of the 
classroom situation: “when I got home I just drew this little diagram ... I think what 
I couldn’t understand on the day [in the classroom] was that this wall went on 
forever!” (first interview). The importance of the diagrammatic stage invites us to 
look closely at how it happened; the original moment was the empirical intuition 
according to Husserl, which emerged and enabled the transition, as Mary described 
it in her interview: 
Once I could draw a diagram and look back [to the classroom experience], 
I look at it from this point of view; it’s much easier than being in that point 
[i.e. the fixed point in the classroom], that looking, like, when standing here 
[she points to the fixed point on the diagram] all you see is the wall! [see 
figure 19] You don’t see all this is going on as well. So once you can see 
from a bird’s eye view it’s easier to. 
Her intentionality was fulfilled by intuiting the diagram as a ‘bird’s eye view’ 
perception of the classroom. Her new perception appeared ‘in one stroke’, since it 
was not by induction that she realised that the sought curve could not be a straight 
line parallel to the wall, as she thought in the classroom; it just did not make sense 
anymore because she could now actually see it, from her ‘bird’s eye view’ 
perception of the diagram. She also realised ‘in one stroke’ that her position in the 
classroom did not signify a straight line but a fixed point. So immediacy was an 
important feature of the transformation of the paper diagram to the classroom re-
presentation and the dispelling of her classroom misconceptions. It is an example 
of the embodiment of perception, when the intuitive moment is also the moment 
of transformation. 
In order to appreciate the empirical character of this intuition we need to 
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look closer at its visual and kinesthetic features, and motility as basic intentionality 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002a). As I focused on the intentional origins of the perceptual 
object (the classroom re-presentation through the diagram) I applied Husserl’s 
theoretical ideas about lived-experience, in my attempt to explore how it came to 
life in a new sense. The diagram, more than representation of existing knowledge, 
was an embodied act that “constituted new relationships between the person doing 
the mathematics and the material world” (DeFreitas & Sinclair, 2012, p. 134). By 
“responding to the call” of the diagram (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, pp. 161), 
kinesthetically and visually, her pre-reflective, operative intentionality was directed 
to the ‘bird’s eye view’ of the classroom setting: It was an embodied operation that 
took place (not a positing thought), that ‘I can identify the diagram as such a 
perspective of the classroom, here, on the piece of paper’. 
We notice how the operative intentionality manifests itself through “what 
would be missing without it” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002b, p. 44, cf. Part 1, §1.4.5): Mary 
acquired a particular sense of space, emanating from an operation of a plan 
perspective on the paper as a single object, which preceded any positing act; 
because I cannot posit anything before there is space for such a positing, and in 
particular, space that I can inhabit with my living body. It was only due to the new 
perception of the diagram by the operative intentionality that the reflective, positing 
(intentionality of) act could appear, that ‘I was standing there, at that point, and 
this line is the wall’. And it can serve as an example of how the living body is present 
in the perceptual field, as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have predicted it (Husserl, 
1970a, p. 106; also cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, pp. 87-88). 
It was not only Mary’s diagram but also her classroom experience that 
acquired a new sense due to her bird’s-eye-view intuition, since she could now 
“look at it from this point of view; it’s much easier than being in that point, when 
standing all you see is the wall!”; the classroom’s yet unexplored experience was 
re-presented on the piece of paper, ready for the student’s mathematical interface 
to be applied. 
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3.4.2.3 The formal third stage of the investigation and the intuitions that 
took place 
Mary’s intention to mathematise the diagram was confirmed when she directly 
introduced the Cartesian coordinate system into it, thus entering the formal 
treatment of her investigation. She placed the fixed point at the origin and the wall 
became a straight line parallel to the x-axis (Figure 19). Due to her ‘bird’s eye view’ 
intuition every formal treatment that followed became equivalent to a classroom 
situation, thus imbuing her abstract ideas with an embodied empirical sense. 
3.4.2.3.1 The empirical intuitions of the symmetrical points and the 
parallel lines 
She easily found the first 3 points that belonged to the curve, namely the (10, 0), 
(-10, 0) and (0, 5). Then she visually intuited that the curve will be symmetrical to 
the y axis and while she was looking for more points, the first key idea in the formal 
stage of her enquiry appeared. She thought that if she would draw lines parallel to 
the x-axis and the wall in the area between the x axis and (0, 5), they would 
intersect the sought curve in 2 points (the grid paper has played a part in her 
empirical symmetry intuition, since she did not actually draw any lines parallel to 
the ‘wall’ and the x axis—see Figure 19): 
So I had this point, this point and this point. so then, I was like ‘there must be 
another point; so what would happen if I’d change, if I moved this point so 
[that] it was on the line of y=4’, yeah? (interview extract) 
She recalls a feeling of certainty (“I was like ‘there must be another point’”) and 
there is already kinesthetic language involved (“what would happen if I’d change, 
if I moved this point”). Her empirical intuitive idea that the curve is symmetrical to 
the y- axis and that it cannot go any further than 5 towards the ‘wall’ made her 
parallel lines intuition possible. She saw these parallel lines as effective for a curve 
that was not there, apart from the 3 points that indicated the symmetry. And her 
feeling of certainty motivated her subsequent actions. The spatiality of her insight 
(the spatial reorganisation of the space between the x-axis and (0, 5)) and the 
actual sense of motion as she “moved this point” bear evidence of the kinesthetic 
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features of her intuition. 
Mary then “continued altering the y coordinates so that the distance from 
the wall changed” and “pulled out a triangle in the hope it will help us calculate 
what the x coordinate would be in order for the distance from the wall to the origin 
to remain equal”. She involved the Pythagorean Theorem and her hope acquired 
formal ground by finding the first point ((√20, 4)), and the whole process became 
a technique as she called it: “The technique seemed to be working so I decided to 
continue to use it”. 
The empirical intuition of the lines parallel to the wall with its kinesthetic features, 
based on the visual intuition that presented the sought curve as symmetrical, 
reorganised the space between the origin and (0, 5). Her intuitions constituted 
space within space (since the lines parallel to the wall and the x-axis represented 
for her their distances from the wall and the x-axis, respectively), and brought 
objects to the surface of consciousness (lines parallel to the wall and line segments 
perpendicular to the wall). Culturally mediated concepts (such as the coordinates, 
the grid paper and the Pythagorean Theorem) interplayed with kinesthetic and 
visual personal experience in order to constitute the new object (the parallel lines 
as the way to fix the x coordinate) and the new tool/technique that realised143 her 
new object. 
3.4.2.3.2 The intuitions related to the x2 curves 
Mary had found the first 5 points of the curve ((0, 5), (10, 0), (-10, 0), (√20, 4), 
(−√20, 4)). According to Merleau-Ponty (2002a) attention “first of all presupposes 
a transformation of the mental field, a new way for consciousness to be present to 
its objects” (p. 33). The 5 points to which the student directed her attention to, 
became a figure on the ground of the paper and the other lines she had drawn. As 
she clarified in her second interview, “it was an aha-moment, I noticed that all of 
                                                          
143 The application of her new object in her technique is also perceived as a better apprehension of the newly-
constituted object (cf. the theoretical section §5.1). 
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the points were going in the same fashion and thus there must be a rule as to what 
they were all following”. A curve connecting these 5 points appeared in her 
consciousness. After she “realised that there was some pattern” she intuited that 
“this shape of graph”, which she had just intuited out of the 5 points “is resemblant 
[sic] of the x squared graph”. That is how her double intuition occurred: at first she 
noticed that there is “some pattern” between the 5 points and then the idea of “the 
x squared graph” appeared in her consciousness. 
The extraction of a form out of the 5 points could be explicated as an 
empirical intuition according to Husserl and the result was the creation of an object, 
a shape that was brought to consciousness. The immediacy of intuition concerns 
the moment that the intentional act was fulfilled, the moment when sense was 
attributed to the intuitive operative intentional act, by the separation of the form 
out of the 5 points. The form of the 5 points has a pre-linguistic visual expression, 
as it transforms the real objects (the 5 points) to a new kind of object (a profile of 
the sought curve). 
The second intuition associated the object that came out of the first one, 
with the x curves. It bestowed the image of the first intuition with an abstract 
categorial feature, i.e. as belonging to the family of the x2 curves, which is what 
makes this intuition an abstract (categorial) intuition. It is a moment in which we 
feel how the intuitive contact took place: the student’s operative intentionality 
extracted the form out of the 5 points and her intentionality of act (to find “a rule”) 
posited the form as an x curve figure; It was “proper learning” (as she called it in 
the interview) that helped her to find an answer but it was only intuition that 
allowed it to appear in consciousness at the right moment. 
3.4.2.3.3 Integration of processes - the constitution of the first formula 
Mary objectified the set of arbitrarily chosen lines parallel to the wall and their 
corresponding perpendicular line segments (parallel to each other) and she used it 
as a technique, by applying it to the generation of another pair of curve points 
((√40, 3), (−√40, 3)). She then wondered if there was “a point that would be of 
equal distance to the wall and the origin ... once the moveable point passed the x-
~ 217 ~ 
 
axis”. By application of her already objectified technique she overstepped her initial 
intuitive conviction that the curve is limited by the x axis... It is a case that her 
formal treatment corrected the pitfall of her visual empirical intuition, showing that 
intuitions may be misleading but they are not necessarily end barriers; and it 
exemplifies how intuitive mathematics in action is legitimate mathematics. 
At this point Mary employed instruction based arguments, without parting 
from her intuitive approach. She noticed that the x curve is translated to the 
maximum point (0, 5), so she thought of the formula y = 5 – x2. She tried the point 
(10, 0) in the formula but she got -5 = -100. And then she manipulated the false 
arithmetic relation into the correct formula (y = 5−
𝑥2
20
), by using the point (10, 0) 
and focusing on number 10, as the following coursework extract shows: 




          [Focusing on 100—she draws 20 with it in the second term of the equation] 
     0 = 5 −
100
20
   [Introducing 0 – intention to use (10,0) as the entry point to the formula] 
     0 = 5 −
102
20
   [Intention to use 10 – focusing on 10] 
     0 = 5 −
x2
20
     [x replaces 10] 
     y = 5 −
x2
20
     [y replaces 0] 
This is how Mary constructed the formula y = 5 −
x2
20
 . Her intention to use 
(10,0) because of 10 (i.e. the distance between the wall and the fixed point) is 
indicated by prioritising the substitution of 10 by x over the substitution of 0 by y. 
Mary then tested the point (√20 , 4) in her formula and she was convinced 
that the formula is correct. Two points ((10, 0) and (√20 , 4)) were enough to 
constitute the sense of generality for her, which was something repeated later on 
(see the following section). The introduction of the formula by the student became 
an objectification of the coordinates of the points having the property of 10 units’ 
equidistance from a straight line and a fixed point. Finally, her persistence in 
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number 10 throughout the process became the preparatory step to her last 
intuition, which brought the general formula to the surface. 
3.4.2.3.4 The intuition of essences related to the general formula 
There is a particular kind of abstract intuition, which is a categorial intuition that 
Husserl calls intuition of essences and it is characterised by apodictic evidence 
(Lohmar in Haritmo, 2010, p. 74). The example of Mary’s last intuition will allow us 
to get a glimpse at the main features of this kind of intuition, which holds particular 
significance for generalisations and mathematical proofs. 
Although Mary had answered the particular mathematical enquiry, her intuition 
pushed her investigation further, by objectifying the whole process into a new tool 
in order to extend the task. The distance between the wall and the fixed point 
remained her intended number as she repeated the whole process and found the 
formula of the curve when the distance between the fixed point and the wall is 6 
units instead of 10 (𝑦 = 3 −
𝑥2
12
). As she explained in the interview she had already 
seen the essential relations between 10 and 5, 20 in the first formula before she 
figured out the second formula. But she became increasingly certain concerning the 
part of number 10 in the first formula, as she applied identical processes to the 






 of all the curves with the 
same property, by replacing 10 by a variable in her initial formula. 
The particular qualities of the intuitions of essences surface here, such as the three 
‘moments’ that conjoin, in the following sequence: 
 The first formula is the starting example (Lohmar in Haritmo, 2010, p. 
78), the object of experience (ibid., p. 83) and it became the leading 
example, already incorporating essential embodied elements as the previous 
analysis has shown. 
 The generality that the leading example gains through the modeling of 
the whole process in another, intended example (the second curve). The 
matching of the first formula to the second one (and the correspondence 
between 10 and 6) was decisive for the process of its generalisation. 
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 The “synthesis of coincidence” (ibid. p. 79), through the recognition of 
number 10 as such, stripped of its particular originations and seen as a 
‘variable number’. This operation is instantiated in the leading example, by 
pinning 10 down to the mathematical symbolic frame and transforming it to 
a variable. That is how number 10 was recognized as essential for the 
expansion of the formula and finally acquired a new quality. 
The 3rd moment is the conclusion and the core of the intuition, since all steps were 
realised in a stroke, in the recapitulating act of coincidence (the third ‘moment’), 
typical of the intuitive immediacy. Mary sidestepped the various connotations of 
number 10 (sensory, algebraic, geometric) and identified it as a number—as ‘any’ 
number. What made this possible is what Lohmar calls the interpretation of the 
“special synthesis of coincidence” (Lohmar, 2010, pp. 79, 80; also cf. Husserl, 1973, 
Section 1), based on the singular example of the first formula and the generality it 
acquired from its reflection on the other formula and curve through number 10. 
The ‘synthesis of coincidence concerns the qualitative transformation - through a 
novel thematical identification - of the particular, out of the awareness of the 
generality. The synthesis of coincidence occurs between the subdividing acts - the 
two formulas. It is the apprehension of the coincidence as the identity of the 
general feature that becomes the essence, expressed as the general formula - the 
intended object of a new category. 
3.4.2.4 The curve as a “moveable point” – Coexistence of abstract and 
empirical intuitions as a sign of deep understanding  
The phenomenological analysis allows us to see the linkages between the empirical 
and the abstract (categorial) intuitions, and the transition from the pre-reflective to 
the reflective field of experience. 
The student perceived the sought curve as a “moveable point”, which is an 
expression she repeatedly used for the curve in her coursework. Her sensorimotor 
expressions (“moveable”—see Mary’s quotation in Part 3 § 3.4.2.3.3) are signs of 
how she explored the relationship between the locus of the parabola points and the 
functional one. She vividly described it when she had accomplished the task: 
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Like for that I am positive that I can say that if this is true and if this part 






 and you would be 
equidistant from the wall and a fixed point. (first interview extract) 
So the formula could be rolled back to its empirical origins, integrated in a 
perception that permeated the student’s investigation: it’s always points, either 
points to be traced with lines parallel to the wall, points to judge if the formula is 
the correct one, to manifest the generality achieved through the concrete particular 
case, and so forth. It is in this sense that Mary’s reactivation of the parabola was in 
its turn sedimented to a line that “you could stand on anywhere” and “be equidistant 
from the wall and a fixed point”. Adding a new perception to the formulas of 𝑥2 
functions, in her broader mathematical interface. 
Finally, what is remarkable and pertinent to this research is that due to a 
sequence of successful intuitions she constructed formulas that she only later knew 
that they are called parabolas, and a general formula, in a bottom-up process. It 
was this lack of names and ready-made information often confused with knowledge 
that enabled her to realise the parabolas, through their equidistance property. 
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PART 4 – Discussion and Conclusions 
Introduction – a summary of what has been achieved up to this moment 
In this section I will introduce the main themes of this chapter through a concise 
description of how the previous chapters have contributed to the argument 
employed in my research, and how they have paved the discussion that follows. 
In the theoretical section I delineated the complexity of the cognitive lived-
experience, and the significance of a neglected side of the learner’s cognitive praxis, 
the one related to the pre-reflective or passive stage, within which the operative 
intentionality synthesises object-like entities that are intentionally driven towards 
objectification (see the Table 1 and the Graph 3 in Part 1 §1.5.7). And I haven’t 
been engaged so much with the most easily recognisable intentionality of act, which 
is the positing intentionality that constitutes objects, thus endorsing them to the 
discursive field and ultimately to the significative field of mathematics. The latter 
intentionality was analysed and linked to the former in the analysis of the data that 
followed, in all three investigations that came under my Husserlian/Merleau-
Pontyian analytical lens.  
I chose as most appropriate for my theoretical and methodological purposes 
the first-person perspective, i.e. the perspective of each of the three students that 
was engaged in the investigation each time, in the classroom or at home. For this 
perspective I employed Husserl's transcendental phenomenological reduction, 
which I introduced as the necessary phenomenological methodology, in the theory 
and the methodology/methods sections. Due to the reduction I bracketed influences 
of cultural tools and practices, in order to investigate the end-points of 
phenomenological reductions, which are the intuitions for Husserl (Hintikka, 2003, 
pp. 178, 179). 
In order to access the abstract intuitions in particular, the phenomenological 
reductions were the only way, according to the theory. 144  Due to my 
                                                          
144 “[T]he intuitions that are not already given to me in sense perception are uncovered by phenomenological 
reductions” (Hintikka, 2003, p. 178). 
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phenomenological attitude and the reductions, informed by Merleau-Ponty's radical 
reflection, the data analysis recognised two major kinds of intuitions, namely 
empirical and abstract intuitions, and the analysis manifested their grounding on 
the learners’ lived-experience. Moreover, various links between these two kinds of 
intuitions were detected and analysed.  
I applied a close analytical look at the effects of the NoM sessions on three very 
different cases, and I tried to clarify my perception of the radical orientation of 
Husserl's mature cognitive approach, by emphasising the intentional and the 
horizonal aspects of the objects’ emergence, in each case. In fact, the emergence 
of the object—as an object-like entity, followed by the constitution of the latter as 
an object—was at the centre of my investigation. I distinguish between the 
appearance of the object-like entity and the object itself (the object’s constitutive 
‘moment’), since these two ‘moments’ can be very close but they are not identical.145 
Moreover, these two moments are important for the clarification of the phenomenon 
of objectification, since they bring to the surface the essential role of the two 
intentionalities that correspond to these two ‘moments’, namely the operative 
intentionality and the intentionality of act. The data became findings as they were 
lit by the theory, while they clarified the theoretical ideas involved, and they 
exemplified how subtle theoretical notions may appear in ‘everyday’ learning lived 
experiences. As Husserl (1983a, p. 41) put it: 
Evident data are patient; they let the theories pass them by, but remain what 
they are. It is the business of theories to conform to the data, and the 
business of theories of knowledge to distinguish fundamental kinds of data 
and describe such kinds with respect to their proper essences. 
                                                          
145 An example of this différance, concerning the emerged object-like entity and its constitution as an object 
(which was the “optimal solution” for Ivan), is exemplified in the following section 1.3.2. 
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4.1 Ivan – A mature intuitive approach on mathematics that 
was released due to the special character of the NoM course 
4.1.1 Preliminary discussion of the data analysis key issues 
The main finding in Ivan’s case was his intuition of essences and the concomitant 
synthesis of coincidence, performed during his investigation of the ‘New York cop’ 
task, which combined spatial, visual and algebraic features. In the analysis section 
we followed Ivan’s investigation of the task, starting from his activity during the 
session with his group, which took place without interference by my presence and 
without any specific direction or guidance on behalf of the teacher. The teacher 
gave general suggestions, such as not to prioritise finding formulas but to use “an 
intelligence about moving around the space, and seeing how you can cover it”. He 
also asked the students to adopt a reflective attitude towards their activities and 
their group activity, by becoming aware of “the systematicity of the ways” that they 
would locate the formulas (section 3.2.1 in the data analysis). And, deeper than his 
“general suggestions”, the teacher had his own intentions for the introduction of his 
investigations, while I was in the process of collecting data, before they became 
findings. It would be very useful to take a closer look to the teacher’s intentions, 
since it will help us with discussing the analysed data. 
4.1.2 Important issues accruing from the data analysis and related 
to Ivan’s synthesis of coincidence 
I intend in this section to discuss deeper the principal findings of Ivan’s case, starting 
from the synthesis of coincidence that enabled the emergence of the intuition of 
essences, since they were disclosed as the peak moment(s) of Ivan’s investigation. 
By unfolding the data that I collected I showed how the essence of the ‘diagonal 
pattern’—namely the object that was intuitively constituted as the intended object—
drew its intentional origins from Ivan’s intention to find a holistic answer, namely a 
pattern that would deal with all cases. There are important issues that the data 
analysis chapter supports but does not mark, does not make explicit. Such issues, 
which occur ‘naturally’ from the analysis of the data and the phenomenological 
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attitude that investigates and evaluates them, will be explored in this section. Three 
arguments, concerning the synthesis of coincidence that realised Ivan’s intuition of 
essences, will be disclosed, and show how a common event can come freely up to 
life; while the tools that we were afforded in our theoretical and analytical journey 
will be expected to bear fruits equal to the effort that was undertaken. Why is it a 
common event? Because it summarises a moment that is common to all 
mathematics classes: the transition from the concrete to the abstract mathematical 
object, whatever that may be. Moreover, it exemplifies a process of generalisation, 
with a detailed organisation of natural numbers in matrixes (grids), according to the 
number of rows and columns. We need not be misled by Ivan’s readiness and 
‘natural intuitivity; Ivan’s case is exemplary because it makes crystal-clear how the 
transition is done after struggle and little steps, which join in a “breakthrough 
moment”. The ‘vertical lines’ cops idea that Carry had suggested and Ivan had 
adopted was one of the ways that Ivan tried to fix a relation between the square 
grids (see the numbers and shapes around each square grid in figure 3 of Part 3 
§3.2.2.1, in the data analysis). But it became particularly significant when he applied 
it to the 3 × 𝑛  grids. What we followed with Ivan was a compound learning 
experience that its complexity reveals its authentic speech, in Merleau-Ponty’s 
terms. Our understanding of the theatre of patterns that Ivan went through until 
the session was finished,146 up to the moment that he spotted the diagonal pattern, 
derives from our understanding of the significance of the operational potential of 
his embodied consciousness, which prepared the ground and made possible the 
final synthesis for Ivan. In discussing the data analysis findings it will be useful to 
take a closer look at the principal features of Ivan’s intuition. 
                                                          
146 I remember vividly how many papers Ivan left behind him, full of drawings, without giving them to me in 
order to photocopy them. His face full of discontent due to the lack of results, as he crumpled some of these 
papers. 
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4.1.2.1 The qualitative transformation of the particular, out of the 
awareness of generality 
The synthesis of coincidence was exemplified as the final moment in a three-step 
process: it started from the recognition of the starting example, it continued with 
the variation of the starting example, and it culminated at the synthesis of 
coincidence that recognised the ‘leading pattern’ in what first appeared in the 
starting example and even in the 3×3, 4×4 grids alone (Figure 5 in Part 3 §3.2.1 of 
the data analysis), which had first triggered his attention. A novel thematisation of 
the pattern that was ‘isolated’ in the 3×3, 4×4 grids as the leading pattern that 
would cover all cases was achieved, due to the variation of the starting example, 
that is the modelling of the six square grids on the six 3×n, grids.   
As it was stated in the analysis of Ivan's ‘synthesis of coincidence’, the latter was 
concerned with the qualitative transformation of the particular, out of the awareness 
of generality (Part 3 §3.2.3.1). It is obviously crucial for the broader discussion that 
a theoretical and practical elucidation of this “awareness of generality”, and a 
corresponding explication of the “qualitative transformation of the particular” are 
needed. 
The particular was his realisation that an ‘asymmetrical’ pattern gave the best results 
in the cases of the 3×3, 4×4 grids; we noticed how he intentionally focused on it 
when he compared it with the symmetrical patterns of the 3×3, 4×4 grids, by 
drawing them next to each other (Part 3 §3.2.2.2). The transformation of the 
particular to the general case147 was achieved due to the intuitive synthesis of 
coincidence, which was the result of the application of the ‘asymmetrical’ pattern to 
square and 3×n grids. And the generality was achieved by the constitution of the 
‘diagonal pattern’148 as the pattern that would be applied for all grids. 
                                                          
147 This ‘moment’ is interpreted as the awareness of the generality (the abstraction) in the particular, by 
CHAT, in the sense that the concrete case is endowed with more ‘knots’ of meaning (and consequently of 
signification), thus entering (re-presenting) the realm of cultural, pre-established epistemic concepts/objects. 
148 The expressions ‘diagonal pattern’ and ‘asymmetrical’ pattern refer to the same pattern, which was the 
one that Ivan used in order to solve the ‘New York cop’ task. 
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It needs to be added that such a constitution would not bring any significant results 
if it would not be integrated to Ivan’s previous explorations, which brought two 
important spatial conceptualisations: 
 Ivan’s notion of the “inside cops”, which led him to the configuration that 
was based on starting with 2 cops on the outside, which both had a 2 blocks 
distance from the top left corner of his drawings (Figure 2). 
 Carry’s notion of the ‘vertical lines’ cops (the amount of cops for each vertical 
line of the grid), which was adopted by Ivan (cf. the numbers under the 3 ×
8 grid in Figure 6). 
The first notion was the key in finding the ‘asymmetrical’ pattern itself, since it 
determined the form that is common to all grids, i.e. the configuration of cops at 
the top left corner. And it became part and parcel of Ivan’s conception of this 
pattern, thus integrating his best results from his exploration on the square grids. 
The second notion allowed the discovery of the arithmetic pattern (1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 
1, 1, 2), which became the basis for the algebraic treatment that followed. In the 
next section we will explore how the transformation of the particular to the general 
case was realised by Ivan. 
4.1.2.2 Operative intentionality and the object, before constitution 
– the building up of the feeling of certainty 
The intuition of the ‘diagonal pattern’ unlocked the task for Ivan for one more 
reason, since it gave him the feeling of certainty that he had found the appropriate 
pattern, which allowed him to move methodically beyond the square grids.  
But let us examine more carefully Ivan’s first step of his synthesis of coincidence: 
he checked the table that he had drew for the square grids, and he did not find any 
link between the numbers of cops in that table;149 he then did not question the 
asymmetrical diagonal pattern that he was using, but he tested the same pattern 
for the 3 × 𝑛 grids instead. We notice that even before the second step of his 
synthesis of coincidence there is a feeling of certainty that there is already 
                                                          
149 Ivan mentions in his coursework that “it seemed like there wasn’t any logical way forward”. 
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‘something’ to be explored further.  The pattern as it appeared in the 3 × 3, 4 × 4 
grids is an object-like entity for Ivan, since it has not yet become the “diagonal 
pattern”, the “optimal solution”. As soon as it was isolated and compared with 
another (symmetrical) pattern it already became something that he wants to 
determine closer, to apply it again to a second set of grids, namely the 3 × 𝑛  grids. 
Therefore we can detect the manifestations of operative intentionality:  
 In synthesising the 3 × 3 and 4 × 4 grids with the asymmetrical pattern, as 
one pattern, but not yet as an object (a synthesis of identification). 
 In sustaining the pattern of the 3 × 3, 4 × 4 grids in the square grids, and  
 In driving a new application of the same pattern to the 3 × 𝑛 grids.   
Thus we testify how the operative intentionality operates, and consequently how 
the “emergence of the sense” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002b, p. 18) takes place, before the 
object is constituted by the intentionality of act, as the “optimal solution”. Moreover, 
we see that already at the first step of his synthesis of coincidence Ivan started 
building up the feeling of certainty that he had found a suitable pattern for all grids. 
We could also say that the pole of symmetry (Kolen, 2005) concerning the intended 
object, was instituted through an embodied operation that brought together 
previously neglected possibilities. In terms of Ivan’s intentional approach, the 
intentional horizons for the sought object that was about to emerge were 
rearranged, and his protentions concerning square grids and symmetry shifted to 
“empty indications”150 involving orthogonal grids and the diagonal pattern. The 
inductive approach that I used, which ‘predicts’ (anticipates) the presence of 
operative intentionality and the object-like entity in particular areas of the learner’s 
non-discursive cognitive operations, although discovered in analytical practice it is 
already predicted by Husserl (Husserl, 1970a, p. 51): 
In the most primitive way, even the ontic certainty of any straightforward 
experience is inductive. Things ‘seen’ are always more than what we ‘really 
                                                          
150 Protentions and empty indications are two terms that refer to the same thing, i.e. to the 
anticipations/expectations that are an integral part of the learner’s embodied conscious acts in her present. 
For the importance of protentions/empty indications for the prefiguring of the sought object, see section 3.3 
in the theory chapter.  
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and actually’ see of them. Seeing, perceiving, is essentially having-
something-itself [Selbsthaben] and at the same time having-something-in-
advance [Vor-haben], meaning-something-in-advance [Vor-meinen]. All 
praxis, with its projects [Vorhaben], involves inductions. 
Since we deal here with a “phenomenology of the experience”151 (Derrida in Husserl, 
1936, p. 50), my detailed exploration of  
 the object-like entity, which appeared to and was spotted as worthy for 
exploration by Ivan—and 
 the operative intentionality that synthesised it as such, and pushed it forward,  
became possible due to a methodological reduction that sought for the intending 
and the intended, on the ground of Ivan’s lived experience, right from the start, 
parenthesising all that would blur the actual phenomenon. Hence Ivan’s history of 
objectification becomes instructive of a path, which might be more common than 
one thinks, since it is related to students that acquire the freedom to act according 
to their intuitions, and the concomitant mathematical self-confidence. Moreover, it 
sets an example of how this self-confidence is built, as it is based on practicing 
intuitive investigations, as is the case with Ivan’s natural-like intuitivity, to which the 
analysed episode is but a mere example. 
The analysis of Ivan’s learning episode shows 
 The anticipatory force of the phenomenological methodological instruments 
that I have used throughout the study, such as the phenomenological 
reduction, the epochè (bracketing) and Merleau-Ponty’s radical reflection, 
which enabled this detailed account. 
 The anticipatory, “inductive” potentiability (potential and ability) of Ivan, 
from the pattern that emerged from the 3 × 3, 4 × 4 grids, to square and 3 ×
𝑛 grids, and then to a pattern and nine formulas. 
                                                          
151 Derrida (ibid.) writes: “A phenomenology of the experience is possible thanks to a reduction and to an 
appropriate de-sedimentation”. 
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Revisiting the empirical texture of Ivan’s investigation we notice that the new 
concept of the grids with the same height replaced his (exclusive) focus on the 
square grids and led him to the construction of nine final formulas (Figure 9 in Part 
3 §3.2.3.2), thus covering all space. But the analysis showed—and Ivan’s interview 
confirmed 152 —that “the shape pattern came first”, that it “was the main 
breakthrough” (Ivan’s interview extracts). The arithmetic pattern that emerged from 
the 3 × 𝑛 grids was additional to the synthesis of coincidence, which constituted the 
“diagonals” as the appropriate, generalisable pattern;153 and it sealed the intuition 
of the “diagonals” as the source of suitable conceptualisations, leading to the closer 
determination of the “diagonal pattern” (the new object) through the task (see 
Graph 3 in Part 1 §1.5.7). And the closer determination of the intuitive object of the 
“diagonal pattern” commenced with the specification154 of the “diagonal pattern”, 
as the functioning—i.e. algebraically effective—generalisable use, on grids with the 
same height.  
Another student (Diana) presented a few formulas in her coursework (see appendix) 
from the work that was done in her group during the New York cop session. Diana 
also mentions in her interview (section 3.6 in the analysis chapter) the 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 
2, 1, 1, 2 arithmetic pattern that Ivan found at home, which she did not consider as 
significant for her approach, since she was not aiming at a consistent pattern for all 
grids. I did not further analyse Diana’s investigation of the Doubling modulo, since 
the result that is pertinent to Ivan’s investigation is already apparent:  
Structure does not just appear, unless supported by the intentionality that yields it 
visible for the cognising subject. 
There is also something less apparent yet significant from the theoretical viewpoint 
of my research, concerning the genesis of the object: 
Intentionality and its object do not co-emerge. 
                                                          
152 Part 2 § 3.2.3. 
153 The diagonal pattern worked, i.e. it achieved the minimum amount of cops for 12 grids, 6 square and six 
orthogonal (3 × 𝑛) grids, before the arithmetic pattern surfaced. 
154 See specifying fulfilment in the Graph 3 of Part 1 §1.5.7. 
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Intentionality precedes the object’s constitution, and it is manifested in various 
ways. More precisely, the operative intentionality synthesises the object-like entity 
(that will become the constituted object), and then the object is constituted, as it 
co-emerges with the intentionality of act.155 This process was clearly manifested in 
this section, in the analysis of Ivan’s first and second step of his synthesis of 
coincidence. 
4.1.2.3 Ivan’s case under the light of Diana’s treatment of the 
‘New York cops’ task 
The data analysis revealed the fervent activity in the group of Ivan, Carry and 
Donald, who did not manage to resolve the different approaches that Ivan and Carry 
developed throughout the session. The primary target of the data analysis was to 
lay bare the operation of the intuition of essences, through the three steps of the 
synthesis of coincidence, and the impact of Ivan’s intuition on his algebraic 
expansion of the task. The target here is to get into these genetic moments from a 
practical point of view, by showing that these theoretical notions actually refer to 
moments that occur far more often than we would expect, and are recognisable due 
to a particular analytical operation that I exemplified in the previous section, and 
which Merleau-Ponty (2002b, p. 44) circumscribes in his notes on Husserl's Origin 
of geometry: 
It is the thought of the intentionality which is proper to language, 
interrogation of language, the epoche of language, the suspension (limit of 
eidetic variation) revealing only the operation, a contrario. We do not see the 
operation, since it operates. We see what would be missing without it; we 
circumscribe it as what makes speech be a ‘speaking of’ ... and not be the 
conscious having of the idealities implied in speech. (emphasis in the original) 
As it happens in every class, there were students who did and students who did not 
or partially did find answers to the New York cop short-sighted policemen task.  
                                                          
155 In other words, the two intentionalities are not regarded as strictly separated, but rather as dialectically 
interrelated, through the transcendental subject. 
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teacher’s intentions towards the given task. It was shown in the analysis of the data 
how: 
 Donald merely followed the methods of Ivan and Carry.  
 Carry followed the teacher’s suggestions by not aiming at finding formulas 
at all (see Carry’s interview during the session). 
 Ivan also focused on the shapes of the cops’ configurations in the square 
grids, aiming at a consistent pattern for all grids before being engaged in 
finding formulas for particular kinds of grids.  
It was also shown how Ivan actually and literally substantiated the teacher’s 
suggestions (section 3.2.5). Ivan’s remarkable intuition of the diagonal pattern 
brought him to the exploration of the 3×n, 4×n, 5×n, 6×n, 7×n, 8×n grids, and to 
his new intuition of different formulas, according to the remainder of the columns’ 
number division by 3. Even this latter intuition,156 how was it initiated? The 3×n 
grids (six of them) that Ivan drew, and the rhythm of 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2 (see 
Figure 1), already provide a richness of indications towards number 3, which Ivan 
had at his disposal, and he was focusing on at that moment, even before he 
collected suitable data to support an argument. We know that the lived body is 
triggered by the allure of the objects that it encounters each moment of cognitive 
conscious life, and we understand that: 
 Objectification is possible due to a synthesising intentionality that operates 
with association, and separates forms from the learner’s lived experience. 
 The objects’ features, such as rhythm or the shape of dots on a grid do not 
appear as stimuli, but rather as Gestalts, as figures on the ground. 
 These figures are brought to life due to embodied intentional operations, 
before they are constituted as objects.157  
We know from Diana’s interview (section 3.6 in the analysis chapter) that she and 
her group had arrived at the same arithmetic pattern that Ivan found. And in Diana’s 
                                                          
156 This intuition is not analysed in the data analysis section, as I chose to focus on the far richer intuition of 
essences. 
157 See the previous subsection (§4.1.3.2). 
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coursework (see appendix) we find the same arithmetic patterns that Ivan found.  
But the difference between Ivan’s use of them and Diana’s group cooperative work 
when they confronted them, equates from my phenomenological perspective to 
Ivan’s holistic intentionality, which allowed (or ‘forced’) him to intuit that “I could 
break it up into 3 sequences” (extract from Ivan’s coursework, in section 2.3.6 of 
the analysis), and deal with the grids' width as three classes, according to their 
remainder of their division with number three (known as mod3 classes). This holistic 
view afforded Ivan to take advantage of the same arithmetic results that we find in 
Diana’s tables: as soon as his intentionality of act constituted the diagonal pattern 
as the overarching pattern for every grid, it was easy for Ivan to treat the arithmetic 
patterns as particular cases (parts) of the same whole, as the following extract from 
Ivan’s coursework indicates: 
Starting with a 3x2 grid, (3 up 2 along), then the next grid in the sequence 
was 3x5, then 3x8... which gave me a pattern of 4,8,12,.... This pattern I 
called "when, (n+1)/3, is an integer". 
4.1.4 Conclusion 
The analysis of Ivan's intuition has shown that the object of the “diagonals” 
configuration was in fact given in experience, and how the Husserlian approach to 
experience is in fact distinct from the corresponding Kantian and Cartesian 
approaches. The object became known as it was separated from his lived 
experience, rather than constructed within it. The description of Ivan's activity in 
the classroom and at home, and the analysis that followed, also attempted to 
delineate the route from a level of experience that is not subjected to the objective 
categories, to the reflective, positing experience of an intuitive object at hand. 
Ivan shared and adopted ideas during the session, he made several 
unsuccessful attempts to reach a pattern that could be generalised and finally, at 
home, he realised with the immediacy of intuition that one of the patterns he had 
already found was “the optimal solution,… the best way to arrange” the cops. The 
incubation of his gut feeling throughout the session that there is a unified pattern, 
paid off in the three steps that led to the synthesis of coincidence. The essence of 
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his “diagonals” was that they could be used as the optimal way of covering the grid 
space with short-sighted policemen, as they could be mathematised.  
Ivan constituted his subjective comprehension of the grid space at the 
moment that he secured its intersubjective—mathematical—dimension. Moreover, 
the analysis showed how his constitution of the new object (the “diagonals”) was a 
transition from the pre-reflective, operative recognition of the ‘asymmetrical’ pattern 
as such,158 to the visual, reflective and positing intentionality of the arithmetic 
pattern;159 this transition is an example of how the operative intentionality makes 
possible the intentionality of act. 
Finally, the complexity of the intuitive moment analysed in my research serves as 
evidence of how the Husserlian approach to intuition considers consciousness as 
essentially embodied, and intersubjective, being the target and the constituting 
moment, through the establishment of relations that render qualities communicable. 
4.2. Diana – the transformation of negative to positive feelings 
towards the course, as soon as she managed to transform raw 
empirical material to abstract mathematical objects 
4.2.1 Implications for the student – Conclusion 
The ‘doubling modulo’ activity and its treatment by the student had major 
implications for her, as the following extracts from her interview manifest: 
it was very very long-winded and it took me a lot longer to understand it than 
it did for everyone else. But now I’ve done this and it’s my way, nobody else 
seems to have done that way. … I like my way! It’s a long way, but I like my 
way … I think when I’m teaching I need to get over the urge to give 
answers… not straight away. … [A] lot of the time –and it’s not just with 
maths, it’s with other subjects– I’ve been very cautious when I found an 
answer, if my answer isn’t the same as everybody else’s I’ve just assumed 
                                                          
158 It is where Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's operative intentionality is at work. 
159 The intentionality of act is at work. 
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mine is wrong! Because it’s not the same as somebody else’s … I think I’ve 
possibly become a bit more confident with what I’m doing; because I’m 
thinking “well, because I’ve got a different answer to somebody else it 
doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s wrong, it just means I thought about it in 
a different way”. So it has, yeah it’s been good for me! … I think I have 
realised from these lessons that it helps people more if you help with their 
understanding of it rather than just give them an answer straight away; and 
naturally make them think about it and what they are doing and why they 
are doing it, which obviously is very important with wanting to be a teacher. 
(bold indicating her emphasis, italics added) 
Starting from an empirical intuition and due to the character of the sessions that 
allowed an open frame of what a ‘correct’ result is, the prospective teacher 
developed her ideas, devised a method, and cashed in the whole operation to a new 
perception of learning and teaching. She separated the question/answer sequences 
from her experience in her empirical intuition, which enabled the abstract intuition 
or intuition of essences (Wesensschau), where a new separation from the new layer 
of data took place, namely the separation of the algorithmic abstract essence from 
the particular patterns concerning 15 numbers (the hyle, or raw data in Husserl's 
terms), spread in several pages. Hintikka (1995, p. 183) explains: 
According to Husserl, we can come to know essences by means of empirical 
experience by separating them from the hyle in Wesensschau. The main 
difference as compared with Kant is that we do not create the essences, we 
merely come to know them by separating them from the sensory data.  
As the aforementioned extracts and further observation of the prospective 
teacher in this course as well as in other courses showed, she reconsidered her 
approach to learning and teaching in two major issues, as her “frustration” was 
radically transformed: 
 Her results and methods can be valid although different than the other 
students’ results and methods. 
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 Teaching and learning is not about giving or getting the answers “straight 
away”, but rather about “help[ing] [people] with their understanding” and 
“making” the students “think about it and what they are doing and why they 
are doing it”. 
The analysis showed how new objects surface through empirical and abstract 
intuitions, and the interrelations between the two intuitive stages (empirical and 
abstract). Furthermore, we noticed how the materials of intuition are neither internal 
nor external, as there is an overlap of the objects as they are given:  
 In their material form—either drawn directly from experience, or as 
structured questions and answers concerning numbers. 
 And their intended form that intuition separates from the sensory or abstract 
data (respectively).  
“It is crucially important to emphasize that, according to Husserl, there is an actual 
interface of my consciousness and reality, that reality in fact impinges directly on 
my consciousness” (Hintikka 1995, p. 83). The materials of intuition are not 
prepackaged, but rather it is reality impinging on consciousness in the form of 
unstructured raw materials (Hintikka 1995, pp. 102-103). The questions, the 
answers and the judgments were transformed to commands within algorithms, 
which in turn formed a flowchart, in which the value of the entrance is any given 
number.  This is how we have access to reality and not due to some predetermined 
internal mind structure. The mind-body dualism is cancelled, since consciousness 
for Husserl is embodied (Tito, p. 186); and the relation between consciousness and 
reality is mediated by intuition. The phenomenological analysis can investigate 
empirical or abstract objects as they are intended by the learner, which become 
known in her lived experience by separating them from the unstructured raw 
material, rather than by been constructed in experience through our already 
categorial intelligence. 
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4.3. Mary – The representative case of all detected intuitions 
and objectifications 
4.3.1 Classification of intuitive expressions, as they were detected 
in Mary’s activity 
Although all the intuitions found in Mary’s treatment of the parabola task are 
analysed with the Husserlian classification of empirical (Anschauung) and abstract 
intuitions (categorial-Wesensschau), a classification according to their different 
intuitive expressions follows, with their relations to the classifications from the 
literature review and some corresponding examples from the findings. It is rather a 
grouping of the intuitive expressions that were detected, under the four headings 
that follow, aiming at a mapping of the embodied features that were also decisive 
for the realisation of all intuitions. In other words, it is not an empiricist approach 
that leads us here to the aforementioned grouping, but a deployment of the intuitive 
features that could allow a question to be posed and be given a preliminary answer; 
that is, which is the ground on which the intuitive expressions and their 
corresponding intuitions are emerging from, as they yield objects and 
objectifications anew. Hence we discern what it is precisely that makes the resulting 
objects and objectifications possible; the answer being that it is no other than the 
lived body, the learner’s embodied consciousness. A first task is thus to map the 
area of embodied expressions not with an empiricist eye but with a transcendental 
descriptive eye; ready to extend it to the results of our observations, applying a new 
reduction and suspension of judgment towards the object-as-it-is-intended by the 
transcendental ego. This is precisely what the phenomenological immersion to each 
phenomenon is all about. It is to sense the horizonal/intentional lived-world of the 
learner(s), where objects and objectifications appear as new, and they definitely are 
linked to the real, for Husserl’s strong realism (e.g. principle of all principles). Having 
said that I ought to add for a fuller view that Husserl has been the theoretical explicit 
or implicit reference to many of the founders of the post-modernist tradition 
(Ricoeur, Derrida, Merleau-Ponty, etc.).Therefore, the classification that follows is 
in rough but crucial terms a first mapping of the operations of the lived body: 
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 Informal logic intuitive expressions: they are empirical intuitions in 
Husserl’s terms, and they are often holistic and plausible intuitive 
expressions, and/or relying on a physical model or on some leading examples 
(cf. Poincare’s 1st and 2nd categories and Davis & Hersh’s 3rd, 4th and 5th 
categories).  
 Examples of these expressions concern Mary’s certainty that the curve 
is symmetrical to the y axis when she had found just 3 points, which 
led her to the intuition of the lines parallel to the wall (§ 3.4.2.3.1). 
Another example is related to seeing the x-axis in her drawing as a 
barrier for the curve (§ 3.4.2.3.3.), before her other intuitively based 
work allowed her to push on to a more mathematically complete view. 
Both examples indicate immanent kinesthetic features, thus bringing 
evidence for the embodied roots of what we call ‘informal logic’. 
 Kinesthetic intuitive expressions: they are empirical intuitions in 
Husserl’s terms, similar to the visual intuitive expressions but based on 
sensory-motor experience (cf. Poincare’s 1st category, Fischbein’s primary 
intuitions and Davis & Hersh’s 4th and 6th categories). 
 Examples of these expressions are the kinesthetic aspects of the 
‘bird’s eye view’ intuition (§ 3.4.2.2.) and the intuition of the lines 
parallel to the wall (§ 3.4.2.3.1.). 
 Visual intuitive expressions: they are empirical or abstract intuitions in 
Husserl’s terms, based on vision, occurring from adequate instruction and/or 
personal experience (cf. Poincare’s 1st category and Davis & Hersh’s 2nd 
category). 
 Examples of these expressions are the visual aspects of the ‘bird’s eye 
view’ intuition (§ 3.4.2.2.) and the intuitions related to the x2 curve 
(§ 3.4.2.3.2.). 
 Mathematical–formal logic intuitive expressions: they are abstract 
intuitions in Husserl’s terms, formed after adequate instruction and able to 
create mathematical reasoning (cf. Poincare’s 3rd category, Fischbein’s 
secondary intuitions and Davis & Hersh’s 6th category). This expression has 
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embodied components due to the subjective approaches of the 
transcendental ego.160 These approaches concern lived experiences where 
the becoming of objects in intuitive ways on behalf of the learner amounts 
to constituting freely within the broad mathematical field.  
 An example of these expressions concerns the intuition of the general 
formula (§ 3.4.2.3.4) as a course of intuitions, realised after informal 
and formal intuitions, based on the former, regardless if previous 
instruction has taken place.  
 on symmetry  (§3.4.2.3.1) 
 on the fallible intuition that the curve will not cross the x-axis,  
 on the x2 category of curves (the categorial intuition), as based 
on the image of a bell, after 5 points of the curve were at place 
 in the formal treatment of numbers in the construction of the 
formula (but) with an embodied intuitive eye in keeping 
number 10 as central, as in using the point (10,0) in order to 
verify her initial hypothesis, linked to her embodied—distance 
from the wall—feature. ,  
 and finally, on the line(s) that the general formula depicts as 
paths next to walls, comprised by points in real 
phenomenological space (extract in §3.4.2.4). 
How all these informal intuitions or intuitional components are 
involved in the intuition of the general formula? Simply because they 
participated (co-presentified in Husserl’s terms) in passive synthesis, 
as principal agents (vehicles) in shaping the horizons of the intentional 
lived experience that yielded the general formula, culminating in the 
formula with number 10, which become the leading example in her 
synthesis of coincidence. Since embodied consciousness is meant here 
beyond 
                                                          
160 Transcendental, i.e. surviving as identical due to retentions and protentions that transcend recollections 
and anticipations alike, due to the conviction, the certainty of intuition that fills them selectively) 
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The following Table 2 summarises the main themes analysed in the data, and the 
last column shows that there is evidence that Mary has produced significant activity 
in all those areas, which was one of the main reasons that her work was chosen for 
this paper. 
  The task’s main objectification features, according to the intuitive acts and 
expressions of these acts, as they surfaced for each intuitive object 
Mary 
Intuitions  






informal logic  Symmetry of the curve. ✓ 
kinesthetic 
 Bird’s-eye-view intuition. 
 Points belonging to the curve are 
located by parallel lines to the 
wall (parallel lines intuition). 
✓ 
visual 
 The diagram as the 
representation of the activity in 
the class (bird’s-eye-view 
intuition). 
 The x-axis is a boundary for the 
curve. 
 The shape out of the 5 points 
(empirical stage of the x2 
intuition) ✓ 
ABSTRACT INTUITIONS 
(Categorial intuitions, and 
Wesensschau or intuitions of 
essences) 
visual 
 Categorial intuitions, in 
particular the second stage of the 
categorial intuitions—e.g. the 
shape that emerged from the 5 
points (i.e. the first, empirical 
stage) seen as an x2 curve (the 




 Intuition of essence. The 
constitution of a new, general 
formula, covering all real 
distances from the ‘wall’, in the 
three steps of the starting or 
leading example, the variation of 
the starting example and the 
synthesis of coincidence, due to 
the stereoscopic vision. 
✓ 
 
Table 2. Summary of the findings in Mary’s case 
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4.3.2 Discussion of Mary’s data analysis key issues 
The research supports the claim that phenomenology, being a philosophy of the 
'immediate experience' can give a convincing account of the significance of intuition 
in the objectification process. 
The two-level structure of intuitions (empirical/abstract), as it was introduced 
in section 5 of Part 1 (the theory chapter), and as it was analysed in the data (e.g. 
§§ 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.4.2.3.2 of Part 3 (the data analysis chapter) corresponds to ideas 
expressed in non-phenomenological literature. For example, Fischbein points at 
primary intuitions as the cognitive beliefs that develop independently of any 
systematic instruction as an effect of their personal experience, which corresponds 
to the Husserlian empirical intuition. And Husserl’s abstract intuition is similar to 
Fischbein’s secondary intuition (Fischbein, 1994, p. 68) that has no natural roots, 
and the Piagetian operational intuition (ibid., Ch. 4) that comes from special action 
towards objects of the world, rather than mere perception. By employing the 
Husserlian theory, the similarities and differences between the two levels of 
intuitions were clearly shown in the data analysis, without any appeal to idealist or 
biologistic concepts, such as the concept of the adaptation mechanism (ibid. p. 59), 
but by taking into account their position and functioning in the objectification 
process. The theory of intentionality that the Husserlian phenomenological 
perspective has afforded us—by distinguishing the intentionality of act from the 
operative intentionality, as well as their products and functions—allows us to sense 
the importance and the richness of the latter intentionality, appreciating its contact 
with the pre-objective raw (hyletic) material and its unfathomed synthetic 
capabilities. 
But what is principally new in Husserl’s approach is intuitions as objectifying 
acts, which separate new objects from unstructured, unthematised raw material: 
 The bird’s eye view intuition brought up a figure from the 5 points 
that Mary had found; this new object-like entity derived from 
unstructured sensory-motor classroom and home experience, and  
 The general formula appeared as the identification between elements 
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of particular formulas, which became essential only due to the 
fulfillment of the intentionality of the general formula. These formulas 
were grounded on an embodied perception of number 10, as “the 
distance between the fixed point and the wall”. Moreover, the intuition 
of the general formula was realised as soon as number 10 was 
qualitatively transformed through its diverse conceptualisations by 
Mary. 
Therefore, the phenomenological approach that I employ in my research deals with 
the learner’s lived experiences as separations of lived profiles of the learner’s reality, 
not as already categorised Kantian perceptions. It is now useful to summarise our 
overview of empirical and abstract intuitions, after the analysis of the findings: 
Empirical intuitions are more than mediators of our lived-life, they are 
accumulations of experience of our embodied consciousness and they bring new 
objects that we come to learn as we use rather than construct. They are embodied, 
pre-objective operations, followed by action. Empirical intuitions concern the 
transformation of the sensory, unreflected, raw data to forms, to empirical objects, 
which become the ground, the subsoil of the abstract ones; (e.g. the ‘bird’s eye 
view’ intuition that transformed Mary’s classroom experience into the diagram and 
became the ground for her further abstract intuitions (§ 3.4.2.2 in Part 3). 
Abstract intuitions bring objects of a new kind with them from ‘ordinary’ 
singularities, such as the figure that emerged from the 5 points on the piece of 
paper and was linked to the x2 curves (§ 3.4.2.3.2 in Part 3), or the numbers—
distances on her diagram—that were intuitively targeted and evolved to a technique 
and then to a variable, in Mary’s general formula (§ 3.4.2.3.4 in Part 3). Abstract 
intuitions were shown: 
 to follow similar patterns of emergence to corresponding empirical intuitions: 
e.g. the figure that emerged from the 5 points appeared on the ground of 
the grid lines of the paper and other lines she had drawn, in the same way 
as the x2 curve graph emerged on the ground of other graphs (§ 3.4.2.3.2) 
 to work on the products of empirical intuitions: e.g. Mary has recognised a 
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pattern in the 5 points, which became a basis for the x2- curve abstract 
intuition (§ 3.4.2.3.2), or e.g. number 10, intuited as a critical number—as a 
key number for the progress of her investigation—and then becoming the 
basis for an abstract intuition, through its involvement in the formula 
production (§§ 3.4.2.3.3, 3.4.2.3.4), and 
 to bring new sorts of objects to the surface (e.g. the general formula in 
§3.4.2.3.4), by focusing on invariable features of previously constituted 
objects (the two formulas), in the context of their cultural (mathematical) 
horizons. 
Mary’s last intuition towards the formal expression of the parabola (§ 3.4.2.3.4) is 
considered as a particular kind of abstract intuition, the intuition of essences. It 
illuminates the essential properties of two previously objectified forms; but the 
interaction between forms keeps the starting example as the principle knot of 
reference. In this case the general formula appeared as the essential property of 
two particular formulas and the first of them stood as a reference to Mary’s 
embodied experience. Thus the synthesising intuitions of coincidence (essences) 
become the embodied, personal and at the same time cultural agents of learning 
and teaching experience. The intuition of essences revealed not just an abstract 
knowledge of formula, but rather a node in the system of layers of objectified 
experience grounded in the living-body. 
I consider Mary’s last intuition towards the formal expression of the parabola 
(section 3.4.2.3.4) as a particular kind of abstract intuition, the intuition of 
essences. It illuminates the essential properties of two previously objectified forms; 
but the interaction between forms keeps the starting example as the principle knot 
of reference. In this case the general formula appeared as the essential property 
of two particular formulas and the first of them stood as a reference to Mary’s 
embodied experience. Thus the synthesising intuition of coincidence—and the 
essence it brought in the shape of the general formula—became the embodied, 
personal and at the same time cultural agent of learning and teaching experience. 
The intuition of essences revealed not just an abstract knowledge of formula, but 
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rather a node in the system of layers of objectified experience grounded in the 
living-body. 
From one hand it is the living body, the body-subject that lies at the core of 
intuitions, from another hand it is the intuitions, the starting points for the discursive 
nature of knowledge, since they link the pre-objective raw material (hyle) of lived-
experience to the reflective conscious treatment of cultural (mathematical) objects. 
During the objectification process objects emerge once the students become 
conscious of the effective implications of their intuitions and then the objects evolve 
through their further involvement in the students’ activity towards the next 
objectifying acts, in order to arrive to the final cultural form. It is in this sense that 
intuitions of essences, as well as all abstract intuitions are the end points of the 
learner’s analysis and “by the same token the starting-points of our epistemological 
and constitutive processes” (Hintikka, 2003, p. 180). 
We can see here that one of the novelties of Husserl is that he gives a 
legitimate answer to Meno’s paradox of the acquisition of knowledge, through the 
subjective cognitive praxis, which is transcending its cultural mediation at the same 
moment that it is culturally transcended by pre-existing tradition and similar 
constitutive practices. Being deliberately bracketed by phenomenological attitude 
cultural conditions took significant part in the investigated process of 
objectification: it was the cultural practice of modelling that allowed Mary to draw 
the diagram; it was the ruler as a cultural tool that allowed her to depict a straight 
line on the paper; it was the specially structured grid paper that facilitated the 
application of the coordinate system and her visual intuitions, and so forth. But it 
was only personal lived experience that let objectification happen, that made 
possible the coincidence of intuitive synthesis in Mary’s last intuition. Thereby I 
suppose that Husserl, who has radically rethought Kantian and Cartesian 
dichotomies, could be considered as complementary to current cultural-historical 
approaches, from the point of view of the subject-in-the-world. 
I exemplified how the lived experiences genetically break down the dualism 
of “outer” and “inner” world, since they are “appearances-of-something… of 
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existing things presenting themselves” (Held, in Welton, 2003, p. 28). “[T]hey are 
the In-between, that which originally opens the dimension of intentional 
appearance within which consciousness and the world have already met—before 
any subject-object rift” (ibid.). It is in the beginning, in the origins of objectification 
where the genetic issues of the constitution of temporality (Husserl, 1991, 2001) 
and of the “unity of coincidence corresponding to the unity of sense” (2001, p. 44; 
cf. 1970b, 1973) arise. There—in the origins of objectification—are structures that 
persist in personal cognitive experience, namely the synthesis of coincidence, the 
recognition of the generality from the mirroring of a starting example, and the 
double operation of categorial intuition. This double operation of intuition (§ 
3.4.2.3.2) starts from an empirical particular that is constituted—not merely found 
yet not constructed—and then used for the categorial association in order to 
introduce the presented curve figure to the x2 family of curves. Making association 
possible is a poetic moment (Radford, 2010, p. 6), which Husserl's theory of 
experience makes visible, where a student is engaged with her living body that 
manifests itself in its actions, starting with its intuitive body-subject-in-the-world 
constitutions. 
4.4 General discussion 
a. Summary and key issues of the data analysis 
Now that the analysis and the discussion of each of the three learning episodes of 
Ivan, Diana and Mary have been exposed, a broader (general) discussion of the 
three cases as a whole may commence, in the context of the research questions 
that the study has posed from the beginning. It is a discussion that includes the 
following foci:  
1) An account of where the main theoretical terms introduced in Part 1 were 
exemplified. 
2) How the methodological routes introduced in Part 2 enabled the results. 
3) The structures emerging from the close inspection of the inaugural stages of 
objectification in the findings themselves, in Part 3. 
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4) The introduction of Meno’s Paradox, concerning the actualisation of new 
knowledge, which will receive a suggestion for an answer from the theoretical 
standpoint of this research, and  
5) A response to contemporary and previous (yet popular as ‘common sense’ 
sort of understanding) constructivist/Kantian-based research frames.   
The subsections that follow include discussion of these topics; they will illustrate the 
efficacy of the adopted theory and accentuate critical problems concerning other 
perspectives thar have already been indicated in the theory (Part 1), and evidence 
has been collected after the analysis of the learning episodes (Part 3). The argument 
developed throughout the research is based on the perception that the source and 
the ground of learning is the boundless possibilities that lived reality reserves for 
the learners, rather that its representations. It is the same problem when we deal 
with mathematical signs, as soon as we tend to forget that the sign is limited to a 
particular world that the object always transcends (e.g.  ‘three’ transcends its 
significations III, 3, |𝒜|, when 𝒜 = {a, b, c}, a, b, c ∈ ℚ). Learning in this sense is 
equivalent to separating associations of lived (previously intuited) perceptions of 
lived experience, and developing them to abstract mathematical objects that are 
meaningful for the task-at-hand. 
In other words, it is presentations (based on immediate perceptions of what 
is present) interwoven with re-presentations and presentifications,161 which are 
shaped as new thematisations and can be intuitively produced at any conscious 
moment, that make our cognitive ground ‘groundless’, full of intuitive certainty and 
the awareness of indeterminacy, driving us to new understandings through closer 
determination of already constituted objects and through new objects that we 
constitute and get to know as we use them.162 The distinction of my Husserlian 
                                                          
161 Re-presentation and presentification (see next footnote) refer to acts “whereby things are given in a less 
fully present way, as for instance, in acts of memory, imagination, symbolic representation, and so on” (Moran 
& Cohen, 2012, p. 260), in contradistinction to presentation, which is based on lived experiences “in which 
the intentional objects are given in intuitive experience, immediately, directly, and with in propria persona, 
‘in-the-flesh’ (leibhaftig), here-and-now, full presence” (ibid. – also c.f. Index-Glossary). 
162 In regular perception for instance, the object is presented through an adumbration (a profile of the real), but 
the absent sides which are co-intended are given through an empty presentification, in Husserlian terms. 
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phenomenological perspective from Kantian and constructivist views will be clarified, 
following the aforementioned argument line.   And it is the only way according to 
the arguments employed here that the reactivation of mathematical objects can be 
observed as it operates; that is reactivation as the reverse process of the 
sedimentation of meaning, of sense. 
4.4.1. An account of where the main theoretical terms introduced in Part 
1 were exemplified. 
Now that the analysis and the discussion of each of the three learning episodes of 
Ivan, Diana and Mary have been exposed, it can be realised that various terms of 
the theory found concrete description in the data, in various types of intuitions 
performing as critical objectifying acts. And the account of such terms and the 
instances of their descriptions in the data analysis will help in structuring a summary 
of the thesis, in relation to its analytical contribution. So the main theoretical terms 
that this study introduced and that have found detailed descriptions in more than 
one of the cases are the following: 
 Intuition, in its various forms: 
 Empirical intuitions:  
 Diana’s first stage of her categorial 𝑥2 intuition. 
 Mary’s bird’s-eye-view intuition. 
 Mary’s intuition of the symmetrical points,  
 Mary’s intuition of the lines parallel to the wall.  
 Mary’s first step of her 𝑥2 intuition.  
 Abstract intuitions:  
 Categorial intuitions in two stages, namely the empirical and 
the abstract stages: 
 Diana’s intuition of the rule, followed by the intuition of 
the algorithm. 
 The two stages of Mary’s 𝑥2 intuition. 
 Intuitions of essences in three steps  
 Ivan’s intuition of the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern 
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 Mary’s intuition of the general formula. 
 The interrelation between empirical and abstract intuitions, in both cases, 
namely in the case of categorial intuitions—since the two stages that 
comprise categorial intuitions stand for empirical and abstract intuitions 
respectively—and in the case of the intuition of essence (compare Ivan’s 
empirical focusing on the 3 × 3, 4 × 4 grids’ pattern—as a pattern worthy for 
exploration—and his abstract synthesis of coincidence at the third step of his 
intuition of essence Part 3, Ch. 2). 
 Objectification, given through a literature example163 and in various instances 
in the three analysed episodes, in the cases of empirical and abstract 
mathematical objects. In a nutshell, it was shown how objectification 
originates in the operations of the lived body, while different kinds of 
intuitions, driven by qualitatively different intentionalities, partake the whole 
process.  
 The living body or lived body (used interchangeably), as the body-subject in 
lived-experience, particularly as Merleau-Ponty took it up from Husserl:  
 In Ivan’s building up of his intuition of essence (during the first and 
second step of the intuition) and in his stereoscopic vision (that 
actualised the third step of the intuition).164 Also in his intuitive last 
reflection in the classroom, when he felt that a solution is within his 
grasp (Part 3, §3.2.2.2). 
 In Diana’s transformation of her empirical trial-and-improvement 
method to an algorithm. It was a case where the learner’s intuitions 
actually record her thought process in the texture of the intuitive 
objects that she devised, which is a symptomatic feature of intuitive 
acts in general, pertaining to their operative and active involvements 
in objectification. 
                                                          
163 Cf. the ‘red book example in Part 1, § 1.3.3. 
164 Cf. Part 3, §3.2.3. 
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 In Mary’s transformation of the diagram to a classroom bird’s-eye-
view and various other cases up to the end, when the general formula 
arose from her ‘vertical’ link with 10 as “the distance from the wall”, 
and as she was describing the property of the general formula by 
linking it with her embodied experience, as a line where “you could 
stand on anywhere on the line… and you would be equidistant from 
the wall and a fixed point”. 
 Operative intentionality and intentionality of act, in cases such as: 
 The categorial (abstract) intuitions of Mary and Diana, where the 
aforementioned intentionalities find expression in the two stages of 
this abstract kind of intuition respectively (operative in the first, 
empirical stage and intentionality of act in the second, abstract stage), 
as Husserl's theory anticipated.  
 Ivan’s intuition of essence, where operative intentionality was 
detected running in all three steps, from the persistence to the 
‘asymmetrical’ pattern, up to the third step of his intuition, which was 
actualised by the stereoscopic vision of the two first steps, in the so 
called synthesis of coincidence. 
 Many ‘small’ examples, like  
 Ivan’s shifting of intentions from symmetrical to asymmetrical 
patterns already during his classroom exploration, after he 
found the asymmetrical 4 × 4 grid. 
 Diana’s work out of the task’s rule as a set of algorithmic 
commands that resembled her trial-and-improvement process, 
as she separated the form of the algorithm from the 15 
drawings. 
 The ways that her intuitions of symmetry and of the x-axis as 
a barrier for the curve interfered with Mary’s investigation. 
 The process of closer determination of the objects that the intuitions brought 
to the surface, as well as the objects themselves shaped the particular 
approaches that the students adopted in each of the three learning episodes:  
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 In Ivan’s case, when his determination to follow symmetrical patterns 
throughout the classroom investigation hindered him from realising 
the significance of a pattern that he had found, and how his intuition 
of the asymmetrical diagonal pattern at home changed everything. 
 In Diana’s case, where her intuition of the task’s rule inaugurated her 
algorithmic approach, followed by her intuition of the algorithm that 
depicted the steps she went through, up to her flowchart. 
 In Mary’s case, when her bird’s-eye-view intuition set the ground for 
her subsequent embodied treatment of the task or, more precisely, 
for linking (communicating) her (fresh in memory) classroom 
experience with her intuitive mathematical experience, through her 
“little diagram”. As Aristotle has put it, “The greatest thing by far is to 
have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by 
another; … for to make good metaphors implies an eye for 
resemblances” (Aristotle, Poetics, 1459.a4).165 And after the analysis 
and discussion of Mary’s learning episode as a whole, we have seen 
where Mary’s command of her bird’s-eye-view intuitive metaphor has 
led her. She indeed took command of her bird’s-eye-view intuitive 
metaphor. Full of intuitive ideas and rich in producing tools that 
brought more intuitions and objects respectively, she culminated her 
investigation with an essential objectifying act that brought an object 
of a new category to the surface (categorial act), by revealing an 
essence of her first formula, in its generalised version. Thus generality 
and apodicticity (quality pertaining to proof) were detected as crucial 
features of the Husserlian intuition of essence, for the second time 
after Ivan. The stereoscopic vision—which is now posed as an 
immanent feature of the intuition of essences—was confirmed once 
                                                          
165 I find exciting that this fitting Aristotle’s extract to Mary's intuitive grasping of the bird's-eye-view 
metaphor comes from his Poetics, due to Radford’s ‘red book' example, which was analysed in Part 1,, §1.3.3  
as a prelude to the analysis of objectification, and as an exemplification of the transcendental 
phenomenological reduction that is also adopted through the research. 
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again as she mirrored the whole process that led her to the first 
formula, into finding a second formula, and as soon as it was done the 
operations of the lived body synthesised a variable to replace 10 
primarily and 6 secondarily. And it was also shown for the second 
time166 how the intuitions of essences are in fact categorial intuitions, 
thus putting (successfully) the theory to the test of actual learning 
praxis, since theory contends (cf. Lohmar, 2010, p. 117) that the 
intuition of essence is a form of categorial intuition (c.f. Part I, Ch. ). 
From the accounts of the lived body and of the intentionalities analysed in the data 
and the abstract intuitions (categorial and intuition of essence) that the operative 
intentionality precedes the intentionality of act in every instance, as expected from 
the theory, with the former intentionality being an expression of the synthetic, 
associative and orchestrating performance of the lived body, while the latter 
intentionality being associated with the objectifying, constitutive stage that 
cognition is recognisable as such, entering the realm of communicable expressions. 
Ivan, Diana and Mary brought evidence (in the phenomenological sense) by 
clarifying different adumbrations of different expressions of the same phenomena, 
namely intuitions (empirical, categorial and intuitions of essences) and their 
corresponding empirical and abstract mathematical objects. Thus we investigated 
closely how intuitions in each case operated as objectifying acts, endowing with 
meaning (sense) the learners’ lived experiences. 
4.4.2. How the methodological routes introduced in Part 2 enabled the 
results 
In the analysis of the data the aim was to investigate the genetic formations of 
sense (Husserl, 2001) and discover the presuppositions of logic and formal 
mathematics in the learners’ lived worlds. For this reason the phenomenological 
methodology was employed, as the one afforded with the critical questioning of the 
world’s appearance as ‘already there’, while this very world is inevitably constituted 
                                                          
166 Since in Mary’s case the ‘essence’ of 10—from the distance from the wall to a constant in a formula and 
then to becoming a variable—revealed the object of a new category, i.e. the general formula. 
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as such, as ‘already there’. By not reducing the learners’ world to a phenomenon, 
in an acknowledged, originally Husserlian sense, we would be ‘blind’ to its 
constituted nature and unable to discern the structurations that resist psychologistic 
and naturalistic exigencies.  
Already prepared from the theoretical part, we were warned of the pitfalls of 
(Kantian informed) structuralism, which inevitably resorts to an unfounded 
intrumentalism, deemed to achieve local results, in borrowing material from other 
methodologies (e.g. RME, Activity Theory, enactivism through Varela, Rosch and 
Johnson ); thus acquiring a vague link to phenomenological and materialist dialectic 
roots. On the contrary, and distinctively to contemporary research that employs 
phenomenological conceptual frames (Roth, DeFreitas & Sinclair) the starting point 
here is that “perceptual experiences are intentional because they are a revealing or 
disclosing of the world. And they are conscious because they are a revealing or 
disclosing of the world to someone—their subjects” (Rowlands, 2010, p. 163). And 
from the fact that intentionality, as revealing the world and disclosing it at the same 
time with indeterminacy, already starts with awareness in a double sense: that is 
the awareness of the aforementioned indeterminacy and the awareness of the mine-
ness of the perceptual experience:  
If I am aware of a conscious state and/or its properties—I am aware of my 
pain or what it is like to have it—then my conscious experience at that time 
consists not just in that of which I am aware; it consists also in my awareness 
of it. (ibid.) 
So, as now can be clarified, the methodological routes described in Part 2 and 
depicted on the Graph 4 in § 2.2 were informing the theory as they were enabling 
the data sources to become data, the data to become findings and to become a 
new sort of data for further reflections and further findings. This general structure 
is only a rough description of processes that shifted from key ideas to intuitions, 
then to the operative intentionalities and the intentionalities of act that sustained 
these intuitions, then to the lived experience that was the source for the embodied 
consciousness that availed these intuitive operations.  
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The regressive course that the reduction followed was from the mathematical 
objects to the powers of the lived body: from Ivan’s nine formulas to the 
‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern, to the quest for symmetry, for a unifying pattern 
that ‘ought’ to appear on square grids, throughout his classroom investigation. We 
can trace here the successive reductions leading to the intentional origins of Ivan’s 
nine formulas: from the formal mathematical objectivity of the formulas, to Ivan’s 
lived experience of symmetry and square grids, there is a strenuous path that 
Husserlian phenomenology undertakes step by step, since it recognises passivity 
(the pre-reflective and pre-objective stage) as the field for the intentional forces of 
the lived body. And since it deals with the transition from empirical to abstract 
knowledge without the separatist Kantian/Piagetian frame of sensibility and 
knowledge. 
And from the ‘other side’, namely from the viewpoint of the research’s 
methodological apparatus I started with the observation of Ivan’s investigation of 
the task in his group, and his and Carry’s short interviews, taken in the middle of 
the session; the contrasting results that he produced and the “breakthrough 
moment”, as recorded in his coursework, rang a bell that this data source could 
become data. After the analysis of a lengthy interview with Ivan I disclosed the 
intentional origins of his mathematical objects. And it was only then that the 
reactivation of Ivan’s course towards his decisive intuition became available for 
phenomenological description. After confirmation e-mails and successive reflections 
the structure of the intuition of essence surfaced, as the photographic image 
appears slowly on celluloid, in the darkroom, and it was later confirmed as such by 
the theory. Successive analyses, where findings were becoming data for new 
findings brought new elements to the surface, as the three features/properties of 
intuition 167  were applied in the three-step process, up to the synthesis of 
coincidence. It was from this elemental unit of phenomenological knowledge 
production (see Graph 4 in Part 2, § 2.2), as the phenomenological attitude was 
                                                          
167 Namely immediacy, intentionality and the feeling (filling) of certainty. 
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locked on to the phenomenon168 of the emergence of objectification, that notions 
such as the stereoscopic vision appeared, in order to maintain the sense of Ivan’s 
intuitive object (the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern), before it entered the 
mathematical domain—thanks to the arithmetic rhythm 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2.      
A pending question run through the study, concerning mathematical objects 
born out from tension, as this fundamental awareness of determinable 
indeterminacy was cashing in intentionalities that operated pre-reflectively, before 
they were reflectively constituting.  Such was the concern of the phenomenological 
analysis, to trace these intentionalities from their neglected depths, as they shaped 
and availed the objects that finally appeared; aiming at disclosing the genetic 
moments of objectivation, as the primal stage of objectification. This absolute focus 
invites reduction and bracketing, whatever the theme of phenomenological research 
may be, in micro or macro level, if a meaningful description is to be presented, with 
all the care that the bracketing will be neither arbitrary nor excluding (what is 
bracketed). Particularly in the case of my study this rule was followed in detail, since 
the teacher was naturally abstained by any form of guidance towards the students, 
and I followed his example, choosing cases to analyse that interference from both 
me and the teacher was truly minimum without being forced, even in a remote 
sense. Therefore the bracketing of teacher and researcher came as a given principle 
of the course, adopted by the researcher in a naïve exploratory sense, as I did not 
know what it was that I was looking for when I was participating these sessions, 
before the transcendental phenomenological reduction and bracketing were 
deepened and explicitly implemented, as a route, as a becoming, rather as a state 
of affairs. 
                                                          
168 That is phenomenon in the phenomenological sense that this study has introduced; and not in the 
commonsense use of the word, which is often confused with its specific employment by the 
phenomenological study of intentional consciousness. It is common practice in our field to use 
phenomenological language without any justification, as if phenomenological terms have not been 
historically introduced (e.g. Coitchu, ESM, 2015). Such an indifference towards historically introduced terms 
would most probably be addressed accurately by phenomenalism rather than phenomenology. 
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Finally, the extensive use that the structures of categorial and intuitions of 
essence may afford to mathematics teachers, for their abstracting and generalising 
capabilities, in teaching and introducing new mathematical concepts, as well as new 
approaches to old concepts by the students,169 in a critical analysis that involves 
their lived worlds. 
Now that the methodology and the methods are opened up for further 
reflection we can say that the initial reduction was put into action as a result of the 
decision to follow the Husserlian inversion of the Cartesian way (Part 1, §§1.1.b, 
1.1.d, 1.4.2, 1.4.6; Part 2, §2.8), consisted of the beginning with the being of the 
objects of thought (the cogitationes), of experience as it occurs and is simply being 
reflected upon, and of taking the objects of thought as the ultimate source that 
cannot be doubted (Husserl, 1999b, p. 62). This reduction of the cognitive praxis to 
a phenomenon in which its primordial act is already a (proto)cognitive act, 
accordingly entailed bracketing (of the teacher and of the participant observer), in 
order to render the students’ objects of thought visible, to ‘isolate’ them so to speak 
as components of the primal relation that the fulfilment of intentionality renders 
possible.  
Thus the research question concerning the possibility of analysing mathematical 
objects as phenomena of lived reality, and not as ready-made objects of our world, 
‘already existing’ and ‘ready to be transferred’, was answered by the 
phenomenological theory employed in the study (see Part 5, B), but only after the 
phenomenological methodology was put into action, with reductions and bracketing 
as aforementioned. In philosophical terms, the phenomenological attitude and the 
concomitant reductions and bracketing allowed me, as a mathematics education 
researcher, to think differently about the issues of learning mathematics, in 
particular of acquiring abstract knowledge through tasks; which was the reward for 
                                                          
169 In a process reminding me of Ambrose Bierce’s ‘old saws fitted with new teeth’, where Aesop’s myths 
receive new take-ups. 
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trusting the transcendental (intentional) ego and the constitutive ground of the lived 
body and its powers. 
In small coins, the absolute focus on the intentional web sustaining each student’s 
objectification, allowed the tangibility of the inaugural intentional reflective 
modalisation that turned perceptions to judgments, namely constitutive judgments.  
Was not Ivan’s posing of the ‘asymmetrical’ pattern as the pattern for all grids such 
a constitutive moment? Diana’s posing of the algorithm, as an essence of the trial-
and-improvement component of the rule of the task? Or Mary’s posing of the “little 
diagram” as an embodied bird’s-eye-view over the classroom, allowing her a 
different look over the maze she was into literally (when she was enacting the fixed 
point in the classroom) and metaphorically, according to Meno’s aporia, as she knew 
nothing about what she was looking for. Nothing, apart from the fact that it should 
look like a curve rather, a straight line! Which, although erroneous, it was already 
indicating an object. All this marvel of embodied experience, in each case of the 
analysed episodes would simply not be visible without the reduction and bracketing 
that turned our regard exclusively on the intrapsychic processes and their links to 
the lived (embodied) reality that enabled the objectifications. 
The phenomenological approach of the research suggests that unfolding the 
multiple stratifications of the subjective perspective of the learner’s lived-world is 
equivalent to letting actual engagement of the learner emerge, and the learning 
praxis to take place and be recognised as such. Focusing on the students’ intuitions 
and objectification processes is an approach that leads to the core of their learning 
practices, since intuitions, as particular expressions of perception, are connecting 
the hyletic data, i.e. the “unstructured raw material”—that is ‘material’ with previous 
or just formed significations, and in any case taken up anew—with “our structuring 
and form-giving mental activities” (Hintikka, 1995, p. 98). Nurturing the students’ 
intuitive processes, facilitating them with corresponding intentional teaching 
adjustments, and aiming for the “intuitive starting point” (van Hiele, p. 122) are 
suggested forms of action. 
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The backbone of such practice as the one I just suggested is no other than 
the methodology/methods that need to be employed, as I also stated earlier. The 
methods of the phenomenological reduction and the bracketing (epochè), and the 
methodology of the phenomenological attitude, as a process of becoming (a “zig-
zag” movement)170 from the natural attitude, “our straightforward involvement with 
things and the world”, to the phenomenological attitude, “the reflective point of 
view from which we carry out philosophical analysis of the intentions exercised in 
the natural attitude and the objective correlates of these intentions” (Audi, 1999, p. 
405). These methods allowed the “‘leading back’ from natural beliefs to the 
reflective consideration of intentions and their objects” (ibid.). And, most 
importantly, they allowed access to the part that intuitions play in this fundamental 
cognitive unit, which is cancelled (as a Cartesian dualism) as soon as the lived body 
and its powers171 become a recognised principal actor. It is after pondering over the 
manifestations of the lived body172 that one is legitimised to substantially refer to 
cognitive actions (as a fully-fledged praxis) or constructions in general, without 
risking becoming groundlessly functionalist.173  
Let me put it this way: how far would the detailed analysis of Ivan’s 
mathematical activity go in revealing the sense of his mathematical activity, not only 
in the significance of his new object for the task, but also for us, as researchers 
trying to grasp a clearer sense of the cognitive praxis? Would there be a clear 
distinction of the prevalence of the lived body in re-cognising the 3×3, 4×4 grid 
pattern (before finding the arithmetic pattern), if the intentional origins of Ivan’s 
intuition would not be explored as the origins of the sense endowing forces, if the 
intentionalities (operative and active) that made his intuition a “breakthrough 
                                                          
170 Husserl, 1936, pp. 50, 177; 1970a, p. 58; 2001, p. xix. 
171 The lived body and its powers serve the embodied consciousness as an organ of perception, substantiating 
our metaphors and shaping our thoughts. 
172 A detailed approach of the manifestations of the lived body in students’ diagrams is employed in the work 
of DeFreitas & Sinclair (2012) Although comparing and contrasting my perspective with DeFreitas’ neo-
empiricist approach (e.g. add refs) is beyond the scope of this study, it may suffice to say that her detailed 
research in diagrams, inspired by Châtelet’s radical phenomenological viewpoint, is perceived as compatible 
to the manifestations of the lived body that are mentioned here. 
173 Cf. following section §4.4.5. 
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moment” would not be prioritised and investigated—before we got to know that the 
‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern was the fulfilment of his primary intention to find a 
pattern for all grids? Finally, would the detailed analysis of Ivan’s mathematical 
activity reveal the sense of his ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern, firstly as a pattern, 
recognised by his living body as suitable for all grids, and only then as exploitable 
mathematically through the rhythm (1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2) of the vertical street cops? 
Since the sense is related to the operations of Ivan’s embodied consciousness, 
namely his lived body. And it is also the research essence for that matter, of my 
persisting research questions, related as they are to the commencing of 
objectification.  
The analysis of Ivan’s intuition would make no sense from my 
phenomenological perspective if the analytical focus would not turn its regard 
towards the primal significance of the lived body in objectification. By recognising 
and prioritising it we managed to realise how Ivan’s lived body came first, and 
played a crucial part (firstly) in pursuing a symmetrical pattern for all grids 
exclusively in square grids, and then again, in perceiving stereoscopically the 
synthesis of coincidence of the square and the 3 × 𝑛 grids. 
Such self-fulfilling rhetorical questions emanate from each of the three cases. 
Ivan's case is only the first example where my particular attention to the lived body 
and its powers gave results. Another case is Mary's birds-eye-view intuition, which 
presupposed and consequently manifested in various ways its embodied (kinesthetic 
and visual) character; it was another case where operative intentionality was proved 
crucial, since it allowed various re-presentations of the classroom setting, hence 
facilitating subsequent intuitions. 
The friendly and open exercise of the research experiment that I was engaged in 
for the last four years was an experiment that took place for the first time, for all of 
us, the researcher and author of this dissertation, the teacher and the students, 
without any prescriptions or full control or imposing of any kind of attitude, apart 
from the instruction not to interfere in the students’ strategies or their be-puzzled 
moments. No methodology was pre-given, but the phenomenological methodology 
~ 258 ~ 
 
became inevitable as my initial aim was to get as deep as possible to the genetic 
‘moment’ of objectification. That is to the moment when objects appear anew for 
the learners, as they interact when working in groups, allowing me to observe and 
record their mathematical investigations. 
4.4.3 Structures emerging from the close inspection of the inaugural 
stages of objectification. 
We followed Ivan’s investigation up to his constitution of the ‘asymmetrical’ 
diagonal pattern as the appropriate pattern for all grids, after the exchange of ideas 
in his group and his focusing on symmetrical patterns. We saw how he found the 
pattern but did not understand its significance. And then, we analysed the rich three 
step process of the intuition of essence, which comes about due to the synthesis of 
coincidence that is achieved in the third step. We investigated the transition from 
the raw material of the pattern as it appeared on paper, to the abstraction of the 
generalised “shape pattern”. Since we revealed Ivan’s initial intention for a general 
pattern for all grids, to which this object was constituted for. 
In Diana’s case we saw the desperate attempt to constitute something out 
of her own understanding, which was focused on the “rule” of the task itself. 
Without moving away from the trial-and-improvement method that she was 
extensively using throughout the sessions she devised a set of commands, which 
became an algorithm, and finally a flow chart, depicting the rule as it was applied 
for any number.  Diana effectively used a categorial intuition in two stages, the 
empirical and the abstract, which yielded, due to a double move of her intentionality, 
firstly the rule and then the algorithm (cf. Part 3, §§3.3.1, 3.3.2), without anyone’s 
help in the class, before she elaborated her idea with a flow chart at home. The 
teacher legitimised her answer instead of rejecting the idea as off-purpose, since 
the aim was supposed to be the exploration of different numbers and according 
generalisations, and the revealing of the properties as a result of this exploration 
(see Figures 11 and 15 in Part 3, §3.3.1, for three different approaches). There is 
no doubt that the teacher’s legitimisation of her answer was the key to her major 
understanding after this activity, that “because I’ve got a different answer to 
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somebody else it doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s wrong, it just means I thought 
about it in a different way” (see Diana’s interview in Appendix C). Intuitive objects 
that find their way to the formal mathematical domain bear their own truths, and 
hold their convictions, especially if they are encouraged by the teacher. It is in this 
sense that my view on intuitions is from the learner’s perspective as it can be 
perceived by the teacher, as I am trying to understand the manners that lead to it, 
based on necessity rather than causality.  
Cultural, social, political, ideological in any sense horizons, were bracketed—
neither arbitrarily nor in an exclusive way—in order to allow the phenomenon of 
intuitions as objectifying acts to come to the fore. Although not under the scope of 
the current research, they may well become the theme of investigation in research 
with different scope than this one here. In other words, the argument is that 
phenomenological theoretical and methodological frames such as the ones adopted 
by this research may well be included in the arsenal of research with a different 
scope or even theoretical standpoint, as long as thinking acts and thought objects 
are under investigation. 
In Mary’s case we saw how an embodied start-up can help students bring up 
fluent embodied and intuitive activity. The history of Mary’s concept of the x2 curve 
appeared as full of small discoveries and misleading assumptions that were 
overcame by her subsequent intuitive acts.174 In this sense, the individual learning 
history may be more instructive than the history of a concept. My research supports 
the teacher’s desire to learn from the students’ particular ways of learning, to 
communicate these individual perceptual approaches with the other students, and 
to reflect on her own. I offer my analysis of the students’ unique learning 
experiences as starting examples for teachers who would venture to bring some 
implication of phenomenological attitude into teaching practice.  
                                                          
174 She 'saw' that the sought curve is not a straight line from her bird's-eye view of the diagram (Part 3, 
§3.4.2.2.) and she removed her previously intuited x-axis barrier by applying her just objectified 
'technique' of the parallel lines (§3.4.2.3.1). 
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4.4.4 The introduction of Meno’s Paradox, concerning the actualisation 
of new knowledge, which will receive a suggestion for an answer from 
the theoretical standpoint of this research 
The phenomenological perspective advocated by this study opens a possibility to 
disclose the mystery of “[h]ow will you set about looking for that thing, the nature 
of which is totally unknown to you?” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 431): at the very 
beginning of a new knowledge it is the living body and the lived world that meet 
beyond the object-subject dichotomy, in order to shape—more accurately to 
prefigure—objects by intuitive acts. It is the origin of the objectification process, 
when intuitions bring objects on the surface of consciousness, shaped exactly in 
accordance with the operative intentionalities of the learner, as it was shown in each 
of the three cases of this study. 
The study of intuitions reveals the latent object-like formations of sensory-
motor behaviour that emerge in the constitutive, reflective moment of 
objectification. As it was shown in Ivan’s case, the symmetry ‘syndrome’ that 
occupied almost all of Ivan’s experience in the class was shaped primarily by his 
lived body: we can induce it not only by what happened, namely by the decisive 
intuition of the ‘asymmetrical’ pattern, but even from what was not conceptualised 
until then, since he was judging each grid’s pattern according to its symmetry; thus, 
the 5 × 5  grid that employed the ‘asymmetrical’ pattern of the 3 × 3 grid was 
(justifiably) classified as symmetrical but it was not classified as repeating the 
‘asymmetrical’ pattern of the 3 × 3  grid, simply because his lived body did not 
recognise it as such. In other words his operative intentionality had a different 
direction than synthesising an asymmetrical pattern with a symmetrical one.175 The 
asymmetrical 4 × 4  grid and the diagonal pattern that he later found somewhat 
reoriented his lived body, although not able to understand “at that point the 
significance of this”. And it was quite different when his lived body focused on the 
3 × 3, 4 × 4  grid pattern at home, when he expanded from square to orthogonal 
                                                          
175 In other words re-cognising their common pattern, beyond the dichotomy according to symmetry. 
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grids and employed his previously acquired technology in order to detect the 1, 1, 
2, 1, 1, 2 rhythm in the vertical street cops. The powers of the lived body are clearly 
manifested by the contrast of Ivan’s passivity—in the context of the ‘asymmetrical’ 
3 × 3  grid pattern (before he found the ‘asymmetrical’ 4 × 4  grid pattern), as he 
was passively and actively directed otherwise—and his passivity and activity that 
followed, towards the ‘asymmetrical’ pattern. And it is an indication of how small 
examples176 can work in revealing operative intentionality as an expression of the 
lived body, since “[w]e do not see the operation, since it operates. We see what 
would be missing without it; we circumscribe it as what makes speech be a ‘speaking 
of’” (2002b, p. 44). 
From the viewpoint of the mathematical tasks and the cognisant’s actions 
and origins of actions that this study argues for, what is separated from the learner’s 
lived reality is open in being re-cognised as the object that fulfills the intentions that 
will tether it to the task-at-hand, until the new object will acquire its position in the 
communicable frame of mathematics. Moves that are firstly realised in an embodied 
manner (e.g. gestures), are later transformed to signs (Arzarello, Ferrara, Robutti, 
Paola, 2005; Radford, 2003, 2009). But what is crucial for Meno’s Paradox is that 
perception allows previously unperceived hyletic (raw) data to be determined in a 
new sense. And new knowledge to appear as previously unnoticed, intuitive 
gathering of sensuous and/or abstract configurations of the lived, embodied real, 
thus becoming available for communication with others—subjectivity turning 
towards intersubjectivity right from the inaugural stage of constitution, as its telos. 
Concerning our quest for an answer to Meno’s Paradox I will use Husserl's words as 
a reflective instigator… 
In any experience, even that of an objectivity apperceived for the first time, 
a preknowledge of as yet unapperceived properties of the object is involved, 
                                                          
176 Some of these small examples are mentioned in the account of operative intentionality and intentionality 
of act, in the earlier section §4.4.1. My study is abundant of such ‘small examples’ due to the employed 
methods and theory. 
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a preknowledge which might be undetermined or incompletely determined 
as to its content, but which will never be entirely empty. (1970a, p. 94) 
It makes us reminiscent of the ancient Athenians’ temple to the unknown god, from 
which Paul preached in order to convert them to Christianity, claiming that he 
brought them the unknown god that fulfills their anticipation. Under the dialectic 
principle that action provokes reaction ‘Saint Pauls’ emerge in every unknown slot 
(or podium, if you prefer) that we have afforded our conscious acquisitions with. 
The ‘Saint-Pauls’ are compared to what is intended for the tasks-at-hand; moreover, 
podiums are endlessly constituted as soon as particular intentions arise, aiming at 
them. The knowledge/ignorance dilemma that Meno’s Paradox puts us against 
becomes a false dilemma from my Husserlian viewpoint, since there is no such thing 
as sheer ignorance or complete knowledge in the first place: already at posing the 
question there is a prefiguring anticipation (protention) that already prescribes a 
solution, there is always “a preknowledge of as yet unapperceived properties of the 
object” (ibid.), and even after it is discovered the object is open to new 
thematisations, in a process of closer determination that can be taken up again and 
again. In the pre-reflective area where the object is prepared takes place an 
embodied (pre-reflective yet conscious) “pregnancy”, where the hyletic data, the 
“real but not intentional element of the experienced” (Derrida, 1978, p. 205)” feeds 
in, open to unexpected thematisations that operate in intuitive certainty. It is not 
due to oblivion that is withdrawn that Meno’s Paradox is resolved, as the Platonists 
would have it, nor due to biologistic justifications, in which Piaget-Fischbein’s 
constructivist approaches resort. And the indeterminacy concerning the object of 
new perception that actually never ceases, is not a problem but rather a challenge, 
an intuitive drive in some sense for new objects and objectivities. 
4.4.5 Discussion of approaches to perception in contemporary 
mathematics education research 
The critical part that intuitions play in the objectification process is not an explored 
(thematised) topic in mathematics education research, despite the rich literature 
that draws on each of the two subjects, namely intuitions and objectification, for 
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their own sake. For it is one thing to talk about how important intuitions are and 
emphasise the contribution of intuitions to the construction of mathematical 
knowledge production, to pose an essential link of complementarity between 
intuitions and formal mathematical knowledge;177 it is one thing to call for the 
awareness of gaps between “treasured intuitions” and actual mathematical truths 
(Fischbein, 1994; Kidron, 2011; Kidron & Dreyfus, 2010), and trying to bridge them 
(Ejersbo, Lenon &Arcavi, 2014). Finally, it is quite another thing to ask for better 
educational practice after experimental observations and pre-conceptions of the 
separate functioning of sensibility and understanding, without the crucial instrument 
of intentionality and the exploration of the powers of the living body, operating as 
an organ of perception.  
And it is quite different to perceive objectification as an activity grounded on 
the pre-reflective, operative, silenced stage that Husserl calls passive stage, where 
the operations of the lived body prepare what appears, and protend what is coming; 
by protend here meaning a latent anticipation which may be fulfilled or collapse, 
and which is the foundation of new knowledge.  
For example, it is quite different to detect the embodied roots of Mary’s bird’s-eye-
view intuition of the diagram, who took command of her metaphor in realising the 
diagram as depicting the classroom setting that she had experienced a few hours 
ago. The release of a new perspective that the bird’s-eye-view intuition brought her 
ensued the release in handling the task with formal, mathematical tools. It enabled 
the transition from her classroom experience and the real wall (‘limited’ in one sense 
yet ‘rich’ in another sense), to the mathematical exploration, without leaving her 
embodied experience in the classroom behind. This transition was depicted vividly 
in her interview: 
Once I could draw a diagram and look back [to the classroom experience], I 
look at it from this point of view; it’s much easier than being in that point 
[i.e. the fixed point that she enacted in the classroom], that looking, like, 
                                                          
177 Mathematical is another name for what has been called abstract throughout this study, which is concerned 
with the transition from the pre-mathematical to the mathematical knowledge constitution. 
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when standing here [the fixed point] all you see is the wall! You don’t see all 
this is going on as well. 
So what is the object here? What did this intuition of the diagram as the classroom 
setting brought to Mary’s exploration? It’s is not hard to perceive that an embodied 
operation is implied by the bird’s-eye-view, set by kinesthetic, synthesising 
perceptions of the piece of paper, (Figure 17 in Part 3, §3.4.2.1), when only a 
straight line (the wall) and a point (the fixed point) were drawn. It is not hard to 
feel that this embodied operation was repeated again and again in her investigation, 
that it became a landmark, or rather, a source of further intuitions (like the parallel 
lines to the wall, or the startup of the 𝑥2intuition).  
But what was the object that the bird’s-eye-view intuition brought to life, as 
this theory promises that intuitions actually do bring objects with them? Is it the 
diagram itself, seen through ‘new eyes’, after the ever renewed operations of the 
lived body? My answer is both affirmative and negative; affirmative due to the 
dynamic transformation of the diagram as new lines and points were drawn, as new 
horizons, in Husserl's terms, entered her field of exploration through the diagram. 
On the other hand the object of the bird’s-eye-view intuition cannot be ‘just’ the 
diagram, since the diagram is only a profile of Mary’s perception of the task, 
including the diagram. The task was a pole that determined certain choices to be 
made and others to be abandoned. But Mary’s particular (subjective) response to 
the task’s open question (“what kind of curve is formed?”), which is the primary 
focus here, not only motivated her transformed view of the diagram, but it also 
motivated her perception of the task (as finding new points that belong to the curve, 
until the formula could be extracted). This dynamic move (the shifting of Mary’s 
horizons within her investigation) from task to diagram and from diagram to task 
was clearly manifested by Mary’s extension of the task. And it is schematized in the 
following Graph 5, since it was a primary source of tension that fueled her 
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subsequent investigations.178 Since it shows how Mary could shift from the ‘I can’ 
of the diagram, which enabled her particular approach of the task,179 to the diagram 
as an object of Mary’s perception in furthering the task’s open question. In other 
words, the diagram did become a new object as it was transformed by Mary’s bird’s-
eye-view intuition and at the same time the intuited object fueled a constant 
dynamic operation (through her lived-body) that transcended (extended) the 
diagram’s objective sense, towards furthering her perception of the task’s open 
question. And in the synoptic Husserlian vocabulary, the living body kept operating 
through the diagram (the transformation of the diagram was ongoing), either by 
entering the diagram’s intuitive resources (living the task through the diagram) in 
order to achieve answers to the task’s question, or by reflecting on the task’s 
question itself, manipulating the diagram as an object. 
 
Graph 5. The tension between the diagram and the task. The diagram becoming 
subject and object of Mary’s perception, as it produces results for the task’s open 
question and as it extends the task. 
                                                          
178 This dynamic move also delineates the shifting of Mary’s intentional forces (operative and active) towards 
two poles of her investigation, namely the pole of the open question that the task posed and the embodied 
possibilities that the diagram allowed and (to some extend) prescribed. 
179 The task becoming the diagram’s task. 
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Mary’s bottom-up dialectic towards the task gave results beyond the 
expectations of the task’s initial question, since Mary’s abstract, mathematical 
achievements remained grounded on her perception of the diagram. It is manifested 
in her interview, as she describes the property of the general formula that she found, 
as “standing on it”; which was a clear indicator that her perception of the curve was 
still grounded on her diagram, in other words this perception had remained the 
texture of her investigation. And it is in this sense that the object of her bird’s-eye-
view intuition transcended her perception of the diagram.  
The aforementioned example was picked up from the variety of examples that this 
study offers, for a few principal reasons that are relevant to the arguments 
developed through the study, in order to exemplify my response to contrasting or 
seemingly similar approaches of intuition and objectification in our field, based on 
Cartesian and Kantian models of perception. The main reasons are the following: 
The potential of the study of empirical intuitions, as placed within the context of 
intuitive objectification, and in particular the potential of the exploration of 
the constitutive aptitude of the lived body, which are themes that are largely 
ignored in our field and fully misunderstood by Kantian inspired research. 
 The distinction between signification (e.g. the lines of Mary’s diagram 
endowed with formal mathematical sense) and objectification (e.g. the ‘I can’ 
see the classroom through the diagram, from such and such perspective), 
which is the source of signification, echoing the prehensions180 of the lived 
body that nevertheless transcends (traverses) all significations. 
It is clear that the latter of the two reasons—based on reflections grounded on the 
data presented here—indicates and to some extend determines the scope of the 
former. In other words, the object as what transcends any of its mathematical 
significations (e.g. “three” as more than its significations III, 3, or |𝒜| when 𝒜 =
                                                          
180 Prehension is “an imperfect or incomplete ‘grasp’ of a purportedly objective state of affairs, where it is 
somehow known that the state of affairs is imperfectly or incompletely given … where the content of the 
grasp adumbrates or points to something beyond what is given” (Tragesser, 1977, pp. 17-18, also cf. Part 1, 
§§ 1.4.3.1, 1.4.5, Part 3, §3.3.1, 3.4.2.3.1). 
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{𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ ℚ ), yielding different profiles in different tasks (3𝑥 − 2 =
0,   lim
𝑥→3
𝑓(𝑥))  effects my way of looking at objects, in particular abstract 
(mathematical) objects, as I live through them in mathematical activities. This is 
happening to me, to my students, to these three students and it is very much a 
common experience. Yet it is taken for granted and not questioned critically, as 
appearance synchronous to the appearance of reason; which is constituted, 
according to my Husserlian view. The question underlying my research questions is 
firstly, how abstract knowledge becomes possible in the first place; and secondly, 
how close one may get to the origins, the genetic moments of abstraction—more 
precisely the genetic moments of abstract, mathematical objectivity—through 
objectification. 
My study brought theoretical and analytical evidence of an approach to 
objectification as a hand-in-hand operation with intuitions, in their interrelated 
empirical and abstract expressions, an approach that is theoretically grounded on 
Husserlian ideas. The critical aspect of the study starts from its perception of the 
intentional ego (whose conscious acts are always conscious of) as a starting point 
of the cognitive praxis, and from bracketing (without excluding) anything but this 
fundamental relation between what is intending and what is intended. That is 
reducing the experience to the fundamental relation between the subjective and the 
objective poles respectively—and most importantly, realising the interplay of these 
poles on the ground of lived experience. Thus the study focused on the organ of 
perception called the living body or the lived body, and its powers—like operative 
intentionality, which is responsible for syntheses that allow objectification to 
commence. This full view of the cognitive phenomenon, which the 
phenomenological theory and methodology made possible has now shown its 
potential towards Kantian/constructivist/Fischbeinian perceptions of objectification 
and intuition, through the analytical depth achieved and the explication of the 
transition from empirical to abstract knowledge, which are taken as separated 
though complementary by the aforementioned theories..  
This research study is—considering its size and aims—an attempt to open up 
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an exploration of the history of abstraction, based on Husserlian phenomenological 
concepts, such as the ones introduced in the theory and met in the data analysis. 
This history is unfolded as soon as the intentional origins of each object are traced, 
and the operative and active intuitive forces are exposed; such as the operative and 
active intuitive forces that surfaced in the analyses of the three learning episodes. 
As a result of the detailed investigation, invariable features surfaced, such as 
the stereoscopic vision of the intuition of essence, the three genetic 
properties/features of intuition as an objectifying act, or the structures of the 
categorial intuitions and the intuitions of essences. Hence the three learning 
episodes transcended the contexts that they appeared, the particular course, 
teacher and researcher, in becoming exemplary cases of disclosed cognitive praxis. 
Using a new phenomenological description that lends its legitimacy from Husserl's 
late reflections and Merleau-Ponty’s radical appropriation and expansion of 
Husserlian ideas. 
In further reflection my study is in this sense an attempt to introduce a new 
phenomenological perspective of intuitions and objectification, through their 
existential link, which is rooted in lived experience and the “realm of passive doxa, 
namely of passive believe in being” … 
 [T]he realm of passive doxa, of passive believe in being, provides a ground 
of belief which is the foundation not only of every particular act of cognition 
and every orientation of cognition and all judgment of what exists but also 
of every individual judgment of value, of all practical activity bearing on what 
exists—therefore, it is the foundation of everything which we call ‘experience’ 
and ‘having experience’ in the concrete sense of the term. (1973, p. 53) 
Which is how Husserl describes the essential self-evident givenness, the pregiveness 
that is synthesised in the “realm of passive doxa” (the passive stage of the Graph 3 
in Part 1, § 1.5.7 and the upper ‘half’ of the proceeding Table 1), leading to every 
particular act of cognition and all judgment; which is how I understand in this 
research study,  the main subject of the critique of original phenomenological 
research… 
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[T]his concept of experience as self-evident givenness, of the pregiveness, 
first of all passive, of individual objects, has its distinctive characteristic in 
this: that it indicates the fundamental structure of every experience in the 
concrete sense... (Husserl, 1973, p. 53, italics in the original) 
As I was participating to the sessions I was focusing on moments when the students 
devised mathematical objects and the origins of these objects. Probably inevitably 
I came across the silenced area where cognition is grounded, and started casting 
light on how it “affects us immediately”, providing “a stimulus to action” (ibid.).181 
The exhaustive analysis and discussion have shown how the Husserlian – Merleau-
Pontyian theory and methodology employed here availed me with the possibility to 
give an in depth theoretical and analytical account. An account that none of the 
theories that my study has responded in detail could have offered. 
  
                                                          
181 Again, Husserl's emphasis on the “stimulus” rather than the “action”, signifies another distinction between 
his—and my— approach and the Piagetian/radical constructivist ones. It is a distinction that is justified by 
my previous analyses of Katian/ Piagetian approaches. 
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PART 5. Conclusions  
A. An account of the primary theoretical and analytical themes that 
emerge after the discussion 
The aim of the study has been to disclose the role played by intuitions for the 
objectification process. And the theoretical, methodological and analytical layers of 
the study have been organised in order to make clear the structures of the central 
argument, which concerned the crucial link between intuition and objectification. 
This link is crucial since it illuminates how understanding appears in the students’ 
consciousness, as they are involved in mathematical cognitive praxis.  
Understanding through the emergence of objects in consciousness is a 
central theme in the Husserlian approach, which was chosen as the perspective of 
the study. After completing the general discussion it is time to zoom out, cashing in 
the study as an object, and as its parts, themselves objectified in their own sense 
and as parts of a whole. The laborious route of the first Part combined with the 
methodology/methods of the second Part which were implemented in the data 
analysis (Part 3), provide us with the following summary of steps: 
 The introduction presented the necessary terminology, with regular reference 
to the theoretical (re)sources (Part 1, Ch. 1). 
 The development of the theoretical approach to cognitive acts, from the 
Cartesian doubt to the Kantian distinction between sensibility and knowledge, 
and the instrumentalism that Husserl cancels by digging deeper into lived 
experience (P. 1, Ch. 1). This step opened the theoretical discussion of the 
distinction between the Husserlian approach that is adopted by this study 
and other seminal approaches that are engaged in foundational, genetic 
aspects of the objectification. And it showed the advantage of the Husserlian 
theory towards the other philosophical approaches. 
 A literature example was utilised (P. 1, Ch. 3, §1.3.2), as an exemplification 
of: 
 the elaborated Husserlian view on ‘ordinary’ experience through 
objectification; 
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 the application of the (transcendental) phenomenological reduction. 
Hence, a first phenomenological description of objectification was given, 
including the links between the reflective and the pre-reflective areas of 
cognitive actions, thus delving into the complexity of objectification’s 
inaugural stages. This step introduced the complexity of students’ 
understanding, which takes place within cognitive praxis and is consisted of 
reflective and pre-reflective layers. 
 Husserl's theory of lived experience was introduced (Ch. 1, 4), from the 
genetic multiple present (the Now-moment), to the constitution of sense and 
meaning through objectification. Since objectification is the principal means 
of sense constitution in late Husserl's theory, this step was necessary in 
understanding the origins of objectification in lived experience; which 
amounts to showing how understanding is grounded on the immediate 
contact of the students to the world. 
 Central to the study was the Husserlian approach to intuitions and 
objectification (P. 1, Ch. 5). Three features/properties of intuition were 
detected as genetically necessary due to the intentional character of 
conscious acts, even of the operative, embodied and pre-reflective conscious 
acts;182 here is a first indication that Husserl's theory enables as a further 
gaze into experience, through the articulation of notions such as the lived 
body and its operative powers (kinaesthetic,, tactual, visual, auditory, 
gravitational etc.),183 operative intentionality and intentionality of the act, 
categorial intuitions in two stages and intuitions of essences in three steps. 
The same terms returned vividly in the analysis section (Ch. 3), in each of 
the three students’ investigations. And even other concepts like protention 
returned, as the—not yet fully-fledged—anticipation that operated towards 
Ivan’s persistence in the ‘asymmetrical’ diagonal pattern. And I certainly do 
                                                          
182 Although it is a ‘loose’ sense of intentionality where the ego is not at play, consisted of the mine-ness of 
the experience and the arsenal of the trail of retentions and protentions.  
183 See Lappas & Spyrou (2006) for a detailed Husserlian approach of the sense of perpenticularity in the 
Eucledian Elements. 
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not aim at returning to the analysis section as I conclude; rather, I attempt 
to point out how actively ongoing the phenomenological reflection is, as it 
enables further descriptions that foresee the operative silenced aspects of 
conscious life, as they operate—see also the last step in this account, related 
to the adopted methodology. Which addresses an important aspect of 
mathematical thinking, since much of what goes on in it is ‘silent’ and  it is 
taken for granted. 
 The study also addressed the distinction between the Husserlian and the 
Kantian approaches to experience (P. 1, Ch. 2, 4), thus crystallising a Kantian 
approach to intuition that my Husserlian reading deems insufficient to go 
beyond a functionalistic perception of lived experience. It is a perception that 
still lives and thrives in constructivist research; one that does not trouble the 
transformation of sensibility to knowledge beyond the necessity and equal 
importance of both, and the hindrances that tacit models and intuitions play 
in acquiring correct formal understanding. 
 Implications were explored, of the aforementioned distinction, to theories 
that are inspired by (or leave intact) Kant’s perception of experience, Piaget’s 
Kantian influence and Fischbein’s Piagetian (and Kantian) influences, such as 
constructivist and radical constructivist inspired research (P. 1, Ch. 5).184 
 Meno’s paradox was introduced in light of a contrasting view on the 
aforementioned theories in mathematics education (P. 1, §1.3.1); the same 
paradox is employed up to the end of this study (P. 4, §4.4.4), as it 
exemplifies the starting point of the theoretical distinction between 
Husserlian and Kantian/constructivist ideas that are crucial for the analysis, 
and its development as the (theoretical) argument of this thesis that Husserl’s 
theory may provide an adequate arsenal of concepts in order to deal with the 
learner’s lived experience, hence enabling a better understanding while 
                                                          
184 The main arguments of the Husserlian-Merleau-Pontyian framework that I adopt in this study are given in 
the analyses of the three cases, while the primacy of the presentation of the study’s theoretical milieu—
necessary for the understanding of what the research argues for—prevented further theoretical exploration of 
the ramifications of constructivist based research. 
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formulating general structures or ways of approaching the students’ thinking 
processes. 
 The aforementioned steps were part of the theoretical account that provided 
the following concepts and clarification of concepts emanating from the 
adopted Husserlian theory and methodology: 
 the living body and operative intentionality (P. 1, Ch. 4), which support 
and are present before a registered abstract object. The living body is 
co-constituted as it constitutes mathematical objects; the student’s 
mathematical interface is in dynamic tension and prospect of expansion 
in any constitutive ‘moment’ of objectification. Operative intentionality is 
the key player in enacting empirical objects and reconfiguring their 
previous thematisations, or summoning novel ones; 
 the intentionality of act and the concomitant object constitution (the 
commencing of objectification) in the theory (P. 1, Ch. 3, 4, 5) and in the 
focused intentional analyses of the three learning episodes (Part 3). 
Therefore the path from the pre-reflective (passive) stage to the active, 
reflective one is elucidated from the Husserlian phenomenological 
perspective of the study (cf. table and figure in Part 1, § 1.5.7). A new 
phenomenological understanding of foundational, genetic aspects of 
objectifications is now given in the theory and in the analysis of lived 
investigations. 
 The aforementioned concepts played a key role in identifying critical acts and 
their genetic features, within the students’ objectification processes. And this 
identification was important for the empirical parts of the study, since it 
allowed structures of the objectification processes to surface in each of the 
three analysed cases, in the elaboration of the critical part that intuitions play 
for objectification: 
 the empirical and the abstract stages of the categorial intuitions (P. 1, 
Ch. 4, 5; Part 3, Ch. 3, 4) elaborated in two cases how empirical ‘matter’ 
becomes abstract mathematical objects that orient the student towards 
conceptualising the task-at-hand; 
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 the three steps of the intuition of essence (P. 1, Ch. 5; P. 3, Ch. 2, 4) 
demonstrated also in two cases how an empirical (Ivan’s 3 × 3, 4 × 4 grid 
pattern) or quasi-empirical (Mary’s first formula) singularity is generalised 
and exploited mathematically; 
 the three genetic features/properties of intuitions that allow them to be 
detected as such, as it was shown in the analysis of the data, in each of 
the three studied learning episodes. The genetic character of the three 
features/properties of intentionality, immediacy and the feeling (filling) 
of certainty give an original account of intuitions in general and the 
aforementioned intuitions in particular, without any recourse to 
biologistic/adaptive models; instead, the transcendental—intentional—
character of consciousness is the sole principle that the whole edifice is 
built upon. And what was given prominent attention in this study was its 
critical interplay with the living body and its powers;  
 clarification was provided of how immediacy is perceived differently by 
Husserl and Kant, Piaget and Kantian-based constructivism. This subtle 
yet critical difference was also an implicit (if not explicit) locus of my 
theoretical engagement related to intuition. The theoretical result 
concerning the aforementioned clarification and Kantian-inspired 
approaches contributes to the phenomenological understanding of the 
foundational, genetic aspects of objectifications, and they were the 
following: 
 Piaget and constructivism, up to its radical ramifications overcame 
the Kantian limitations by the recourse to action as the ultimate 
meaning endowing activity, and the acceptance of abstract intuitions. 
Nevertheless, the constructivist theoretical frame and its 
contemporary revivals repeat the Kantian approach to experience as 
already knowledge, as afforded by the structures that the 
categorically afforded mind will separate. The dichotomies between 
sensibility and knowledge, empirical and abstract intuitions—Piaget 
and Fischbein consider them as complementary yet strictly 
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separated—do not enable the understanding of the transition from 
empirical to abstract knowledge constitution, hence both reduce 
knowledge to constructions. 
 Constructivist inspired studies in mathematics education research are 
lacking elementary instruments like intentionality, in its various 
expressions and forms. As a result they take the learner’s lived 
experience for granted and they move one step further, asking how 
intuitions effect the learner’s thinking strategies, aiming at bringing 
the learners in situations when intuitions are expected to operate 
erroneously, thus guiding them to confronting their own tacit models 
(examples given in Ch. 1). Which is a typical Piagetian method, based 
on the so called cognitive conflict, and it is a miniature of 
constructivism’s perception, as it aspires to explicate issues of 
complex intentionalities without having explored the ground of the 
constitution of these forms. On the contrary, the phenomenological 
theory and methodology was shown capable in disclosing the 
operative intentional forces of the lived body, which prepared the 
objects before they were constituted as such, in each of the three 
analysed cases. It was testified in the manner of Ivan’s shift of 
attention from symmetrical patterns to the asymmetrical diagonal 
pattern; it was confirmed as the drive in Diana’s building up of 
abstraction through local algorithms, as even her last product, 
namely the flow chart depicted her “thought process”. Finally, the 
living body and its operative powers were present from the beginning 
of Mary’s home investigations, starting from the embodied take up 
of the diagram as the classroom bird’s-eye-view. And they run 
through her investigation, up to her devise of the general formula 
due to her intuition of essence, as it was still perceived as a line that 
“you can stand on”. 
 The methodology of the phenomenological attitude was indispensable in 
analysing the data and enabling the application of the theory; the methods 
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entailed phenomenological reduction and bracketing (epochè), and their 
applications in successive reflections, as elements of the phenomenological 
unit of knowledge production (graph 1 in Part 2, § 2.2). 
My thesis, more than a philosophical inquiry it is Husserlian phenomenology 
expanded by Merleau-Ponty’s radical expansion of Husserlian concepts, and 
explored through practice. The aforementioned account concerns steps and 
concepts that were demonstrated theoretically in Part 1 and 2 of the study, and 
were elaborated empirically (analytically) in Part 3, in favour of a new 
phenomenological understanding of foundational, genetic aspects of objectification. 
And in the following section I will demonstrate how the aforementioned steps have 
contributed to the research questions and the principal findings of this study of 
intuitions as critical objectifying acts. 
B. To what extent were the research questions answered 
The phenomenological theory and methodology that is adopted by my research 
disclosed the operative intentional forces of the lived body, and the analysis 
demonstrated how the intentional forces (operative and constitutive) work together, 
as they prepare the objects, on the course towards their constitution as such. As 
we saw it in each of the three analysed cases:  
 Operative and constitutive intentional forces were detected in the manner of 
Ivan’s shift of attention from symmetrical patterns to the asymmetrical 
diagonal pattern, and during the three steps of his intuition of essence. 
 Similar forces were confirmed as the drive in Diana’s building up of 
abstraction through local algorithms, and even her final product (the flow 
chart) depicted her “thought process”. 
 The living body and its operative powers were present from the beginning of 
Mary’s home investigations, starting from the embodied take up of the 
diagram as the classroom bird’s-eye-view. And they run through her 
investigation, up to her devise of the general formula due to her intuition of 
essence, as still being a line that “you can stand on”. 
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There is a plethora of evidence due to the data analysis, both for empirical and 
abstract intuitions, on how the students devised mathematical objects in order to 
tackle the mathematical tasks. The diversity of mathematical objects was explicated 
down to their intentional origins, in the students’ lived experiences. In experiences 
where intuitions were the critical objectifying acts. 
The intuited objects, approached as fulfilling intentionality with immediacy 
(and thus bringing the filling of certainty that the object found is the one that was 
sought) brought the unfolding of intuitions as objectifying acts. In each of the three 
students’ cases we noticed how each intuition was aiming at an object, called for 
due to intentional forces that prefigured and prepared it as such. And some of these 
objects became the catalysts of each student’s exploration.  
The theoretical and analytical elaboration of the object’s pre-objective life 
and its intuitive drawing to the objective state, due to operational and constitutive 
intentional forces, is the principal finding that this study contributes to mathematics 
education research. And it is precisely the finding that justifies (phenomenologically) 
the approach of intuitions as critical objectifying acts, i.e. as the crucial instigators 
of objectification.  
It concerns a new perception of intuitions and objectification, as interrelated, 
and as involved in a certain yet incomplete apprehension (prehension) towards 
objects that are constituted for the task at hand. Which is a tension (between 
intuitive certainty and the indeterminacy of incomplete apprehension) that can only 
be resolved through the task; hence the stimulus for action, which is at the same 
time the stimulus to know the new object better.  
The study suggests intuitions from this particular Husserlian perspective in 
which the primary, genetic features of intuitions derive from the genetic relation of 
the fulfilment of intentionality with immediacy, the latter understood as the access 
to the giveness of grasped objects. It is a giveness that is not taken for granted by 
Husserlian phenomenology. In the relentless questioning of the how of lived 
experience by Husserlian phenomenology the objects’ ‘giveness’ is not an 
independent property of the object; rather it is part and parcel of the intentional 
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engagement of the learner with the world. And the filling of intentionality indicates 
a certain feeling of certainty, in which the intuitive conviction is expressed, that the 
object found is the object sought. This view that brings out intentionality, immediacy 
and the feeling (filling) of certainty (intentionality) as the principal properties of 
intuitions, with the third being the expression of the meeting of the other two in the 
shape of an object, not only does it give us features through which intuitions may 
be detected and analysed and nurtured; most importantly it reveals, after this critical 
questioning, an answer that is coherent and plausible, to say the least; an answer 
that involves intentional consciousness in its ‘pregnant’ state, providing us with the 
full menu of the intuitive process. And this happens without any resort to biologistic, 
adaptive behaviour, nor to any legislation for cognitive conflicts to appear. Conflicts 
are, instead, the lived reality of the dialectic, synthesising, operative potentiabilities 
of the lived body, acting as an organ of perception that cannot be boxed in the 
sayable, the linguistic, which is the first idealisation according to Husserl (1936). Yet 
it feeds and grounds the constitutive, meaningful results that encircle a certain 
profile, each time, an abstract object that is soon introduced to mathematical 
formalism. In summary, it is the better understanding of the cognitive praxis that 
the research argues that it has afforded us with, as the primary result of the 
approach of intuitions as objectifying acts. 
Hence the answer to the first research question, concerning how do the 
students devise mathematical objects in order to tackle mathematical tasks met the 
answer to the last research question, concerning intuitions, in mutual response. 
Since the part that intuitions play in the students’ commencing of objectification was 
answered through the exploration of the critical objectifying functioning of 
intuitions, in the three learning episodes.  
The part that intuitions played for the constitution of mathematical objects 
(i.e. objectification) in each learning episode was decisive, and critical in 
exemplifying the texture of the materials used and of those produced, due to 
according intuitions. Hence it was demonstrated how intuitions and objectification 
are interrelated concepts, from the Husserlian viewpoint of my study. And that the 
~ 279 ~ 
 
manifestation of findings was enabled due to focusing on this primordial relation, as 
Husserl would call it.   
The manifestation of findings also justified the extensive use of Husserlian 
terminology, in service of the closer and fuller grasping of the open possibilities of 
Husserlian-based research. As my particular theme demonstrated, what sustained 
the cases as cases and the research as a whole was the building up of the argument 
concerning intuitions as objectifying acts. And the analysis of the three learning 
episodes was practiced so that it could achieve generality for the investigation of 
intuitive acts in service of objectification. 
The findings of the study allow me to say that phenomenology provided me 
with a conceptual framework under which I could begin to organise the data that I 
was collecting, to decide what data for the study are, and the methods needed in 
order to let the data yield findings. It allowed me to acquire a bird’s-eye-view of the 
maze that the genesis of objectification is concerned with, due to the conceptual 
affordances of the theory and the radical bracketing, the suspension of any 
judgment concerning anything but the phenomenon under investigation. This critical 
interrogation could be generalised as being related to putting the theme of the 
research and its context 185  under critical, exploratory, phenomenological 
questioning. And thus extracting phenomenological descriptions that can yield 
results with general claims—as is the case for this study—or results concerning 
teaching suggestions from a Husserlian perspective (Kospentaris & Spyrou, 2008; 
Lappas & Spyrou, 2006; Moutsios-Rentzos & Spyrou, 2014, 2015; Moutsios-Rentzos, 
Spyrou & Peteinara 2013, Spyrou, Moutsios-Rentzos & Triantafyllou, 2009). 
The research question concerning Meno’s paradox, namely how the students 
come to new knowledge  and how they know that what they found is what they 
                                                          
185 Such poles of interest are for example the teacher, the classroom as a unit, the effects of a curriculum and 
the alternative approaches to teaching and learning mathematics within a certain curriculum; also the 
reactivation of mathematical concepts (Lappas & Spyrou, 2006; Moutsios-Rentzos & Spyrou, 2013, 2014) 
and their significance for the actual involvement of the students with the historicity of mathematics in a 
phenomenological sense (Kospentaris, Spyrou, & Lappas, 2011Lappas & Spyrou, 2006; Moutsios-Rentzos, 
Spyrou & Peteinara 2013). 
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were looking for, was given a suggestion for an answer from the theoretical 
perspective of my study in the general discussion (§4.4.4). And it was further 
clarified in my discussion of approaches to perception in contemporary mathematics 
education research (§4.4.5), as my approach was contrasted to dualistic perceptions 
of mind and body (Cartesian) or knowledge and sensibility (Kantian), which still find 
ground in mathematics education.  
The analysis of the students’ investigations has shown that there are ways 
of analysing mathematical objects as phenomena of lived reality, and not as ready-
made objects of our world, ‘already existing’ and ‘ready to be transferred’. As it was 
shown in each learning episode, the exploration of the origins of mathematical 
objects in the students’ lived experience, and the disclosing of the operative powers 
of the lived body and of the consequent constitutive acts, revealed the bottom-up 
process within which existing mathematical objects are reactivated (e.g. Mary’s 
case), while allowing space for new mathematical objects to emerge. Although not 
any new (culturally-historically) mathematical objects appeared in the students’ 
explorations, their intuitive investigations indicated manners in which—under 
different circumstances—new territories could be opened up and yield new 
mathematical objects. 
As a mathematics education researcher, the framework that I used allowed 
me to give a phenomenological description of objectification as a bottom-up 
process, already starting in the pre-reflective (‘passive’) stage, due to the living body 
and its operative powers. This process, as it is depicted in figure 1 (Part1, § 1.5.7), 
enabled me to think differently about the issues of learning mathematics, and in 
particular of acquiring abstract knowledge through tasks. The phenomenological 
theoretical and methodological frames were put to the test of actual learning praxis 
and they managed to give results, concerning the constitutive ‘moment’ of 
objectification and the grounding role that the neglected ‘passive’ stage plays for 
objectification. My research has demonstrated that objectification can be perceived 
as the last step of a complex process, which is rendered visible due to the 
phenomenological theory and methodology. And despite the ‘long path’ that 
mathematical objects follow according to Husserl's theory, after the complex 
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process that was analysed here, the first steps of objectification have manifested a 
richness that is already illustrative of the texture and the structure of this elemental 
cognitive ‘moment’ of objectification. And the theoretical, the methodological and 
the analytical clarifications that have been presented have the potential to be used 
effectively by mathematics education researchers and practitioners (teachers) for 
the open exploration of the students’ learning situations, and for a corresponding 
teaching practice. 
C. Contribution to knowledge – Areas of further development 
The evidence that surfaced in the analysed learning episodes, due to the 
phenomenological theory and methodology had a double significance—according to 
the two sets of research questions; namely one concerning the philosophical and 
methodological research questions, and the other one concerning learning 
mathematics as a cognitive praxis, from the learners’ perspectives. Although the 
two sets of research questions and the resultant findings are inextricably linked 
under the rubric of objectification, I will attempt to highlight the contribution of this 
study to knowledge as it emanates from the double character of the research 
questions.  
After the copious theoretical elaborations and the analytical realisations I can 
argue that the study has disclosed a novel phenomenological gaze on the 
mathematical learning experience on one hand, and has arguably advocated for a 
perception of intuition as a critical objectifying act on the other hand. This is in 
general terms the double contribution that was already announced in the preface of 
the study, as two novelties that were then expected and are now harvested. These 
two sets of contributions will be presented in this final section, while areas of further 
development will be indicated—as possibilities for expansion of the current research 
framework—and limitations of the study will be acknowledged. 
The critical questioning of how objectification occurs made possible the 
illuminations that the chosen theoretical and methodological filters afforded. The 
study introduced many critical Husserlian terms for the understanding of the 
cognitive praxis, such as the living/lived body, operative intentionality and 
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intentionality of act, categorial intuitions and intuitions of essences. The aim of the 
introduction of these concepts is to facilitate an alternative approach to everyday 
learning situations (as was the case here), which can be useful for learning and 
teaching practices, and even for theoretical investigations of possibilities for bridging 
theories that are seemingly incompatible (see below). The reductions used in the 
observations, the collection and the analysis of the data, supported as they were by 
the bracketing of sociocultural factors and the teacher’s guidance, and the 
minimised influence that I exercised in the students’ acts, allowed the close 
examination of a previously unexplored phenomenon, namely intuitions as 
objectifying acts, thus bringing to the surface the stuff that objectifications are made 
of, to paraphrase Hamlet.  
The aforementioned phenomenon concerns the cognising subject’s transition 
from one key thought to another, the transition that takes place through embodied 
and lived awareness that operates and posits objects, moving towards ever more 
abstract entities, as it fully immerses in the mathematical formal horizons. This is 
the course that my research study followed, by developing the existential link of 
intuition and objectification theoretically, methodologically and analytically, in the 
necessarily limited space of the thesis.  
As a result of my chosen methodology a teacher, although bracketed 
throughout the study186 may now reap the fruits of her abstention and capitalise on 
the knowledge gained. The three steps of the intuition of essence, and the two 
stages of the categorial intuitions are obvious catalysts for potential reactivations of 
the learners’ lived worlds in the classroom. I’m always tempted to introduce a 
concept in the class by presenting two different starting points that either meet or 
can be drawn by intuitive analogy. For example, I introduced the concept of the 
variable in the class by using the handshake problem and the Gaussian series, which 
‘meet’ at the same formula, thus introducing the generalisation capability of 
variables, as independent from and integrating different mathematical situations—
                                                          
186 This is what I meant when I stressed that the bracketing does not mean exclusion or negligence of the 
topic/person that is bracketed, and that on the contrary, the study offers results that are useful for the teacher. 
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thus resembling the structure of the intuition of essence that is detected twice in 
this study. The same goes for the highlighting of the learners’ intuiting moments by 
the teacher, as soon as she can detect them in the students’ narrative or text. This 
is one main aspect of what I mean by advocating for mathematics in the making, 
which is this study’s implicit theme; namely the re-discovery of mathematical objects 
such as the parabola, relations for dots in space, or integrating algorithms from 
empirical technology (trial-and-improvement), as was shown in Mary’s, Ivan’s and 
Diana’s cases respectively.  
Just as the teacher acknowledged (legitimised) every coherent mathematical 
practice the students devised, I never asked questions of validity and generalisation 
beforehand, as I tried to explore the emergence and constitution of these two 
concepts, as features of the learners’ intentional horizons, which grounded the 
validations of the emerging objects and opened up their generalisable features. 
Neither was the objects’ mathematical nature taken for granted; rather, the objects 
were considered mathematical due to the students’ intentional horizons that 
endowed them with such features.  Due to my phenomenological approach I neither 
intended to confirm or deny the ‘objective’ existence of the learners’ objects. I 
instead paid heed to the appearances as intended and their ground in intuition. And 
as the analysis of the study has demonstrated, the establishment of the (intuitive) 
relation just described, a relation which fulfilment of intentionality makes possible, 
became the cornerstone of my study on objectification.  
Yet despite the bracketing of the objective validity—thus the bracketing of 
what science receives as something measurable, thus culturally incorporated 
beforehand—both validation and generalisation returned, as soon as the 
phenomenological ground was set. We saw it in both intuitions of essences and in 
the categorial intuitions, namely how a few steps or stages respectively brought 
certainty of generalisations, which was confirmed (validated) and expanded—
actualised formally and generalised within the mathematical frame. In other words, 
when the field of research is the emergence of objectification the issues of validity 
and generalisation occur as observed phenomena in the field, and the methodology 
is a solid vehicle towards transforming data sources to data, and data to findings, 
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firstly because it transforms them to phenomena in the original phenomenological 
sense, related with embodied intentional (transcendental) conscious actuality, 
rather than cogito schismatic knowledge separated from sensibility, or mythically 
treating the transition from one to the other—through ready-made categorial 
affordances.  
From the practical point of view, as soon as a researcher and/or practitioner 
in mathematics education may reflect on the analysed episodes under the light of 
the adopted theory, and re-cognise or identify similar practices in her own research 
field or in the classroom (respectively), she will have already made a significant step 
towards the phenomenological attitude that I have been arguing for in this study. 
The very next step would be to become attentive towards the learners’ drives and 
intentional moves. And the next step would be to involve the students’ narratives 
and embodied significations (gestures, diagrams, metaphores) of their own 
perspectives in the mathematical dialogue (which would thus develop), and nurture 
the latter by according design—e.g. by promoting the students’ enactment of their 
understandings. A crucial aspect in the aforementioned roughly delineated process 
is the dissemination and sharing between other learners, of the different approaches 
that some of them have, while covering all of them in time. Hence learning space is 
constituted and reflected upon, for each learner, enabling them to express their 
understandings and needs, while including their lived experiences in the 
mathematical discourse of the classroom.  
A subtle issue concerning the application of the theory to the learning 
episodes needs to be clarified: as I tried to introduce all the concepts and terms 
that were necessary for the better grasping of the analytical methods and their 
significance for the appreciation of the findings as such, I might have given the 
impression that I merely illustrated a certain theoretical frame. Yet this 
interpretation would only have noticed a part of this study and certainly not the 
most critical one, concerning its realisation. It was rather through and due to the 
data that the theory was enacted/activated, and the culmination of the theory 
application came as the only possibility to voice the students’ lived experiences, 
down to their intentional origins. As these origins were disclosed, after successive 
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reflections, Ariadne’s thread was then in place, in order to bring me back to the 
objects as constituted, as the ‘final products’. And the pathway was given shape 
due to further analysis and theory polishing. 
Husserlian philosophy from my perspective is also particular in the sense that, 
more than a philosophy it is a method of reflection and what today is called a 
“research program”. Contrary to the widespread portrayal of transcendental 
philosophy by Heidegger and others, the world of the natural attitude is not 
metaphysically downgraded to the status of mere appearance for Husserl, it is 
simply bracketed. It is put out of play for the possibility of critically important 
features of actual lived experience to emerge. Such as the features of operative and 
active intentionality, immediacy and the feeling (filling) of certainty, and their 
genetic interplay for the objectifying achievement of every intuitive act, as it was 
demonstrated in the previous parts of the study. These features/properties of 
intuition were discerned as intrinsic, genetic features, beyond psychologistic or 
naturalistic concessions, only after the phenomenon of objectification was viewed 
within the context of the learner’s intentional lived experience and the operative 
resources of the lived body. In a similar manner the two stages of the categorial 
intuitions and the three step process of the intuition of essence came to the fore. 
Therefore the findings were shaped, inextricably linked to the theory and 
methodology used; and the philosophical ground that Husserl offered went hand-
in-hand with a method where his concepts’ implementation to our meaning 
endowing activities could be realised as fruitful for practical use. Therefore, the 
demonstration of the concordant interplay between theoretical (phenomenological) 
concepts and analytical practice is another contribution of my study, enabled due 
to critical reflections that phenomenology supported. This contribution also indicates 
consequences concerning areas of further development of my research, since the 
perception of phenomenology as a “working philosophy” and the findings that this 
perception enabled me are an encouraging example for further investigations within 
the phenomenological framework, as well as for the exploration of analogous usages 
of different theoretical frames, with similarly double-faceted orientations—e.g. 
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Vygotskian developmental experiment as a method, eliciting results under Cultural 
Historical Activity Theory.  
A difference concerning my approach and the Kantian/constructivist one was 
principally clarified in the explicit use of the phenomenological methodology and of 
the prioritisation of the intentional potentiabilities of the lived body, as the object’s 
intentional origins were explored, due to according bracketing. The analysis of the 
three learning episodes manifested through the findings how reduction and 
bracketing allow a close look at the phenomenon, by bracketing out what blurs the 
view and zoom in the critical factual necessities that Husserl's reflections have 
inaugurated.187 Which is also (more precisely) a critical difference between the 
Husserlian–Merleau-Pontyian perception that is adopted here, and the Kantian, 
Piagetian, Fischbeinian perceptions of experience, object construction and 
intuitions. As it became explicit through the phenomenological analysis of the data, 
Husserlian and Husserlian-based phenomenological frames have a significant 
advantage in understanding the deep embodied roots of the cognitive praxis. But, 
although the study covered an extensive theoretical and methodological/analytical 
ground in the space that is available here, it has also met limitations and possibilities 
for expansion, which will be given an account here, as envisaged at this point in 
time. 
The primary focus of my study has been on the individual learner from the 
first-person perspective, as she constitutes abstract objects in order to conceptualise 
the demands of the task. The more elaborated the demands, the more elaborated 
the intuitions that take care of them, with the path towards more elaborated 
abstractions remaining an open horizon for the theory adopted here. This Husserlian 
transcendence of Cartesian and Kantian notions of cognitive praxis renders Husserl 
as the pedestal and the closing act of modernity, and at the same moment inscribes 
(implicitly or explicitly) his cognitive problematique at the very roots of 
                                                          
187 Phenomenology is approached as a “working philosophy”, as a programme opened by Husserl and 
followed by major thinkers of our times; as I have mentioned at the preface of this study, Husserl's books are 
notoriously lacking in examples. The analytical details of the three learning episodes may instigate 
new/renewed reflections on the same or other concepts of the same thinker, relevant to our abstract field. 
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contemporary postmodern discussions of the same issues, with those based on 
Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Heidegger, Sartre, Gadamer, Dennett, Føllesdal, Smith & 
MacIntyre being a noteworthy though limited presentation of Husserl’s mostly 
unacknowledged influence. Husserlian phenomenology, as an epistemological 
theory and methodology, with ontic and ontological dimensions was exemplified as 
a valuable arsenal of theoretical/methodological approaches to lived experience, 
that can become powerful if polished in research practice; hence my lengthy delving 
into theoretical and empirical accounts of lived experience and of the powers of the 
living/lived body could be perceived as contributory to mathematics education 
research efforts that would aspire to bring theory closer to research practice. 
Yet there are critical aspects of the learning experience that I have been 
engaged in through my study, which have remained ‘untouched’, since they were 
deliberately bracketed. They demarcate limitations of my study, coming from the 
upper part of the figure in Part 1, § 1.5.7, namely from the task, as a signifier of 
‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ social and cultural dimensions and motivations, such as those 
that activity theory is concerned with, following the dialectic materialist perception 
of objectification. These acknowledged issues, concerning the social and cultural 
dimensions of the cognitive experience were addressed only in passing in this study, 
due to the exclusive focus on the theme of the origins of the appearance of 
objectification. They were bracketed as I focused on the primordial relation of the 
intending act/thought and the intended object, as I was applying and testing 
theoretical concepts in detail. But although they are bracketed they are not 
neglected, since I fully acknowledge their importance for the broader understanding 
of the cognitive phenomenon. yet the successful application of the theory and 
methodology in this study invokes the need for further testing of the Husserlian 
phenomenology’s bridging potential. In particular, the bridging potential towards 
the sociocultural activity theory that adopts new instruments (e.g. eye-tracker) in 
detecting cognitive reflective and pre-reflective actions, which is another of my 
research concerns, based on and extending the work presented here. Although my 
contribution to the joined research effort that I am engaged in is still in experimental 
mode, some published results are already in circulation (Shvarts & Zagorianakos, 
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Crossroads of phenomenology and activity theory: An analysis of the number line 
perception, CERME 9, TWG 17, Feb. 2015). The meaningful results that the 
conjunction of the two seemingly incompatible theoretical manners provides and 
promises is encouraging for the continuation of the aforementioned theoretical and 
analytical experiment. 
Not yet doing but could be a dfuture project Finally, apart from possibilities 
for expansion of my current research framework, and limitations of my study that I 
can recognise, I acknowledge that my theoretical/methodological framework has its 
own blind spots, which I can barely sense. An indication of such a blind spot comes 
already from Rudolf Gachè’s notion of ‘groundless ground’ where, echoing Derrida’s 
origins in the history of the criticism of reflexivity he maintains that the origin and 
its constitutive operation are themselves situated within a syntax without origin. In 
this sense, the end of the presentation of my study demarcates a beginning of 
further theoretical and analytical investigations of the origins of mathematical 
learning activity and their operation towards constituting mathematical meaning. 
More generally, the elaboration of theoretical terms—in carefully and 
persistently reflected and analysed practice—of a theory that was originally 
envisaged as a “working philosophy”, and which developed as a methodology, could 
be refined into a useful instrument of meaningful analyses, for different topics within 
mathematics education. Since with the use of appropriate reductions and bracketing 
one may shift her focus from the constitutive relation of the intending act and the 
intended object to…  
 the teacher’s reflections and acts during her practice and her 
concomitant investigative enquiry towards alternative presentations of 
mathematical concepts, much in the spirit of Jo Boaler’s (e.g. 1999) 
focusing on the importance of mistakes, struggles and persistence, 
while I advocate for the parallel explicit usage and strong awareness 
of phenomenological concepts, such as the ones presented in my 
study; 
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 the shift to the classroom as a unit, and to a given curriculum as an 
object, as a pole that promotes or hinders certain practices, and the 
gaps in it that release alternative approaches and powers, which 
nurture actual, lived activities and interpolations based on the latter; 
such a critical analysis could question the regulatory agency of the 
curriculum, in favour of the creative/innovative impulses of the 
participants’ (teachers and learners) lived bodies, hence allowing 
alternative choices to unfold their lived truths. 
Considering Husserl’s relentless efforts as the starting point of my theoretical and 
methodological frames, the findings that were traced in the data analysis are also 
expected to act as exemplary cases for the theory and the methodology that enabled 
them. And that they are expected to be seen as a gesture for the opening of a 
broader dialogue concerning clarifications between theory and practice, in 
interpreting cognitive phenomena such as the ones that my study has dealt with in 
order to offer a novel perspective to mathematics education research. 
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The term “achievement” can be understood both verbally, that is, as naming 
the process of achieving something, and nominally, that is, as naming the 
product of that process. The primary meaning of “achievement” for Husserl 
is verbal rather than nominal. Hence, an achievement is, in particular, an 
intentional achieving that constitutes or discloses an object. For the most 
part, Husserl speaks of achievement in the context of discussions of the 
active syntheses productive of categorial objects. Both the synthesizing 
activity and the categorial object are denoted by the term “achievement.” 
The achieving is an intentional performance, the presenting or making-
present of an intentional object, that is, the object as disclosed, as having 
this particular significance. (Drummond, 2007, p. 33) 
Active synthesis: 
Active syntheses are those in which the ego functions as productively 
constitutive, that is, as achieving a disclosure of the object by way of 
subjective processes that are specifically achievements of the ego. Husserl’s 
favored example of active synthesis is the act of judging that discloses a state 
of affairs. Also included among active syntheses, however, would be acts of 
practical reasoning, acts of counting or collecting, acts of multiplying or 
dividing, acts in which I become aware of universals, acts combining 
judgments in arguments or theories, and so forth. Central to the idea of 
active synthesis is that the ego works with ‘materials’ already given 
beforehand. For example, in the case of judging, the perceived object with 
its properties is the “material” articulated and synthesized in the judgment. 
In the judgmental articulation of such a perceived object with its properties, 
a new object—the articulated state of affairs—is constituted. Hence, active 
synthesis involves a ‘product’ (Erzeugnis), but this product should not be 
understood in the sense of a construction out of materials that are really 
inherent (reell) in the act itself. Instead, the ego takes pre-given, ideal or ir-
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real (irreell) senses and attends to them in such a way as to fashion a new 
sense at a higher and more complex level. The judging that constitutes the 
state of affairs that, for example, the table is brown is founded on the 
perceiving that apprehends the table as brown, and the judgmental or 
propositional sense is founded on the perceptual sense of the object. 
(Drummond, 2007, p. 34) 
Apperception:  
For Husserl (2001, p. 112) apperceptions are “intuitive presentations of a co-
present, for instance, the antechamber of this room, or the co-presence of 
alien psychic life that is given perceptually along with the alien lived-body”, 
and he also calls them memories of the present. Also, in Husserl’s words, 
“Every motivation is apperception. The emergence of a lived-
experience A motivates the lived-experience of a B in the unity of a 
consciousness; the consciousness of A is equipped with an intention 
that points beyond, ‘indicating’ a coexistence. But here we must add 
that every unfulfilled intention, every unfulfilled horizon contains 
motivations, systems of motivations. It is a potentiality of motivation. 
When fulfillment takes place, a current motivation is there. … 
Fundamental for the theory of consciousness is the universal 
exploration of the relations of consciousness intending beyond itself 
(beyond its self)—what we call here apperception—to association.” 
(Husserl, 2001, pp. 625-626) 
“For Husserl, an apperception (Apperzeption) always presupposes and is 
founded on a perception (see Husserl, 1999a, § 55). To apperceive means 
to grasp something over and above what is actually perceived. … For 
instance, in all perception of a physical object, direct perception is of the 
facing side of the object, the hidden sides of the object are apperceived or 
appresented in an empty manner. … In his Passive Synthesis lectures, 
Husserl defines apperception as 'a consciousness of having something that is 
not present in the original' (Husserl, 2001, p. 367; Hua XI 234). Apperception 
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involves a certain awareness of properties, profiles, horizons that are not 
sensuously given in the perceiving itself, e.g. if I am in a room, I am aware 
not only of the objects that are inside the room, but also of the building in 
which I am. This connection between presence and absence is crucial for 
phenomenology. There are not only apperceptions of the things and the 
world but also of the self and others. Our interests, customs, convictions, 
judgements, etc. are grasped 'apperceptively' (Husserl, 1970a, § 59). … 
'There are different levels of apperception corresponding to different layers 
of objective sense' (Husserl, 1999a, § 50, 111; Hua I 141). Husserl says that 
an apperception does not involve inference (Husserl, 1999a, § 51). For 
Husserl, seeing another living body as a subject or cogito is a typical example 
of an apperception.” (Moran & Cohen, 2012, pp. 39-40). 
B 
Bracketing 
Bracketing, or epochè in Husserl's terms, roughly means letting particular 
states of affair out of present consideration and controlling/minimising their 
influence, although being aware of them, in order to clear out the view of 
what is at stake. Since epochè is one of the fundamental phenomenological 
methods and due to the limitation of space I will employ Drummond’s 
succinct description: 
The epoché is a methodological device that suspends one’s 
participation in the belief characteristic of the natural attitude, the 
belief, namely, that the world and its objects exist. This suspension 
has its correlate in what Husserl calls the ‘bracketing’ of the object, 
the removal of the existential index from the experienced object. The 
epoché involves, then, a neutralization of one’s belief in the existence 
of the world or of an object. This neutralization might be employed in 
the shift from belief to doubt, or in the shift from the natural to the 
critical attitude that characterizes scientific or theoretical experiences, 
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or in the shift to a more narrowly characterized ‘logical’ or 
‘mathematical’ attitude whose concern is solely with the deductive 
relations existing among different propositions or among objects 
considered purely formally, or in the shift to aesthetic awareness, or, 
finally, in the shift to the phenomenological attitude. The epoché, 
then, is in general the suspension of belief, and as such, it is a moment 
in the phenomenological or transcendental reduction in which one’s 
attention is led back to the constituting acts of consciousness with 
their object simply as given and without regard to the existence or 
non-existence of those objects. The term epoché, however, when the 
suspension is universal, is sometimes used simply to refer to the 
phenomenological reduction itself. (Drummond, 2007, pp. 67-68, 
emphasis in the original) 
Body-subject (or body schema): 
Body-subject or body schema is the pre-cognitive intelligence of the body 
manifested through action & intertwining with the world at hand. 
C 
Categorial  
Categorial means categorical in Husserl, but in the broadest sense, from empirical 
(morphological) to abstract categories, and from the subject’s conceptual world in 
immediate experience to the scientific realm of formal knowledge.  
D 
E 
Epoche: see bracketing. 
Evidence (Evidenz): 
Husserl's concept of Evidenz is variously rendered as 'inner evidence', 
'self-evidence', or simply 'evidence'. Husserl understands evidence as 
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'an experiencing of something that is and is thus; it is precisely a 
mental seeing of something itself (CM § 5). It is 'nothing other than 
adequate self-givenness' (IP, Hua II 59). Knowledge in the strictest 
sense requires 'evidence', that is, cognitions given with insight 
(Einsicht) and with a certainty to be sharply distinguished from blind 
belief or a psychological feeling of conviction. For Husserl, 'the most 
perfect 'mark' of correctness is evidence' (LU Pro/. § 6). To know 
something is to be able to verify it by tracing it back to some evident 
experiences that ground it fully. Evidence can be immediate but more 
usually is a gradual process. As Husserl will clarify in FTL: 
Evidence ... designates that performance on the part of 
intentionality which consists in the giving of something itself ... 
The primitive mode of the giving of something itself is 
perception. (FTL §59) 
For Husserl, self-evidence is not confined to the mathematical or 
logical domains. There are many different kinds of evidence, for 
Husserl, depending on the domain of knowledge. His standard 
examples of selfjustifying evident acts are our normal perceptual acts, 
e.g. acts of seeing which normally present the object with all the 
accompanying evidence necessary to warrant a judgement of the form 
'I see x'. To get someone else to see requires drawing their attention 
to it, nothing more. Evidence is an ongoing, everyday 'achievement' 
(Leistung) in all cognitions where the object is given in a satisfactory 
form, with 'intuitive fullness' (anschauliche Fulle) or as Husserl prefers 
to say, in which the object gives itself. Husserl emphasizes that self-
evidence involves the transition from empty intentions to fulfilled ones 
(a process in the sense of 'fulfilment'), that it is the ('absolute') 'self-
givenness' of the object (itself), so that it's the mode of the givenness 
of an object, that it's something that belongs to the form of our acts. 
Husserl also discusses Evidenz in his Formal and Transcendental Logic 
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(§§ 105-1 07) and Cartesian Meditations § 6. (Moran & Cohen, 2012, 
pp. 114-115) 
Husserl (2001, pp. 108-109)  mentions evidence a number of times, since it 
is crucial in building up his theory of perception and ultimately epistemic 
knowledge, as (both) grounded on intuition, which is in its turn indissolubly 
linked to the evidence brought up by self-giveness.: 
A datum that is given in immanent perception, i.e., that is adequately 
given in each Now does not therefore admit of any further 
confirmation with respect to this Now. Still, it does occur as a 
fulfillment insofar as the preceding perceptual phase already points to 
what is to come. This fulfillment is a fulfillment of an anticipation and 
is a definitive, absolute fulfillment, or evidence. 
In other words, evidence appears already as “a fulfillment of an anticipation”, 
at the primordial phase of lived-experience, as the fulfillment of the 
protention of the just-having-been-Now, thus been deprived of metaphysical 
features that are still eminent in Kantian transcendental philosophy, due to 
the distinction between sensibility and knowledge.  
The primordial phase of lived-experience is the flow of appearances, and the 
according trails of retentions, primal impressions and protentions. It is the 
field where the temporalisation of our lived-experiences takes place in inner-
time consciousness, and the ground for the constitution of objects and 
objectivities, in passive and active syntheses, coloured by the discipline due 
to which they gain validation, as they serve the ever renewed task horizons, 
and as they become the carriers of reactivation and of renewal of knowledge.  
The profile of the real that is absorbed from the lived-body, the subject-body, 
is intuitively grasped; and here is detected Husserl's primordial sense of 
intuition, equivalent to mere, immediate—instant and unmediated—contact. 
The feature of immediacy is kept throughout Husserl's descriptions, for all 
forms of intuition.  





something is said to be given insofar as the ego yields to the allure and has 
turned toward it attentively, laying hold of it in egoic acts of interest, 
cognition, explication, or examination, etc. (Husserl, 2001, p. xlii, from 
Anthony Steinbock’s introduction) 
cf. self-giveness below 
H 
Horizons 
 Inner horizons 
The inner horizon—by virtue of the three-fold structure of the living present—
intentionally refers to other appearances or presentations of the identical 
intended object. For example, the momentary perceptual phase in vision 
presents one side or aspect of the object from a particular perspective. This 
momentary phase, however, has intentional connections to past 
presentations of other sides of this same object, and it has intentional 
connections as well to possible presentations of the object that might arise 
in the course of a continued perceptual inspection. This noetic structure 
allows one to say from a noematic standpoint that the genuinely and directly 
appearing side refers beyond itself to its other sides and aspects. The inner 
horizon, in other words, unites in a single awareness a multiplicity of 
differentiated senses internal to the total significance the identical object has 
for us. The experience including its inner horizons thereby presents the object 
that is the identity proper to these unified senses. (Drummond, 2007, pp. 96-
97) 
 Outer horizons 
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The outer horizon, on the other hand, intentionally refers to other objects in 
the “surroundings” of the object that is the thematic concern of 
consciousness. These surroundings may be a spatial field—a background of 
other objects—in and against which the perceived object stands out. But it 
might also be, say, a context for a judgment, a context, for example, 
comprising relevant judgments about similar objects or comprising other 
judgments belonging to a theory in which the present judgment will take its 
place. At the most general level, the outer horizon comprises intentions 
presenting other objects that co-inhabit the world with the intended object. 
This view of outer horizons also has its noematic counterpart in the view that 
the world is the ultimate horizon of all intended objectivities. (Drummond, 
2007, p. 97) 
 
Hyle, hyletic data or sensuous contents: 
hyle, ancient Greek term for matter. Aristotle brought the word into use in 
philosophy by contrast with the term for form, and as designating one of the 
four causes. By hyle Aristotle usually means ‘that out of which something has 
been made’, but he can also mean by it ‘that which has form’. In Aristotelian 
philosophy hyle is sometimes also identified with potentiality and with 
substrate. Neoplatonists identified hyle with the receptacle of Plato. (Audi, 
1999, p. 408) 
Hyletic data include, first, the sensuous contents that present the objective, 
sensible determinations of an object. This is the fundamental meaning for 
Husserl of the expressions ‘sensuous contents’ and ‘hyletic data.” However, 
hyletic data also include, second, feelings such as sensuous pleasures and 
pains that are involved in the awareness of the value of objects. And they 
include, third, what Husserl calls “drives,” the instinctual tendencies that 
involve bodily feelings of certain kinds. Husserl understands all such hyletic 
data to be real (reell) moments of experience. 
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Husserl isolates the basic notion of hyletic data in reflecting on the 
perception (Wahrnehmung) of material things in space. He imaginatively 
varies the perception such that the sensible qualities of the intended object 
remain constant while their appearance to us varies. Husserl attributes this 
change in appearance to changes in the fullness and vivacity of the really 
(reell) inherent sensuous contents. He concludes, therefore, that the 
intentional experience must be composed of two real (reell) moments: an 
intentional apprehension or noesis and the sensuous contents. The noesis is 
a form (μορφή) that animates or interprets the sensuous matter (ὓλη). The 
basic idea is that the hyletic data are the presenting or representing “stuff” 
that is really inherent in the experience. However, because hyletic data are 
sensuous in character, Husserl extends the scope of the term to include all 
really inherent sensuous moments. Hyletic data do not themselves bear the 
mark of intentionality; they are referred to an object only by virtue of their 
being intentionally “formed” by the apprehension. 
Originally Husserl thought that all acts have some sort of material stuff 
or hyletic data to be intentionally formed, but his analyses of both inner time-
consciousness and of categorial acts persuaded him otherwise. 
Consequently, it appears that he retained the doctrine of hyletic data only for 
the impressional moment, that is, primal impression, within the momentary 
phase of consciousness. Moreover, although he initially characterized hyletic 
data as a really inherent moment of the experience, there are places in 
Husserl’s works where he speaks of hyletic data more noematically as the 
immediate sensible presence of the objective determination itself. Finally, the 
broadest sense in which Husserl speaks of hyletic data is to refer that which 
is passively pregiven as the materials on which active thinking operates. 
(Drummond, 2007, pp. 97-98) 
I  
Ideation:  
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Husserl modifies the view that we grasp the species through abstraction 
and instead claims that we have an act of ideation, an essential intuiting of 
the species themselves (see Husserl, 1970b, § 88). ‘Eidetic intuition' 
replaces 'ideation' in Ideas I, although the term does continue to appear in 
later writings (Moran, & Cohen, 2012 pp. 2, 26). 
Intentionality: 
Intentionality is an essential peculiarity of the sphere of mental 
processes taken universally in so far as all mental processes in some 
manner or other share in it. … Intentionality is what characterizes 
consciousness in the pregnant sense and which, at the same time, 
justifies designating the whole stream of mental processes as the 
stream of consciousness and as the unity of one consciousness. … 
Under intentionality we understand the own peculiarity of mental 
processes "to be consciousness of something." … a perceiving is a 
perceiving of something, perhaps a physical thing; a judging is a 
judging of a predicatively formed affair-complex; valuing of a 
predicatively formed value-complex; a wishing of a predicatively 
formed wish-complex; and so forth. Acting bears upon action. Doing 
bears upon the deed, loving bears upon the loved one, being glad 
bears upon the gladsome; and so forth. In every actional cogito a 
radiating "regard" is directed from the pure Ego to the "object" of the 
consciousness-correlate in question, to the physical thing, to the 
affair-complex, etc., and effects the very different kinds of 
consciousness of it.” (Husserl, Ideas I, pp. 199, 200) 
Husserl uses the words ‘intention’ and ‘intending’ throughout 
his works in a way similar to our daily usage, indicating a purposeful 
striving. Intentional consciousness is, in all its forms, focused on 
finding satisfaction in the intuited self-having of lived experience. 
Consciousness wants to go toward evidence; that is what forms its 
goal, its telos. In this sense, all conscious life—as Husserl would say 
~ 311 ~ 
 
in his later work—rests under the rule of a ‘teleology.’ (Held in Welton, 
p. 14) 
In this regard we speak of the ‘intersubjective constitution' 
[intersubjektiven Konstitution] of the world, meaning by this the total 
system of manners of givenness, however hidden, and also of modes 
of validity [Geltungsmodi] for egos; through this constitution, if we 
systematically uncover it, the world as it is for us becomes 
understandable as a structure of meaning [Sinngebilde] formed out of 
elementary intentionalities The being of these intentionalities 
themselves is nothing but one meaning formation operating together 
with another, ‘constituting’ new meaning through synthesis. And 
meaning is never anything but meaning in modes of validity, that is, 
as related to intending ego-subjects which effect validity. 
Intentionality is the tide which stands for the only actual and genuine 
way of explaining, making intelligible. (Husserl, 1970a, p.168) 
[A]s soon as one has progressed far enough in the reorientation of 
the epochè [it should be clear] to see the purely subjective in its own 
self-enclosed pure context as intentionality and to recognize it as the 
function of forming ontic meaning (Husserl, 1970a, p. 169, emphasis 
added) 
Phenomenology begins from the intentional relation between 
constituting subjectivity and its correlated constituted object. 
Intentionality points to the intrinsic correlation between the object as 
meant and the subjective act which apprehends or means (‘intends’) 
it. … Husserl speaks of the need to go back to the ‘intentional origins’ 
and attempt to follow the build-up of ‘sense-formations’ which we 
eventually experience in a completely immediate way as the whole 
intuited life-world, understood as an ‘integrated framework of 
meaning’ (Sinnzusammenhang, C 284; K 331) or ‘meaning formation' 
(Sinnbildung, C 378; K 386). (Moran, 2012, p. 53) 
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Husserl took over Brentano's conception of intentionality but greatly 
expanded and clarified it. He felt that Brentano's own conception was 
too deeply embedded in an internalist and introspectionist outlook. 
Brentano maintained (at least in his earlier years) that psychological 
states revealed themselves directly and immediately to consciousness 
(their esse is percipi) and that they were exactly as they presented 
themselves, whereas the external world was known only indirectly. … 
Husserl records that Brentano never accepted the analyses in the 
Logical Investigations as a development of descriptive psychology and 
the 'mature execution' of Brentano’s idea (Phen. Psych. § 3, p. 24; 
Hua IX 34). Husserl, then, must present intentionality in an entirely 
new context, stripped of the misleading apparatus of modern 
representationalist philosophy. For Husserl, intentionality properly 
construed made visible the manner in which things present 
themselves to consciousness in their various modes of 
meaningfulness. (Moran, 2012, pp. 54-55) 
 
Intrapsychically:  
Intrapsychically is rendered here as within the conscious activity of the 
individual. The term does not imply a process cut off from the subject’s world-
as-lived, and it involves intersubjectivity in two fundamental ways: 
 The materials that are involved in the intrapsychic moments of 
consciousness are culturally and socially mediated. 
 The very transition from prereflective to reflective intrapsychic acts 
maintains intersubjective intentional functions, which translate qualities 
into relations that are transmittable to others, thus in awareness of the 
subject’s community and its norms—e.g. mathematical norms, i.e. 
manners (treatments) that when they are applied they transform objects 
to admissible abstract objects. In other words intrapsychic acts realise the 
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shifting188 and they intentionally (intersubjective intentionality) introduce 




[T]he lifeworld … is always already there, existing in advance for us, the 
―ground of all praxis whether theoretical or extratheoretical. The world is 
pregiven to us… not occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal 
field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-
certainty-of-the-world. (Husserl, 1970a, p. 142) 
The lifeworld is the latent, normally unexamined givenness of experiences, 
situations, events, etc.. The lifeworld typically goes forward without self-
conscious intervention or purposive design; it incorporates an unnoticed, 
unprompted expectedness. Only when some taken-for-granted aspect of a 
lifeworld shifts does the lifeworld become apparent (Seamon, 2013), and 
such a negation—which still takes place in the lifeworld and will fall back out 
of awareness once the break will be incorporated—takes place when the 
learner intuits an object, due to the reconfiguration of the horizons that the 
constitution of the new object entails.  
And in a 'rough' sense, objectification gives the phenomenologist a unique 
chance to lay bare the lifeworld's taken-for-grantedness itself. 
Lived body:  
“For embodied consciousness Merleau-Ponty, like Husserl, reserves the term 
"living body"” (Tito, M. J., 1990, Logic in the Husserlian context, p. 185). 
Husserl uses the term Leib, which has been translated both as ‘living body’ 
(e.g. Husserl, 1970a, pp. 50 (n. 15), 106, 161, 217-218, 324, 331) and ‘lived 
                                                          
188 The shifting is meant as a new embedding of the object’s horizons, a shifting of horizons, in Husserl's 
terms. 
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body’ (e.g. Husserl, 2001, pp. 19, 50, 73, 265). I have adopted the ‘lived 
body’ terminology since it seemed more faithful to other Husserlian 
terminological choices (e.g. lived experience instead of living experience –
e.g.. Husserl, 1973, p. 321) and since it is one used even in classical 
translations (Husserl, 2001). The same term—lived body—is also used by 
renowned scholars for both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, e.g. Donn Welton 
(1999b) and Catherine Morris (2012). Morris (p. 49) also informs us that 
“[p]rior to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Husserl had already made a crucial 
distinction between 'the lived body' (Leib) and 'the body-object' (Korper)”. 
My adaptation of the ‘lived-body’ terminology is also concomitant to Moran’s 
expression body as lived (e.g. Moran, D., 2010, p. 135). Finally, cf. 
“Romdenh-Romluc’s claim that for Merleau-Ponty 'the body is a form of 
consciousness'” (Morris, K., 2012, Ch. 3, fn. 2), and “[for Husserl] the essence 
of consciousness is to be embodied” (Tito, 1990, p. 187). 
Lived experience (Erlebnis) 
Lived experience is a key concept that Husserl introduced in order to “lay 
bare the 'sources' from which the basic concepts and ideal laws of pure logic 
'flow', and back to which they must once more be traced, so as to give them 
all the 'clearness and distinctness' needed for an understanding, and for an 
epistemological critique, of pure logic” (LU Introduction § 1, I, p. 166; Hua 
XIX/1 6-7). Looking back in 1925, Husserl described the aim of the Logical 
Investigations as follows: 
In the year 1900-01 appeared my Logical Investigations which were 
the results of my ten year long efforts to clarify the Idea of pure Logic 
by going back to the sense-bestowing or cognitive achievements being 
effected in the complex of lived experiences of logical thinking. 
(Husserl, 1977, p. 14) 
Husserl introduces lived experience as a field from which we can take 
distance from, in the phenomenological attitude, approaching it as a 
subjective gesture that constantly has the potential to ‘re-invent the world’, 
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the lived-world of the subject in the first place. He expresses the investigation 
of lived experience as a new task, which marks his “return to the things 
themselves. The new task consists in… 
the attempt to go back radically and consistently from the respective 
categories of objectivities and ask about the modes of consciousness 
determinately belonging to them, about the subjective acts, act-
structures, foundations of lived experience, in which objectivities of 
such a character become objects of consciousness, and above all 
become evidently self-given. (Husserl, 1977, p. 20) 
It is another manifestation of Husserl’s critique of rationality, as he 
maneuvers his conception of evident, intuitive self-giveness to the core of 
the validation of the sciences, logic and mathematics included. The objects 
of consciousness “become evidently self-given” in what Husserl calls manners 
of giveness. Studying the manners that objects are given in the students’ 
consciousnesses, through the students’ lived experiences, is a significant part 
of phenomenological—or phenomenologically inspired—research since, as 
Held explains… 
[M]anners of givenness are the way in which intentional consciousness 
carries out its lived experiences, but in the same stroke these are 
appearances-of-something; in other words, they are manners of self-
revelation, of existing things presenting themselves. If we were to 
apply the Cartesian question, asking whether we should add these 
lived experiences to the category of consciousness’s ‘outer’ or ‘inner’ 
world, then we could not appropriately comprehend their richness. 
Lived experiences break down this dualism; they are the In-between, 
that which originally opens the dimension of intentional appearance 
within which consciousness and the world have already met—before 
any subject-object rift. (Held, in Welton, 2003, p. 28) 
Hence Husserl is positioned beyond the Cartesian dualism by his allowance of 
“existing things presenting themselves”. He also moved beyond Kant’s distinction 
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between sensibility and knowledge (Critique of Pure Reason), since embodied, 
passive object generation holds the primal cogitata, the proto-objects of thought 
according to Husserl. 
M 
Manners of giveness and lived experiences: 
[M]anners of givenness are the way in which intentional consciousness 
carries out its lived experiences, but in the same stroke these are 
appearances-of-something; in other words, they are manners of self-
revelation, of existing things presenting themselves. If we were to apply the 
Cartesian question, asking whether we should add these lived experiences to 
the category of consciousness’s ‘outer’ or ‘inner’ world, then we could not 
appropriately comprehend their richness. Lived experiences break down this 
dualism; they are the In-between, that which originally opens the dimension 
of intentional appearance within which consciousness and the world have 
already met—before any subject-object rift. (Held, in Welton, 2003, p. 28)  
Meaning: see sense 
N 
Noetic: 
Noetic process is a process directed by the ego pole towards the object pole, 
having the specific intentionality of objectivation, i.e. the intentionality to 
release objective sense out of transcendental and immanent objects that 
appear in the Life-world of the subject. 
O 
Originaliter: 
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The term ‘originaliter’ is used by Dorion Cairns and Husserl in order to express 
the ‘grasping’ in its 'personal' actuality; another term used by Husserl for the 
same reason is originarily (cf. Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 264). 
Object-like formation: 
Objectlike formation [ Gegenstiindlichkeit], that is, something that exhibits 
the basic structure of an object (including an object-phase), but is more 
"elementary" than an object in the full-fledged sense or has not (yet) 
exhibited objectivity. This is not to say that the objectlike formation cannot 
have its own internal continuity maintained in passive time-consciousness, 
but only that it is not the result of active processes that give it an identity 
such that it becomes a theme of cognitive interest. [fn 21:] This is why I 
translate the term Gegenstiindlichkeit as objectlike formation, rather than 
objectivity or even objecthood. The expression gegenstiindlich I render 
"objectlike," and depending upon the context, "with objects," since Husserl 
sometimes uses the expression to indicate it as qualifying the noun: e.g., 
gegenstiindliche Feld. Here he does not mean a field that is like an object, 
but rather, a field filled with objects that can potentially become thematic. 
(Husserl, 2001, p. xli, in Anthony Steinbock’s introduction) 
P 
Passive genesis: 
See passive stage. 
Passive stage or passivity: 
Passive stage is for Husserl the pre-reflective level of experience, the level of 
'preconstitution' (sic). “The most fundamental form of passivity is the flow of 
temporal experience whereby retentions and protentions just occur as part 
of the experiencing of the present. Moments of time and moments of 
sensuous experience (e.g. apprehending a colour patch as having a uniform 
colour) are united together by association” (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 237). 
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The passive stage involves passive genesis, which “names those processes 
which give the world its pregiven, stable and harmonious character. It also 
gives the objects encountered in the world their sense character that is 
encountered as fully formed by active perceiving etc.” (Moran & Cohen, 2012, 
p. 28). One law of passive genesis is that every experience becomes a trace 
in retention and does not vanish completely (see Husserl, 2001, p. 114); and 
its universal principle is association (ibid.).  
The following summation is written by Anthony Steinbock in his preface to 
the 2001 edition of Analyses concerning Passive and Active syntheses 
(Husserl, 2001) and it serves as a concise description of what passivity is for 
Husserl: 
Passivity designates a dimension of experience that a regressive 
inquiry into origins unearths, and which serves as a point of departure 
for an explicative genetic account that traces motivations leading back 
"up" to cognitive activity. More particularly, passivity is that realm in 
which, through fundamental laws of association, affective forces spur 
an egoic attentiveness to objects, enabling acts of remembering and 
expectation to constitute objects as such, i.e., as in-themselves-for-
us. 
Pregivenness: 
According to the Analyses, something is pregiven insofar as it exercises an 
affective allure on me without being grasped by me as such, responsively or 
egoically. [fn 20:] This is certainly one sense of pregivenness. Another sense 
also occurring around the time of the Analyses is what is always already there 
for the individual who can in turn appropriate it either passively or actively. 
(Husserl, 2001, p. xlii) 
Presentification 
Presentification is a term used by Husserl in order to distinguish objects of 
regular perception, which are given directly and with ‘in the flesh’ here-and-
now presence (presentation), from objects that do not have this in-the-flesh 
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givenness (re-presentation) (Moran & Cohen, 2012, pp. 260-261). Anthony 
Steinbock (Husserl, 2001, p. 110, fn. 64), gives us a subtle distinction 
between presentification and re-presentation: 
Empathy [Einfiihlung] as a mode of presentification does not make 
present a previous or futural perceptual object because the other or 
the alien can in principle never be given ‘originally.’ This is certainly 
different from a remembering that literally re-presents its object, or 
from a futural presentification that anticipates a futural object as 
present, or finally from a co-presentification in which something that 
is not given in the original at present, but can in principle be present 
(cf. below 367, 373f., 377f.). Accordingly, rather than translate 
Vergegenwärtigung as re-presentation, which would be well-suited for 
temporal acts, I prefer the common neologism, presentification, since 
it includes the full complement of acts ranging from imagination to 
empathy. (Husserl, 2001, p. 110, translator’s footnote) 
Presentification and re-presentation need to be distinguished from 
representation (which is a key term for constructivist research), since not 
only do objects of consciousness additionally bear temporal features that are 
pre-constituted and their history is registered (e.g. in recollection the 
awareness of their past feature), but their intentional history (e.g. in 
perceptual acts that are recollected and even in futural presentifications that 
“can in principle be present”) is also retrieved, in gradations of clarity and 
fusion. The associative character of consciousness guarantees that 
presentifications and re-presentations are not arbitrary or just reflexive. 
Reflective and pre-reflective motivations—intentionalities in the 
phenomenological language—play a crucial part (e.g. in the retrieval of 
previous presentations). In these motivations takes place a fundamental 
interplay between subject and object, between the intending and the 
intended. On one ‘side’ (the object-pole in Cartesian terms – c.f. Husserl, 
1970a, p. 207) the objects’ allure, calling for signification the ever searching 
torchlight of consciousness on the other ‘side’ (the object-pole in Cartesian 
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terms); and most importantly, the embodied operations of the living body 
that synthesise these profiles of lived reality (which is the ground within 
which the aforementioned dualism of ego and object poles is cancelled, 
precisely due to these operative syntheses), thus preparing them for possible 
objectification, if chosen for particular drives that seek fulfilment. It is under 
this light—the light that phenomenology affords us with and at the same 
stroke allows us to explore tasks as this one that my study touches—that 
lived experience and the operations that emanate from it, i.e. the texture of 
our life-world, make possible—and in a sense determine—our consequent 
object constitutions. 
Primal impression 
For Husserl, every temporal experience has a moment that he calls the 
'primal or primordial impression' (Urimpression). In early works, he 
sometimes refers to it as 'primordial sensation' (Urempfindung, Hua X 324). 
Husserl describes this primal impression as the moment of creation (Hua X, 
105); it is the very core of the living present. However, it is a necessary 
eidetic law that this primal impression must be modified into a retention. The 
primal impression can be said to found the retention, yet the primal 
impression as such can appear only in the retention. There is no absolute 
experience of the primal impression as such. (Moran & Cohen, 212, p. 262) 
Protention 
Protention is that phase within the momentary phase of consciousness or 
living present that intends yet-to-come phases of absolute consciousness. 
(Drummond, 2007, p. 171) 
The now moment, retention and protention are three mutually related, non-
independent parts of each conscious lived experience according to Husserl's 
analyses of time consciousness. According to Ideas I § 77, a protention is the 
'precise counterpart' of a retention. Just as retention is not yet memory, so 
protention is not yet anticipation in the full sense which is a form of 
presentification. The protention modifies the already elapsed retention. 
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Husserl speaks in this regard of a backward streaming or backward mirroring 
(Rückstrahlung) of the protention in the retention. Retentions motivate 
protentions and protentions are founded on retentions. Protentions and 
retentions belong to passive experience. (Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 265-266, 
emphasis in the original) 
[P]rotention is not yet the fully fledged conscious act of anticipation but a 
structural component of any lived experience (Erlebnis). (Moran & Cohen, 
2012, p. 207) 
Psychologism:  
‘Psychologism’ entered the English language as a translation of the German 
word ‘Psychologismus’, a term coined by the Hegelian Johann Eduard 
Erdmann in 1870 to critically characterize the philosophical position of Eduard 
Beneke (Erdmann, 1870). The relationship between logic and psychology was 
fought over most intensely in the German-speaking lands between 1890 and 
1914. This dispute centered on the question whether logic (and 
epistemology) are parts of psychology. Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl 
are the best-known figures of this controversy. John Stuart Mill exerted great 
influence in both sides of the controversy, since his System of Logic (1843) 
was not only a key inspiration behind much German-speaking psychologistic 
philosophy, but it also contained some crucially important anti-psychologistic 
ideas (Godden, 2005). Most German-speaking philosophers, from the 1880s 
onwards, agreed that the following arguments deserved the label 
‘psychologistic’ (I shall write PA for ‘psychologistic argument’): 
(PA 1) 1. Psychology is defined as the science which studies all (kinds of) laws of 
thought.  
2. Logic is a field of inquiry which studies a subset of all laws of thought. 
Ergo, logic is a part of psychology.  
(PA 2) 1. Normative-prescriptive disciplines — disciplines that tell us what we 
ought to do — must be based upon descriptive-explanatory sciences. 
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2. Logic is a normative-prescriptive discipline concerning human thinking.  
3. There is only one science which qualifies as constituting the descriptive-
explanatory foundation for logic: empirical psychology. 
Ergo, logic must be based upon psychology.  
(PA 3) 1. Logic is the theory of judgments, concepts, and inferences. 
2. Judgments, concepts, and inferences are human mental entities.  
3. All human mental entities fall within the domain of psychology. 
Ergo, logic is a part of psychology.  
(PA 4) 1. The touchstone of logical truth is the feeling of self-evidence.  
2. The feeling of self-evidence is a human mental experience. 
Ergo, logic is about a human mental experience — and thus a part of 
psychology.  
(PA 5) 1. We cannot conceive of alternative logics. 
2. The limits of conceivability are mental limits. Ergo, logic is relative to 
the thinking of the human species; and this thinking is studied by 
psychology.  
Who actually held these views, indeed whether anyone did, was hotly 
contested at the time, but it seems reasonable to attribute PA 1 to Theodor 
Lipps (1893) and Gerardus Heymans (1894, 1905), PA 2 to Wilhelm Wundt 
(1880/83), PA 3 to Wilhelm Jerusalem (1905) and Christoph Sigwart (1921), 
PA 4 to Theodor Elsenhans (1897), and PA 5 to Benno Erdmann (1892).  
(Kusch, 2011, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 
R 
Reflection / self-reflection: 
'Reflection' (Besinnung) and 'self-reflection' (Selbstbesinnung) are key terms 
for Husserl. … Husserl distinguishes between Besinnung and Reflexion 
(‘reflection’): 
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The reflection [Besinnung ] in question is a particular case of that self-
reflection [Selbstbesinnung] in which man as a person seeks to reflect 
upon the ultimate sense of his existence. We must distinguish between 
a broader and a narrower sense of self-reflection: pure ego-reflection 
[Ich-Reflexion] and reflection upon the whole life of the ego as ego; 
and reflection [Besinnung] in the pregnant sense of enquiring back 
into the sense or teleological essence of the ego. (C 392n; K 510-11 
n.1) 
Husserl, then, understands Besinnung more as a kind of existential self-
meditation rather than as a Cartesian-style introspection, even one reflecting 
on one's life as a whole. … Husserl uses several variations on the notion of 
'reflection'. He frequently characterizes his reflection as a 'backwards 
reflection' (Rűckbesinnung, C 17; K 16) or questioning back’ (Rűckfragen, or 
Zurűckfragen, cf. C 56; K 57, C 69; K 70; see also K 185), a regressive enquiry 
into the ‘original motivation’ (Ursprungsmotivation, C 57; K 58) that gave rise 
to modernity. This concept of reflecting or questioning back is central to what 
he calls 'genetic' or 'genetic-historical' enquiry. (Moran, 2012, pp. 49-50) 
Reflective level of the experience 
Retention (also cf. protention) 
Perception takes place in the now, in the present, and its object is 
apprehended as immediately present, ‘in the flesh’ (leibhaftig, as Husserl 
says), as being there in the same temporal phase as the mental process itself. 
In memory, however, while the lived experience (Erlebnis) is in the present, 
the object remembered is not experienced as being in the present, but 
precisely as not present and as ‘having been’. Memory suffers from an 
essential inadequacy in that things can be represented that were not, in fact, 
ever perceived (see Ideas I § 141), or different memories can be fused into 
one memory. For Husserl, retention (or, in earlier terminology, ‘primary 
memory’, Hua II 67) is not yet memory in the strong sense (‘secondary 
memory’'), although it forms the basis or ground for both passive and active 
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rememberings. Rememberings present objects as whole entities, whereas a 
retention is a part of a perceptual awareness, it is a ‘just past’ that is still 
there in a reduced or modified sense. It still has a kind of ‘impressionality’. 
(Moran & Cohen, 2012, p. 207) 
Reduction: 
Husserl's example on and explication of the Phenomenological reduction: 
Now, if I take as my point of departure this reflection that remains 
completely unphenomenological, this "I have heard the song," I can 
now, as phenomenologist, carry out the reduction on it, bracketing 
the spatio-temporal mundane actuality of song and singer. Then I will 
gain the transcendental phenomenon, namely, the past 
transcendental phenomenon of my—of the ego's—earlier acoustical 
perception of the song, whereby the real song itself is only the 
intentional object of the hearing. 
In this way I can gain the entire realm of my memories as 
phenomenologically reduced, thus the realm of all memories of 
objectively mundane things and processes, and then of all memories 
in general, e.g., memories of mathematical proofs that I have carried 
out; and I gain them not only as present facts, but according to their 
remembered intentional content. And what finally results from this is 
my (i.e., the Ego's) past transcendental life with all of its past poles 
which, insofar as they are object poles, are bracketed, while the ego 
that is everywhere identical is the transcendental ego, and should not 
be bracketed, just as little as the past transcendental lived-
experiences. 
One can also put it in this way: In the case of rememberings 
and with all other presentifications that we will take up later, we 
deviate from our earlier principle of putting out of play all positings 
that are carried out in the lived-experience itself. I only put out of play 
the positing, the memorial belief in the past objectivity, but not the 
belief implied in it, namely, the belief in my past ego and my past 
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lived-experiencing, and my past perceiving in which my past life was 
given perceptually. We emphasize this because the transcendental 
subjective element that is past is also precisely transcendentally 
subjective, and because we initially want to appropriate 
transcendental subjectivity as a whole in one stroke as far as the unity 
of the ego and its lived-experiences can reach (regardless of whether 
they be present or past). In doing this we follow the evidence that 
itself lies, in part, in the phenomenological reflection on the present, 
in part, in the phenomenological reflection on the past (that is, in the 
reflection penetrating into the intentional content of memories). But 
we do not ask whether or not this evidence is apodictic, whether or 
not it is better than the evidence, e.g., of external perception (that we 
had to put out of play to begin philosophically). 
We can treat memories of the future, expectations, in the same 
way as memories of the past. (Husserl, 2001, pp. 453-454) 
 
Husserl claims to have discovered the phenomenological reduction some time 
around 1905 in his Seefelder manuscripts; and its discovery marks a sharp 
break between the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations and 
the transcendental phenomenology of the mature Husserl (Moran & Cohen, 
2012, p. 107). The phenomenological reduction aims to overcome the naive 
thinking about the object in the nature attitude as something that simply 
exists on its own and comes to understand the object as correlated with a 
specific mode of apprehending it. The perceived object, as intentional 
correlate of the perception, is distinct from the real object (Moran & Cohen, 
2012, p. 75). 
Reminiscent of the universal Cartesian doubt, it [the methodological 
technique of the phenomenological reduction] is nevertheless different 
therefrom. Whereas the distinguishing characteristic of Cartesian doubt is 
that it annuls the positing of an object’s existence or the validity of a 
judgment, the distinguishing characteristic of the phenomenological 
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reduction is that it refuses to understand this annulment as the opposite of 
the positing of the existence of objects and the general validity of experience 
that characterizes our natural experience—a positing Husserl calls the 
“general thesis of the natural attitude” (Hua 3, §30). The phenomenological 
reduction, in other words, is not the negation of the general positing 
characteristic of our ordinary experience. The content is not negated, but our 
affirmation is withheld. In the performance of the phenomenological 
reduction, we attempt to call the universal positing characteristic of ordinary 
experience into question, to hold it reflectively before ourselves as a positing 
whose validity is to be examined. Our participation in the affirmation 
characteristic of ordinary experience is suspended, and the objectivities given 
in experience are not lost to our reflection but are instead considered only as 
presumed existents. They remain available for reflection just insofar as they 
are experienced; the index attaching to them, however, has changed, and 
their status as objects of experience has been modified so that they are now 
viewed exclusively in their being as objects of that experience in which they 
are posited. It is not, therefore, as it was for Descartes, the object that is 
disconnected in the performance of the reduction; it is the philosopher’s 
participation in the positings that characterize the ordinary experiences of 
the natural attitude. The reduction is a change in attitude that leads our 
attention back to the subjective achievements in which the object as 
experienced is disclosed in a determinate manner and to the achievements 
in which we realize the evidence appropriate to confirming or disconfirming 
our natural experiences. These achievements have a certain kind of priority 
over the object that they disclose in a determinate manner, and the 
investigation of them reveals how it is that we come to experience the objects 
in those determinate manners; how our different experiences are related to 
one another; and, therefore, how the different kinds and levels of objectivity 
are related; and, finally, how our experience confirms or disconfirms in 
fulfilling intentions what was merely emptily intended or mistakenly intended. 
(Drummond, 2007) 
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Anthony Steinbock notes, in his introduction to the 2001 translation of 
Husserl's Analyses concerning Passive and Active Syntheses: 
The more common expressions like Selbstgebegenheit (with which 
Husserl means both the giving of the self of the object on the part of 
the subject as a noetic process, and the self-giving of the self of the 
object from the object), I render as "self-givenness"; in this case, one 
should hear in the expression "self," then, not the subject, but the 
ipseity of the object, the self-givenness of object it-self in the 
intentional relation. As such, the object it-self is never experienced in 
a neutral manner; it exercises an affectively significant allure on the 
perceiver to be constituted as such, that is, for the "ego" to turn 
toward it attentively and to constitute it as a theme of interest in an 
active manner. The fact that something is actually heard or seen or 
smelled, etc., is due to "affective rays" radiating from the object, 
drawing in its wake the horizonal referential implications. (Husserl, 
2001, p. lvi) 
Husserl himself mentions self-giveness a number of times, since it is crucial 
in building up his theory of perception and ultimately knowledge, as 
grounded (both) on intuition, which is in its turn indissolubly linked to self-
giveness. We discern here (Husserl, 2001, p. 108) Husserl's particular 
realism, binding the empirical (in a fully transcendental sense) with the 
transcendental, and allowing a further view, than Kant’s perspective on 
experience. Husserl's distinction between the Kantian and his transcendental 
version is also tangible where he denies the inaccessibility of the object’s in-
itself (which is what self-giveness is all about, according to Husserl), an 
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intangibility instituted by Kant. In its place, Husserl brings the indeterminacy 
of this knowledge, which cannot be fully fulfilled, since it “is never determined 
definitively”: 
To be sure, we know that even a perception, in particular, an external, 
transcendent perception, can occur in syntheses of fulfillment and not 
only as a perception confirming an intention; rather, it can even occur 
as a mere intention that becomes fulfilled in new perceptions. This 
happens, for example, when we perceive a tree from the front, and 
wanting to know it better, draw nearer to it and now perceive it in 
new perceptions; by determining the tree more closely, we also have 
a fulfilling confirmation. Meanwhile, every external perception harbors 
its inner and outer horizons, regardless the extent to which perception 
has the character of self-giving; this is to say, it is a consciousness 
that simultaneously points beyond its own content. In its fullness it 
simultaneously points into an emptiness that would only now convey 
a new perception. The self-givenness of a spatial thing is the self-
givenness of a perspectival appearing object that is given as the same 
in the fulfilling synthesis of appearances intertwining and devolving 
upon one another. But it is the same object that itself appears now 
this time in one way, now another time in another way, appearing in 
other perspectives, always pointing from a perspective to ever new 
perspectives in which the same object that is exhibited is continually 
determined more closely, and yet is never determined definitively. For 
we always expect appearances of newly opened, empty horizons. 
Thus, where there is no horizon, where· there are no empty intentions, 
there is likewise no [synthesis of] fulfillment. 
Sense ('making sense’ of experience): 
The notions of 'sense' (Sinn) and 'meaning' {Bedeutung) are central to 
phenomenology. Phenomenology is concerned with meaning, but one must 
be careful here not to think solely of linguistic meaning. Husserl tends not to 
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distinguish sharply 'sense’ (Sinn) from 'meaning' (Bedeutung), although he is 
aware of Frege's distinction. Insofar as he does make a distinction, he tends 
to employ 'meaning’ primarily for linguistic meaning. The term ‘sense’, for 
Husserl, carries wider connotations, in that non-linguistic activities, such as 
perceiving, remembering and so on, also involve 'sense', i.e. we perceive the 
paper lying on the desk as having its own existence, self-identity, spatio-
temporal continuity, objecthood, and relation to and distinctness from other 
objects, but also its own history, cultural meaning, significance and so on. 
The central focus of phenomenology, it can even be said, then, is the 
problem of sense, οf meaning. Husserl often couples together the concepts 
of 'sense' and 'validity’ (Sinn und Geltung, e.g. C 76; K 78) that things, 
people, situations, social actions and so on have for us as experiencing 
subjects in the world. From the standpoint of phenomenology, a thing’s 
ontological status cannot be distinguished from its sense or meaning. 
Something can be a religious icon in one cultural context and a cultural 
adornment in another (e.g. a tattoo). Hence Husserl speaks of ‘being-sense’ 
(Seinssinn), or ‘ontic sense’ (Carr’s translation, see C 122; K 124), or ontic 
meaning' (C 100; K 103), referring to this interwovenness of ontological 
standing and significance. He also regularly speaks of something's 'validity of 
being’ or ontic validity’ (Seinsgeltung, C 77; K 79). 
All experiences, no matter how vague and apparently inconsequential 
(even illusions, hallucinations, dreams, reveries), make sense in some form, 
and the kind of sense an experience conveys has its own particular mode of 
‘givenness’, its own peculiar way of coming to prominence, its own temporal 
duration, its structural form, implied connection with other experiences and 
so on. To perceive something as a physical, material thing, for instance, 
involves many levels of constitution of sense, but to see it as also a picture 
or artwork is to grasp it in a further and quite distinct mode of meaning 
disclosure, and distinct again from a tool used for a practical purpose, or a 
relic approached through religious veneration, a souvenir and so on. 
Language articulates this rich differentiation of kinds of object, but our rich 
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perception already intuitively makes these discriminations, and it is 
phenomenology’s task to document them and grasp their essential character.  
For Husserl, sense is not simply something outside us that we 
apprehend, it is something that is 'constituted’ or put together by us due to 
our particular attitudes, presuppositions, background beliefs, values, 
historical horizons and so on. In short, phenomenology is a reflection on the 
manner in which things come to gain the kind of sense they have for us. 
(Moran, 2012, pp. 50, 51, 52) 
State of affairs:  
'State of affairs' denotes the way things stand. States of affairs are those 
realities (loosely speaking) that we refer to by propositions such as 'S is P' or 
'A and B stand in relation R’. If the state of affairs is as it is asserted to be, 
then the proposition is true. In this connection, the proposition is 'the truth-
bearer' and the state of affairs is 'the truth-maker'. Or, put the other way 
around, the state of affairs is what we typically 'express' in perceptual 
propositions; e.g. 'the candle is on the dining table'. The assertions that 
usually count as 'knowledge' concern states of affairs', e.g. the moon is full; 
20 million people live in Australia; Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo; blue 
colours are called 'blue' in English; this is a book; A is not ~A; the global 
economy is becoming increasingly integrated. In short, our knowledge of the 
world concerns states of affairs, not entities simpliciter (LI I, Proleg. §6). 
(Russell, p. 114, emphasis in the original) 
T 
Telos, teleology: 
The term 'teleology' (from the Greek telos, τέλος, meaning ‘purpose’ or ‘goal’) 
means goal directedness, being directed to goals or ends. … Husserl uses the 
term ‘teleology’, especially in his later works, to refer to the specific networks 
of ends that motivate human life and culture. Intentionality as directedness 
has an inbuilt teleological character, for Husserl, e.g. empty intentions aim 
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at fulfilment. Husserl specifically talks about the 'teleology' of western culture 
in the Crisis and associated texts (e.g. Vienna Lecture). (Drummond, 2007, 
p. 314) 
Transcendental ego: 
The transcendental ego is transcendental consciousness in its subjective 
dimension and as reflected upon. The transcendental ego is the intentional 
center of all conscious life and, hence, of all objectifying experiences, all affects, 
all valuations, and all volitions and actions. Husserl’s transcendental ego differs 
from Immanuel Kant’s insofar as it is not a formal identity accompanying all 
experiences; instead, for Husserl the transcendental ego is a self-transforming 
identity over time. It is an identity by virtue of its self-unification in the living 
present and inner time-consciousness, and it is self-transforming insofar as it 
acquires new convictions and new habitualities. In this way, the transcendental 
ego is self-constituting, and it also discloses itself as a psychological ego in the 
world. Husserl sometimes uses “transcendental ego” in a wide sense equivalent 
to “transcendental consciousness”. (Drummond, 2007, p. 205) 
On the subject of the ego, see Lester Embree’s chapter (in Carr & Casey, 1973), 
where he devotes careful attention to Husserl’s texts in order to discover just 
what Husserl meant by this perplexing term. 
 
Transcendental reduction: see Reduction 
  




Appendix A. My recently published article in Educational 
Studies in Mathematics 
The article that was published in January 2015 in Educational Studies in 
Mathematics (ESM) is the result of two years of research and refinement of the 
research results, thus containing a substantial part of the theoretical, 
methodological and analytical work that has been exposed in the five Parts that 
comprise the body of the thesis. Anna Shvarts, my co-author, helped me 
substantially in cutting down the text within the deadline, and supported me when 
I needed to complete the work, while teaching full-time in the complicated working 
conditions of the economic crisis that has hit my country the last years. 
I want to thank the anonymous reviewers of ESM for their deep involvement with 
the ideas of the article, and their open attitude towards the theory, the methodology 
and the analysis involved in it, judging that the work is worthy of publication to this 
seminal journal in our field.  In particular, I want to thank 
 Reviewer 1, who acknowledged the clear and informative presentation of my 
theoretical presentation and of my Husserlian/Merleau-Pontyian application 
of the theory to the data, despite his personal reservations; “think[ing] that 
by wanting to see a more primitive empirical intuition at work in Mary's 
thinking, the authors miss the ‘sedimented’ character of her starting point”. 
Unfortunately, my focus on giving a phenomenological description of the 
reactivation of the parabola that took place in Mary’s case, did not allow me 
to point out explicitly how this very process reveals the sedimentation that 
mathematical objects undertake, and the reactivation process as actual de-
sedimentation. Allusions are given in the preceding chapters (Part 3, 
§3.4.2.4) of Mary’s sedimented understanding of the formula as a collection 
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of points that have a certain property, although beyond the scope of this 
study.  
 Reviewer 3, who acknowledged that 
 the Husserlian and Merleau-Pontyian position is contrasted explicitly 
with the Kantian and the differences are clearly demonstrated;  
 that the analysis of the student's developing awareness, as it is 
enabled by the deeply drawn theory, is novel; 
 and that the implications for researchers and teachers are insightful 
and applicable. 
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The role of intuition in the process of objectification of 
mathematical phenomena from a Husserlian perspective: A 
case study. 
Andonis Zagorianakos · Anna Shvarts 
Educ Stud Math (2015) 88:137–157 
DOI 10.1007/s10649-014-9576-9 
Published online: 12 November 2014 
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014 
Abstract The research is a study of the Husserlian approach to intuition, informed 
by Merleau-Ponty’s theory of perception, in the case of a prospective teacher of 
mathematics. It explores the two major stages-categories of intuition, the essential 
relations between them, and their vital role in the emergence of empirical and 
abstract mathematical objects, as they are used by the student in order to 
conceptualise mathematical phenomena. The student’s activity is analysed to its 
intuitive origins, and an intuition of essences manifests its significance for 
generalisations and insights for mathematical proofs. Through an in depth 
phenomenological data analysis, intuition is delineated as an essential mediator 
between the learner’s world-as-lived and her objectification process. Finally, some 
implications for teaching and learning are suggested. 
Key words: Intuition; Husserl; Merleau-Ponty; Phenomenology; Embodied 
consciousness; Living body; Operative intentionality; Intentionality of Act; 
Objectification; Objectivation; Constitution of an object; Mathematical objects. 
1. Rationale of the research – Aims 
Anyone engaged more or less in mathematical enquiry knows that the results of this 
endeavour are usually presented as stress free, as an almost ‘natural’ process. In 
the textbooks, mathematics is ordered in a linear way and presented as a unity in 
the sense of a ready-made product (Steinbring, 1991). Teachers present theorems 
to the students unaware of the etymology of the word, which is associated with the 
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final view (thea) at the top of a hill or a mountain, after the laborious climbing has 
taken place. A similar phenomenon takes place when teachers encounter their 
students’ thoughts and suggestions, since the teachers gauge them according to 
their perception of mathematics and mathematical knowledge, neglecting the 
particular paths that their students take and their key ideas. The qualification of 
these key ideas in order to become visible is the target core of our present research. 
In the analysis of the data we will shed light on the figuration process of the learner’s 
world-as-lived in relation to mathematical knowledge; and trace the origins of 
learning in the reactivation of a cultural object, a parabola, through equidistance 
from a wall and a fixed point, first actually then formally, by a prospective teacher 
of mathematics, due to successful (fulfilled) intuitions. Intuitions became the origins 
of such key ideas under the Husserlian phenomenological lens that we are drawing 
from, as objectifying acts that signal the immediate access of the individual to her 
lived world, from which she acquires the texture and the material of her thoughts. 
Using a corresponding phenomenological data analysis our current research has a 
four-fold aim: 
 To accentuate the given aspect of learning mathematics as a non-
prepackaged experience of the learner’s world–as–lived. 
 To manifest how intuition may be realised as an essential objectifying act, 
operating as the link between formal mathematical knowledge and the 
learner’s lived-experience. 
 To explore and to exemplify the role of different kinds of intuitive acts in the 
first stages of objectification. To attempt an inquiry into the ‘things 
themselves’, the learner’s lived-experience that becomes the material for 
empirical and abstract (mathematical) objects, and to explore essential 
actual and structural relations between these objects.  
 To suggest possible implications of a neo-Husserlian phenomenological 
perspective for teaching practice. 
2. Kantian and Husserlian approaches to objectification and intuition – A 
new perspective to intuitions as objectifying acts 
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2.1 A critical difference between Kantian and Husserlian approaches 
Most definitions and classifications of intuition are endowed with a constructivist 
lens originating in Kant, Descartes or Plato, especially when it comes to abstract 
intuitions. Processes that inhabit the cogito, the discursive human mind, take over, 
and the abstract intuitive processes are ultimately settled in internal, relational 
cognitive models. The mature Husserlian approach on experience (after his Time 
Lectures and Ideas II)189 that our research adopts, cannot be properly understood 
as a meta-Kantian philosophy without a space permitting clarification of its crucial 
yet highly neglected divergence from Kant’s notion of experience and knowledge. 
"Experience is an empirical knowledge," writes Kant (cited in Tito, 1990, p. 78). By 
experience Kant means objective thinking, knowledge. In other words, there is a 
predisposed categorial network that the subject is stored with, which makes 
perception possible. Although the issue exceeds the limits of this paper it may suffice 
to say that the difference between Husserl and Kant is very subtle yet crucial, since 
Kant recognises experience as already endowed with objectivity, while Husserl 
considers objectivity itself being constituted by the subject(s) (as a major pole of 
constitution), the communities and the social-cultural-historical entities, while the 
scientific communities are also at the centre of his interest (1970a).  
Husserl introduces “a new phenomenological attitude which focuses on the 
correlation of experienced and experiencing within lived experience itself as a 
foundation of the sciences” (Husserl, 1983b, p. ix). In a necessarily crude sense we 
could say that for Kant, the objects that are constructed by the subject are 
‘separations’ of experience by thinking, which is already categorial;190 while for 
Husserl “[t]he object is the idea of the fulfilled sense (as fulfilled completely)” 
(Husserl, 2001, p. 449). Which leads him to the essential “how the ‘objective’ a 
priori is grounded in the ‘subjective-relative’ a priori of the life-world or how, for 
example, mathematical self-evidence has its source of meaning and source of 
                                                          
189 Husserl, 1991 and 1989 respectively, in the references. 
190 This issue also amounts to the difference between Kant’s representation and Husserl’s re-presentation, 
which exceeds the space limitations of this paper. 
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legitimacy in the self-evidence of the life-world” (1970a, p. 140). Kant’s persistent 
categorial membrane separates the subject from the world by making impossible 
her immediate contact with it, while Husserl introduces the immediacy of perception 
and objects as “self-given in a simple intuition” (Husserl, 1973, p. 150, §12). This 
immediate contact with the life-world (not the world of Kantian things-in-
themselves) takes place through the living body, which is also constituted at the 
moment of object constitution. The embodied nature of consciousness and the 
immediacy of contact yield proto-knowledge directly from the real, thus allowing 
Husserlian phenomenology to overcome previous varieties of phenomenological 
ideas such as the Kantian one, where phenomena are reduced to mere opinions 
(Radford, 2014). 
Kant’s principle idea that the transcendental ego is already installed with some 
qualities beforehand (a priori) remains as a genetic seal, inherited as we shall see 
by the constructivist followers of Kantian ideas in mathematics education and in 
particular intuition. Moreover, Kant’s concept of intuitions does not anticipate any 
abstract intuitions, apart from the a priori intuitions of time and space. And these 
intuitions yield knowledge due to their ideality and not due to their immediacy 
(Hintikka, 1972, p. 344). Husserl’s approach is in sharp contrast to Kant’s approach, 
since he argues for the constitution of all categories through his concept of 
categorial intuitions (section 2.4). 
2.2 Husserl’s notion of objectification 
The concepts and theory used in this paper are drawing on Husserl's theory of 
objectification/objectivation, as it is explicated in his mature work and posthumously 
published manuscripts (Husserl, 1970a, 1973, 1983a, 1983b, 1991, 2001), as well 
as the use of Husserlian  ideas (operative intentionality, living body) by Merleau-
Ponty (1964, 2002a, 2002b).  
 Husserl delineates a complete course of the objectification process in five 
stages (Husserl,, 1936 pp. 163-165), from the “intrapsychically constituted 
structure” (p. 163) of the proto-geometer, to the final, ideal stage of the object, 
through the social scale of “the community of scientists as a community of 
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knowledge living in the unity of a common responsibility” (ibid. p. 169). During the 
first stage an object appears in front of consciousness, “in original ‘self-evidence’” 
(p. 163). In the second stage the same object appears and it is identified as the 
same. Then, in the third stage the subject has isolated an idea of object and applies 
it to different situations. In Husserl's 4th and 5th stage of the objectification the idea 
obtains the status of an “absolute ideal Objectivity” (Derrida, cited in Moutsios-
Rentzos, Spyrou, & Peteinara, 2014, p. 30). 
Husserl’s unexplored work on objectification that concerns us here is related 
to the first stage of objectification, “the history of the object itself as the object of 
a possible knowledge” (Husserl, 2001, p. 634). Husserl introduced objectivation—
his special term for the early stages of objectification—of objects, from their 
objectlike to their object status (2001, part 3). The object appears for the first time 
in consciousness as a separation from its hyletic (raw) empirical material, by fulfilling 
the intentionality that was aiming at it. The fulfilment of intentionality leads to the 
constitution of the object, namely to a novel thematisation, a unity of previously 
latent features that perception brings together as a profile of the subject’s lived 
reality, a new configuration from the 1st person perspective. 
The acts of constitution don’t just appear in a vacuum, since:  
 The individual involved in the primal constitution of a (mathematical) object 
for herself is already in a world, which houses and provides the material for 
the learner’s intuitions. 
 The subject herself has pre-reflective operative intentionality to render her 
proto-objects intelligible for others right from the start (Husserl, 1970a, 
§54b) and then objects appear in front of her consciousness as existent for 
others. 
 There is a meaningful tension in the interplay between the subject that 
exercises the objectifying act, and the object that is intended (Kolen, 2005), 
a negotiation of meaning through the task/activity. 
In an educational context, the key ideas that were involved in the objects’ 
genesis are ‘awaiting’ their reactivation, for a meaningful sense of the 
teaching/learning praxis, and the students are guided through the unfolding of 
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hundreds and thousands of years of evolution that each mathematical object 
conceals in its refined, ‘final’, ready-made mode in which it is presented. This aspect 
is stressed in the cultural-historical approach towards objectification, which is 
introduced as the process when “students gradually become acquainted with 
historically constituted cultural significations and forms of reasoning and action” 
(Roth & Radford, 2011, p 48). In this approach a new object appears in subjective 
consciousness as a result of learning, by the “transformation of cultural objective 
knowledge into an object of consciousness” (Radford 2013, p. 25).  
The important problem here is that the cultural objects are originally 
unknown for the learner: “How will you set about looking for that thing, the nature 
of which is totally unknown to you? Which, among the things you do not know, is 
the one which you propose to look for?” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 431). From the 
phenomenological perspective “perceptual consciousness is not an empty box, into 
which a perceptual object shows up unannounced and ready-made” (Husserl, 2001, 
p. 606), but due to the “continual coinciding of sense” (ibid.) new objects appear. 
If from the cultural-historical perspective to objectification a student is supposed to 
be able to reactivate culturally predisposed objects, for phenomenology it is the 
constitution of new objects that allows the learner to approach and to enrich the 
cultural objects, through her lived experience. And it is the history of objectivation 
(2001, p. 634) that reveals the origins of the reactivation of mathematical objects 
and objectivities in the acts of new constitutions, regardless if the latter have already 
entered the mathematical domain or are illuminations (Hadamard, 1954) that could 
achieve the final stages of the objectification that Husserl (1936) delineates. 
At the moment of constitution the learner manifests herself as the Husserlian 
transcendental subject “that intentionally engages the world and discloses its 
significance” (Drummond, 2007, p. 204). The constitutive moment reveals both, the 
constitutive subject and the constituted object, through “the correlative 
intentionalities of which they are the poles, through whose function they have, and 
have attained, their ontic meaning” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 182). The intentional 
identification of the object by the objectifying act, performed with the immediacy of 
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self-giveness is intuition itself, which will be at the centre of our investigation in this 
paper. 
2.3 Two kinds of intuition and the categorical structure of knowledge 
Intuition is a highly controversial topic in science and philosophy and some authors 
even suggest that the concept of intuition may be misleading and that it should be 
avoided in scientific reasoning (Fischbein, 1999, p. 11). Many researches describe 
different kinds of intuitions that are supposed to function on different levels of 
cognition, from empirical to abstract knowledge. Piaget distinguishes empirical 
intuition—which concerns the physical or psychological properties of objects (Beth 
& Piaget, 1966, p. 224)—and operational intuition that “possesses an immanent 
logic” (ibid., 212). Fischbein (1994) classifies intuition by their origins as primary 
and secondary, where “Primary intuitions refer to those cognitive beliefs which 
develop in individuals independently of any systematic instruction as an effect of 
their personal experience. (p. 64), while “the category of secondary intuitions 
implies the assumption that new intuitions, with no natural roots, may be developed. 
Such intuitions are not produced by the natural, normal experience of an individual” 
(ibid., p. 68).  
Let us look more closely to the philosophical base of Piaget and Fischbein’s 
positions, since the latter’s approach is also endowed with a constructivist lens, 
originating from the Kantian theory of mind (Otte, 1998). For Fishbein intuition is 
an act of consciousness that presents empirical or mental objects to us, based on 
pictorial models, ideality, abstractness, absolute perfection and universality 
(Fischbein, 1994, 2001). In this approach intuition appears in an already structured, 
thematised world, as a “combination of incompleteness of information and intrinsic 
certitude” (Fishbein p. 51). The ‘blindness’ of constructivism to the pre-objective 
stage of the cognitive lived experience makes the constitution of abstract entities 
incomprehensible: it leaves the structure of the lived world unexplicated and the 
origins of constitution are lost in predisposed categories. Such a case appears in 
recent mathematics education research (Andra & Santi, 2013), where “[i]ntuitive 
thinking can be seen as the sensuous side of intellectual activity” (p. 31). Verifying 
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the Kantian tradition of Fischbein in classifying intuitions as separated—in 
“sensuous” and “intellectual” classes— ‘inescapably’ informs an instrumentalist view 
on cognition, which supposes that “what we are, feel, think” is constituted by  
artifacts (p. 30). 
“For Husserl there is a level of experience that has not yet been subjected to the 
objective categories, a level of experience that is the ground of the objective 
categories. The ‘I’ is such an experience, an experience that is preobjective, and is 
not knowledge” (Tito, 1990, pp. 78-79). Husserl (1970b, 1983b) gave a privileged 
position to intuition for systematic knowledge (Smith, 2007), by placing it at the 
core of his principle of all principles (Husserl, 1983a, p. 44). He approached intuition 
as the objectifying act in which a person grasps something immediately in its bodily 
presence and also as a primordially given act upon which all of the rest is to be 
founded. For Husserl the source of intuitions is reality itself, constituted by the 
subject not in a metaphysical manner but through the immediate contact with it, 
the intuitive contact. “What is given in intuition for Husserl are components of 
reality, not our impressions of them, … at this absolutely crucial point he remains 
totally foreign to the Kantian way of thinking” (Hintikka, 2003, p. 174). 
2.4 Husserl’s Stages of intuitions – Empirical and Abstract intuitions  
According to Husserl, the intuitive process starts from the separation of the forms 
that are imposed on the raw empirical material (the hyletic data or simply hyle, 
deriving from the Greek word for matter), from the data themselves.  
“Empirical intuitions are due to reality impinging on my consciousness, not to 
the activities of my own mind. … In order to reach empirical intuitions, I have so to 
speak to look outwards, not inwards” (Hintikka, 2003, p. 178). Husserl calls this first 
stage Anschauung—intuition—and the outcome of this stage is an empirical object.  
For Husserl the empirical intuitions are not an experience in the Kantian sense, since 
consciousness is already embodied. The separation is not performed due to the 
categories that manipulate the empirical (sensory) data; nor is it a mere mental 
recognition of patterns that are so far familiar only to others. It is intuition that 
allows embodied intentional consciousness to distinguish objectlike entities from raw 
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material and transform them into empirical objects. The objectilike entities reside 
consciousness until operative intentionality will call them forth to a new 
thematisation, a new unity that is constitutive for the new object. Embodied 
consciousness is what Husserl and Merleau-Ponty call the living body, “which is 
never absent from the perceptual field” (Husserl, 1970a, p. 106, also cf. Merleau-
Ponty, 2002a, p. 87, and Tito, 1990, p. 185). The body191 plays an essential role in 
the fulfillment of operative intentionality, since it is “a sensory-motor behavior 
through which the world is constituted for man (sic) as the world of human 
consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. xvi). The operative intentionality is 
“already at work before any positing or any judgment” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. 
498) and it “produces the natural and antepredicative unity of the world and of our 
life” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, p. xx). It is pre-reflective but this does not mean that 
it is unconscious (Reuter, 1999, p. 76); and it can be revealed: 
We do not see the operation, since it operates. We see what would be 
missing without it; we circumscribe it as what makes speech be a "speaking 
of" ... and not be the conscious having of the idealities implied in speech. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002b, p. 44)192 
Due to the operative intentionality the cognising subject does not construct objects 
(by imposing categories on experience) but rather enacts and inhabits them, by 
separating them from the unstructured raw material. Despite the immediate feeling 
of certainty that intuition brings there is a tension, since the intuitive moment with 
all its fullness of certainty is realised as a prehension, i.e. the “inadequate or 
imperfect grasp of something, where the content of the grasp adumbrates or points 
to something beyond what is given … a form of incomplete cognitive apprehension” 
(Tragesser, 1977, pp. 17-18). What is crucial from our cognitive point of view is that 
the operative intentionality makes possible the intentionality of act (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002a, p. 486), “which is that of our judgements and of those occasions when we 
voluntarily take up a position” (p. xx). The intentionality of act is responsible for the 
                                                          
191 The body as (intentional) subject, not as an object (cf. Reuter, 1999, pp. 71-72). 
192 The extract is from Merleau-Ponty's notes on Husserl’s Origin of Geometry. 
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“more complete apprehension of the object” (Tragesser, 1977, p. 19) that is 
achieved through its application to the task. 
The other crucial novelty of Husserl’s approach towards Kantian 
epistemologies that concerns us here is his introduction of the categorial intuitions, 
which are intuitions of abstract objects (Husserl, 1970b). The categorial intuitions 
take place in two stages, following empirical ones and using their products. 
When the second intuitive stage takes place—the categorial stage—an 
abstract object will emerge, in a process that is “more like seeing than imagining” 
(Hintikka, 2003, p. 177). According to Husserl:  
…Husserl's essences, do not come to us separated from the empirical objects 
whose "forms" they are. … This intuition has the effect of opening to my 
consciousness, not only an empirical object consisting of matter and form, 
but that form or essence in itself, separated from its hyle. (Hintikka, 2003, 
pp. 177, 180) 
The intuitions of essences (Wesensschau) are a special case of categorial 
intuitions and we refer to both of them as abstract intuitions. For the same reasons 
Wesensschau will refer to both of them.193 Let us sum up the two main kinds of 
intuitions according to Husserl: 
 The empirical intuition (Anschauung) enables the subject to extract forms-
objects from the raw empirical material (the hyle) through her lived 
experience, due to operative intentionality. The disentanglement of forms 
turns them into empirical objects and they become known as such, as soon 
as they are separated. 
 The abstract intuition (categorial, Wesensschau) enables the subject to 
extract abstract forms-objects from the products of empirical intuition, as 
well as from the results of more elaborated objectifying acts. The 
disentanglement of abstract forms takes place due to the intentionality of 
                                                          
193 Examples of a categorial intuition and an intuition of essences are given in sections 5.3.2, 5.3.4 
respectively. 
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act, and turns them into abstract objects that are still based on the subject’s 
lived experience. 
 
2.5 Intuitions as interrelated forms, functioning in a similar way 
The stages of the categorial intuition, i.e. the empirical and the abstract stages are 
linked, although the second one may immediately succeed or take place long after 
the first one.  
Since the empirical objects of the first stage can become materials for the 
second one that produces abstract objects, Husserl provides a strong indication for 
the emergence of abstract objects as interrelated with empirical objects, which 
either are or they are related to empirical material, previously objectified (section 
5.3.2). And he approaches cognition as linked to the learner’s embodied 
consciousness, rather than to pre-existing objective categories. He grounds the 
seeing of ‘essences’ on an embodied perception of conscious activity, and identifies 
intuition as the operator “on the overlap of my consciousness and reality” (Hintikka, 
1995, p. 82), as an actual mediator between the world-as-lived by the individual 
and her constitution of abstract mathematical objects. His inquiry concerns “the way 
in which the life-world constantly functions as subsoil, into how its manifold 
prelogical validities act as grounds for the logical ones, for theoretical truths” 
(Husserl, 1970a, p. 124). 
Categorial intuitions follow the pattern of empirical intuitions: The latter 
intend objectlike entities and by intuitive synthesis thematise them into empirical 
objects; the former collect invariable features (essences) of empirical objects and 
they synthesise them into abstract objects.  
Husserl’s theory elucidates how an empirical object is transmuted to an 
abstract object during the 2nd stage-category of intuition, how an abstract object 
undergoes the same process as it is transformed into another abstract object and 
so forth. Husserl, as a mathematician, is aware of the particular nature of 
mathematical norms and mathematical objects which can proceed higher and higher 
in a process of abstraction.   
2.6 Criteria for intuitive moments. 
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To identify a particular act as intuitive we used the following criteria of intentionality, 
immediacy and the feeling of certainty: 
 Intentionality is the property that makes intuition an objectifying act. In 
empirical intuition it is a straightforward (immediate) effect, and it is 
determined as such by Husserl in abstract intuitions: “what makes seeing 
an essence an intuition is not that it is seeing an essence, but that it is 
seeing an object which is ‘itself given’” (Hintikka, 2003).  
 Immediacy is the intuitions’ critical feature, which distinguishes them from 
other concepts such as memory or imagination (Husserl, 1970b; Hintikka, 
2003; Held, 2003). Immediacy is present in both intuitive instances and 
it brings with it a feeling of certainty. 
These criteria were used in the analysis of the empirical data allowing us to 
understand the different kinds of intuition that the students used, according to their 
relations to the students’ lived experience. The Husserlian theory of intuitions 
offered a solid explication of their origins in the cultural and time dependent world 
of experience, and it shed light on their expansion to more elaborated intuitions.  
Being attentive to visual and kinesthetic evidences of the sensory-motor pre-
objective experience of the student we expect to have a glimpse on how intuition 
transforms raw material into objects, thus contributing something critical for 
mathematical education by better understanding the constitution of the 
mathematical objects by the students. 
3. The description of the course - The case of Mary 
The data analysis is a case study from a course that took place in the academic year 
2010-2011 and involved a group of 13 students, training to be teachers in British 
secondary schools. The course consisted of twenty 3-hour sessions, where the main 
targets were the production of generalisations by the students and their diverse 
conceptualisations of mathematical phenomena, such as the embodied 
understanding of curves. The teacher avoided the provision of information 
concerning the tasks, intervening in the students’ methods or interrupting their 
discourse (as described by Brown, 2012); he only described the operational aspect 
of the tasks. For this reason this course was particularly appropriate for our research 
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where we intended to look at the learning process from the first person perspective 
and to bracket (i.e. set aside from the present consideration) influences of cultural 
tools and practices, which inevitably accompany any education.194 
The students were invited to use their common sense and mathematise their 
results in any way they thought appropriate. They were working in small groups of 
3 to 5 people of their own choice and it was suggested to continue ther 
investigations at home and push them as far as they could in order to submitt their 
findings in their coursework.  
In the episode that will be analysed195 the students were asked to make 
sense of a curve through exercises centred on the students’ bodily movement. The 
teacher of the course asked the students “to think how they can move whilst 
remaining equidistant” from the wall (10 foot-paces) and a student who remained 
stationary. No other direction or indication on how to proceed was given to the 
students, who were free to handle the activities any way they thought suitable. 
The student of our case study, Mary (pseudonym), was embodying the fixed 
point, while another student was acting out the curve (fig. 1). The first author 
participated in Mary’s group while avoiding to facilitate the students’ investigations. 
A few days after the session Mary presented an elaborate drawing (fig. 2) and a 
detailed account of her treatment of the activity at home. At the end of the course 
she submitted her report on this activity as her favourite amongst several. 
 The session was audio and video taped (after gaining the students’ 
permission) and Mary’s home work was analyzed through interviews and the text of 
her coursework. An interview was conducted a few days before the student 
delivered her coursework, then an additional interview took place and an e-mail was 
used in order to clarify a few issues. In the following sections we analyse Mary’s 
                                                          
194 It doesn’t mean that we suppose intuitive processes to be limited to individual processes: we acknowledge 
that for the fullest understanding of intuitive processes in the learning practice attention needs also to be paid 
to the social-cultural dimensions, as it is attempted in Andrà & Santi, 2013, Andrà & Liljedahl, 2014. 
195 A different perspective of this session appears at a paper that was published recently (Brown, Heywood, 
Solomon, & Zagorianakos, 2013). 
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data, as they were triangulated or cross-checked from the aforementioned data 
sources. 
 
Figure 1:  The other student with her back to the wall and looking at Mary (the fixed point) 
moves her hands perpendicularly towards the wall. 
4. Qualitative methodology of the data analysis 
The driving force of this study is our intention to  explore  the  genetic  moments  
of  cognitive activity, in the sense that Husserl (1936, 1989, 1973, 1991, 2001) gives 
to  it and Merleau-Ponty  develops it to  the  primacy  of  perception. We aimed to 
describe the mathematical phenomena as they occurred in the tasks from the 
student’s individual perspective, and to start from a viewpoint free from hypotheses 
about what the student’s constructions should be and as free as possible from 
preconceptions (Husserl, 1970b). For this reason we attempted to apply a 
phenomenological reduction that focuses on the experience in which the object is 
given to the subject, instead of analysing the object of experience itself. Under this 
perspective the consequence of bracketing was necessary in order to approach the 
student’s objects as they appeared. Starting from ‘bracketing’ the body of the 
mathematical tradition and ‘bracketing’ cultural interventions in the learning process 
we were driven towards “bracketing of questions regarding the actual existence of 
the experiences on which we reflect and the object of those experiences and 
focusing instead on the object just in the manner of its appearance” (Drummond, 
2007, p.160). The first author participated in the whole course of learning sessions 
and he adopted the teacher’s strategy; he inevitably was not a detached and 
impartial observer but an internal participant who tried to enter into the perceptions 
of the students and see the learning situations as they saw them.  It was an ongoing 
and adjusting process of bracketing and coming to the phenomenological attitude 
(Moustakas, 1994; Lester, 1999). In this context the current study approaches the 
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learning process from a point of presence within and through it, attempting to make 
it as transparent as possible by accessing its origins in the student’s conscious acts, 
deeply rooted as they are in the individual and common horizons of the world-as-
lived and perceived by the learner. 
Under the perspective that was adopted during the participation in the 
sessions, the student’s communicable expressions (verbal, figurative, diagrammatic, 
etc.) were explored on the different levels of systematisation, generalisation and 
abstraction, trying to gain access to the “intrapsychically constituted structures” 
(Husserl, 1936, p.163) from which these expressions originated. Through these 
expressions we came to intuitions as a main mechanism of appearance of the 
objects. By applying the phenomenological attitude, we argue that the treatment of 
the particular case study could gain generality towards mechanisms of 
objectification not by inductive conclusion but by phenomenological evidence that 
“covers other acts besides simply perceptive seeing”, while “[s]ense-formations 
whose nature it is to exist as subjectively produced results are 'grasped' originaliter 
in being produced” (Dorion Cairns cited in Husserl, 1936, p. 13). It is in this sense 
that we achieved evidences of different kinds of intuitions, which were revealed not 
as empirically existent and observable, but as the residue of phenomenological 
analysis.  
5. The three stages of the student’s investigation  
In further analysing the empirical data our phenomenological method allowed 
essential structures to be revealed by acknowledging the learner’s intentional 
transcendental ego as an objectifying unit. In the course of close exploration of all 
the material three stages emerged from Mary’s investigation, namely the embodied 
(when she was in the classroom) the diagrammatic and the formal. 
5.1 The embodied first stage of Mary’s investigation 
The analysis of the audio and video recordings of the first stage revealed important 
clues about the curve and her formal negotiation that followed: 
 Mary, who acted as the fixed point, thought that the curve was a straight line 
parallel to the wall, midway between the wall and the fixed point, while the 
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other student, who acted as the curve, thought that it was a semicircle with 
a radius of 5 foot-paces and its centre located at the fixed point. She was 
moving to different positions—curve points—with her back to the wall and 
looking at Mary, repeatedly moving her hands perpendicularly towards the 
wall (fig.1),196 in order to indicate each curve point’s distance from it. 
 The other student and the first author, in order to show that the curve could 
not be a straight line parallel to the wall, used the right triangle formed by 
the fixed point, the midpoint—located on the straight line segment midway 
between the fixed point and the wall—and another point on the line parallel 
to the wall from the midpoint.  
 The students could not reach an agreement on what the curve would look 
like, so they could not conceptualise it and try to identify mathematical 
relationships; and they chose not to use notes, only their bodies. At some 
stage the first author suggested that finding more curve points might help 
them understand what kind of curve it is.  
Mary seemed puzzled throughout the activity, and after the break the teacher, 
who was engaged in another group during the particular investigation, asked 
what the students thought of it; the other student said “we were trying to find 
out another point” and Mary responded “we were struggling with it”. 
                                                          
196 The picture is included with the permission of the student. 
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Figure 2:  Mary’s "little diagram", when it was completed. Later she added the formula 
for her final expression. 
5.2 The diagrammatic second stage – The empirical ‘bird’s eye view’ 
intuition 
Mary started the second stage of her negotiation at home the same day with a 
diagram of the fixed point and the ‘wall’ (fig. 2 shows the same diagram when it 
was completed). Her diagram has its intentional origins in the portrayal of the 
classroom situation: “when I got home I just drew this little diagram … I think what 
I couldn’t understand on the day [in the classroom] was that this wall went on 
forever!” (first interview). The importance of the diagrammatic stage invites us to 
look closely at how it happened; the original moment was the empirical intuition 
according to Husserl, which emerged and enabled the transition, as Mary described 
it in her interview: 
Once I could draw a diagram and look back [to the classroom experience], I 
look at it from this point of view; it’s much easier than being in that point 
[i.e. the fixed point in the classroom], that looking, like, when standing here 
[she points to the fixed point on the diagram] all you see is the wall! [see 
figure 1] You don’t see all this is going on as well. So once you can see from 
a bird’s eye view it’s easier to… 
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Her intentionality was fulfilled by intuiting the diagram as a ‘bird’s eye view’ 
perception of the classroom. Her new perception appeared ‘in one stroke’, since it 
was not by induction that she realised that the sought curve could not be a straight 
line parallel to the wall, as she thought in the classroom; it just did not make sense 
anymore because she could now actually see it, from her ‘bird’s eye view’ perception 
of the diagram. She also realised ‘in one stroke’ that her position in the classroom 
did not signify a straight line but a fixed point. So immediacy was an important 
feature of the transformation of the paper diagram to the classroom re-presentation 
and the dispelling of her classroom misconceptions. It is an example of the 
embodiment of perception, when the intuitive moment is also the moment of 
transformation. 
In order to appreciate the empirical character of this intuition we need to 
look closer at its visual and kinesthetic features, and motility as basic intentionality 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002a). As we focused on the intentional origins of the perceptual 
object (the classroom re-presentation through the diagram) we applied Husserl’s 
theoretical ideas about lived-experience, in our attempt to explore how it came to 
life in a new sense. The diagram, more than representation of existing knowledge, 
was an embodied act that “constituted new relationships between the person doing 
the mathematics and the material world” (DeFreitas & Sinclair, 2012, p. 134). By 
“responding to the call” of the diagram (Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, pp. 161), 
kinesthetically and visually, her pre-reflective, operative intentionality was directed 
to the ‘bird’s eye view’ of the classroom setting: It was an embodied operation that 
took place (not a positing thought), that ‘I can identify the diagram as such a 
perspective of the classroom, here, on the piece of paper’. 
We notice how the operative intentionality manifests itself through “what 
would be missing without it” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002b, p. 44, section 2.4): Mary 
acquired a particular sense of space, emanating from an operation of a plan 
perspective on the paper as a single object, which preceded any positing act; 
because I cannot posit anything before there is space for such a positing, and in 
particular, space that I can inhabit with my living body. It was only due to the new 
perception of the diagram by the operative intentionality that the reflective, positing 
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(intentionality of) act could appear, that ‘I was standing there, at that point, and 
this line is the wall’. And it can serve as an example of how the living body is present 
in the perceptual field, as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty have predicted it (Husserl, 
1970a, p. 106; also cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2002a, pp. 87-88). 
It was not only Mary’s diagram but also her classroom experience that 
acquired a new sense due to her bird’s-eye-view intuition, since she could now “look 
at it from this point of view; it’s much easier than being in that point, when standing 
all you see is the wall!”; the classroom’s yet unexplored experience was re-
presented on the piece of paper, ready for the student’s mathematical interface to 
be applied. 
5.3 The formal third stage of the investigation and the intuitions that took 
place 
Mary’s intention to mathematise the diagram was confirmed when she directly 
introduced the Cartesian coordinate system into it, thus entering the formal 
treatment of her investigation. She placed the fixed point at the origin and the wall 
became a straight line parallel to the x-axis (figure 2). Due to her ‘bird’s eye view’ 
intuition every formal treatment that followed became equivalent to a classroom 
situation, thus imbuing her abstract ideas with an embodied empirical sense. 
5.3.1 The empirical intuitions of the symmetrical points and the parallel 
lines 
She easily found the first 3 points that belonged to the curve, namely the (10, 0), 
(–10, 0) and (0, 5). Then she visually intuited that the curve will be symmetrical to 
the y axis and while she was looking for more points, the first key idea in the formal 
stage of her enquiry appeared. She thought that if she would draw lines parallel to 
the x-axis and the wall in the area between the x axis and (0, 5), they would 
intersect the sought curve in 2 points (the grid paper has played a part in her 
empirical symmetry intuition, since she did not actually draw any lines parallel to 
the ‘wall’ and the x axis—see fig. 2): 
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So I had this point, this point and this point… so then, I was like ‘there must be 
another point; so what would happen if I’d change, if I moved this point so [that] 
it was on the line of y=4’, yeah? (interview extract) 
She recalls a feeling of certainty (“I was like ‘there must be another point’”) and 
there is already kinesthetic language involved (“what would happen if I’d change, if 
I moved this point”). Her empirical intuitive idea that the curve is symmetrical to 
the y-axis and that it cannot go any further than 5 towards the ‘wall’ made her 
parallel lines intuition possible. She saw these parallel lines as effective for a curve 
that was not there, apart from the 3 points that indicated the symmetry. And her 
feeling of certainty motivated her subsequent actions. The spatiality of her insight 
(the spatial reorganisation of the space between the x-axis and (0, 5)) and the 
actual sense of motion as she “moved this point” bear evidence of the kinesthetic 
features of her intuition. 
 Mary then “continued altering the y coordinates so that the distance from the 
wall changed” and “pulled out a triangle in the hope it will help us calculate what 
the x coordinate would be in order for the distance from the wall to the origin to 
remain equal”. She involved the Pythagorean Theorem and her hope acquired 
formal ground by finding the first point ((√20, 4)), and the whole process became 
a technique as she called it: “The technique seemed to be working so I decided to 
continue to use it”.    
The empirical intuition of the lines parallel to the wall with its kinesthetic features, 
based on the visual intuition that presented the sought curve as symmetrical, 
reorganised the space between the origin and (0, 5). Her intuitions constituted 
space within space (since the lines parallel to the wall and the x-axis represented 
for her their distances from the wall and the x-axis, respectively), and brought 
objects to the surface of consciousness (lines parallel to the wall and line segments 
perpendicular to the wall). Culturally mediated concepts (such as the coordinates, 
the grid paper and the Pythagorean Theorem) interplayed with kinesthetic and 
visual personal experience in order to constitute the new object (the parallel lines 
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as the way to fix the x coordinate) and the new tool/technique that realised197 her 
new object. 
5.3.2 The intuitions related to the x2 curves 
Mary had found the first 5 points of the curve ((0, 5), (10, 0), (-10, 0), (√20, 4), 
(−√20, 4)). According to Merleau-Ponty (2002a) attention “first of all presupposes 
a transformation of the mental field, a new way for consciousness to be present to 
its objects” (p. 33). The 5 points to which the student directed her attention to, 
became a figure on the ground of the paper and the other lines she had drawn. As 
she clarified in her second interview, “it was an aha-moment, I noticed that all of 
the points were going in the same fashion and thus there must be a rule as to what 
they were all following”. A curve connecting these 5 points appeared in her 
consciousness. After she “realised that there was some pattern” she intuited that 
“this shape of graph”, which she had just intuited out of the 5 points “is resemblant 
[sic] of the x squared graph”. That is how her double intuition occurred: at first she 
noticed that there is “some pattern” between the 5 points and then the idea of “the 
x squared graph” appeared in her consciousness.  
The extraction of a form out of the 5 points could be explicated as an 
empirical intuition according to Husserl and the result was the creation of an object, 
a shape that was brought to consciousness. The immediacy of intuition concerns 
the moment that the intentional act was fulfilled, the moment when sense was 
attributed to the intuitive operative intentional act, by the separation of the form 
out of the 5 points. The form of the 5 points has a pre-linguistic visual expression, 
as it transforms the real objects (the 5 points) to a new kind of object (a profile of 
the sought curve). 
The second intuition associated the object that came out of the first one, 
with the x2 curves. It bestowed the image of the first intuition with an abstract 
categorial feature, i.e. as belonging to the family of the x2 curves, which is what 
                                                          
197 The application of her new object in her technique is also perceived as a better apprehension of the newly-
constituted object (cf. section 2.4). 
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makes this intuition an abstract (categorial) intuition. It is a moment in which we 
feel how the intuitive contact took place: the student’s operative intentionality 
extracted the form out of the 5 points and her intentionality of act (to find “a rule”) 
posited the form as an x2 curve figure; It was “proper learning” (as she called it in 
the interview) that helped her to find an answer but it was only intuition that allowed 
it to appear in consciousness at the right moment.  
5.3.3 Integration of processes – the constitution of the first formula 
Mary objectified the set of arbitrarily chosen lines parallel to the wall and their 
corresponding perpendicular line segments (parallel to each other) and she used it 
as a technique, by applying it to the generation of another pair of curve points 
((√40, 3), (−√40, 3)). She then wondered if there was “a point that would be of 
equal distance to the wall and the origin … once the moveable point passed the x-
axis”. By application of her already objectified technique she overstepped her initial 
intuitive conviction that the curve is limited by the x axis…. It is a case that her 
formal treatment corrected the pitfall of her visual empirical intuition, showing that 
intuitions may be misleading but they are not necessarily end barriers; and it 
exemplifies how intuitive mathematics in action is legitimate mathematics. 
At this point Mary employed instruction based arguments, without parting 
from her intuitive approach.  She noticed that the x2 curve is translated to the 
maximum point (0, 5), so she thought of the formula y = 5 – x2. She tried the point 
(10, 0) in the formula but she got –5 = –100. And then she manipulated the false 
arithmetic relation into the correct formula (y = 5 −
x2
20
), by using the point (10, 0) 
and focusing on number 10.   
Mary then tested the point (√20 , 4) in her formula and she was convinced 
that the formula is correct. Two points ((10, 0) and (√20 , 4)) were enough to 
constitute the sense of generality for her, which was something repeated later on 
(see the following section).  The introduction of the formula by the student became 
an objectification of the coordinates of the points having the property of 10 units’ 
equidistance from a straight line and a fixed point. Finally, her persistence in number 
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10 throughout the process became the preparatory step to her last intuition, which 
brought the general formula to the surface. 
5.3.4 The intuition of essences related to the general formula 
There is a particular kind of abstract intuition, which is a categorial intuition that 
Husserl calls intuition of essences and it is characterised by apodictic evidence 
(Lohmar in Haritmo, 2010, p. 74). The example of Mary’s last intuition will allow us 
to get a glimpse at the main features of this kind of intuition, which holds particular 
significance for generalisations and mathematical proofs.  
Although Mary had answered the particular mathematical enquiry, her 
intuition pushed her investigation further, by objectifying the whole process into a 
new tool in order to extend the task. The distance between the wall and the fixed 
point remained her intended number as she repeated the whole process and found 
the formula of the curve when the distance between the fixed point and the wall is 
6 units instead of 10(𝑦 = 3 −
x2
12
). As she explained in the interview she had already 
seen the essential relations between 10 and 5, 20 in the first formula before she 
figured out the second formula. But she became increasingly certain concerning the 
part of number 10 in the first formula, as she applied identical processes to the 






 of all the curves with the 
same property, by replacing 10 by a variable in her initial formula. 
The particular qualities of the intuitions of essences surface here, such as the 
three ‘moments’ that conjoin, in the following sequence: 
 The first formula is the starting example (Lohmar in Haritmo, 2010, p. 78), 
the object of experience (ibid., p. 83) and it became the leading example, 
already incorporating essential embodied elements as the previous analysis 
has shown. 
 The generality that the leading example gains through the modeling of the 
whole process in another, intended example (the second curve). The 
matching of the first formula to the second one (and the correspondence 
between 10 and 6) was decisive for the process of its generalisation. 
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 The “synthesis of coincidence” (ibid. p. 79), through the recognition of 
number 10 as such, stripped of its particular originations and seen as a 
‘variable number’. This operation is instantiated in the leading example, by 
pinning 10 down to the mathematical symbolic frame and transforming it to 
a variable. That is how number 10 was recognized as essential for the 
expansion of the formula and finally acquired a new quality.  
The 3rd moment is the conclusion and the core of the intuition, since all steps were 
realised in a stroke, in the recapitulating act of coincidence (the third ‘moment’), 
typical of the intuitive immediacy. Mary sidestepped the various connotations of 
number 10 (sensory, algebraic, geometric) and identified it as a number—as ‘any’ 
number. What made this possible is what Lohmar calls the interpretation of the 
“special synthesis of coincidence” (Lohmar, 2010, pp. 79, 80; also cf. Husserl, 1973, 
Section 1), based on the singular example of the first formula and the generality it 
acquired from its reflection on the other formula and curve through number 10. The 
‘synthesis of coincidence’ concerns the qualitative transformation - through a novel 
thematic identification - of the particular, out of the awareness of the generality. 
The synthesis of coincidence occurs between the subdividing acts - the two 
formulas. It is the apprehension of the coincidence as the identity of the general 
feature that becomes the essence, expressed as the general formula - the intended 
object of a new category. 
5.4 Coexistence of abstract and empirical intuitions as a sign of deep 
understanding – the curve as a “moveable point”. 
The phenomenological analysis allows us to see the linkages between the empirical 
and the abstract (categorial) intuitions, and the transition from the pre-reflective to 
the reflective field of experience. 
The student perceived the sought curve as a “moveable point”, which is an 
expression she repeatedly used for the curve in her coursework. Her sensorimotor 
expressions (“moveable”) (see the quotation in 5.3.3) are signs of how she explored 
the relationship between the locus of the parabola points and the functional one, as 
she vividly described it when she had accomplished the task:  
~ 358 ~ 
 
Like for that I am positive that I can say that if this is true and if this part 






  and you would 
be equidistant from the wall and a fixed point. (first interview extract) 
So the formula could be rolled back to its empirical origins, integrated in a perception 
that permeated the student’s investigation: it’s always points, either points to be 
traced with lines parallel to the wall, points to judge if the formula is the correct 
one, to manifest the generality achieved through the concrete particular case, and 
so forth. 
Finally, what is remarkable and pertinent to this research is that due to a 
sequence of successful intuitions she constructed formulas that she only later knew 
were called parabolas and a general formula, in a bottom-up process. It was this 
lack of names and ready-made information often confused with knowledge that 
enabled her to realise the parabolas, through their equidistance property. 
6. Discussion 
The research supports the claim that phenomenology, being a philosophy of the 
'immediate experience' can give a convincing account of the significance of intuition 
in the objectification process.  
The two-level structure of intuitions (empirical/abstract), as it was introduced 
in sections 2.4-2.5 and analysed in the data (e.g. 5.3.2) corresponds to ideas 
expressed in non-phenomenological literature. For example, Fischbein points at 
primary intuitions as the cognitive beliefs that develop independently of any 
systematic instruction as an effect of their personal experience, which corresponds 
to the Husserlian empirical intuition. And Husserl’s abstract intuition is similar to 
Fischbein’s secondary intuition (1994, p. 68) that has no natural roots, and the 
Piagetian operational intuition (ibid., ch. 4) that comes from special action towards 
objects of the world, rather than mere perception. By employing the Husserlian 
theory, the similarities and differences between the two levels of intuitions were 
clearly shown in the data analysis, without any appeal to idealist or biologistic 
concepts, such as the concept of the adaptation mechanism (ibid. p. 59), but by 
taking into account their position and functioning in the objectification process  
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But what is principally new in Husserl’s approach is intuitions as objectifying 
acts, which separate a new object from unstructured, unthematised raw material. 
The bird’s eye view intuition brought up the diagram as a new object from 
unstructured sensory-motor classroom and home experience, and the general 
formula appeared as identification between elements of particular formulas, which 
became essential only due to the fulfillment of the intentionality of the general 
formula. Here we deal with the learner’s lived experiences as separations of lived 
profiles of the learner’s reality, not as already categorised Kantian perceptions. 
Empirical intuitions are mediators of our lived-life, they are accumulations 
of experience of our embodied consciousness and they bring new objects that we 
come to learn as we use rather than construct. They are embodied, pre-objective 
operations, followed by action. Empirical intuitions concern the transformation of 
the sensory, unreflected, raw data to forms, to empirical objects, which become the 
ground, the subsoil of the abstract ones; (e.g. the ‘bird’s eye view’ intuition that 
transformed Mary’s classroom experience into the diagram and became the ground 
for her further abstract intuitions (section 5.2)). 
Abstract intuitions bring objects of a new kind with them from ‘ordinary’ 
singularities, such the figure that emerged from the 5 points on the piece of paper 
and was linked to the x2 curves (section 5.3.2), or the numbers—distances on her 
diagram—that were intuitively targeted and evolved to a technique and then to a 
variable, in Mary’s general formula (section 5.3.4).  Abstract intuitions were shown: 
 to follow similar patterns of emergence to corresponding empirical 
intuitions: e.g. the figure that emerged from the 5 points appeared on 
the ground of the grid lines of the paper and other lines she had 
drawn, in the same way as the x2 curve graph emerged on the ground 
of other graphs (section 5.3.2) 
 to work on the products of empirical intuitions: e.g. Mary has 
recognised a pattern in the 5 points, which became a basis for the x2-
curve abstract intuition, or e.g. number 10 was intuited as an 
important one and then became a basis for abstract intuition through 
its involvement in the formula production  
~ 360 ~ 
 
 and to bring new sorts of objects to the surface (e.g. the general 
formula in section 5.2.4), by focusing on invariable features of 
previously constituted objects (the two formulas), in the context of 
their cultural (mathematical) horizons. 
We consider Mary’s last intuition towards the formal expression of the 
parabola (section 5.2.4) as a particular kind of abstract intuition, the intuition of 
essences. It illuminates the essential properties of two previously objectified forms; 
but the interaction between forms keeps the starting example as the principle knot 
of reference. In this case the general formula appeared as the essential property of 
two particular formulas and the first of them stood as a reference to Mary’s 
embodied experience. Thus the synthesising intuitions of coincidence (essences) 
become the embodied, personal and at the same time cultural agents of learning 
and teaching experience. The intuition of essences revealed not just an abstract 
knowledge of formula, but rather a node in the system of layers of objectified 
experience grounded in the living-body.  
From one hand it is the living body, the body-subject that lies at the core of 
intuitions, from another hand it is the intuitions, the starting points for the discursive 
nature of knowledge, since they link the pre-objective raw material (hyle) of lived-
experience to the reflective conscious treatment of cultural (mathematical) objects. 
During the objectification process objects emerge once the students become 
conscious of the effective implications of their intuitions and then the objects evolve 
through their further involvement in the students’ activity towards the next 
objectifying acts, in order to arrive to the final cultural form. It is in this sense that 
intuitions of essences, as well as all abstract intuitions are the end points of the 
learner’s analysis and “by the same token the starting-points of our epistemological 
and constitutive processes” (Hintikka, 2003, p. 180). 
We can see here that one of the novelties of Husserl is that he gives a 
legitimate answer to Meno’s paradox of the acquisition of knowledge, through the 
subjective cognitive praxis, which is transcending its cultural mediation at the same 
moment that it is culturally transcended by pre-existing tradition and similar 
constitutive practices. Being deliberately bracketed by phenomenological attitude 
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cultural conditions took significant part in the investigated process of objectification: 
it was the cultural practice of modelling that allowed Mary to draw the diagram; it 
was the ruler as a cultural tool that allowed her to depict a straight line on the 
paper; it was the specially structured grid paper that facilitated the application of 
the coordinate system and her visual intuitions, and so forth. But it was only 
personal lived experience that let objectification happen, that made possible the 
coincidence of intuitive synthesis in Mary’s last intuition. Thereby we suppose that 
Husserl, who has radically rethought Kantian and Cartesian dichotomies, could be 
considered as complementary to current cultural-historical approaches, from the 
point of view of the subject-in-the-world. 
I exemplified how the lived experiences genetically break down the dualism of 
“outer” and “inner” world, since they are “appearances-of-something… of existing 
things presenting themselves” (Held, in Welton, 2003, p. 28). “[T]hey are the In-
between, that which originally opens the dimension of intentional appearance within 
which consciousness and the world have already met—before any subject-object 
rift” (ibid.). It is in the beginning, in the origins of objectification where the genetic 
issues of the constitution of temporality (Husserl, 1991, 2001) and of the “unity of 
coincidence corresponding to the unity of sense” (2001, p. 44; cf. 1970b, 1973) 
arise. There—in the origins of objectification—are structures that persist in personal 
cognitive experience, namely the synthesis of coincidence, the recognition of the 
generality from the mirroring of a starting example and the double operation of 
categorial intuition. This double operation of intuition (section 5.3.2) starts from an 
empirical particular that is constituted—not merely found yet not constructed—and 
then used for the categorial association in order to introduce the presented curve 
figure to the x2 family of curves. Making association possible is a poetic moment 
(Radford, 2010, p. 6), which Husserl's theory of experience makes visible, where a 
student is engaged with her living body that manifests itself in its actions, starting 
with its intuitive body-subject-in-the-world constitutions. 
7. Implications for teaching and learning 
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The phenomenological perspective of our research approaches an understanding of 
cognition where intuitions and their objects are seen as essential sources of meaning 
during the learning and teaching practices. Adopting this position one becomes 
attentive to the individual learning history of objects, to the sequence of the 
learner’s intuitive moments that make possible the evolution of objectification from 
raw material towards formal mathematical knowledge. The history of the student’s 
concept of the x2 curve in this study appeared as full of small discoveries and 
misleading assumptions that were overcame by her subsequent intuitive acts.198 In 
this sense, the individual learning history may be more instructive than the history 
of a concept. We support the teacher’s desire to learn from the students’ particular 
ways of learning, to communicate these individual perceptual approaches with the 
other students, and to reflect on her own. We offer our analysis of the student’s 
unique learning experience as a leading example for a teacher who would venture 
to bring some implication of phenomenological attitude into teaching practice.    
The phenomenological approach of the research suggests that unfolding the 
multiple stratifications of the subjective perspective of the learner’s lived-world is 
equivalent to letting actual engagement of the learner emerge, and the learning 
praxis to take place and be recognised as such. Focusing on the students’ intuitions 
and objectification processes is an approach that leads to the core of their learning 
practices, since intuitions, as particular expressions of perception, are connecting 
the hyletic data, i.e. the “unstructured raw material” with “our structuring and form-
giving mental activities” (Hintikka, 1995, p. 98). Nurturing the students’ intuitive 
processes, facilitating them with corresponding intentional teaching adjustments, 
and aiming for the “intuitive starting point” (van Hiele, p. 122) are suggested forms 
of action. 
The research shows how in fact more delicate is the teacher’s task, since it 
requires letting knowledge emerge  and acknowledging its rich grounding in the 
learners’ intuitions, rather than confining it to her own perceptions by offering ready-
                                                          
198 She ‘saw’ that the sought curve is not a straight line from her bird’s-eye view (section 5.2) and she 
removed her previously intuited x-axis barrier by applying her just objectified ‘technique’ (section 5.3.3). 
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made answers, and utterly reducing it to “the procurement of useful information” 
(Heidegger, 2004, p. 15):  
Teaching is even more difficult than learning. We know that; but we 
rarely think about it. And why is teaching more difficult than learning? 
Not because the teacher must have a larger store of information, and 
have it always ready. Teaching is more difficult than learning because 
what teaching calls for is this: to let learn. The real teacher, in fact, 
lets nothing else be learned than—learning. (p. 15) 
The research can thus contribute to “the emergence of a complex collective 
whose interactions and products are mathematical”, in service of diversity that is 
assumed and flexible rather than legislated (Davis & Simmt, 2003, p. 149). 
8. Conclusions 
We regard the results of our research as contributory for both theoretical 
understanding of learning and practical application in learning and teaching.  
The phenomenological perspective advocated by this study opens a 
possibility to disclose the mystery of “[h]ow will you set about looking for that thing, 
the nature of which is totally unknown to you?” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, p. 431): at 
the very beginning of a new knowledge it is the living body and the lived world who 
meet beyond the object-subject dichotomy, in order to shape objects by intuitive 
acts. It is the origin of the objectification process when intuitions bring objects on 
the surface of consciousness, shaped exactly in accordance with the operative 
intentionalities of the student. Intuitions reveal the objects that emerged in sensory-
motor behaviour, as we have shown by the analysis of the student’s visual and 
kinesthetic experiences. Despite the cultural practices that provoke and the cultural 
tools that form this behavior it is exactly the embodied consciousness of a 
transcendental subject—a student in our case—that was populated by objects. The 
intuitive constitution of the first objects appears without any predisposed categorical 
structure in the outside world, which is constituted together with the objects. This 
is the very subtle and specific role of intuition that phenomenological analysis 
reveals and that escapes being perceived from Kantian-inspired methodologies.   
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As we have shown, Mary’s process of objectification was enriched by 
empirical intuitions that transformed hyletic material into empirical objects, and by 
abstract intuitions that transformed her lived world (already inhabited by empirical 
objects) into abstract objects. The contention of this research is that teaching 
diversity already arises from the awareness of intuitions and their embodied ground 
from which the variety of ideas, strategies and approaches emanate for the learner. 
By adopting a phenomenological point of view the teacher may become perceptive 
to the students’ intuitions and attentive to their conceptions, which will in turn 
facilitate the objectifications of their understandings. Teachers’ orientation towards 
the understanding of the student's living body experience is a step towards an 
inclusive, student-centred teaching frame. It is a suggestion towards a critically 
realistic interrogation of teaching and learning norms that ignore the student and, 
eventually, the mathematics (Polya, 1988; Lakatos, 1978). 
The inclusion of pre-objective and pre-scientific material in teaching and research 
frames, allows the knowledge of the body and the embodied consciousness to 
contact the mathematical significative domain rather than be “silenced by the 
sayable and the linguistic” (deFreitas & Sinclair, 2012, p. 149). As Merleau-Ponty 
(2002) summarises it, “all knowledge takes its place within the horizons opened up 
by perception”. In this process intuition is the essential objectifying act. 
References 
Andrà, C., & Santi, G. (2013). Intuitive thinking in a context of learning. In A. 
Lindmeier & A. Heinzeet, (Eds.), Proceedings of the 37th conference of the 
International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education (Vol. 2, pp. 
25-32). Kiel, Germany: PME. 
Andrà, C., & Liljedahl, P. (2014). ‘I sense’ and ‘I can’: framing intuitions in social 
interactions. In C. Nico, P. Liljedahl, S. Oesterle, & D. Allan (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the Joint Meeting of PME 38 and PME-NA 36. (Vol. 2, pp. 49-
56). Vancouver, Canada: PME. 
Beth, E. W. & Piaget, J. (1966), Mathematical epistemology and psychology, 
Dordrecht: Reidel. 
~ 365 ~ 
 
Brown, T. (2012). Mathematics education and subjectivity. New York: Springer. 
Brown, T., Heywood, D., Solomon, Y., & Zagorianakos, A. (2013). Experiencing the 
space we share: Rethinking subjectivity and objectivity. ZDM Mathematics 
Education, 45, 561–572. 
Davis, B. & Simmt, E. (2003). Understanding learning systems: Mathematics 
education and complexity science. Journal for Research in Mathematics 
Education, 34(2), 137-167. 
deFreitas, E. & Sinclair, N. (2012). Diagram, gesture, agency: Theorizing 
embodiment in the mathematics classroom. Educational Studies in 
Mathematics, 80(1-2), 133-152. 
Drummond, J. (2007), Historical dictionary of Husserl’s philosophy. New York: 
Scarecrow Press. 
Fischbein, E. (1920/1994). Intuition in science and mathematics: An educational 
approach. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Fischbein, E. (1999). Intuitions and schemata in mathematical reasoning. 
Educational Studies in Mathematics 38, 11–50. 
Fischbein, E. (2001). Tacit models and infinity. Educational Studies in Mathematics 
48, 309–329. 
Hadamard, J. (1954). The psychology of invention in the mathematical field. 
London: Dover Publications. 
Heidegger, M. (2004). What is called thinking? New York: Perennial. 
Held, K. (2003). Husserl’s phenomenological method. In D. Welton (Ed.), The new 
Husserl (pp. 3-31). Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press. 
Hintikka, J. (1995). The phenomenological dimension, in B. Smith & D. W. Smith, 
(Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Husserl, (pp. 78-105). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hintikka, J. (1972). Kantian intuitions, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of 
Philosophy, 15(1-4), 341-345 
~ 366 ~ 
 
Hintikka, J. (2003). The notion of intuition in Husserl. Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie, 224, 169-191. 
Husserl, E. (1936). The origin of geometry. (Translated by D. Carr, from Biemel 
edition of Husserl’s ‘The crisis of European sciences and transcendental 
phenomenology’.) In J. Derrida (1989). Edmund Husserl’s origin of geometry: 
An introduction (pp. 155-180). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 
Husserl, E. (1970a). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental 
phenomenology: An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. 
Translated, with an Introduction, by David Carr.  Evanston:  Northwestern 
University Press. 
Husserl, E. (1970b). Logical investigations. (Translated by David Carr.) New York: 
Humanities Press. 
Husserl, E. (1973). Experience and judgment. (Translated by J. Churchill & K. 
Ameriks.) London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Husserl, E. (1983a). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a 
phenomenological philosophy: First Book, General introduction to a pure 
phenomenology. (Translated by F. Kersten.) The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 
Husserl, E. (1983b). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a 
phenomenological philosophy: Third Book, General introduction to a pure 
phenomenology. (Translated by Ted Klein & W. Pohl.) The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 
Husserl, E. (1989). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a 
phenomenological philosophy: Second Book, Studies in the phenomenology 
of constitution. (Translated by R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer.) Dordrecht: 
Kluwer. 
Husserl, E. (1991). On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time 
(1893-1917). (Translated by J. Brough.) Dordrecht: Kluwer, A. P. 
~ 367 ~ 
 
Husserl, E. (2001). Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on 
transcendental logic. (Translated by A. Steinbock.) Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
Kolen, F. (2005). An interpretation of Husserl’s concept of constitution in terms of 
symmetry. In A-T. Tymieniecka (Ed.), Analecta Husserliana (vol. 88, pp. 307-
314). London: Springer. 
Lakatos I. (1978). Proofs and refutations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lohmar, D. (2010). Intuition in mathematics: On the function of eidetic variation in 
mathematical proofs. In M. Haritmo (Ed.), Phenomenology and mathematics 
(vol. 195, pp. 73-90). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). The primacy of perception. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002a). Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002b). Husserl at the limits of phenomenology. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press. 
Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research methods. Thousand Oaks 
California: Sage Publications. 
Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. London-New York: Routledge. 
Moutsios-Rentzos, A., Spyrou, P., and Peteinara, A. (2014). The objectification of 
the right-angled triangle in the teaching of the Pythagorean Theorem: An 
empirical investigation. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 85, 29-51. 
Otte, M. (1998). Limits of constructivism: Kant, Piaget and Peirce. Science & 
Education, 7, 425–450. 
Polya, G. (1988). How to solve it. Princeton: Princeton Science Library. 
Radford, L. (2010). The eye as a theoretician: Seeing structures in generalizing 
activities. For the Learning of Mathematics, 30(2), 2-7.  
Radford, L. (2013). Three key concepts of the theory of objectification: Knowledge, 
knowing, and learning. REDIMAT-Journal for Research in Mathematics 
Education, 2(1), 7-44. http: //doi.dx.org/10.4471 /redimat.2013.19. 
~ 368 ~ 
 
Radford L. (2014) Phenomenology, praxis, and the question of mathematical 
objects. Educación Matemática, número especial, 25, 124-145. 
Reuter, M.   (1999). Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pre-reflective intentionality. Synthese 
118, 69–88 
Roth, M., & Radford, L. (2011). A cultural-historical perspective in mathematics 
teaching and learning. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. 
Smith, W. D. (2007). Husserl. New York: Routledge. 
Steinbring, H. (1991). Mathematics in teaching processes. The disparity between 
teacher and student knowledge. Recherches des Mathématiques, 11(1), 65-
108. 
Tito, J. M. (1990). Logic in the Husserlian context. Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press. 
Tragesser, R. (1977). Phenomenology and logic. London: Cornell University Press. 
van Hiele, M. (1986). Structure and insight. London: Academic Press. 
 
  
~ 369 ~ 
 
 
Appendix B. Ivan’s and Carry’s interviews during the New 
York cop session 
Paragraph 1. Ivan’s short interview, 10/2/2011, 12:11am 
The interview was taken at the beginning of the second part of the New York cop 
session. I was participating in Ivan’s group and, in this sense, Isaac's interview is 
also a cross–checking process. As I had already familiarised with him and his work 
in the group I started the interview without any introduction; it was the 5th out of 
the 7 interviews I took that day and the interview was already running out of time, 
although the time that I had available for the interviews was not strictly set. I am 
using conversational analysis (CA), after Penakülä (Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, ch. 34) for the transcription of this interview, in order to transfer the 
narrative rhythm: 
R: Hello Isaac, [I place a chair next to mine], sit there please. [Isaac sits and I sit] 
Alright, just tell me how you started with it, and how you got to the point that you 
are now? 
I: Eh:199, I started off deciding to look out squares, rather than (.)200 increasing the 
columns.201 
R: What kind of squares?202 
I: Eh:, equal squares,203 5 by 5. 
R: Ah, all kinds ((sizes))204 of squares! 
I: Yeah, yeah. 
                                                          
199 : Prolongation of sound. 
200 (.) Pause of less than 0.2 seconds. 
201 Isaac's interview took place after Caroline’s one—which was the 1st interview—and he used the ‘columns’ 
terminology before I said anything about the activity. 
202 I leave no gaps in Isaac's narrative, in order to maintain the fast narrative rhythm. My question does not 
sound as having any sense, but it is prompting Isaac to describe what he did with the squares. 
203 The last word ending with a questioning intonation, to be interpreted as “is that what you are asking?” 
204 (()) Transcriber’s comments that explain what was just said or happened. 
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R: 2 by 2, 3 by 3,  
I: Yeah. 
R: 4 by 4, 5 by 5 and (.) and so on.…205 
I: Yeah! 
R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep talking about it] 
I: Then ehm, looking at how: (1.9)206 the patterns form, (.) to do with, (1.7) this 
size ((he is pointing to one of the squares in his notes during the activity)) such as 
eh… (1.5) I’m thinking about where would be the most sensible place to put a point 
((i.e. a cop)); (1.6) so that you get the optimum solution. 
R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep on talking about it] 
I: Eh:. 
R: 207 And trying to find patterns I guess. 
I: Yeah! I decided that it would be most sensible to work from the (.) outside.208 
Once you’ve done one ()209 of the outside, deciding which points from the inside, 
you need to cover (0.9) next. 
R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep talking about it]210 
I: To cover all the squares. 
R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep talking about it] 
I: As well as you are working away to the () (1.0) crossing up bits. 
R: [sound prompting Isaac to keep on talking about it]211 And eh, what did you get 
with that? I mean did you find something out o:r… 
I: Well: I fou:nd that (.) all of the patterns are symmetrical, along a diagonal (0.5) 
eh, line 
                                                          
205 I am introducing a systematic approach of squares, shifting the conversation to what I had already 
observed and to the mathematical potential of his treatment, as I saw it. 
206 (1.9) Silence measured in seconds. 
207 Isaac does not respond, and I try to maintain the fast narrative rhythm, as in footnote 5. 
208 Outside Emphasis. 
209 () Inaudible word. 
210 Consult previous footnotes concerning the continuance of the rhythm. 
211 Isaac does not respond, and I try to maintain the fast narrative rhythm, as it is described in footnote 200. 
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R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep on talking about it] 
I: Eh, (2.7) [checking his notes] e:ven symmetry 
R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep on talking about it]212 Any:, any formula 
on that or…  
I: Eh, not a formula yet. 
R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep on talking about it]213 Have you been 
engaged with eh, rectangles? 
I: Eh, no not yet. 
R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep on talking about it] 
I: I (.) decided to focus on squares (.) first. 
R: [I make a sound prompting Isaac to keep on talking about it]214 So you found 
patterns fo:r squares; is there any regularity there? (2:03) 
I: (1.0) Eh: (.) Other than the diagonal symmetry (.), and the number of (0.8) 
columns of most of them so far. (1.0) There’s a (.) 5 (.) diagonal (.) lines (.) from 
which they go along (1.5) or most of them.215 
R: You mean that the number of diagonals (.) is equal to the number of eh: rows 
or columns? 
I: Eh, no, just (.) 5. Like this eh, 5 diagonals, like 5 diagonals, like 5 diagonals, like 
5 
R: So there are 5 diagonals in each case? Not in each case but, after th… three 
I: Well, after three, and I’m assuming I’m not wrong to say that... 
R: To 4. 
I: Yes, well, after 3, because 4 is after 3! 
R: Yeah, yeah.  
I: [laugh] 
                                                          
212 Isaac does not respond, and I try to maintain the fast narrative rhythm, as it is described in footnote 200. 
213 Isaac does not respond, and I try to maintain the fast narrative rhythm, as it is described in footnote 200. 
214 Isaac does not respond, and I try to maintain the fast narrative rhythm, as it is described in footnote 200. 
215 He refers to the diagonals of the cops’ placement in the 3 by 3, 4 by 4 and 5 by 5 precincts.  
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R: Yes [laugh]  
I: I’m assuming that it will go on to s… six or (0.8) so on. (2.1) I don’t know really  
R: So is that all (.) you’ve done (.) so far? 
I: Yeah. I’m collecting data at the moment if I can make a (.) generalisation. 
R: Alright. Ok?  
I: [approving nod] 
R: Thanks. (3:14) 
Paragraph 2. Carry’s short interview, 10/2/2011, 12:11am 
Researcher: Please tell me how you started and where you’ve come so far and which way 
did you… 
Carry: Ok, the way we begun, eh, the teacher just said to think about how the placement 
of the cops would change as you expand the precincts, and those different ways to expand 
it; so first I had to look at the expanding at adding on a column, eh, to a block each time, 
eh, making… you know squaring, the blocks, and putting, eh, like a path of blocks 
around each time, so it’s expanding.  
R: Square or? 
C: This would be the first one and then, you put this round and this one [the student 
holds the notes she kept during the task and she refers to these notes] 
R: Like the ‘garden-path’ [activity].216 
C: Like the garden-path, yes. But I haven’t gone into that one [laugh]. So I started 
off with the easiest one which was adding that column of block[s] on each time. 
R: Keeping the [number of] rows the same or… 
C: Keeping the [number of] rows the same, [that is] 2, 2 [rows]… 
R: 2 by something 
                                                          
216 The way she described her strategy reminded me another activity, where the ‘garden’ was consisted of 
squares and the ‘path’ was consisted of squares surrounding the ‘garden’. 
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C: Yeah, 2 by something; but then if it was the other way around, increasing the 
rows it would be… 
R: It would be the same. 
C: It would be the same, yes [laugh]. (1:15) So, eh, I did by the first ones 2 by 2 
and then 3 by 2 and then 4 by 2,217 and, eh, I was seeing, from my optimum 
placements that the number of cops was one more than the… the row length?218 
[her questioning intonation at the end of her phrase expressed uncertainty about 
the expression ‘row length’ that she used]219 
R: Yes. 
C: For 2 it was 3 cops 
R: The amount of columns or rows?220 
C: Yeah, the amount of columns, sorry yeah. 
R: Yeah. 
C: And then I put it into a table and… so, and then I started looking at it and why 
it was like this; and then, for my reasoning it was that because one cop is needed 
to… eh… 
R: To watch. 
C: To watch each... I was calling them just the ‘vertical streets’, because that’s how 
they are in my paper; and all the streets in between, so you would need, eh, one 
to go, to cover that, so… 
R: Yeah. 
                                                          
217 The first number refers to the columns and the second one to the rows of each precinct. 
218 It seems like she has not yet found a ‘fixed’ name for her empirical intuition, concerning the part that the 
expansion of columns plays in relation to the cops’ expansion, when the rows are kept invariable. Giving a 
name to the columns’ expansion amounts to constituting a profile of her experience; hence endowing a 
discursive sense to the pre-objective materialisation of the qualities that she has already perceived. 
219 Although she is thinking ‘vertically’, by counting the amount of cops in each column and adding more 
columns, she is expressing ‘horizontally’ when she says “the row length”. 
220 I am instinctively trying to ‘fix’ the conversation using the ‘rows’–‘columns’ terminology, rather than 
‘row length’. 
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C: So that would be the… all of the columns plus the one in the end, or plus one; 
depending the way you look at it. Because it’s only 2 rows… yeah! It works. Like 
that, so if it was getting increasing this way or this way, then it changes of course, 
but because it stays on 2 rows then you can do… you can fit in a thin… 
R: So your basic idea is, is, how would you describe it if you like? 
C: Eh, as you add a column at each time, you will need one cop more than that 
column, to cover all the streets. That was the conclusion I came to. 
R: And that’s when you got 2 rows. 
C: When… yeah, it’s like 2 rows and… 
R: And no matter how many columns. 
C: Yeah. 
R: Have you experimented with any other pattern to see if there’s any regularity 
there? Say, 3 rows or squares or whatever? 
C: Eh, well, I could look at 3 rows but then I decided to look at square precincts, 2 
by 2, 3 by 3, 4 by 4. 
R: Did you find any regularity there, did you discover anything? 
C: So I just started experimenting a bit and placing them and… comparing my 
results with [those of] the people on my table [the other members in her group], 
and we sort of agreed on the optimum placements [of the cops]… so then I decided 
to try and find more of a pattern,221 because it wasn’t really that clear with this 
one; you know, what the pattern was, so… and we222 began trying to place the, 
eh… the cops in the same sort of way each time but [when] it gets bigger it gets 
really difficult! To do, eh… so, there’s a lot [unintelligible words] the cops around 
the outside, we realised that eh… you can always work out the minimum number 
of cops you’ll need on the outside because of how far they can see. If it’s 2 by 2, 
it’s just 2 [cops] on the outside. 
                                                          
221 She shifted to checking regularities in the image of the cops’ distribution in the squared precincts. 
222 Her tense turns to second personal. 
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R: If it’s 3 by 3 you’ll need 4 [cops on the outside].223 
C: 3 or 4, 4. Between 5 and 8 you need 6. And you can carry on working this up. 
R: So you concentrated on the outside cops. 
C: Yeah! So I separated it ‘cause… 
R: And then you would check the inside cops? 
C: And I would start looking at the inside ones or trying to find a pattern to see how 
they change each time, so… So I started like this and then 2, then, and so it was 
looking, the first three, it’s, it’s doubling [laugh]. Eh… But then, this one is the next 
one, so it’s still following a pattern, it’s from here to here, with the 6 now in the 
inside.224 And this is the next one, so now there is… 
R: So there is some pattern. 
C: There is a pattern, yeah, and it’s getting difficult now, you can see [laugh]. (6:03) 
Crossing out more as they get bigger. 
R: You are using different colours for the outside cops and the inside cops? 
C: Yes, I think it’s easier to get to visualise the patterns; and that’s where I’m up to 
really; and, yeah, I’m just trying to find a pattern so that I can see how that… how 
that changes as it increases, and so that I will find something general  
R: So is it how you understand generalisation in this activity? 
C: Yeah! Yeah, and this is the way that I’m choosing to look at it. I don’t know why 
[laugh], because it’s just the way itself, it’s so, I see it, I just saw it as two separate 
things, the outside, the cops at the outside… 
R: So you are trying to manage with the shape and then come out with a formula. 
C: Yeah, yeah. 
R: To manage the shape, whatever the shape might be and then you might come 
out with a… 
                                                          
223 I’m just saying what I see in her notes, in order to keep the conversation flowing. 
224 She talks about the 6 by 6 precinct, where there are 6 cops inside. 
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C: To try and find a common way of increasing… how the cop pattern changes as 
it increases. 
R: Could you repeat [what you said, since] there is a conversation at the corridor?225 
C: I’m trying to find… what I’ve been trying to find is not a formula, I’m trying to 
find a common way of increasing the cops each time, and seeing from that pattern 
something that matters. 
R: Yes… 
C: I guess; it’s not really focus on formulas at all [laugh], [I’m] not bothered with 
that. Yeah, but it’s interesting, I like it (7:37). 
R: That’s your personal way of doing it, that’s interesting too. 
C: And that’s as far as I’ve got now. So I will continue with looking for these 
patterns; but there are just so many ways of expanding it and continuing with the 
problems, that you just have to choose something! [laugh] (8:00) 
R: You don’t feel that you’ve managed it yet but, you’re moving on… 
C: I will, it has to be taken into account [as] you’re saying well, what if I you had 3 
rows. You’d begin with 3 rows and then you’re increasing the columns. Well, I’m 
sure you know I could find eh… a common pattern for that as well, but I haven’t 
looked at that, yet. But I could do; there are just lots of things, but you could do, 
so, you have to narrow it down to manage it. But I might go back to that. 
R: Ok, that’s fine. 
C: Ok. 
R: Thank you. (8:42) 
 
                                                          
225 The conversation takes place at a corridor, two people appeared and started to talk to each other and I did 
not hear what she just said. 
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Paragraph 3. Ivan’s lengthy interview, 7/4/2011 
One of the reasons for this interview was the disappearance of the recording of his 
presentation from my digital recorder. My purpose was to test my assumptions 
during his presentation, to explore his conception of his own presentation as well 
as the other students’ presentations, his perception of mathematics and 
mathematical objects, and his conception of what is a ‘good’ teacher. 
Ivan was writing some notes concerning his activity while his was waiting for me.  
Researcher: You are doing something about your activity, aren’t you? 
Ivan: Yes, is anything you… 
[He sounded a bit ‘tight’ and I interrupted him by telling him what I really 
thought about his activity, thinking that it would encourage him:226] 
R: I found it very interesting 
He immediately loosened his way of sitting and he smiled. 
R: It had various objectives… 
I: Yeah 
R: and I found it extremely interesting 
I: Yeah, thanks 
R: I’d love you to give me some clues about it, how you’ve picked it up and what 
you were aiming at when you chose it  
I: I first came across when I was reading a book, which I got for Christmas of my 
mum, called “Alex’s adventures in number land”; and I thought it seemed like quite 
a nice little sequence, pattern type thing.227 And I’ve seeing Sierpinski’s triangle 
before, so I thought “I’ll have a look at that”; a square one would do, it was the 
                                                          
226 My aim was to conduct the interview in a ‘casual’ manner, with Ivan talking most of the time, and 
minimising my intervention to the clarification and the broadening of the topics of the conversation (semi-
structured interview). 
227  My emphasis; Isaac’s attention to the activity that he decided to present seems to have been initially drawn 
because of its pattern type aspect—since Sierpinski’s carpet is actually a fractal. It was “later on” that he 
realised its potential for generalisation in 3D shapes—as he admits in his following comments—although he 
was probably aware of the Sierpinski triangle—i.e. the expansion of Sierpinski’s idea in the 2D space.  
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thing mentioned because I knew that later on you could do in a 3D shape. So I 
started looking at the two dimensional Sierpinski’s carpet. The main thing that I 
wanted to look at is area rather than vertex or edges because it would be quite 
simple to account.228 So I looked at what the area of the first one would be, which 
would just be x2. Then what would happen when we remove the middle [square] of 
the three by three grid, so get the x2- 
x2
9
 , which got me   
8
9
x2; then the smaller one, 
which ended up being   
64
81
x2. It wasn’t until the one after that, the  
512
729
 , that I 
realised that it was  
8
9
 to the power of n-1, times x2 for the area. So, once I worked 
that out I thought “okay, what happens with the cube?” and, “should I look out with 
the cube?”. So, first thing I did look out, it was volume, because it looked the logical 
step area for 2D shape to 3D shape 
R: Yes, from area to volume 
I: Yes, and that was a bit more complicated because you are imagining spaces which 
can’t see as well; because you can’t draw a three dimensional cube with all the lines 
‘cause you just confuse yourself immensely.  
At this point I was tempted to test (without having any intension to insist) 
Isaac’s attitude towards mathematics as an abstract field, when ‘reality’ 
or a ‘concrete’ model of it can no longer provide any help. I said the 
following, trying to make it sound more like a question than a statement:  
R: So you have to use abstract tools in order to manage it, yeah?  
I: Yes 
R: And do it with just empirical methods [like] “I can see this there, I can see that 
there” 
I: Yeah, a [an unclear word] of imagination as well 
                                                          
228  It seems important for Isaac that the task ought to be a demanding one. 
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I did not spot any particular tendency to explore this dimension so I 
decided to change the subject. I decided to explore his motivation when 
choosing the particular task. 
R: So it really excited you to check this activity and that was the primary reason 
because you liked it  
I: Yeah! 
R: Why would you think that it is useful to anybody there? 
I: I didn’t think about anyone else, I just wanted to do it, to see what happens229 
(3:12) 
R: Yeah, although I saw that you cared quite a bit so that everybody would 
understand it 
I: Yeah 
R: You’ve been around, you were walking around, you were helping everybody… in 
fact, to be honest I thought that you gave a bit more information than was 
necessary 
I: Yeah, I kind of wanted people to get to the answer because that’s… I 
wanted them to understand rather than to just be left in darkness trying 
to find their own way out 
R: Did you worry when I was choosing a different way of doing it –I was going 
through series,230 I don’t know if you realised that 
I: It kind of worried me when you started writing two to the power of three and 
three squared and…231 I was thinking “you don’t need to do that! Just keep it 
simple”. It’s the best way rather than over-complicating it 
                                                          
229  It seems that the gratification that he is personally getting from the involvement with the task is Isaac’s 
primary motive. 
230  That is infinite sums of sequential numbers (∑ 𝑥𝑛
∞
𝑛=1 ). 















, since he 





𝑥2 (for the case n=4). 
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R: I was trying to formulate something like this:  𝑥1 + 𝑥2 + 𝑥3 + 𝑥4 + ⋯  
I: A geometric sequence 
R: Also a sum:  ∑ 𝑥𝑛
∞
𝑛=1  
I: A sum of all… to infinity 
R: And you [may] stop at any stage; if you do three stages that’s it, if you do ten 
[stages] that’s it. And then you can see that it converges through the general 
algebraic formula that you have found 
[At this point I realised that I got a bit carried away with the 
mathematical aspect of the approach that I had during his activity, in my 
attempt to test how he reacts towards a different mathematical approach 
(one that he had not thought of), and what was his strategy for 
alternative approaches that might occur during his activity.] 
I: Yeah 
R: It gives a different dimension to the activity than the one that you already 
thought; and I thought “he is worried because I’m going through another ‘path’… 
I: Yeah! 
R: …and I don’t get to what he has thought of it” 
I: Yeah! 
[I remained silent waiting for his reaction] 
I: Well, I suppose there is probably a path to go to get it and I just wanted to guide 
people on my path rather than having them exploring their own routes; and yours 
just seemed to confuse me, so I tried to keep you on a ‘narrow road’, not allow you 
to ‘go into the woods’ 
R: How did Lewis react to it? He was pretty fast, wasn’t he?232 
                                                          
232 My sense during the activity was that Lewis has been at least as fast as I was, and probably even faster (see 
the file Reflection on Isaac's presentation); one of the reasons asking this question to Isaac was to test this 
assumption. 
~ 381 ~ 
 
I: [He was] Pretty quick, not sure how quick he was because I didn’t have to deal 
with him much, because he didn’t need help.233 And I noticed a few people [that] 
just copied of each other in the end. 
R: Copied? 
I: Tim copied Lewis. Because Tim didn’t understand anything to do with it and then 
he had the answer right up the end when Lewis had it, so…  
R: What about David? 
I: Dave… 
R: Did he copy Tim, who copied Lewis? 
I: I don’t think that Dave copied! I think that Dave just left confused, as Dave usually 
is left confused 
R: There were other people who just didn’t cope with it, did you feel that? 
I: The table234 that was here, which was Barbara, Joanna, Kirsty and Sindy, they 
just sort of lost interest and started talking about other stuff, and I couldn’t control 
them; and every time I went over and tried to help them with some of the even 
simple stuff, just finding the area of one of the cubes, which have removed, they 
got confused over that. So that was a problem because I wasn’t expecting them to 
get confused 
R: That [at least] one of them would go through, and so the other ones would go 
along with it. Or Diana, she was pretty confused I think235 
I: Diana was pretty confused but she slowly grasped what I was trying to get at 
with how x over three becomes x squared over nine, when you [an unclear word] 
it together, and how you work out the lengths of each side to [an unclear word]. At 
one point she started eh… what she did? … she was doing something really weird 
                                                          
233  Isaac confirms here my assumption that he was providing feedback to all those who would care for it. 
234  He is talking about a particular group of his peers when he refers to “The table”. 
235 Diana was sitting next to me and I noticed that she was expressing difficulties managing the algebraic aspect 
of the activity (see the file Reflection on Isaac's presentation). 
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with breaking each… breaking it down into its ninths again, then removing it from 
that… and get back up 
R: Separate pieces 
I: Yeah, so she looked at that just bit, work out what that was and to get the rest 
of it rather than just removing it bit by bit…236 
R: Typical by Diana, she is ‘breaking’ things as… 
I: Yeah! 
R: …to the easiest kind that you can think of; then she sums up, she…  
I: Yeah! 
R: …she insists in getting there and she doesn’t give up 
I: But the problem was that when she was doing that she was making mistakes 
which…  
R: But you were there! I noticed you had an eye on everything… 
I: Yeah! 
R: …you made sure that nobody would… 
I: Yeah! 
R: …lead astray “in the woods”, you know…  
I: Yeah! 
R: …going there around 
I: I was glad Caroline got to an answer, as well; that, that made me happy. She 
managed almost independently, and how she got all these results; she was one 
                                                          
236 It appears that Diana noticed the fractal quality of Ivan’s activity (see footnote 4 in Reflection on Isaac's 
presentation) and she was working with a part of the shape in the same way that she would be working with 
the original shape. It was Diana’s particular way of trying to make the activity manageable by ‘breaking’ it into 
smaller manageable pieces, and it is quite interesting how Ivan unfolded Diana’s different construction of the 
activity, different in the sense that Isaac was not expecting such a treatment (“she was doing something really 
weird”). 
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small step away, from getting an answer, and she couldn’t see that, she was so… 
(8:16) 
R: Did you give it to her? 
I: I didn’t give it to her in the end, at all, to how she may come about it; I said to 
look at the powers and to do with the iterate issues rather than just looking at the 
numbers itself. So…   
R: Then she got it 
I: Yeah, then she got [it] a few minutes later. So, I was kind of happy about that 
R: So it was important for you that people would be engaged and come through 
with it. 
I: Yeah, probably because it was something I enjoyed doing myself; I just wanted 
everyone else to have the same feeling I had when I was doing it. (8:45) 
R: I love your altruistic way of… 
I: Yeah! 
R: …thinking other people all the time 
I: Yeah…237 
R: Right! What other kind of interest did it have [the Sierpinski carpet problem] in 
mathematical terms, do you think?238 
I: It was just some… I don’t know why it was so interesting, it just… looks fun and 
I just wanted to see whether I could do it, whether I could get an answer239 
R: Was it important that it had a formula there? 
                                                          
237  Ivan doesn’t notice –or just ignores– the slightly satirical tone of my voice. 
238 In other words, which other mathematical aspects of the Sierpinski triangle he might wanted to promote 
with his presentation. 
239  With these statements Isaac confirms some of my remarks on his general attitude towards his task (see the 
file Reflection on Isaac's presentation). 
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I: I felt that I had to have a formula or, I felt everyone had to get to a 
stage with a formula,240 that’s why in the end of the thing I wrote up results for 
the people who didn’t get it and work through how to get from results to a formula; 
I didn’t give a formula, I gave them the results for what they would have got if they 
had… did it… like… got the right areas or minus the right areas off, and then they 
worked through the results to get a formula, rather than me just giving it to them. 
So…241 
R: You told me, I remember, “if you choose the other way you’ll end up with a nice 
formula”… 
I: Yeah, yeah 
R: …giving me a “carrot” to follow.242 How do you think a teacher model is for you? 
(10:23) 
I: From my previous experience [when] you are going to a lesson, you’d normally 
have something on the board which you would write down in a notebook, then you’d 
work through questions. And I actually don’t mind that form of teaching because 
that’s how I learned the best, from my experience. But this243 is less about learning 
what to do; it’s more about building a foundation around what you already know, 
to help you apply it to other things… rather than just to a simple question.244 So… 
R: Would you say that this is your perception of the whole course with this teacher? 
I: Yeah, I think that’s how I feel about most of the things; it’s stuff I’m only using… 
it’s the information I’ve learned from learning maths but, I’m using the 
bits of information I’ve learned, I’m reinforcing it with other bits of maths 
I’ve learned, to make things that I’ve not looked at before.245 
                                                          
240  My emphasis; a second important aspect in Isaac’s choice of Sierpinski’s carpet was that it involved 
formulas—see also footnote 2. 
241  Whenever Isaac says “so…” at the end of his talk, it means that this is all he has to say. 
242  That is tempting me, offering me a motivation in order to alter my approach towards the objective of the 
activity—as he saw it. 
243  Isaac refers to the teacher’s sessions (‘Nature of Maths’). 
244  His comment refers to the teacher’s course. 
245  My emphasis; Isaac describes how he keeps contact with earlier constructions while exploring new 
situations. 
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R: What is now your general picture of the NoM sessions that you had here? 
I: They are my favorite lessons 
R: I would like to understand better what you mean by that. Is it because you don’t 
have to memorize things, because you have a good time or… 
I: It’s because I enjoy doing it rather than… I’m enjoying maths but I really 
enjoy this type of maths:246 thinking for myself rather than just playing 
[with] an equation to a question and getting an answer.247 That has its own 
merit to me because you get a solution which is a definite answer, generally at the 
end; whereas this you can go anywhere, get right answers… no matter 
what you do!248  As long as you understand…There are certain things 
which you could do wrong to get wrong answers but, there’s less… 
opportunity to…249 
R: because you are choosing the way, is that what you… 
I:  Yeah, you choose what you’re looking at, so you choose what the answers are! 
R: And is that exciting for you? 
I: It is nice 
R: It is nice… 
I: It’s nice, yeah 
R: Do you think that it has enhanced or changed or altered in any way the 
conception of maths that you had… before… the construction of maths?  
I: I don’t know 
R: Has it influenced it at all or… is it the same as it was before the sessions? 
                                                          
246  Ivan’s emphasis 
247  My emphasis 
248  The creative aspect  
249  My emphasis 
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I: Oh, it’s made me want to do these more! Like, before I started the NoM sessions 
I probably wouldn’t have bothered spending my own time to work on something 
like this 
R: Like Sierpinski’s carpet 
I: Yeah. So, after doing the NoM sessions I come across Sierpinski’s carpet in a book 
and it made me… the knowledge of what we do in Nature of Maths made me want 
to work out what we’ll do for this. And how it could be looked at and how it 
could be furthered…250 like, instead of maybe doing this Sierpinski’s carpet we 
could do Sierpinski’s triangle, and rather than doing… I think it’s called a hypercube, 
you could do a tetrahedron type one, where you got a tetrahedron then you remove 
the octahedron; from the remaining ones you remove an octahedron. So… 
R: So does it give you ideas about new tools… in maths… to make it more 
interesting? 
I: Yeah! Interesting... I find maths interesting, but I find this more interesting. But 
this is maths still so, technically … 
R: Sorry?251 
I: I find maths interesting, but I find ‘Nature of Maths’ more interesting than maths. 
But ‘Nature of Maths’ is still maths so, ‘technically’. 
R: Yeah, yeah 
I: It doesn’t make sense252 
R: Could you for instance tell me which have been your favorite activities that we 
had with… 
I: Nature of Maths 
R: Yeah. 
                                                          
250  My emphasis. 
251  I asked him to repeat what he said because I did not quite understand it. 
252  He means that “Technically” (formally) his phrase is contradictory.  
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I: The ones I rove more around were algebraic… equation; getting to a solution so… 
I liked the… I think it was ‘doubling the modulo’? 
R: Oh the ring there, the…253 
I: The ring… I found that quite interesting, and the ‘A - B lattice’. The one where 
we’re getting from A to B on a sixteen point grid; do you remember that one? 
R: … 
I: We had a grid like that [he is drawing it], we had A and B… 
R: Oh, different ways of getting there. 
I: Yeah, yeah and, that one was quite nice for me because I thought about a 
different way to how some other people thought about it, like a… like today with… 
I think it was… Sinead? No,… Elena, Elena [pseudonym], did the… “get the fly from 
A to G”.254 
R: Yeah, yeah 
I: I did the same that I did for the ‘A - B lattice’, modeled out A and gave each of 
these letters; and I went to see… F from F I could go to G or H… and that got me 
to an answer, and it was a definite answer; and, I found that kind of nice. 
R: Mmm… 
I: I didn’t go to how it would change if B was in a different place, I only solved it 
for where B was; but you could take it a lot further, you could change the amount 
of points, [also] where it is on the thing. I’m not quite sure whether you’d get an 
algebraic answer. 
R: Doesn’t it sound a bit like the Decision course that you got?255 
I: Yeah, I’m not too keen on Decision; I’m not too keen on Decision but I like 
this!256 
                                                          
253 Ivan’s and other students’ findings in the Doubling modulo task looked like rings. 
254 Ivan refers to Elena’s presentation that took place the day of the interview. 
255  I am teasing him a little bit, since he had already told me that he does not like the Decision course. 
256  He responds to my teasing. 
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R: I haven’t found anybody who is! [keen on Decision]257 Okay, let’s put it in a 
different way, which one was algorithmic…  algorithmic procedure, first you do this 
then you do that then you trace all the different ways or possibilities to get to the 
result you want?… 
I: Quite a lot it was… algorithmic 
R: [it was] Luck [pseudonym], how to get through the bridge 
I: Yeah, that’s a… 
R: First you do that then you do this and then you do… there is a pattern 
I: Counter-intuitive one, very counter-intuitive 
R: What did you think of this activity? 
I: I’ve seen it before! I try to remember when and I remember it was a counter-
intuitive thing-process as to why it would work; which was probably why I think I 
was the first person in the class to get a definite answer.258 So, if that kind of 
helped;259 as well as it was Rosie’s that I knew a bit of stuff about what she was 
doing. 
R: Did you? 
I: You know, when it was φ, the golden ratio,260 working back from a number; do 
you remember that? 
R: I don’t know what you are talking about 
I: Robyn’s lesson? 
R: Oh, Robyn’s lesson, Fibonacci sequence yes, yes 
                                                          
257  I had already an interview with Tom [pseudonym], who was feeling the same as Ivan about this course. 
258  My emphasis this time; it seems like it is an important element for Ivan, since he is choosing the same 
expression.  
259  The phrase was said in a humorous way, possibly wondering if his answer to my question is ‘sufficient’ 
(for my research). 
260  In mathematics and the arts, two quantities are in the golden ratio if the ratio of the sum of the quantities 






= 𝜑). The golden 
ratio is an irrational mathematical concept, equal to 
1+√5
2
, and it is also the limit of the ratios of successive terms 
of the Fibonacci sequence, which was the principal idea in Rosie’s [pseudonym] activity. 
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I: I had previously read about Fibonacci sequences and had produced the result for 
φ (4:06)  
R: Which [students’] presentations-activities [do you think that] did stand out?  
I: There was one that I really liked; would I just be able to look through my notes? 
R: Yeah. 
I: It was Carry’s I think 
R: Oh the boxes! 
I: Yes, Caroline’s boxes… there’s a lot of work that you can put into Caroline’s boxes 
and it seemed quite interesting. (7:15) 
R: In which sense? Can you give me a short description of it? 
I: It was the idea of how many arrangements you can have for a… I think it was 12 
boxes? 
R: One [up] to 10? 
I: One to 13? [he is checking his notes] No, one to 11! 
R: To eleven 
I: Boxes one to eleven, and how you can arrange it, so you get two [columnes] of 
the same height; then the idea of how you can arrange it to get three of the same 
height, what sort of ones could you use for three for the same height, and… 
R: So that’s a rich activity to follow through, right? 
I: Yeah! And, if we had more time we could probably get a bit more working out, 
probably get to definite answers;261 if we had some time, if it wasn’t very quick.262 
This is pretty interesting but… you can solve that after a few minutes.263 I liked how 
Rosie chose a Fibonacci thing because I do like Fibonacci sequences, because I think 
                                                          
261  It is one more time that he is using the same expression. 
262  There was a limit of 20 minutes presentation plus 10 minutes discussion for every presentation. 
263  I think it was Joanna’s [pseudonym] activity that he was referring to, while he was browsing his notes, 
trying to trace the presentations that he thought as the most interesting. The challenging aspect seems to be 
important for Ivan; see also what he says in contrast with Caroline’s activity. 
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they are quite clever264 the way that Fibonacci sequences are solved the golden 
ratio and how enticing… which practically I knew because I got to spend a bit of 
time messing around. 
R: You are using the φ number to manage it [in order to find the previous terms of 
Fibonacci sequences] 
I: Approximate φ number anyway265 
R: Yeah, but that’s how you dealt with it 
I: Yeah, yeah 
R: That’s why one would get quickly to an answer266 and then… 
I: Yeah! 
R: wouldn’t be any point for him… for thinking. What about Mary’s [activity] 
I: I found Mary’s quite interesting because… well, because… the idea… 
R How did you get to the answer?267 
I: Yeah, how it works to an answer268 and then, thinking about what you’ve 
actually done to get that answer,269 and then how you could change it to 
do the same thing but have the same answers270 like… I changed what she 
                                                          
264  My emphasis; the challenging aspect is important. 
265  Approximately, since  φ  is an irrational number (φ ≅1,618033988749) 
266  I rather instinctively repeated –with a low voice– what he said earlier (see footnote 172); he quickly 
responds the same way as before. 
267  He was the first to find a solution. 
268  My emphasis; it is again Ivan’s expression of a “definite answer”. 
269  Reflecting upon and analysing the method he just used in order to get an answer seems to be the next step 
after finding a solution, and Ivan sounds like he has objectified it, and it has probably become a habit. 
270  My emphasis; the reification (treating the method as an object) seems to follow the analysing process in 
his attempts to using the same expression. 
270  There was a limit of 20 minutes presentation plus 10 minutes discussion for every presentation. 
270  I think it was Joanna’s [pseudonym] activity that he was referring to, while he was browsing his notes, 
trying to trace the presentations that he thought as the most interesting. The challenging aspect seems to be 
important for Ivan; see also what he says in contrast with Caroline’s activity. 
270  My emphasis; the challenging aspect is important. 
270  Approximately, since  φ  is an irrational number (φ ≅1,618033988749) 
270  I rather instinctively repeated –with a low voice– what he said earlier (see footnote 172); he quickly 
responds the same way as before. 
270  He was the first to find a solution. 
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did so, instead of timing it by 2 I decided to time it by 4, then add 7, then… I think 
it was timed by 25, then add [the] age, something like that and, I got the answer 
of that so I’d end up with a date, so… 0514, it would have been 0515 eh… 75 plus 
18 is 93 so, that’s what I would have got at the end and… from that I can work out 
a birthday and an age271 
R: I don’t get it really; oh it’s the 14th of May yeah. Then 15th, how does it get 15th? 
Plus 1, you say… 
I: Yeah, because I’ve got the equation 100d+1+75e+8 
R: So you got the equation, then you tested it, is that what you’re mean? 
I: I got the equation and from that equation I would be able to put my 
birthday at the beginning, and get that answer out.272 
R: But how did you get to the equation, that’s the [point] 
I: I just… 
R: It was amazing, I thought 
I: For Mary’s one? 
R: Yeah. 
I: Because… I just followed through the steps. I wrote… I said date is d, and then 
she said she times it by 2, so it’s just 2d, then she times it by 2 at 5; from that she 
times it by 50, so you get 100d plus 250. Which then you can rewrite if you think 
about the columns of what you’ve got, as in units, tens, hundreds, thousands, ten 
thousands. You’ve got a number, which is… oh what I need,273 a hundred thousand 
                                                          
270  My emphasis; it is again Ivan’s expression of a “definite answer”. 
270  Reflecting upon and analysing the method he just used in order to get an answer seems to be the next step 
after finding a solution, and Ivan sounds like he has objectified it, and it has probably become a habit. 
270  My emphasis; the reification (treating extend the task; this paragraph seems to be a hint of Ivan’s creation 
of mathematical objects and his approach to mathematics (in particular to problem solving). Cf. the 
footnote 194. 
271  He is explaining how he found the solution to Mary’s activity, using his birthday and age. 
272 My emphasis; Ivan is exemplifying my interpretation of what he just said in footnote 192; putting his 
“birthday at the beginning, and get that answer out” is meant in terms of testing a more general impact of his 
equation. We notice that what we called reification process in footnote 192 is ‘instant’. 
273  Ivan is actually solving the problem on the spot. 
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as well… Then you’ve got a number which will cover these 4 columns, which would 
relate to your date… so 100d, so… the bottom number would be 4, 1, 0, 5,274 that 
would be 100 times my birthday; but 100 times my birthday plus 2 so it would be 
an extra 200275 so I’d get 0, 5, 1, 6,276 which is what I got out of there. And 50 plus 
my age,277 because my age is a two digit number, I’ll get the 18 plus 50 so I’ll get 
the 68 there. So from using the knowledge, that’s all I have to do, is… I just started 
off with another number, eh… with another date, decided what else…  
R: That was brilliant actually, yeah… You followed a very unique way of doing it I 
mean, me and Lewis were doing it with many variables there… 
I: Yeah 
R: …and it would take more than twenty minutes to get to the answer… 
I: Yeah 
R: …and then you came with the [solution]… 
I: Unfortunately people don’t understand my explanation or how I got to the 
answer; which is always a bit of a nuisance. So… 
R: You think you’ve said enough for people to understand but people need more; 
it’s not enough for them 
I: Yeah! Because what I write down is a thought process that happened at my head, 
just me trying to write that thought process down; sometimes that doesn’t come 
out too nicely, and people can’t follow it.  
R: All right! I don’t think I have another question to ask you.  Yeah, that’s it 
I: Is that it? 
R: Yeah, now you can return to your ‘favorite’ session278 
                                                          
274  He means 1, 4, 0, 5 (the first 2 digits for the date, the other 2 for the month)  
275  He means that the previous number needs the addition of 200 in order to produce the correct date (see the 
next footnote) 
276  He means 1, 6, 0, 5. 
277  The number 50 (out of 250) is added to other two (last) digits, which Ivan has mentioned; these digits are 
related to the age. 
278 The Decision course. 
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I: Ohhh, what! 
Appendix C. Diana’s lengthy interview, 15/4/2011 
Diana seemed to be the less active member of her group during the NoM sessions, 
but she usually achieved to manage the activities in her own way, approaching them 
with quite different methods than all the other students. This interview was partly 
motivated by my attempt to investigate the mental constructions that led her to 
these practices. 
I had asked her to bring the notes and homework from all the sessions, and she 
brought all of them. 
Diana: This is everything I’ve got! 
Researcher: Alright! I brought some stuff too; in case you would not bring 
something I want [to discuss with you] 
D: Well, these ones here are the ones I was thinking of doing to hand in for my 
course work, and then… all of this is just what we’ve done in class [she seemed to 
be proud of the volume of her ‘production’] 
R: Alright!! [it was indeed an impressive volume of work, especially the class notes] 
D: So, the ones I’ve got here, the snooker one, that I’ve… [she was browsing her 
papers on the snooker activity] kind of started to write up, but then not really gone 
much further… with it  
R: So at first you produced it in the computer, I see, and then…  
D: Well no I… I did all my…  I did all my notes here, so these are all the…  I think 
this is all. Because I gave the teacher some of my notes but he can’t find them;  
R: Oh really? 
D: Yeah [laugh] 
R: Did you give them to him, literally, or… 
D: Yeah 
R: …was it photocopies 
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D: Oh they weren’t photocopies; I should have given to him photocopies really… I 
think… yeah that’s it; so, what I did here  
R: [you mean] in the snooker [activity] 
D: was… we started with the 4 by 3 [case]. I think… 
R: [you mean] 4 columns and 3 rows 
D: Yes! And then, I extended it by looking at 4 by 2, 4 by 1, 4 by 4 and all that sort 
of thing 
R: Keeping 4 as a standard there… 
D: Yeah, keeping 4 as a standard, and I went up to… I noticed there was a 
connection with anything that was a multiple of 4 
R: Really? 
D: So, when I… I sort of stopped at 4 by 8, but then to test my theory I checked 4 
by 12, 4 by 16, 4 by 20 and 4 by 24. And I think I can… it’s been a while since I’ve 
looked at this one; but the connection… because what I did when I wrote it up [was 
that] I looked at the number of lines, the number of times that it hit the side [i.e. 
the bounces] 
R: Yes… 
D: I looked at where it started from and where it finished (2:30) and then I wrote 
observations about what I noticed. 
R: The starting point is [always] the same, alright?279 
D: Yeah… 
R: You didn’t look the starting point… a different one,280 the same one all the time, 
yeah? 
                                                          
279  I was surprised that she was writing down the starting point of the ball in each case, since the activity (as 
it was set by the teacher) indicated that the starting point was always the bottom left corner of the snooker 
table. 
280 I try to understand what she did during the activity, since she is showing me a table in her homework (the 
‘final’ outcome), where she keeps record of the starting point, although it is supposed to be the same all the 
time.  
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D: No, I could have done but instead I chose to alter the size of the grid. And I 
suppose it’s something that I could start changing the starting point I never thought 
of that281 
R: I think that it would have been a different problem,282 wouldn’t it? I don’t know, 
what do you think, was it a complicated one, was it a manageable one, was it a… 
D: No! It was manageable I was doing really well with it! But then… because I did 
4 by something then 2, I kept 2 as a constant, then I kept 3 as a constant, 5 as a 
constant, 6 as a constant; and I found a rule283 for… if you named the size of the 
rectangle x, y  
R: If you… what? 
D: The size of the rectangle, if it was a 4 by 3, the 4 would be the value x and the 
3 would be the value y; for example this would be x and this would be y.  
R: [That is] The columns would be the width and the rows would be the…  
D: The height? 
R: Yeah284 
D: Basically the x would be constant and the y would be changing 
R: So the y would be the variable 
D: Yes! 
R: And the x would be the one that you would keep as a constant 
D: The reason that I did that was because I noticed that if the y value was odd 
then they all finished in… you know I could predict where they were going to… 
which side285 of the table that it was going to finish at. But I didn’t really… I haven’t 
looked at this one for a while actually. So I was doing quite well with that but then 
                                                          
281  At the table that she had written the starting point was mentioned in every case—although it is supposed to 
be the same all the time—but she was just recording it rather than questioning it. 
282 In the sense that the teacher had specifically asked to use a particular starting point, although the same 
generalisations would have been produced. 
283  It is interesting that Diana is using the expression “I found a rule” to describe the generalisation process. 
284  The number of columns is the x and the number of rows is the y. 
285  She means the hole of the snooker table. 
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I stopped for some reason because I started doing something else [laugh] So I need 
to look further into this before I can obviously handed it in 
R: Did it give you pleasure this activity, this particular one? Did you like it 
particularly? Because it’s the first one you mentioned [and] that’s the only reason I 
am asking you 
D: Well, the only reason that it’s the first one I mentioned is that it’s the first one in 
my file! It is something that interested me initially because it is something that you 
can easily286 find patterns for; so when you were looking 4 by something, for 
example, it was easy to see patterns in it. So… you can see by just doing the 4 by 
1 up to the 4 by 8: most of them with the exception of 2 all finished on the right 
hand side of the snooker table. So if they started in the bottom left, then they world 
finish on the right hand side either at the top or the bottom. So, I liked that because 
it was something that I easily found patterns for. But it’s just making it a bit more… 
general287 I suppose for different sizes of rectangles and… and things like that, 
so… 
R: Do you feel that there are more powerful… eh… patterns288 that you could find 
if you would… 
D: If I was to put my work into it yes and I’m planning on doing more work on this 
one 
R: Why? You like it or… 
D: Well it’s… one289 because I’ve originally done quite a lot of work on it… 
R: Already, yeah 
D: And I wouldn’t want to disregard this one in my course work; because I’ve 
already done so much on it. And it is quite interesting just to see the different 
                                                          
286  All the words in bold indicate the parts of her speech that she emphasized. 
287  My emphasis; it is the first time that she is using a word relative to generalisation, after the use of words 
such as “rule” or “patterns”. 
288  I avoided using the word generalisation, in order to minimize my influence of the vocabulary that she was 
using.  
289  She means ’firstly’. 
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patterns290 and how you get them, and the different… the different patterns that 
you get with the lines when you… when you are drawing them 
R: And you do find patterns all the time? Or do you have hard time finding any 
patterns?  
D: Not necessarily, no, I found this one… I found this one ok; I think this one is one 
of the more enjoyable ones that I found of what we’ve done. I don’t know why 
but… I can’t find a reason on it but… 
R: Yeah… yeah, right291 
D: It’s that it’s something I’ve been able to… 
R: The snooker 
D: To understand and… 
R: And manage and… 
D: Yeah… I’ve got [laugh] lots [she emphasised the word ‘lots’ while browsing 
through her papers] 
R: Right! You’ve done a lot of work, I noticed! 
D: I know! 
R: Even during the sessions you were working hard! 
D: Yeah, yeah! 
R: I have noticed that! 
D: Yeah! 
R: What do you think about them generally, do you think that they are easy, tough? 
(7:30) 
D: I don’t know, sometimes I feel as though people… I think everybody else seems 
to understand it more than me; like with the doubling one, everybody understood 
                                                          
290  She keeps using the word “patterns” in order to describe her findings, possibly because I used it (see 
previous footnote). 
291  I agree with her in the sense that she doesn’t have to give argumentation for her preference; that our 
conversation may move on to a different topic. 
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it straight away and they could just do it as a loop, like this and they understood 
what the next number would be but I could not process that. The only way I could 
do it was by doing a flow… I invented up doing a flowchart for this, like a flow 
diagram292 
R: Like what? 
D: [she searched her notes and she showed me her work during the task—see 
footnote 14] 
R: Oh, that’s interesting!293 It’s like an algorithm! 
D: Yeah! 
R: It’s like a programme in a computer: “Do that”, “YES”, “NO”, “YES”, “NO”294 
D: Yeah! Because this is the way that I understood it! Because everybody else 
seemed to be able to look at the numbers and know what the next number was! 
R: What made you think of this way of doing it? 
D: Because to me that is quite systematic!295 And I… I respond to things 
that are systematic and that I can… I know what I…  
R: What do you mean "this is systematic”?296 What is ‘systematic’? 
D: Well, with this…  
R: This you mean… what?297 Your [notes]…  
D: This is all my working for it 
                                                          
292 She is talking about the flowchart that she did later at home, not about the algorithm that she devised during 
the task. 
293  See Diana’s coursework, where the final form of her construction is depicted; the initial one had the form 
of a computer programming algorithm, very close to a computer programme written in a pseudo-language (a 
sequence of orders that would inevitably produce the necessary results). 
294 The ‘doubling modulo’ activity was one of the topics that I wanted to discuss with her, but she mentioned 
it soon after the interview started. 
295 ‘Systematic’ was a term that the teacher had often used during the sessions and it seems like that she had 
picked it up. 
296  And I was pointing at notes that she kept during the task. 
297  Sometimes, like in this case, I make questions in order to be clear for the recording what we are talking 
about.  
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R: I was there, I remember it, yeah! 
D: So I did, when I looked at the number 9… I knew that I had to… once we’d found 
the rule298 for it, then… like I say everybody else seemed to be able to say the next 
number but I couldn’t, so I was having to device this kind of system, where I’ve 
said “right, okay, if I do this to that, if I times this number by 2, is it bigger than 
the 9? No it isn’t! So what do I have to do to it? Then I have to do this to it”. And, 
that was easy for me, it was very very long-winded and it took me a lot longer to 
understand it than it did for everyone else. But now I’ve done this and it’s my 
way, nobody else seems to have done that way. But this is, this is how I have 
understood it (9:30) 
R: Right! And from this299 you were drawn to the… the flowchart? 
D: Well, when I was looking at this, I was thinking if I was to give this to the teacher, 
he’d look at it and he’d be thinking “what on earth has she done?”. Because he 
would not understand it! So I thought the only way I can do it is by doing some 
kind of flowchart, flow diagram or algorithm or whatever to be able to explain my 
steps in the thought process that I went through, to be able to understand 
this activity…300 
R: The flowchart is much more advanced than this one, although it might describe 
the same thing, but the flowchart is far more advanced, I think 
D: Well, I knew that if anyone else other than me looked at this they wouldn’t 
know what was going on 
R: I did 
D: Oh, did you? Well I just assumed then, shall I say, that if anybody looked at 
this they wouldn’t [know] what was happening and how I’d got my answers; which 
is why I did that [the flowchart]301 
                                                          
298  Another use of the word ‘rule’ (see footnote 5). 
299  From the ‘sequence of commands’, the algorithm. 
300  My emphasis. 
301  Diana is emphatically repeating that her motivation for advancing her initial ‘sequence of commands’ to 
a flowchart was the need to be understood by the other people. 
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R: That is far more sophisticated 
D: It’s a little bit confusing though, isn’t it? 
R: Why? 
D: It’s easy to follow but there’s just lines everywhere [laugh] 
R: [laugh] is it your thought depicted here? 
D: Yes! 
R: Is this precisely how you have to think and how you thought… 
D: That’s how I thought to be able to do it 
R: It’s a bit of a maze, isn’t it? 
D: It is [laugh] but...  
R: [But] There is an outcome, somewhere, isn’t there? 
D: To me that makes perfect sense! 
R: Yes, yes, absolutely, I like this one… I’ll photocopy it actually302 
D: Yeah! 
R: I like it very much 
D: Well, I’ve got on my… I can e-mail it to you, if you like 
R: Oh please, yes 
D: Because I’ve got it on my computer; so if it’s easier I can email it to you 
A: Oh yes, that would be even better 
D: I still need to double check it because again it’s a while ago since I’ve looked at 
this; and I did double, triple and quadruple checked that this worked and it did, but 
I’ll double check it again [laugh], just for my own benefit 
R: Alright, I would accept it as it is, even if it had errors, 
D: Yeah! 
                                                          
302  My statement was formed as a question actually. 
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A: I mean it doesn’t make a big difference to me; to me it is the construction that 
matters 
D: Right, okay 
R: And I can understand what you’re trying to do here; so, that was about it with 
this activity, which I call it ‘rings’… the doubling 
D: I think it was called ‘doubling’, yeah… 
R: Doubling, yes, ‘doubling modulo’. 
D: Yeah but the reason… I did quite enjoy that one but that was because I 
had a different way to everybody else; that’s why I liked it [laugh]303 
(12:20) 
R: Do you usually have a different way to everybody else or do you usually have 
the same way with somebody else? 
D: No, usually my thought is… my thought is the same as everybody else’s, so this 
one quite intrigued me because I thought it in a different way than nobody else 
seemed to, so it intrigued me, because of that.  
R: It did stand out actually, I remember [that] I came and said “what are you doing 
here?” and you said “Oh, that’s my way of understanding it”; you kept working on 
it 
D: I was way behind everybody else but… well that’s all of that 
R: Anything else about this activity that you would like to mention? 
D: I don’t think so, not particularly. I think this one is finished actually, that’s my 
end product; 304  so I think that one’s done! But I’ve just explained how I 
understood it305 
R: How did you feel about the other students’ ways of understanding it? 
                                                          
303  The short laugh comes after a statement that was uttered very seriously. 
304  She talks about the file “Danielle_Number Sequences” document, which she actually sent me. 
305  See talks about the final three paragraphs of the “Danielle_Number Sequences” document. 
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D: I still don’t understand how they do it; because a couple of people tried to explain 
it to me but I was just completely lost, I didn’t know how they could look at a 
number and go “alright that’ the 1 so the next one needs to be 2 [or] okay that, the 
next one needs to be 4”. I still don’t understand it, their way. Everyone was doing 
the wrong thing306 I don’t think it was explained properly to me, which is why I 
personally haven’t understood it 
R: Yeah, yeah 
D: I like my way! [laugh] It’s a long way, but I like my way [laugh] 
R: [laugh] Okay! You don’t need to understand anybody else’s way, is that what 
you mean? 
D: No, I don’t need to 
R: I thought that you are kind of finding you own ways anyway and sometimes they 
get along with other people’s ways, not that you are doing what the others do. 
D: This is the ‘Garden-Path’ one. (16:22) 
R: Right 
D: And there’s quite a lot of work on that one as well, actually. This is explaining 
what we did in class 
R: In class 
D: This actually will be in colour when I’ll print it out properly; and then, I need to 
look into this more as well because… where is it? [she is browsing her notes] I 
started looking once we… because we looked at gardens that were rectangular in 
shape, and I started looking as to whether there was a difference in the area of 
the… in the path around the garden if it was landscape or if it was portrait. So I 
started looking to the difference in that; and then I found something for that, and 
then I started looking at if the garden was an ‘L’ shape, and I was going from there… 
and then… because what I did: when I was looking at the ‘L’ shape I was looking 
like a square path to go around it, and I did loads of work on that and then I realised 
                                                          
306  She means that the others did not explain their way of thinking in a way that she could understand. 
~ 403 ~ 
 
that actually, I don’t need these bits here because I can just do a path directly 
around it, I don’t need the square; and I just… I still put the work in because it 
seemed a shame to have done all that work and not to include it. So I’ve just 
included it all [laugh]    
R: [laugh] So you include everything, anyway 
D: I just included it all, why not? [laugh] 
R: Maybe you are not convinced from your new discovery, your… discovery; maybe 
you still have to check it out (18:00) 
D: Yeah, I think I’ve got a bit more work to do on it, but I managed to… because I 
looked at predicted formulas for it, so I did a few predictions and then I’ve looked 
at… I’ve gone further into it to see if my predictions are any good 
R: What did you find? 
D: I don’t think any of my predictions were any good307 
R: Oh really? 
D: I’ve looked at them, they don’t work and then… I thought a formula and how I 
can…  I’ve seen that the formula does not work if you will; and then looked to see 
if I can change it in any way. I’ve still got more to do on this 
R: Which are your favorite activities? 
D: I liked the ‘New York cop’ one and I liked the ‘tessellation’ one as well 
R: The tessellation one 
D: Yeah, the one we did with the pentominos and the… 
R: Alright 
D: I liked the ‘New York cop’ one because again that was something that I seemed 
to find… not necessarily a formula for but I found a pattern; and once I 
                                                          
307  It seems that the ‘trial-and-improvement’ method is one of Diana’s favourites. 
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found a pattern it was really easy to move on to the next stage308 and… but 
I haven’t looked at this one for a while 
R: And how did you find the pattern? 
D: How did I find it? Well… [she is browsing her notes] So this is the size of the 
precincts if you will, what we were looking at –I’ve got lots of drawings to go with 
this- because at first, the first thing I noticed before I got any kind of formula 
for the number of police that were needed, the first thing I found was 
actually a pattern in the drawings.309 When I was doing the drawings, I found 
patterns in them; and then I started playing around with the patterns310 
and whether it would be any less311 if you moved the position of the first cop and… 
and I started finding a lot of different patterns with it.312 But I’ve got so 
much work on this... But then I got quite frustrated with this one because I found 
a pattern and then I tried it with something else… what did I do? I found a pattern 
and then I tried it again but then I realised that I… I can’t remember what I did! I 
had to start writing things as I was doing it… Oh that was it! Originally when I 
was doing it I was looking at, like this pattern here! If you can see it’s kind of like a 
cross; if you look the pattern that it’s made, there… 
R: Oh, yeah, yeah 
D: And then there’s one [cop] in the middle [of the cross],313 so I started looking at 
that and going further into that; but then I realised that -I can’t remember how I 
realised- but then I realised I can actually do it like this… See? It’s all in diagonals 
                                                          
308  My emphasis 
309  My emphasis 
310  My emphasis 
311  Necessary cops; she is describing the way that she was trying to find the least number of policemen that 
were needed  in order to survey a number of precincts , as the task demanded. 
312  My emphasis 
313 Diana refers to the teacher’s drawing on the board at the beginning of the task (see fig. 1) 
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Figure 1: The teacher's drawing at the beginning of the session; the dotted square and 
the cop in the middle were drawn first, while the other 2 cops were suggested by 
Donald, after the teacher drew the other three squares. 
R: Alright! 
D: And that [pattern] gives a lot less than this [the cross pattern]. It gives a lot less 
[cops] than this. Oh, maybe not a lot less, it’s 17 there and 16 there 
R: For the same shape [for the precincts] it gives you less cops? 
D: Yeah, for a different pattern. So, rather than looking at the numbers I 
was more concentrated on the pattern that I could see and then once I 
was happy that I had the optimal solution for it, then I started looking at 
the numbers to see if I could find… any kind of… pattern… any patterns 
in the numbers and then started trying to work on a… a general formula 
for it but I’ve struggled with the general formula because of the 
differences;314 because I’ve got a pattern and the difference of the numbers of 
cops is 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1 ,1, 2, 1 ,1, 2, 1 ,1,315 and it goes on and on like that… but I 
need to… work on it to try and find a general formula for it. So that’s something I’m 
still working on 
R: So you also think that it’s a ‘rich’ activity, that you can take it further, I suppose 
D: Yeah, yeah 
R: Since you say you have to look at it further 
D: Yes! Yeah, I need to look into that one further (23:01) 
                                                          
314  My emphasis 
315 Diana and her group arrived at the diagonal pattern and the same number sequence that Ivan found; but 
she and her peers did not manage to advance these findings to formulas, as Ivan did, since they were still 
uncertain of the diagonal pattern that they ought to choose and they could not arrive at a unifying pattern (see 
Diana’s coursework). 
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R: What about the activities that the students presented? 
D: I liked… I liked the one that Caroline did, which was the one with the box, I liked 
that one and that might actually be something I might look further into, to hand in 
with my final sort of portfolio work; because I enjoyed that one.  
R: How did you treat it? What happened there? What did you do there with it, during 
the activity? 
D: Well, when we first started looking at it… when we started doing the activity… 
like I say everybody had different ways because we were splitting in two teams, so 
the team that I was in we were actually playing with the boxes, we were not looking 
at the numbers, we were playing with the boxes to see if we could do it. But then, 
the other team… I suppose… thought… I don’t know how they thought about it but 
they… because you had to make two towers, didn’t you? So I did all the numbers 
together divided by two and then realised that you can’t make two towers because 
it was an odd number, so it was impossible;316 so they did that but my team 
weren’t  thinking about the numbers and playing with the blocks. So it was quite 
interesting to see how different people view different things and the way 
they were doing it;317 so then after that we were given an extra block so we had 
eleven blocks…318 and then… when we were looking at that… eh… what did we do 
when we were looking at that? Then it was the case of looking at all the different 
variations of how you could do it… so, with my team I started looking at the… 
because we knew that … when we added all the numbers together we knew that 
each tower had to have a value of… I think it was 33 or something like that, so we 
started looking at the different ways you can make 33 from the 11 numbers but 
obviously there are quite a lot of combinations for that; when I started looking into 
that one of the other girls instead of starting at 11 she went back and started looking 
I think at… at 6 if there were 6 blocks? No… I can’t remember, she started looking 
                                                          
316  She means that it was impossible to divide the odd number (the sum of the boxes’ numbers) in two equal 
numbers (blocks). 
317  My emphasis. 
318  She means boxes (11 boxes with the numbers from 1 to 11, instead of 10 boxes with the numbers from 1 
to 10) 
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at smaller, so rather than being 11 blocks she may be looked at what would happen 
if it was 3 blocks to see if she could find a pattern that would then maybe lead her 
to the answer for if there were 11 blocks.   
R: Alright! 
D: So I started from the 11 and was working on that, and she started from if it was 
smaller to see if she could find a pattern 
R: And why was it so interesting? Did you come to results or did you… 
D: Well no I didn’t because we run out of time, which is why I was wanting to look 
further into it just to see; because I again I had a system of… I was looking at the… 
I was looking at the blocks and I was… because we had the numbers [up to] 11 I 
was saying “right, okay, so if we had 10 and 11 together that’s going to give us 22, 
so how many of the remaining numbers will give us the combination of… of what 
we need, of the 11 we need left over”; so I was looking at that way and… as I say 
Barbara was, I think it was Barbara that was looking at the smaller blocks  
R: Which other one interest you?  Which other activity was the most interesting for 
you? 
D: Out of everything we’ve done?   
R: The students 
D: I quite liked Ciera’s [activity] where you had to find the triangles, where you had 
a shape; she gave us a pentagon and you had to find how many different triangles 
were in it. Again that was something that I didn’t feel as I finished… because I feel 
as I work quite slowly and… everyone seems to get it like that.319 And I 
was thinking “but I don’t understand how you’ve got this and where have you got 
that, from where have you got this from”. So… again that has interested me 
because… you know, you’re just looking for the shapes and looking for all the 
different and you are seeing if there’s any patterns and… 
R: There were many activities that were interested in the shapes like Dave’s 
                                                          
319  My emphasis; what she means is that everyone seems to get it ‘instantly’, quite faster than her. 
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D: Yeah, I liked Dave’s as well 
R: What is it exactly that draws you to this kind of activities? What is it, the colours, 
the drawing, is it something beyond that… also? (28:00) 
D: I’m not really sure; it’s just something I’ve always been drawn to, even as a kid; 
it was always them kind of activities that interested me and I don’t know what it is 
about them, I don’t know whether it’s because… I don’t know, maybe because of 
the person I am I like to be able to… because whenever I do anything like 
that I can see how it’s systematic,320 how, okay, with Dave’s [activity], I’ve 
drawn this square so what are the variations of that that I can do; and then I find 
another pattern and I think “alright, what are the variations of that that I can do”; 
and to me, it’s something that is very systematic and it’s just personally 
something that I like and being organised and… to me it’s organisation 
and it’s what I like 
R: What about Tim’s? Did you like Tim’s [activity]? 
D: No 
R: Why? 
D: Because… At first I didn’t understand it; it put me off at first because I don’t 
know anything about chess I’ve never played chess I just don’t know anything about 
it. And it’s not something, I don’t know why, but it’s not something that’s particularly 
interested me, before. Because it’s a lot about forward thinking, isn’t it? And I can’t 
really think… 
R: Forward thinking? 
D: Well, from what I understand of chess a lot of people have said to me that you 
think two moves ahead of what you’re actually doing 
R: Yeah, but that’s because there are many different pieces; there [in Tim’s activity] 
you had one knight 
                                                          
320  My emphasis. 
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D: Oh no, I understand that but this is what… that’s why it put me off but then I 
did it! And it was okay when I did the first one, when we had to find where it would 
move in the first instance. But then I think it was a little bit confusing, the 
instructions that Tim gave to me were a little bit confusing from there; because I 
was saying “okay, so from this place, here, this could be my second position but it 
has no account because it overlaps with this”. And I did not fully understand 
R: Oh, the knight can go over [other pieces], it doesn’t matter if there is something 
on the way 
D: And I did not fully understand it 
R: There was an understanding that you needed there. What about Isaac’s, how did 
you feel about Isaac’s, Sierpinski’s carpet activity 
D: It took me a while well, it takes me a while to do everything… it took me a 
while to understand that but once I did… because Isaac was very patient with me 
[laugh] but once I did understand it I really liked it. 
R: How did you treat it? I don’t need details I mean generally 
D: At first I was looking at it and I was thinking that you’d have to draw it to be 
able to understand; because for me, usually I have to be able to visualize 
things to be able to understand it321 
R: You mean to actually visualize yeah? 
D: Yes! So I was drawing all of these [the squares within the square]. Well I didn’t 
draw that one.322  I drew the 1st, 2nd and 3rd stage; which to me was how I 
understood it and… as I say once it was explained to me, and it was just for me 
getting my head around the fact that… this bit here… because we had to find the 
area of this didn’t we? So then… once… and I understood that… obviously then we 
look at the separate ones, so you had to look at the whole thing of the… the area 
of this, with these bits missing; and I understood that but when we got into this I 
started to get lost, when we got into the 3rd stage I started to get lost! But then 
                                                          
321 My emphasis. 
322  She means the 4th stage; see ’Reflection on Isaac’s activity’ file. 
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Isaac came over and explained it to me323 and he said “well this is this and 
this is like that and like that” and “Alright, yeah…”; so I really liked it once…324 
[I did understand it] 
R: And what did you do after you understood what’s going on? 
D: Well because I’m so slow in understanding things we’ve moved into the next 
person’s… 
R: No, no, no not what Isaac did, what did you do? I think Isaac told me in the 
interview that I had with him that you were treating one part of the shape, trying 
to find the area for this particular part and then trying to come from this part to the 
whole…325 Is this so? I mean that is how he described it to me 
D: Maybe, maybe that was what I was doing; maybe that is why I confused myself 
R: Because I thought “Oh, quite typical for Diana”… 326 
D: [laugh] 
R: She is getting fixed into a point  
D: Yeah… 
R: that she can manage and then she…that was my [impression]…  
D: Yeah… 
R: is that what… 
D: Well, originally, for some reason… because when this was drawn on the board 
we had the grid in it, didn’t we? 
R: Yes 
D: So this was a separate one and this was a separate square, so I found the area 
of that but then it didn’t click with me straight away that we were still trying to find 
the area of this; I thought then we were looking at the smallest square and we 
                                                          
323  My emphasis (see also Ivan’s description of Diana’s reactions in the ’Reflection on Isaac’s activity’ file). 
324 My emphasis. 
325  See Isaac's transcribed interview 070411 (8:00 min) 
326  See Isaac's transcribed interview 070411 (8:00 min) 
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were trying to find the area of that! And then with this one looking at that sort of 
smaller square that would be made there and trying to find the area of that smaller 
bit. So I think that’s what I was trying to do at first, look at the little bit 
and then expand it from there327 but obviously that’s not the way to do it 
[laugh] 
R: [laugh] I don’t know if it is, I mean why not? You can find a way through it 
D: Yeah… 
R: That would be okay, wouldn’t it? 
D: Yeah… 
R: You found [a way] with the other stuff there [the doubling modulo activity]. 
Right! What about Lewis’s [activity]? What did you think about that? 
D: I don’t like things like that! 
R: The bridge and the… 
D: I don’t like things like that because I never understand; my brain just won’t allow 
me to work in that way… Because I never… Because… I don’t know why but I’ve 
got a… there’s a game that I’ve got that has lots of different puzzles like that and 
I… I don’t know why but I’ve never understood them even as a child; they’ve 
completely baffled me I’ve never… and I don’t know what it is about them I 
can’t explain what it is but I think it again the only way that I can explain 
it is going back to my system, so I would have to say “right, okay, well 
that one is not going to work so what could I do next? And then what 
could I do next?”328 And I think that the problem that I find is because I 
have to work in that way… people work faster than me and I hear what 
they are saying and I hear them shouting answers so I think “that must 
be then!”. So I’m not working out for myself I’m just overhearing what 
                                                          
327 My emphasis; it is also a strategy that the teacher had suggested during the sessions.  
328 ‘Trial-and-improvement’ method. 
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the people are saying because other people work faster than I do 329 
(35:00) 
R: I didn’t get that actually…330 
D: With Lewis’s [activity], it was the one with the different times of people. It was 
5 people walking…  
R: I’ve got it here 
D: Yeah… And they only had 30 minutes for the lantern, didn’t they? And you could 
only walk as fast as the slowest person, couldn’t you? 
R: Yes 
D: Well, when I started to do it just because of the way I work and I always have 
worked I would have to start with one number so I started with 1 and I said “okay, 
if he went over then, who would have to go over next and who would have to do 
this and who would have to do that”; and it’s a long way to do it but it’s just the 
only way I understand it. But with the others because they worked faster than me 
I heard someone say “the number 12 has to go across”; no, not the number 12, 
“the number so and so has to go across first”, so I think “the number so and so has 
to go across”. So I’m not thinking for myself at that point I’m just hearing what 
other people are saying, I’m thinking “oh that must be right! So I’ll start with that 
and then go from there”. So then I’ll start with whatever number they have said 
and started my system331 again; but then I’ll hear someone else say “oh then you 
have to take that one over”. But because I cannot work fast enough with 
things like this I never get to the answer myself because I always hear 
what other people saying332 
R: So you are changing your mind they change your method while you are 
processing it, is that what you mean? 
                                                          
329 My emphasis. 
330  She was speaking rather fast and I wasn’t sure that I understood what she was saying. 
331 My emphasis. 
332 My emphasis. 
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D: Yeah… sometimes with Nature of Maths I never felt as though I could keep up 
and work as fast as everybody else because a lot of people seem to get things [just] 
like that333 and I’ve always felt as though I was _334 behind (37:16) 
R: They have their own problems! I think that you think of them as something 
sublime; that they are doing everything so fast 
D: They are though! 
R: Are they? 
D: Yeah! 
R: They have problems also! 
D: I know but they’re all… I don’t know they just all seem a lot better than me, at 
maths 
R: Oh that’s because all those who have problems don’t speak… 
D: [laugh] 
R: [laugh] 
D: I feel as though I’m just sat there all time but I haven’t got a clue; I don’t know 
what’s happening, I don’t know what’s going on and then when I always feel as  
though I get to a point of understanding and we’ve moved on something else! 
R: That’s happened to me also! 
D: Yeah… 
R: It’s natural I think 
D: Yeah… 
R: What about your activity? (38:00) 
D: Ohhhh… [a grimace of discontent] 
                                                          
333  She means that they seem to understand very quickly what the activity is all about. 
334  A word that I cannot decipher. 
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R: [laugh] What’s this Ohhhh? 
D: I really struggled to find something 
R: [the one] with the Braille system, wasn’t it? 
D: Yeah… Yeah… 
R: You don’t like it anymore? 
D: Well… I don’t know, I felt like as I really struggled to pick something that I 
actually really liked; originally I was looking at ‘palindromic dates’ but I thought 
well…  
R: Something similar with Mandy’s [activity]  
D: Yeah… But I didn’t; I was looking at it and I thought “okay, it’s interesting”, to 
me it was interesting but I just thought… there’s no… I don’t know… it suggested 
in the book that I found that somebody try and find out which year had; and I 
thought well… that’s just a hell of a lot work! And I just thought I’ve only 
got 20 minutes335 and I don’t want people to look at it and think “really Diana 
you want me to do this?” [laugh] So, I felt as I was really struggling and then I 
saw the Braille thing about 5 minutes before the lesson ended.336 And the teacher 
said “oh that’s quite a good one”. And I’ll admit, I didn’t research it as much as I 
should have done! And I did it and I don’t know, it just seemed really obvious 
because I haven’t… I don’t know… 
R: Really obvious? 
D: I don’t know I just… 
R: What is it? You got a kind of bad feeling about it, is there something wrong with 
it? I mean… 
                                                          
335 My emphasis. 
336  It was a lesson dedicated to providing ideas in order that the students would choose the material that they 
would use for their presentations. 
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D: I don’t think there was anything wrong with it! Because I suppose… it lasted 
20 minutes as it was supposed to and we all got kind of an answer to it 
and everybody seemed to understand it337 but… 
R: Do you mean that it would be more successful if not everybody seemed to 
understand it, if nobody would understand it or if half of them or just one [would 
understand it] or what? [laugh] 
D: [laugh]  
R: When would it be successful [to your opinion]? 
D: I don’t know… 
R: When would you be happy with it? 
D: When would I be happy with it? 
R: Yeah 
D: Well, because I hadn’t put as much thought into it as I should have 
done,338 which I’ll admit, I completely admit I should have put a lot more thought 
into it than I did; and I never thought to see the pattern, you know the… if 
you’ve got 6 dots then it’s only got one possibility, if you’ve got 5 dots then -I can’t 
even remember how many possibilities you had- and then obviously I saw a pattern 
in it but… in a way I was just going with the flow of the class and what 
they found because I didn’t really have any answers to it, I didn’t know 
what was going to happen!339 I just saw it and thought ”yeah I’ll _340 off with 
that” 
R: Some people came out with a formula there 
D: Yeah, so…  
                                                          
337  My emphasis; in this statement seems to be included whatever Diana thought as important in her 
presentation, in the way that it was processed. 
338 My emphasis. 
339 My emphasis; Diana is talking about the formula  
n!
k!∙(n−k)!
 , which calculates the number of different ways 
that k dots are marked in a total number of n dots (n equals to 6 in the Braille system that Diana presented) 
340  Unclear word. 
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R: This is the way… they thought… a few people… they found the formula because 
it’s combinatorics there, 2 dots, 3 dots over six, 4 dots over six, 5 dots over six. So 
it was interesting [for] quite a few people there 
D: Yeah… 
R: But you’re not happy with that [her activity], are you? 
D: Well, I don’t know what I’m going to say about it when I have to write up my… 
because we’ve got to put it in a… final work and I’ve got no idea what I’m going to 
say about it 
R: That’s what worries you about it actually, not the activity itself… 
D: Well, partly, the activity was alright, I was doing it and it seemed like a good 
idea; I felt okay about it before I started doing it and then I started doing 
it and I just thought “this is rubbish”341 
R: Do you usually think like that? 
D: Most of the time, yeah… 
R: Really? 
D: Yeah! [laugh] 
R: Mmm… 
D: [laugh] 
R: [laugh] Tell me please how do you think a teacher would be, because in a sense, 
did you feel like that? That it was…342 
D: In a way I liked it that I didn’t know the answers because I was 
learning with the class.343 And it was nice because I had certain ideas of… sort 
of a rough idea of what might happen but then it was interesting to see everybody 
else’s ideas; so in a way I suppose it was a good thing because I had no 
preconceived ideas of what might happen, it left me open to all the 
                                                          
341 My emphasis. 
342  If she was thinking as if she was acting like a teacher. 
343 My emphasis. 
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possibilities, so I wasn’t saying “right, well this is the answer to it”; it 
wasn’t this definite answer, it was like “right, like okay let’s just explore 
it together and see what happens”. So it left me open to suggestions344 
R: So how would you think yourself as a [teacher]… what is your model of teaching? 
(43:00) Is it something similar to what you have seen in these presentations or your 
presentation? A teacher of mathematics, that is. 
D: I think when I’m teaching I need to get over the urge to give answers… 
not straight away.345 If somebody doesn’t know the answer to something I’m 
very… I want to be able to tell them rather than help them to understand 
R: To understand themselves? 
D: Yeah, I sometimes have an urge to say “the answer is this”; rather than try and 
explain it. I am controlling the urge I am doing quite well with that; I’m having 
training when I’m teaching [laugh] but I… but I don’t know... I don’t really know 
because I have to admit in the NoM sessions I have sometimes been really 
frustrated because I sometimes felt as though… I’ve asked a question and he’s 
answered it with a question! And sometimes it’s just really frustrating because 
I think, well, “am I doing it right or am I doing it wrong?” and he says “what do you 
think?” And I’m thinking that “I don’t know, that’s why I’m asking you!” And it 
frustrates me 
R: [laugh] Yeah, all he means I suppose is “do whatever you want… 
D: Yeah, yeah 
R: …it’s all about your way of doing it, not me, telling you how to do it” 
D: Yeah, I understand that, I do understand that but I had times that I found it 
really frustrating 
R: Because you need somebody to really tell you the answer? 
                                                          
344 My emphasis. 
345 My emphasis. 
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D: Yeah, because I feel I’ve got to a point where I really don’t understand it 
anymore and I don’t necessarily need an answer! Just a little bit of guidance; 
maybe guidance would be a better word rather than answer, you know, a push 
in the right direction; but sometimes I felt as though I wasn’t getting that and it 
frustrated me 
R: [laugh] Yes, yes I know what you mean. What about the activity with the moon 
and the earth and the sun? 
D: [very spontaneous laugh] Oh I think me, Ashley and Mandy just… we were in 
our own little world with that then, weren’t we? To us it made perfect sense, what 
we were doing made perfect sense to us; I mean I enjoyed it because I felt as 
though… I mean obviously I am not claiming to be an expert but I kind of felt as 
though I knew the basic workings of the solar system and I was surprised how 
much I actually learnt from that lesson. Because everything that I’ve done in 
the past in school and everything it’d all been… so like when the sun was moving 
round  I’d never really thought about the seasons and where the sun is positioned 
and you know, I’d never really thought about that; so it was really interesting seeing 
that! And actually having the visual there for it346 whereas in the past I think I 
haven’t had the visual for it, it’s just been “you’ve seen it in the textbook” 
R: The visual? 
D: The visual, yeah, you know how we had the light in the middle, which obviously 
was the sun and the planets, but when I’ve done anything in the past with school 
it’s just been in textbooks; so we never actually _347 anything practical, like we did 
in that lesson. And then, obviously, as pretending to be the earth and orbiting 
around the sun was interesting  
R: And how did you learn, you think? 
                                                          
346 My emphasis. 
347  Unclear word. 
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D: Well, like I say, to me what me, Mandy and Ashley were doing it made perfect 
sense; all three of us, it didn’t seem to make sense to anybody else but to all three 
of us we knew exactly what we were doing 
R: Did you agree with each other? 
D: All three of us agreed, yeah; so our logic was, because we agreed, it was 
right.348 Because all three of us agreed on it and we all knew what each other 
meant, then it made sense. And it was okay, it was fine 
R: Could you explain it to anybody else, what you were thinking, how you concluded 
to whatever you concluded? 
D: I could try, well, the thing is, when we did what we were doing… and then, after 
that we went to the… you know, the polyestering balls we had 
R: The what? 
D: You know, the polyestering balls, and we had all of them, and the light was in 
the middle, well, that explained what we were doing. So, I think what it was that 
we knew what was happening and that when that part of it was explained to us 
with the ‘summer-spring-autumn-winter’ we knew what was going on and we were 
saying what we’ve just said. But nobody else seemed to understand our way of 
interpreting it. You know, when we were stood up and we were hoping around, 
well, our explanation of that was exactly the same, more or less exactly the same 
as the explanation that we were given when we were all standing around looking at 
these polyestering balls  
R: I had the sense that Mandy was moving like this349 [I tried to literally show her] 
D: Yes she was 
R: And she was not moving like this350 
D: No, she wasn’t 
                                                          
348 My emphasis. 
349  See Mary’s drawing during the activity. I will now describe to Diana an episode from the “Earth-Moon-
Sun” activity in a humorous way. 
350  That is without any axis shift. 
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R: And I think that at the same time Ashley was thinking that the earth was moving 
like this… not the axis, as a whole;351  
D: Alright…  
R: So I thought there was a different understanding and I’m checking it now by 
asking you because you were there 
D: Maybe it was just me and Mandy 
R: I was not there at the second part of the activity; in fact during the first part of 
the activity I was talking with Ashley, and you and Mandy were talking to each other 
D: Yeah! [laugh] 
R: We were two (split) groups and… 
D: Yeah! 
R: …as soon as I finished352 I thought “oh, what are we doing here? We are one 
group, not two…  
D: Yeah!353 
R: …subgroups!” So I turned to you and I started talking to you, and you were a bit 
annoyed actually, I think [laugh]  
D: Oh was I? Sorry [laugh] 
R: No, it’s okay [laugh] 
D: [laugh] 
R: “Who is this guy? He just entered the conversation”354  
D: [laugh]  
R: I was just trying to include everybody,355 
                                                          
351  The latter way that was just described. 
352  When I finished talking with Ashley (see Reflection on earth, moon, sun activity file) 
353  Diana recalls the episode that Andonis is describing. 
354 Andonis means that they were involved in their own investigation of the activity (there was no conversation 
actually, Diana and Mary were staring at the “polyestering balls” in silence). 
355  See Reflection on earth, moon, sun activity file for a full description of this episode 
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D: Yeah! 
R: you know, I didn’t want us356 to draw our own conclusions 
D: Oh sorry, I didn’t mean to [laugh] 
R: You were like this… sitting and looking at the [laugh] light in the middle and 
Mandy was at the other side, like this…357 you were looking  
D: I think it was because I think we were getting a little bit frustrated 
because to me and Mandy it made perfect sense but we couldn’t articulate 
to other people.358 I think we were quite frustrated (50:13) 
R: So you think that earth is moving like this?359 Or like this?360 
D: I can’t remember what conclusion… No, I think we came to the… I think we 
came to the conclusion… Oh… No, I think it was going like that 
R: But Mandy was [thinking that] it was walking like that, I thought, as far as I 
remember, she was going like this, the whole body was moving and she was using 
the left [leg] 
D: Oh, that’s because when Mandy was doing it like that we were assuming that 
her leg, like going through her body was the axis 
 
Figure 3 Different models of Eartth moving around the Sun 
                                                          
356  That is, Andonis and Ashley to draw their conclusions separately from the rest of he group 
357  Andonis is describing how they were sitting when he interrupted them 
358 My emphasis. 
359  That is, the way that Mandy described it. 
360  Without any axis shift. 
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R: That’s right, that’s what I thought. And I thought “okay that means that the axis 
is moving”, as the axis was going like this361 
D: Oh, maybe that’s why it made no sense to anybody else then! 
R: But that was a way of thinking about it; I’m not saying one [way] is good, one 
[way] is wrong, I ‘don’t know anything’; I say just what I saw. And then I thought 
that Ashley was thinking that it’s going like this, I cannot turn my finger,362 you 
know 
D: [laugh] 
R: [laugh] and now you say to me that you all agreed and I think “how could you 
agree if you had different models”? 
D: Well, as far as I understood it we all did agree; but maybe thinking about 
it now, maybe I was just agreeing with Mandy and maybe we just 
assumed that Ashley agreed with us363 
R: It might be… But what were you and Mandy agreeing on? That’s what I would 
like to know… on which kind of movement? 
D: I think we eventually agreed that it was going like that 
R: In the end? 
D: Yeah, that’s what we eventually agreed on as far as I’m aware. Yeah… I think 
maybe when we modeled it the first time we actually meant that; we actually  
R: And why were you moving your head so that it always looked at the light?  
D: I can’t remember what that was for, was that the moon or something? 
R: It was probably the moon because the moon is always having the same… 
D: The way that we… it was all the 3 of us that were doing that, the same, weren’t 
we? The way that we saw that was… What we were doing? So it was the moon that 
we were looking at weren’t it? 
R: Yes 
                                                          
361  See Mandy’s model in the Figure 3. 
362  That the axis is spinning around without shifting (see Ashley’s model in the Figure 3). 
363 My emphasis. 
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D: Right! So we were saying that our faces were… not the moon… we were saying 
our faces… I think that we said our faces were the side of the Earth when it’s… 
night time or something like that… We got told that a certain side of the Earth or 
something like that always had to be facing the moon or the sun or whatever it was; 
so that was the reason that we were going so that we were always facing the object 
that was hanging of the ceiling 
R: You were told that the moon was always facing the earth with the same side; 
one side of the moon is the dark side, you never see it 
D: Yeah… was it? I don’t remember now! It seems such a long time ago364 
R: It’s okay, I don’t want to put you in… 
D: No I was… we’ve been told at some point that basically our faces or whatever 
always had to… always had to be facing whatever object it was hanging of the 
ceiling; which is why we were turning like that so we were always facing the… and 
we were looking the way our bodies were going when we were doing that 
R: And why wouldn’t you turn your bodies instead of ‘breaking your necks’? Was 
the body a separate part of the planet? 
D: No… I think the reason we were doing that was because for us to move round 
in a circle365 the only way we could do that and keep our faces facing that object 
was to twist our bodies round. So our bodies were actually not part of what we were 
trying to… it was just the fact that we wanted our faces to always be facing this 
object; and because we had to turn in a circle like this, that was why our bodies 
were moving as it were (55:08) 
R: So your head was the moon? 
D: I think that was the general gist, yes 
R: [And] not the other part of the body; the other part of the body was carrying the 
planet? 
                                                          
364  My emphasis; the interview would probably be more successful concerning the planets activity if it would 
take place soon after the activity. 
365  Diana describes a circular motion, not an elliptical one. 
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D: No, no the body was just in the way. We needed our faces to be constantly facing 
this object, which was why…  
R: Yes, yes. So, the final question, if you like 
D: Yeah 
R: What did you think about these sessions [the NoM sessions]?366 
D: When we first started doing them I enjoyed the investigation that we were doing 
but I have to admit as time went on I started getting more and more frustrated. 
And I think, partly because of the reason I said before; that sometimes I felt as 
though I was never given any kind of push. And I think another part was because I 
always felt as though I work so much slower than everybody else. And I know it’s 
not all about speeding, you have to do learn at your own pace but I always felt as 
though I was that far behind everybody else; and I don’t know to me I never seemed 
to understand anything, it always took me about half an hour longer than everybody 
else. And, like I say, as soon as… 
R: Everybody else! Everybody else? [laugh] 
D: The table I was sitting on then. But then, as soon as I understood it I feel as 
though the lesson was over and that was it! Nothing was carried on with it. But that 
was obviously my own doing because I’ve not gone away from the lesson and 
thought “right, well I’m going to carry on with my understanding of it I’ve just 
finished”. So it’s… I am obviously to blame because I’m in charge of my own 
learning. 
R: I think that these sessions were introducing an alternative way in learning and…  
D: Yeah 
R: And I was just asking how you feel how you think about this alternative way if 
you like, now that the sessions are over; how you feel about this alternative way of 
learning and constructing knowledge 
                                                          
366  It is the last part of the interview and Diana will describe her impressions of the NoM sessions and the 
effect that they had on her. 
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D: I think it’s good because encourages you to learn for yourself and you can 
then see how you learn and apply it to other things; other than just maths you 
can apply it to different things whereas… I’m thinking in schools and everything 
it is as we’ve spoken about before you are not developing necessarily your 
understanding, you are been taught to pass an exam!367 So, I think it was… 
I think part of it I found it frustrating because I never had this kind of 
teaching before; throughout college and throughout school it’s alright 
“you need to do this to be able to get this grade, you need to be able to 
do this to be able to get that grade” whereas this was a lot more of my 
own thought processes and understanding and…368 So it’s good but I think 
because it’s new369 and maybe because I’m a bit older and I’ve never come 
across it before 
R: A bit older? So you think the others have come across it before? 
D: Not necessarily! I don’t think Donald or Ivan have ever come across it before, 
but because I’ve got through say 9 years more teaching than Donald and Ivan for 
example, then, you know on different teaching methods I’ve still never come across 
it. So, maybe it’s harder for me than it is for them because they’re more… open to 
it? 
R: What have you discovered from these sessions? Have you discovered anything 
in your personal way of… 
D: I think, personally, when I put my mind into it I can actually come up with 
things myself rather than relying on other people and saying “well, what 
have you got for this and what have you got for this”; and I think I’ve 
learned to trust myself a little bit more. Because a lot of the time –and it’s 
not just with maths, it’s with other subjects- I’ve been very cautious when 
I found an answer, if my answer isn’t the same as everybody else’s I’ve 
just assumed mine is wrong! Because it’s not the same as somebody else’s 
                                                          
367 My emphasis. 
368 My emphasis. 
369 My emphasis. 
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[answer].370 But I think the lessons that we’ve had and because of the way that 
we have been taught to think for ourselves, and it is a lot of independent thinking, 
that I think I’ve possibly become a bit more confident with what I’m doing; 
because I’m thinking “well, because I’ve got a different answer to somebody 
else it doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s wrong, it just means I thought 
about it in a different way”.371 So it has, yeah it’s been good for me! I have 
enjoyed it but it’s been a hard work [laugh] 
R: [laugh] (1:00:35) 
D: It’s taken me a while to fully appreciate it! Let’s put it that way 
R: Do you think that you will apply any of these things to your teaching? 
D: Yeah, well, like I said before about the… about my need to just give people the 
answers but… I think I have realised from these lessons that it helps people 
more if you help with their understanding of it rather than just give them 
an answer straight away; and naturally make them think about it and 
what they are doing and why they are doing it, which obviously is very 
important with wanting to be a teacher.372 It has been good! Yeah! 
R: After so much pain and suffering… 
D: After so much pain, yes! It was worth it, although I won’t admit that to the 
teacher [laugh] 
R: Thank you very much for your… [cooperation], I’ve enjoyed it 
D: You are welcome, no problem. 
 
                                                          
370 My emphasis. 
371 My emphasis. 
372 My emphasis. 
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Appendix D. Mary’s lengthy interview, 19/5/2011, concerning the 
curves activity and the stellated octahedron activity. 
Paragraph 1. Mary talks about the curves activity, where every 
point is equidistant from a wall and a fixed point 
Researcher: Which one is your favourite one? 
Mary: This one.  This one is definitely my favourite one 
R: The ‘garden-path’ one. Why? 
M: Because it came to a formula 
R But some other [activities also] came to a formula 
M: My other favourite [activity] was the equidistance between the fixed point 
R: Did you sort the problem? [she had a problem with a ‘corrupted’ computer file] 
M: I’ve done it now, I finished 
R: Where is the original? 
M: This is the original 
R: Oh yes, yes [I recognised it]. You were the most silent person in this activity you 
were just sitting there and nobody knew what was going on there in your mind; 
‘was it working at all?’, ‘what was happening there?’. And then you came out with 
all this 
M: I could not get it; on that day I could not get this. At all! 
R: You remember what was happening? 
M: Yeah, yeah. Ashley was demonstrating and you were demonstrating and in fact 
it wasn’t happening! 
R: Yes, it wasn’t happening and I thought “what’s wrong?”. I was using the 
Pythagorean Theorem, 
M: Yeah 
R: Ashley was moving up and down, Yvette came and Mary was just sitting there... 
and then you came out with this; when you came home what [happened]? It was 
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a ‘revelation’? 
M: Well I thought I better try and understand it 
R: And then it was all easy? 
M: Yes! 
R: Suddenly; how did that happen? How do you come from the situation where 
everything was so complicated and incomprehensible... 
M: I think it was because we’ve done like 3 different things on that day, haven’t 
we? I was still thinking about the 1st one and then a little bit it was like I was trying 
to understand the 2nd one and this 3rd one came just like a... It can’t work! 
R: You mean in the same activity we were doing many things 
M: Yeah 
R: Yes, we firstly did this where you have equidistance from 2 points, and then from 
a wall, from a line, and then came this and then we moved to another case 
M: It was all keep going... too much 
R: So you couldn’t concentrate in this particular one 
M: Too much. Yeah 
R: And then? Everything was sorted out? 
M: Yeah, when I got home I just drew this little diagram,373 like... obviously the 
wall... then the cross… and then we knew that this is 10374… and obviously this is 
it375 and then I think what I couldn’t understand on the day was that this 
wall went on forever!376 Like… do you know what I mean?377 
                                                          
373  My emphasis; Mary showed me a piece of paper that I reproduced here –see Figure 1. 
374  She means the distance between the fixed point and the wall. 
375 The diagram serves as a representation of the situation that took place during the session; an obvious attempt 
to visualise the situation that took place. 
376  My emphasis; it was through the diagram visualisation that she managed to get hold of the abstract 
mathematical presumptions of the problem, to transcend the limited representation of the classroom and the 
limitations of the particular situation in the classroom. 
377  By drawing the “little diagram” she realised that the wall was just the representation of a straight line and 
she was transferred from the concrete particular case to the general abstract case. In other words her 
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R: Yeah 
M: It went on, it wasn’t just a fixed point like this was; so then and obviously these 
2, these are the same,378 10 [units] away from the fixed point, [which is] on the 
horizontal, I’m going to make 10 away from the [wall]… 
R: This is a circle here 
M: Yes  
R: Like that, eh? 3 points, one is on the wall and these 2 equidistant from the fixed 
point, yes?379 
M: So this point, this point and this point… so then, I was like “there must be another 
point; so what would happen if I’d change… if I moved this point so [that] it was 
on the line of y=4”, yeah? So then I changed on here [another diagram] and I 
knew380 this distance to the wall is going to be 6 now. 
R: Yes 
M: So using Pythagoras 
R: Yes 
M: this is going to be 4 isn’t it? 
R: Yes 
M: I need this to be 6 and this [has to be] equidistant to the wall 
R: Yes 
M: So then what’s the x coordinate going to have to be for that? 
                                                          
intuition was limited to the concrete example during the session, making it difficult to think of the problem in 
abstract mathematical terms. The abstract representation of the diagram allowed her to further her perspective 
and mathematise the problem. 
378 She means the distance between any point of the curve from the wall and from the vertical axis. 
379 I’m choosing to interrupt her now that her discourse has found a rhythm, so that I’ll have a recorded 
description of the diagram that we are engaged in, for later reference; it is apparent from what she says after 
my interruption that she was not influenced from it. The 3 points that I mean here are the points with coordinates 
(0,5)—halfway between the fixed point and the wall—, (-10,0) and (10,0) [I’m describing the first points of 
the diagram that Mary found belonging to the curve that she was looking for –see Figure 1]. The circle that I 
just mentioned has its centre on the fixed point and its radius equalled 10 units. 
380 Her emphasis. 
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R: Aha! 
M: So then I did that and then I got these 2 points.381 And then I changed the y 
distance again to 7… to… I changed it to y equals 3,382 for these lines; this changed 
to 7, so the hypotenuse changed to 7, so then I… 
R: I’m very happy 
M: So then it just came like that 
R: I’m very happy because I can see here all the ideas that we were talking 
about—and some of them of course I introduced them and I remember them 
M: Yes 
R: Like “why don’t you find many points and then figure out what kind of curve or 
line… 
M: Yeah 
R: …or whatever this is”. So that’s what you are doing here, you’re finding more 
and more points, and then you will find out what is going on 
M: Yeah. And once I got up to the line where… on to the x axis, see? I changed it 
all to it like the graphs so that I could understand it. So then, once it was on the x 
axis     I actually didn’t think that you could have a point beyond that383 
R: Aha? 
M: It turned out that it just keeps going 
R: Why can’t you have a point beyond that? 
M: I didn’t think you could because I was like “but it’s always going to be close to 
the fixed point!” But it’s not because this doesn’t go on forever whereas if we had 
a point beyond the wall then it’s always going to be closer to the wall; it’s never 
going to be the same distance between [the wall and the fixed point] 
                                                          
381  She means the points (−√20, 4), (√20, 4) [see her notes for the use of Pythagorean theorem in order to 
calculate the value for the x coordinate] 
382  y equals 3, therefore 7 is the distance from the wall and –consequently– the fixed point. 
383 She means beyond the x axis. 
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R: That’s right! So if you go beyond this ‘border’, if you call it like that, the distance 
from the fixed point will always be smaller than the distance from the wall, is that 
what you’re saying?384 
 
Figure 1: Mary's "little diagram" 
 
R: No! If we went beyond the wall 
A: Beyond the wall, yes 
R: The distance to the wall is always going to be smaller than the distance from the 
fixed point 
R: And… and I’m adding… 
M: On the other side?385 
R: On the other side 
M: No! 
R: Is this what you’re [also claiming] 
                                                          
384 I’m trying to understand what she is talking about, thinking that she means the fixed point instead of the 
wall. 
385 Beyond the x axis, that is the ‘level’ of the fixed point. 
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M: No, because I got to this point and then I was like “Oh! I’ll try using the same 
method that I did” 
R: Yes 
M: Then we went to here, so I said, so if we moved beyond the x axis the distance 
from the wall is going to be 11, so then the hypotenuse is going to be 11 and this 
distance here is going to be 1. So then what that has to be?386 And it worked. So 
then it carried on to show that the curve is continued (7:11) 
R: So it does continue on this side [and] not on the other side. I like it, this is 
mathematics I love them, you know what I mean 
M: Yeah! 
R: So what kind of curve is this one? 
M: x squared. And then 
R: Yeah, oh I’m sorry, just continue and then? 
M: This is lovely; and then I literally disrupted my ideas. So it’s clearly a curve it’s 
going to be in the form of x2; however an x2 graph is like a cup shape 
R: Yes 
M: Yeah? This is the dots and this is going to be a negative x2 so I have the equation 
-x2 but we know on a normal x2 graph it’s going to cross the point at (0,0). This one 
didn’t, it was translated up to 5 so I had a translation of (0,5); so then I got an 
equation of  y = 5 - x2 alright? But then I tried the point (10,0) so, this one here 
and when I put that to the equation I got -5=-100, which obviously doesn’t… So 
then to get to 5 you have to just divide 100 by 20. So then I came to an equation 
of              y = 5 - 
 x2
20
; it’s the equation of that graph. Yeah? 
R: Did you test more points to see if it fits? 
M: Yeah, yeah; and then I used √24 and then put that in. So I only used √20, I 
knew that the coordinate was 4 from my graph; right? And then it came out that 
y=4. So it was clear that that was the actual equation 
                                                          
386  She means the x coordinate. 
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R: Because you tried one more point and it fitted 
M: Yeah, yeah, yeah; and then I did it so that the wall was only 6 away from the 
fixed point; and then I did it all over again. Before I did this I thought that the 
general formula, it doesn’t matter the distance between the wall and the fixed point 
at all, if we call that distance a, [then] the formula—any, no matter what the 







R: Wait; you say that very quickly and I’m not English 
M: This is the equation that I got from the last graph; so now we’re saying this is 
the wall and this is the fixed point then the distance here is a. So this, in this 
occasion, a was 10 wasn’t it? 
R: Yes 
M: We’ve got 5 so it’s going to be a over 2.  
R: Yes 
M: And then the x2 is the same and then we’ve got 20 on the bottom so it’s going 
to be 2 lots of a. 
R: Which is 2a 








M: But that was just without trying any other… so then I tried the… wall… the fixed 
point being on the 6 away from the wall. So then I got some more equations like 
this 
[Mary explains how she used the same method in order to find the formulas for the 
cases where the distance from the wall is 6, 4, and how her general formula also 
worked for these cases] 
R: Can you call this a proof? 
M: Yeah 
R: Yeah? 
M: I proved it 
R: Alright 
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M: And then this is just putting… like… 
R: There are many nice things in this procedure; I love it really because you have 
used the Pythagorean Theorem, many points to find the curve, testing and 
translating everything to a constant which is a, many nice things (14:00) 
 
Paragraph 2. Mary talks about formulas and ‘pure’ maths 
R: So this one [the curve that all its points are equidistant between a wall and a 
fixed point] is your favourite one? 
M: That one and ‘garden-path’, it’s kind of a joint one. I like this one more because 
it’s finished 
R: You like it because it’s finished? 
M: Yeah; but this one [the ‘garden-path’] I’m thinking: “What if I do this? What if I 
did that?” It could go on forever Andonis, I was even doing that last night 
R: And why do you like the ‘garden-path’ one? 
M: Because it came to a formula at the end; I like it when it comes to a formula 
like… the ‘New York cop’ I didn’t like that one 
R: Why do you like it when it comes to a formula? 
M: Because it’s satisfying387 
R:  You like it because it’s satisfying 
M: Yeah! 
R: That doesn’t make sense! 
M: It makes perfect sense! [laugh] 
R: And you are satisfied because you like it! 
M: Yeah, you feel like you’ve achieved something; if you don’t come to a formula 
it’s just leaves… you keep going 
                                                          
387 Her emphasis. 
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R: [You mean] “What’s the point” if you don’t get a formula. So the formula is 
important for you? 
M: Yeah, kind of 
R: In what sense? 
M: Because it’s like you’ve got something at the end; like you can say “this is 
true!”. Like for that I am positive that I can say that if this is true and if this part 






 and you would be 
equidistant from the wall and a fixed point; I can definitely say that, I would make 
no assumptions whatsoever about the ‘New York cop’; at all! 
R: Forget the ‘New York cop’; I want to understand how you feel about the formula 
it’s very important 
M: That was it! [Mary laughs] 
R: Wait a second because I have a teasing question: you can have results without 
having a formula 
M: Yeah you can but… 
R: You can say “when you do this you’ll have that. When you do that you’ll have 
the other thing”. You have results but the formula is a different form of 
results 
M: Yeah! 
R: Which… I mean, I am with you [i.e. I have the same perspective that you have]388 
M: [laugh] 
R: I just want your… your… [opinion] 
M: I’m trying to think about it and put it in words [silence] 
R: I’m not going to speak I want your… your words [silence]. What is it with a 
formula that makes it ‘important’, makes it… special [silence] 
                                                          
388  She is thinking about it and I’m trying to encourage her. 
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M: I don’t know. I do know but  
R: I mean [you may] give an example to explain I mean… I mean like “I like this 
because aha! There, you see? The formula is there and so I can…” [silence] 
M! I just gave you that example! 
R: Can you enrich the example? 
M: Okay! Pythagoras, he states that a2 equals b2+c2; so we know that for every 
right angle triangle a is going to be bigger than b and c; for sure! Definitely! 
R: Yes! Yes! And you can know even more than that 
M: Yeah! It can take you to so many more things to think about;389 it can 
take you to so many more things just like 
R: So is it the control you have 
M: Yeah! 
R: over the… phenomenon that the formula gives you that fascinates you about it 
M: Yeah 
R: Are these my words? 
M: No, I know what you mean and it’s also why… it’s just the fact that you feel 
like you got something in the end [silence] like you’ve come to 
something.390 I can’t explain it to you 
R: You mean that something is as vague as ‘strange’ before, as soon as you get the 
formula you’ve pinned it down 
M: Yeah, you narrow it down to just a small—maybe not simple—but just the size 
is 
R: Which does what to the phenomenon? 
M: It brings it to a more manageable size; in the teacher’s words [laugh] 
                                                          
389  My emphasis. 
390  My emphasis. 
~ 437 ~ 
 
R: Your words 
M: But it comes from the teacher. 
R: But it comes from the teacher, right? It makes it more manageable and it makes 
it… 
M: Approachable! 
R: Approachable; and it brings results out of it 
M: Yeah 
R: Yes, while before it is a ‘chaos’ 
M: Yes! It could be anything!391 
R: Without the use of many words like “if you do this and you do that”; you just 
have this elegant 
M: Yes! 
R: Little 
M: Just a couple of xes392 a couple of ys393 a couple of vehicles 
R: So you like the xes and the ys and 
M: Yeah 
R: All the variables and all this 
M: Yeah 
R: Formal, ‘real’ mathematics 
M: Yeah 
R: The algebra also is probably; is it the algebra fascinating for you? 
M: Yeah 
R: What is your favourite field in mathematics? 
                                                          
391  My emphasis. 
392  Multiple tense for ‘x’ 
393  Multiple tense for ‘y’ 
~ 438 ~ 
 
M: What do you mean? 
R: I mean there’s algebra there’s analysis there’s geometry, there’s calculus, there’s 
statistics, there’s… you name it 
M: Right, well, I don’t like applied mathematics394 
R: You don’t like applied mathematics 
M: I don’t like it; I don’t like mechanics and decision. I can do it but I don’t like it 
R: So you prefer pure mathematics 
M: Yeah, pure. And I’d say… where would imaginary numbers could that be, in 
algebra would it? 
R: Complex numbers is a realm on its own I think 
M: I like that 
R: You can have complex analysis, complex algebra; so you like imaginary numbers 
too 
M: I like just pure mathematics; and it’s not that I struggle with the applied stuff 
it’s just that it doesn’t interest me, that’s all (27:20) 
 
Paragraph 3. Mary talks about the construction of the stellated 
octahedron 
(49:20)M: I like this one 
R: Which one is it? 
M: When we had to build those shapes 
R: “To build those shapes””? 
M: You remember Andonis, the stellated tetrahedron 
R: Oh, to build the shapes, to construct them! 
M: Not them ones that were hung in there; the other one when we were in that 
                                                          
394  My emphasis. 
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horrible room, in that building 0.5 room and the teacher gave us the… 
R: the string 
M: No, we had to draw the circle with the just our hands like a compass 
R: Oh 
M: And then he gave us those instructions to build the stellated tetrahedron 
R: Yes, yes, yes that very small room at the bottom of the building there. Yeah! 
Why? Why did you like it? 
M: Because I found shapes that I never seen before395 
R: Aha! So you have discovered396 something there 
M: Yes 
R: Is that it? 
M: Yeah 
R: How did that happen? 
M: Just like magic! They were just there! (50:21) Like… me and Barbara, do you 
know when we had the pyramid at the bottom and then the shape was turning 
when you put 2 of them together it made that crazy shape like a star 
R: Yeah 
M: We did it with like… 
R: Stellated tetrahedron 
M: Yeah, that’s it! Stellated… 
R: Oct… 
M: Octahedron, yeah. We’d put the… we’d got out like little triangles because 
obviously it was triangular thingy and like placed it in time in sellotape 
                                                          
395  My emphasis. 
396  I suspect the appearance of mathematical objects. 
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R: Triangular “thingy”? “Thingy” you mean thing?397 
M: Thingy! No I meant triangular shapes 
R: Yeah, yeah, yeah 
M: Because the bottom was like 4 square based pyramids weren’t it? Yeah, so we 
got out triangular shapes and then placed them inside the thing and then stacked 
them together and then took it out… but made like a net at the same time; which 
looks like… if I can remember it looked like this [she makes a draft drawing of a two 
dimensional shape] Do you know what I mean? And that was interesting, to see 
the net when everybody else was just… so, seeing how it changed from 
that, the net that we had into the stellated octahedron there everybody 
else had…398 
R: When was the moment that you felt that you had discovered something? [silence] 
When was it, was it the final moment that you felt like something new was there or 
were you suspicious of something already or… 
M: No, it was right at the very end 
R: Right at the very end 
M: Yes 
R: And what do you thing about these shapes; they were interesting or what? 
M: Yeah they were interesting 
R: Because you never thought of them before? 
M: No! I had never seen a stellated octahedron before in my life; apart from a star 
in the sky but it’s different isn’t it? 
R: Quite! It’s not very close actually; you have to have a lot of imagination to think 
of it as a stellated shape (52:27) 
 [the interview is interrupted by Diana and Ivan] 
                                                          
397  I had never heard of this expression before and I wanted to make sure that I understood it correctly. 
398  My emphasis. 
~ 441 ~ 
 
(54:10) A: So the 3rd one399 was the new shapes, when they came out they surprised 
you 
M: Yeah! 
R: You [actually] constructed them though, yeah? 
M: Well, we didn’t have enough time because me and Barbara were making the net 
and then we were going to put it into the shape and then we had the net and then 
we would see how the thing, the stellated octahedron, and then it was “Oh! This 
makes this!” 
R: Oh so… alright! So you had the… you didn’t manage to get to the end of it but it 
was interesting because you could see where you started and you could see where 
you’d end up to 
M: Yeah! 
R: So you had the two stages of the activity simultaneously there to compare them 
M: Yeah 
R: And that made it fascinating. Is it what I am saying or is it what you are saying? 
M: That is what I said! (55:18) 
                                                          
399  The 3rd activity that stood out according to Mary. 
